106 Mass. 365 | Mass. | 1871
We are asked to set aside, the award in this case as erroneous in matter of law. No questions of law are, by the terms of the submission, which was under the statute, or by the award itself, expressly submitted to the judgment of the court; but the award states the legal principles upon which it is made, and this, it is contended, gives to either party the right to call upon 'the court to set it aside, if error in law is apparent.
When a claim is submitted by the parties to the judgment of one or more arbitrators, without restriction or condition, the judgment or award thereon is conclusive and binding, unless impeached for fraud or some mistake which caused the case to be so far misapprehended that the result stated does not express the real judgment of the arbitrators upon it. It cannot be disturbed for mere error of judgment upon any matter within the scope of the submission. To allow mistakes of this description to avoid the award would be in effect to reexamine the original controversy on its merits, and thus render all awards nugatory. In modern times, at least, courts do not thus defeat the settlement
These principles are settled by this court, and it is not necessary to review the numerous cases in which they are discussed. Mo question can arise, when the submission is unrestricted and the award general, for the decision of all questions of law must then be final; nor when the award is in the alternative, depending upon questions submitted to the court to which it is returned, for then the law must be decided by the court. The difficulty in most of the decided cases has been to ascertain the intention from the terms of the award.
This matter is discussed at some length in Fairchild v. Adams, 11 Cush. 549, 555, where the submission was under rule of court, and the referees in their award stated in full the facts found and the law by which they were governed, without expressly submit ting it to the revision of the court. See copy of award, in 14
In the opinion of the court, there is nothing in the form of the award in this case, from which it can be implied that the referee-intended to have his finding in law open to revision. He states in detail the facts found by him, and then the law found by him as applicable to them, using the same form of expression in his finding of both law and fact, stating the propositions urged by both parties, and adding that in his opinion neither of these views is correct in law. It is enough that there is no affirmative evidence in this that he did not intend to base his award upon his own judgment of the law. The fact that he str- tes the principles of his award is equally consistent with a purpo ,e to do so simply for the satisfaction of the parties, or as a gu de in making the adjustment which became necessary. Havi ig thus made an