202 Ky. 607 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1924
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
In this action by the Elkhorn Coal Company against J. F. Justice the plaintiff asked to be adjudged the owner of certain timber on two tracts of land in Letcher county, and sought an injunction against defendant restraining him from cutting and removing the timber. On final hearing plaintiff was denied the relief prayed for, and the defendant was adjudged to be the owner of the. timber in question. Plaintiff appeals.
The facts are these: Sarah Potter was the owner of a tract of land in Letcher county. In the year 1913 she conveyed the land to her son, J. M. Potter, and her daughter, Rebecca Adington, retaining a life interest in the property. The deed contained the following provision:
‘ £It is the intention of the said Sarah Potter that the land hereby conveyed shall be divided between the grantees, J. M. Potter and Rebecca Adington, equally in acreage, and the said Rebecca Adington is to have her one-half laid off when divided so as to include the old residence. ’ ’
Rebecca Adington and her husband, J. H. Adington, took possession of the old home place, and that part of the farm which the deed provided should be allotted to Rebecca Adington. Thereafter, J. M. Potter erected improvements of considerable value on the other portions. In the years 1915 and 1916 Sarah Potter and Rebecca Adington and her husband sold all the timber of certain dimensions on certain described portions of the land to J. F. Justice. J. H. Adington says that prior to that time he, with the knowledge and consent of J. M. Potter, had
The principal ground on which a reversal is asked is that the deed to Justice was ineffective. The basis of this contention is that a tenant in common cannot convey less than his entire interest in the property to a stranger without his co-tenant’s consent. The rule may be conceded (Nevels v. Ky. Lumber Co., 108 Ky. 550, 56 S. W. 969; Winchester v. Watson, 169 Ky. 213, 183 S. W. 483), but it is not available here, as all the facts and circumstances, as well as the direct evidence bearing on the question, tend to show that the sales were made to Justice with the knowledge and consent of J. M. Potter, the co-tenant, and that being true, the contention that the deed passed no title cannot be sustained.
A more serious question arises as to the extent of the title which Justice acquired by the deeds. Ordinarily, of course, a co-tenant’s deed is effective only as to his interest, and such would be the case here were it not for ■the peculiar features .of the transaction. The original deed from Sarah Potter not only provided that when the land was divided Mrs. Adington and J. M. Potter should have an equal number of acres, but further provided that Mrs. Adington’s portion should be laid off so as to include the old residence. Though no formal partition was made, the parties took possession of their respective parts. Instead of conveying a half interest in all the timber on the
Judgment affirmed.