95 N.J.L. 18 | N.J. | 1920
The opinion of the court was delivered by
There are writs on behalf of the gas companies in this case, and in other cases where different municipalities are concerned, and there are writs on behalf of some of the municipalities. The cases were all argued together, and in the view I take can be considered together. The gas light companies complain because the public utility commissioners did not allow them as large an increase in tire rate for gas as they think just. The municipalities complain because they think the amount allowed too high. All that I need consider are the objections raised by the gas light companies. The
I think it entirely clear that the failure to allow for prices at the time to which the rates apply, July 1st, 1919, was an error. It is not denied that prices were very much, higher in 1919 and. are very much higher now than the average for the years 1911 to 1916. So notorious is this that the Supreme Court of the United States has referred to it in an opinion as a matter of common knowledge. Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256 (at p. 268). In that case; on its own responsibility, the court suggested that in its opinion the decree ought to be modified to permit the complainant to make another application to the courts, for relief. It would be manifestly unjust to apply to a g'as company a standard of value different from that applied to others.. To what extent the increase in prices may be due to an inflation of the currency, or to any particular cause, we do not know. What we do know is that the dollar of 1919 and the dollar of 1930 is worth less than the dollar of 1916, and still less, compared with the dollar of the average year from 1911 to 1916. If it were proposed to value the property of the, gas company in one hundred cent dollars and allow them a return only on that while other values were on the basis, of fifty cent dollars and just double in number, everyone would see the injustice;
I am inclined. to think that the amount allowed by the public utility commission for the value of the plant as a going concern may suffice, but I do not -find that there was any evidence' in the case to justify the figure, and, under section 38 as amended (Pamph. L. 1918, p. 304), the order may be set aside where it clearly appears that there was no evidence before the board to support, reasonably, the same. This makes it necessary that there should be evidence to justify the finding, and that I do not filnd. It is-, of course, a very difficult matter to determine-the value as a. going concern of a business property, and I see nothing to require me to decide now
The companies also claim that they should be allowed for overhead expenses $19,000 for securing the land and getting it together. I think they should be allowed the expenses to which they can, prove they .have been put for this service provided they ai’e not unreasonable. I am not now prepared to say that the amount should be fixed at $19,000.
The companies were allowed an increase in rates which I think inadequate. If, however, T set aside the order the old rates would be restored and this would work the very injustice that these proceedings are intended to correct. I see no reason, however, why I may not render a judgment sustaining the present order as far as it goes and remanding the case to the commission for rehearing to determine how much additional should be allowed. That will be the judgment. The prosecutors are entitled to costs.