Irving ELKIN, assignee of Studio Photographers, Inc. of Pennsylvania v. The BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY of Pennsylvania, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided April 19, 1977.
372 A.2d 1203 | 247 Pa. Super. 505
Argued Dec. 8, 1976.
Jack A. Rounick, Norristown, with him Michael Brodie, Philadelphia, and Emanuel A. Bertin, Norristown, for appellee.
Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.
The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania has appealed from the order of the lower court refusing its motion for summary judgment.1 Bell contends that there are no rеmaining issues of fact which the lower court has jurisdiction to decide. For the reasons developed below, we reverse.
A brief exposition of the facts is necessary for a full understanding of the issues and arguments on this appeal. Appеllee‘s assignor, Studio Photographers, Inc. of Pennsylvania, instituted this action on December 7, 1971, by filing a
Bell filed preliminary objections to the complaint challenging the court‘s jurisdiсtion and moving for a more specific complaint. The lower court entered the following order:
“AND NOW, this 12th day of June, 1972, after argument before the court en banc and consideration of briefs filed, proceedings in this matter are stayed until therе is a determination of standards for the services involved by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in accordance with Section 412 of the Public Utility Law (
66 P.S. 1182 ).”2
Following the entry of the P.U.C. order Studio filed a motion to list the case for trial. On October 21, 1975, Bell filed its motion for summary judgment based on the lower court‘s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Studio‘s complaint. Bell‘s motion was refused, and this appeal followed.
The lower court concluded that since the P.U.C. has no jurisdiction to consider and determine questions of negligence on the part of a public utility, its order of August 20, 1974, could not be binding on Studio. Appellee maintains thаt the lower court was correct and that our recent decision in Behrend v. Bell Telephone Company, 242 Pa.Super. 47, 363 A.2d 1152 (1976) is dispositive of the instant appeal. We, however, must disagree.
In Behrend v. Bell Telephone Company, supra, a telephone company customer sought damages for the omission of his name from both the white аnd yellow pages of Bell‘s directories and the directory assistance operators’ lists, and for the disruption of his telephone service. Bell argued that the lower court erred in permitting a jury to rule on questions within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the P.U.C. However, Bell never contended that no duty existed on its part to correctly list subscribers’ names in its directories or
“The courts retain jurisdiction of a suit for damages based on negligence or breach of contract wherein a utility‘s performanсe of its legally imposed and contractually adopted obligations are examined and applied to a given set of facts.” Behrend v. Bell Telephone Company, supra 242 Pa.Super. at 59, 363 A.2d at 1158 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
We rejected Bell‘s claims that there were factual matters requiring reference to the P.U.C., holding that thе determination of the reasonableness or adequacy of Bell‘s methods of providing service was not before us.
Here, however, appellee‘s complaint concerns the adequacy of the services provided Studio by Bеll. Section 401 of the Public Utility Law, Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1053, § 401,
“By its very nature, the statutory standard is not capable of definition with mathematical precision. The duty is upon the commission . . . to determine on the basis of the facts and circumstances indicated by the substantial evidence whether the service provided is reasonablе and adequate for the public.” Id. 188 Pa.Super. at 169-70, 146 A.2d at 661 62.
In the instant case, it was for the P.U.C. initially tо determine whether the service provided Studio by Bell fell short of the statutory standard required of it. While seeking compensatory and punitive damages in the trespass action, Studio based its claims for relief on Bell‘s alleged failure to render аdequate telephone and directory assistance services. Successful prosecution of this action was thus dependent on findings by the P.U.C. adverse to Bell. Only then could the lower court proceed to determine the questions of liability аnd damages which we held in Behrend v. Bell Telephone Company, 242 Pa.Super. 47, 363 A.2d 1152 (1976) to be within its jurisdiction.
The P.U.C., however, found that the service difficulties alleged by Studio did not constitute a breach of Bell‘s statutory duty to provide reasonably adequate and continuous service. Because Studio failed to appeаl from the P.U.C. order of August 20, 1974, that order is conclusive as to the facts adjudicated by the P.U.C.4 We therefore agree with
Order reversed and judgment entered for appellant.
SPAETH, J., files a concurring opinion.
SPAETH, Judge, concurring:
The difference between Behrend and this case is that in Behrend the telephonе company did not plead the Commission‘s primary jurisdiction, but in this case it did. Primary jurisdiction having been pleaded, the lower court properly remitted the matter to the Commission, for at least counts two, three, and four of the complaint concern the adequacy of the service provided by the telephone company, which is a matter within the Commission‘s jurisdiction. Where I differ with the majority‘s opinion is in its statement, or at least implication, that the first count of the complaint also concerned matters within the Commission‘s jurisdiction. I do not think it did; at least I am not sure.
The first count of the complaint alleged, inter alia, that correctly dialed numbers resulted in connections with wrong numbers, and that even when correct connections were made, conversations could not be carriеd on because of low volume or static, or because of disconnections. Complaint, paragraphs 7-10. These incidents occurred, it is further alleged, because of the telephone company‘s negligent and wilful “fail[ure] to maintаin its equipment in proper and adequate repair and in failing to use reasonable care in the operation and maintenance of the WATS line telephone service and its telephone system, thereby failing to provide reasonable, rapid and efficient service.” Complaint, paragraph 12. These allegations are at least arguably within the following passage from Behrend:
The question of utility policy as it affects the public is not now before this court, nor is the detеrmination of the
reasonableness or adequacy of Bell‘s methods of providing service. This is an action for damages and the fact that the regulation of utility service is exclusively in the PUC‘s jurisdiction does not remove from the court‘s jurisdiction an аction for damages based on a failure of service, any more than the PUC‘s power to promulgate safety regulations prohibits the courts from hearing a claim for personal injuries resulting from unsafe utility equipment. 242 Pa.Super. at 58, 363 A.2d at 1158 (citations omitted).
I think the majority‘s treatment of the first count may be correct, if it means to say that when a plaintiff pleads a utility‘s negligent failure to maintain adequate service, the proper procedure is: first, referral to the appropriate agency to decide the stаndards of “adequate service“; second, if the agency finds the utility‘s service to have been inadequate, referral back to the court for decision on the issues of negligence and damages. See Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19.01 (1958 & Supps. 1970, 1976); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 302-06, 93 S.Ct. 573, 34 L.Ed.2d 525 (1973); United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 10 L.Ed.2d 915 (1963); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952). However, I cannot tell if this is the majority‘s rule. Without clarification, the majority‘s decision in this case, when read with Behrend, will, I fear, confuse the members of the trial bench and bar when they are next confronted with a similar case.
I nevertheless concur in the result reached by the majority because of Studio‘s failure to appeal from the Commission‘s order. Whether or not the first count of the complaint was properly before the Commission, Studio treated it as though it were. If Studio disagreed with the Commission‘s disposition, it was obliged to challenge the Commission‘s order, not collaterally before this court, but by direct appeal.