Elizabeth YY. v. Albany County Department of Social ServicesElizabeth YY. v. Albany County Department of Social Services
Appeal from that part of an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Tobin, J.), entered December 22, 1994, which dismissed рetitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, for custody of her niece.
In November 1991, the Department filed a petition against the mother claiming that she had abandoned the infant and two other children, Kamel and Javar. The Department was given care and custody of Kamel and Javar who were then placed in separate foster hоmes. In October 1992 the infant was transferred to a second foster home joining her brother Kamel. The infant and Kаmel remained together in this foster home. The Department also filed a petition against the father, who apparently was not the biological father of either Kamel or Javar, charging that he had abаndoned the infant.
Following a fact-finding hearing on the two abandonment petitions filed by the Department, the mother and father were found to have abandoned their respective children. A dispositional hearing was later held at which time petitioner’s custody petition was also considered.
Following the dispositionаl hearing, Family Court terminated the mother’s and father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment, ordered that the children be placed in the custody of the Department and freed the children for adoption. The court also denied petitioner’s custody petition. Petitioner appeals from so much of the оrder as denied her custody.
Petitioner argues that Family Court’s order should be reversed because (1) the cоurt applied an improper standard of review in denying her custody, (2) the evidence did not support Family Court’s custody decision, (3) the court improperly held that the infant should be adopted by her foster family, and (4) the Dеpartment violated the provisions of Family Court Act § 1017 (1) (a), which require it to uncover her as a person related to the infant with whom the infant may appropriately reside. We disagree and affirm the order of Family Court.
Considering the issues raised seriatim, we conclude that Family Court applied the proper standard оf review in determining placement of the infant. After a finding of
Petitioner’s assertion that Matter of Michael B. (
Petitioner’s argument that a preponderance of the evidence did not support Family Court’s "best interest of the child” custody decision lacks merit. Petitioner’s status as the infant’s aunt does not give her any superior rights or precedence for custody of the infant (see, Matter of D. Children,
Petitioner’s claim that Family Court erroneously held that the infant should be adopted by her foster family is without merit, as it is based оn petitioner’s misreading of the court’s decision. Family Court appropriately freed the Departmеnt to make the infant available for adoption "including adoption by her foster parents” (see, Social Services Law § 384-b [3] [a]; Matter of Michael B.,
Finally, petitiоner was not harmed by the Department’s alleged violation of Family Court Act § 1017 as she had been aware оf the infant’s plight and the fact that the infant had been in foster care, but did nothing before her current petition activity to inform the Department that she was interested in obtaining custody. It cannot be said that petitioner hаs a valid
Mercure, Crew III, Casey and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.