Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA
KIMBERLY ELLEFSON, CASE NO. CV25-5583 Plaintiff, ORDER v.
PINE TREE HARBOR et al,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on pro se plaintiff Kimberly Ellefson’s motion for “Emergency Relief,” Dkt. 2. Ellefson alleges that she suffered “retaliation, obstruction and disability-based discrimination” by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) when it and other defendants denied her access to their services. . at 2. Her allegations and filings are difficult to follow. She attaches a series of emails and communications from DVR staff to her emergency motion and asserts the documents “speak for themselves,” but does not offer any explanation of the facts of her case nor specify how defendants allegedly violated her legal rights in the motion. . at 1. In her declaration, she alleges that DVR refused her services because it erroneously concluded that she refused to submit a new Individualized Plan for Employment (IPE) and that DVR required her to undergo a psychological evaluation as a condition for services by July 3 in retaliation for Ellefson asserting her legal rights and “raising procedural concerns.” Dkt. 3 at 1–2. Ellefson’s request for relief is also vague. She asks the Court to intervene and require defendants to grant her access “the educational and disability-related supports” that she asserts she “is entitled to.” Id . at 2. She does not specify which services or supports she needs, nor explain why she will suffer irreparable harm if she does not get relief by a specific time.
Her complaint offers more detail than her motion, but it too fails to clarify the chronology or facts supporting her allegations. The complaint asserts that defendants Pine Tree Harbor and Housing and Urban Development denied her housing despite her qualifying under disability accommodations and educational status protections. Dkt. 1 at 5. She alleges that the denial was based on discriminatory practices and procedural barriers that violate disability laws. . She also alleges that defendant Seamar Adult Treatment Center denied her Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) benefits and “held [her] property.” . The complaint includes handwritten notes that articulate both additional allegations and requests for relief that are at points difficult to comprehend. Dkt. 1 at 6–10. Her declaration [1] attached to her complaint sheds some light the content of grievances. Dkt. 1 at 10. In it she asserts that she requested disability accommodation in October 2024, but that “no action was taken until May 15, 2025,” and that in part because of the delay she has been homeless since December 2024. Id . She alleges further that she was denied services from multiple agencies because she “reported theft and misallocation of Substance Use Disorder (SUD) funds” within the city of Tacoma. Id . Based on these allegations, Ellefson brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131–34; the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 49 U.S.C. § 794, the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Whistle Blower Protection Act 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); “Federal Housing regulations and HUD rules and guidelines.” Id . at 3. She seeks compensatory damages for loss of housing, loss of income, and access to education and medical care, damages for emotional distress caused by “prolonged retaliation, defamation, and the denial of legally mandated accommodations.” . at 5. She also seeks an order “requiring all defendants to correct all false records related to [her] case” and issue formal written apologies, and injunctive relief “preventing further retaliation or service denials.” . at 9.
Pro se litigants are not held to the same standard as admitted or bar licensed
attorneys.
Haines v. Kerner,
Construing the filings here liberally, the Court interprets Ellefson’s “emergency
motion” to be a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking immediate injunctive
relief. The purpose of a TRO is “preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable
harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing [on the preliminary injunction
application], and no longer.”
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters &
Auto Truck Drivers
,
Ellefson has not met this standard. First, she fails to demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits of any claim against any defendants. Her claims are difficult to follow, and it is unclear from the record what actions or inactions by each defendant violated her legal rights. She also fails to establish that she will suffer irreparable harm absent Court action. The only discernable rush deadlines in the record is the request from defendant DVR’s Vocational Rehabilitation Supervisor Allesandria Goard to have Ellefson both designate a doctor to complete an updated psychological examination and for Ellefson to submit a new IPE by July 3, 2025. Dkt. 2 at 20. Ellefson does not articulate how or why she will suffer irreparable harm if the court does offer injunctive relief before this deadline. There is nothing in the record to support that the balance of equities tips in Ellefson’s favor nor that relief is in the public interest.
Although the Court empathizes with Ellefson’s loss of her son, her articulated mental health challenges, and housing insecurity, it cannot grant the emergency relief she seeks on this record. Her motion for emergency injunctive relief, Dkt. 2, is DENIED .
Dated this 3rd day of July, 2025.
A BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge
Notes
[1] This is distinct from the declaration she filed separately at Dkt. 3.