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Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knoll
61 F.3d 170
3rd Cir.
1995
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*1 trial. Costs for a new court the district play fair notions of traditional offends against Kirk. taxed pay for make a defendant process to due Owens-Corning asks that delay. another’s delay damages be recalculated award of

the it is unconstitu- further maintains it for delay damages on this impose

tional acting in was never period because it time HEALTH ELIZABETH BLACKWELL by delay caused was the faith and bad WOMEN; Phil- Greater CENTER FOR rule law adopt the of we to court. Were Fund; adelphia Medical Women’s Owens-Corning, we would by articulated CHOICE, themselves on behalf of 238(b)(2) “dur- to state Rule to redraft have Medicaid-eligible of women not cause did ing which defendant Pennsylvania of Commonwealth trial,” “during of delay of the instead financial, health provide whom delay trial.” We plaintiff caused services, Appellees, counseling care and find that inclined and we not so delay trial. no plaintiff caused KNOLL, Treasurer of Baker Catherine argues Owens-Corning also Pennsylvania, in her Commonwealth rule, language of the notwithstanding the Snider, capacity; Karen F. Sec- official delay caused pay it to requiring retary the Com- of Public Welfare process. Ow

judiciary a violation of due Pennsylvania, in her offi- monwealth theory comprehend the ens-Corning fails to Knowlton, Deputy Sherry capacity; cial merely Delay damages underlying Rule 238. of Medical Assis- of the Office money that he or plaintiff for compensate a Pennsyl- of the Commonwealth tance if he or on the award have earned she would capacity; P. vania, Robert her official it. Costa promptly received she had Casey, of the Commonwealth Governor Hotel, Pa. Lauderdale Beach capacity, Pennsylvania, in his official rule also A.2d their successors. being prevent defendant functions to Snider, by keeping Knoll, interest unjustly F. enriched Karen Baker Catherine process during litigation Sherry Robert P. could be earned Knowlton and money. essentially plaintiffs Casey, Appellants. on what to Owens-Corn n. We find no merit Id. 6. No. 94-1954. damages delay violate ing’s argument Appeals, Accordingly, States Court process in this instance. United due Circuit. court’s deci Third in the district we find no error delay damages plaintiff. sion to award 13, 1995. Argued Jan. July 1995. Decided

VI. Conclusion Nygaard’s Dissent Amended Judge jurors two who were 1995. Aug. The refusal remove an abuse of discre- challenged for cause was Aug. Rehearing In Denied Banc required tion. Because defendant in order peremptory of its strikes waste two remedy error, per se reversal prior Allowing evidence

required. into unrelated

testimony of witness error, permitting as was trial was

court to an of an answer into evidence

introduction Ac- co-defendant.

interrogatory a settled judgment

cordingly, we will reverse matter and remand the district court *2 Treasurer, Secretary of the

the State Welfare, Department of Public Pennsylvania Assis- Secretary Medical Deputy and the Commonwealth”) ap- (collectively, “the tance *3 court the district order of from the peal summary for motion Providers’ granting the its hold- based court judgment. The district Pennsyl- claim Providers’ ing on the Hyde by the preempted is statute vania Amendment. Atty. (argued), Office of W. Stoner Sandra Secretary of Health that We conclude PA, Pa., for Harrisburg, appellants of Gen. re- is owed deference Services and Human Snider, Knoll, F. Karen Baker Catherine interpretation garding her Knowlton, Casey. P. Sherry Robert the Secre- Because mandates. Dechert, (argued), McLaughlin Mary A. reporting require- tary has determined PA, appel- Rhoads, Philadelphia, for Price & under the Medicaid permissible are ments for Health Center Elizabeth Blackwell lees Amendment, Act, by the as modified Med- Women, Philadelphia Women’s Greater provision, and they contain a waiver only if CHOICE, themselves Fund, behalf of ical Act Control Pennsylvania Abortion since of Medicaid-eligible women of Com. and § provision, we find no such contains 3215© financial, health they provide Pa. to whom directly in con- Pennsylvania statute counseling services. and care thus, law, invalid and flict with federal Gen., Hunter, Atty. Mi- Secretary’s Asst. Frank W. that it conflicts extent Biddle, Stiles, Atty., Furthermore, Barbara C. U.S. chael R. because interpretation. Staff, Mollin, Civ. Attys., Appellate requirement Alfred certification second-physician DC, as amicus Div., 3215(c) for U.S. Washington, contrary to a federal § to pursuant curiae. extent also invalid regulation, it is regulation. scope of that beyond goes COWEN, and NYGAARD Before: ALITO, Judges. Circuit I. COURT OF THE

OPINION Title of So- XIX action concerns This Act, commonly as the Security known cial COWEN, Judge. Circuit §§ 1396-1396u program, U.S.C. Medicaid for Health Center The Elizabeth Blackwell 1993). (1988 purpose of the Supp. V & health Women, reproductive comprehensive a help provide medical program is to Medicaid first-trimester facility provides care people. Under treatment low-income abortions, Women’s Medical the Greater financial receives federal program, fi- provides Fund, agency that non-profit a administering Med- return assistance women low-income nancial assistance develops within the state program that icaid CHOICE, abortions, and to obtain order law and federal established parameters provides informa- hot-line which telephone (1994). § 430.0 regulations. 42 C.F.R. many its callers on tion and referrals program a Medicaid Establishment planning abor- issues, including family and While of each state. “Providers”), voluntary part on the (collectively, ask tion participate obligated to are not enjoin en- states invalid and to declare Court chooses 3215(c) program, each state that of Medicaid and of sections forcement 3215© develop own state its Act, required 18 do so Pennsylvania Control Abortion (1983 approved by Secre- must plan which & §§ 3201-3220 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. funds, a receive federal tary. In order to reporting and Pennsylvania’s Supp.1994), conform, on its face both plan must pub- state’s requirements for physician certification require- various federal applied, the Medicaid licly-funded abortions 1396c; 1396a, see Har- 42 ments. Pennsylvania, The Governor program. McRae, ris v. addition, 100 S.Ct. regulations federal require (1980); New Jer that each covered service be “sufficient in sey Department amount, duration, Health and Human scope reasonably Services, Cir.), achieve purpose,” cert. 440.230(b) C.F.R. denied, (1994), mandate “may states arbitrarily L.Ed.2d 60 deny or amount, reduce the dura- tion, scope required ... service to an XIX, Under Title categories certain eligible otherwise recipient solely because medical care mandatory, are and must be diagnosis, type illness, or condition.” provided by every state plan, while 42 440.230(c). C.F.R. categories other of care optional, *4 If, hearing, after a finds that each state has the discretion to cover the approved an plan longer no complies 1396a(a)(10). § service. See 42 U.S.C. By with the provisions Act, of the Medicaid law, required states are to fund medically that the state had comply failed to substan- necessary physician services. 42 U.S.C. tially any applicable with require- federal 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a). §§ Participating ment, the Secretary may notify the state that states must eligibility requirements establish federal financial participation will be with- that are “consistent with objectives” held or limited. 42 § U.S.C. 1396c. 1396a(a)(17). Title 42 § XIX. U.S.C. “Title 1976, In Congress passed what is broadly XIX’s common- primary stated objective [is] to ly called Hyde Amendment, pro- State, each enable as far practicable, as hibits federal reimbursement for abortions furnish medical assistance to individuals except in the narrow circumstances that Con- whose ineome and resources are insufficient gress deems to medically be necessary. to meet the costs of necessary medical ser- 1976, Congress Since has added the Hyde Doe, vices.” Beal v. 432 U.S. 97 Amendment to appropriations annual bills for (1977) (cit- S.Ct. Department the U.S. of Health and Human ing 1396,1396a(a)(10)). 42 §§ U.S.C. “A fur- (“HHS”). Services provisions While its have objective ther policies is that governing eligi- varied to degree some year from year, bility be in the ‘best recipi- interests’ of the Hyde effect of the Amendment been to ent.” Hodgson County v. Board Commis- withdraw federal funding under Medicaid for sioners, County 601, Hennepin, 614 F.2d most abortions.1 (8th Cir.1980) 607 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19); 206.10(a)(ll)). 45 § C.F.R. Hyde The Amendment for year fiscal 1994 The state provide must alsо safeguards permitted, for the 1981, first time since ex- assure that its plan penditure Medicaid will be of federal funds for adminis- abortions when tered “in pregnancy “the manner the result simplicity consistent act of rape or incest” 1396a(a)(19). administration.” 42 as well as “necessary § when to save hand, On life of the other the mother.” 103-112, Pub.L. No. “provide state must 509, 1082, (1993). 107 Stat. procedures methods The full relating to the version of Hyde of, pro- utilization payment for, and the Amendment care and vides: services available under plan ... necessary safeguard against None of the funds appropriated under this unnecessary utilization.” 42 U.S.C. Act expended shall be abortion § 1396a(a)(30)(A). except when it is made known to the Fed- original Amendment, 1. Hyde The nancy enacted in were carried to term when so determined 1976, limited federal funding to abortions where physicians.” two Pub.L. No. "the life of the mother endangered would be (1977). 91 Stat. 1460 year through From that the fetus were carried to term.” Pub.L. No. 94- Hyde provided for reim- (1976). 90 Stat. bursement for pregnancy abortions when a re- Hyde expanded following Amendment for the year fiscal rape sulted rape from or incest. The and incest funding to include abortions for provision was eliminated from the Amend- victims of and incest as well as "instances ment from appropriations 1982 until the bill for where long-lasting severe physical health year fiscal damage to the mother would preg- result if the notify [state letter is purpose are which funds entity official to eral pro- a recent Con- this Act that such about directors] under appropriated life of the necessary to save the “Hyde cedure to the enacted revision gressionally result pregnancy is the mother or the Medicaid affects Amendment” which rape or incest. act of of an revision you how this and to tell program Id.2 implemented. law is to be previously held that

This Court has statute, by the as modified the Medicaid mandatory medical all ser- Amendment, participating As with other requires funding for which fed those is avail- to fund abortions Federаl states vices for which Roe v. Ca is available. eral reimbursement able, required to cover abor- States Cir.1980). sey, 623 F.2d By necessary. medically that are tions Preterm, 605; Inc. Hodgson, 614 also F.2d definition, necessary to that are abortions (1st Cir.), Dukakis, cert. medically mother are the life of the save denied, addition, year Congress this necessary. are bound We L.Ed.2d resulting pregnancies abortions added Accordingly, Medic here. precedent category rape and incest *5 aid, rape abortions is funding for incest and medically necessary abortions for which mandatory states. participating for lan- Based on the funding provided. reported Hyde Amendment was The 1994 and year’s Hyde Amendment guage of this requiring provision a of committee with out history Congressional the of debate on rape for and seeking reimbursement women rape of of victims about the circumstances crimes to the to the report abortions incest incest, change in that this we believe officials. appropriate law enforcement signifies Hyde Amendment the text 1993) (daily Cong.Rec. H4304 ed. June of Congressional that abortions intent (§ 207). However, point of order was a rape or resulting from incest pregnancies language Hyde Amendment raised medically necessary light in of both procedure of the parliamentary violated psychological health factors. prohibits medical and Representatives, which of House “legislate” appropriations Therefore, resulting rape on an from attempts to abortions conceded and point The was order bill. to fall with- considered or incest should be from the stricken bill. entire amendment the medically that are scope in of services Cong.Rec. H4307-08. necessary. delegated her Secretary of has The HHS rape incest be The should definition the Medic- authority to oversee and enforce with each in accordance State’s determined Financing Care program to the Health aid may impose reasonable own law. States (“HCFA”). 35,- Fed.Reg. Administration reporting or documentation (1984). 35,249 promulgated has HCFA may be recipients or nec- providers, provides: regulation that a that an essary to assure themselves abor- expendi- funding] available [Federal terminating a purpose tion was for physician an when tures for abortion rape act pregnancy caused found, writing to the Med- and certified impose reporting may not incest. States pro- the basis of his agency, icaid that on deny requirements that or documentation life of the mother judgment, the fessional coverage abortions endangered impede if the fetus were where would be for carried term. rape or pregnancies incest. result from do reporting requirements (1994). To insure that § 441.203 C.F.R. impede coverage covered prevent or addition, for HCFA In on December abortions, requirement reporting directors, Medicaid issued a directive procedure consid- must be waived and explaining: 108 Stat. is identical in lan- 2. Amendment guage No. to the 1994 Pub.L. version. ered be treating reimbursable by rape caused or incest unless the state physician (1) his or pro- agency: her obtains a statement from certifies opinion, patient unable, physician performing the abortion that fessional physical or woman psychological reasons, was a victim rape or incest that she

comply personally requirement. reported the crime to the

appropriate law enforcement together (2) name of offender; obtains By March all physician from the States must ensure signed woman’s state- their ment effect; State Plans do not lan- contain verifies the reporting guage precludes [federal crime with funding] appropriate agency. law-enforcement abortions performed that are Pa.Cons.Stat. save the § 3215(3) Ann. (Supp.1994).4 Pennsylva- life of the mother or to pregnan- terminate nia Abortion Control Act does not resulting cies contain or incest. provision. waiver Letter, from Sally Richardson, K. Directоr, addition, in eases where carrying the Bureau, to All State Medicaid Di- fetus to term would endanger the life of the (Dec. 1993) rectors (emphasis added), mother, Pennsylvania Act provides that App. at 92-93.3 no state or federal funds can expended However, the Pennsylvania Abortion unless danger is certified by physician Act, Control no federal or state funds can be who is not physician perform who will provided for the pregnancies termination abortion and who has no financial interest position HCFA reaffirmed its regarding the non-notarized, obtained a signed statement another letter to state Med- pregnant from the stating woman that she Directors, *6 icaid which stated: incest, rape was a victim of or as the case HCFA will not establish be, a timeframe may within reported crime, and she the rape which cases of or reported incest must be including offender, the identity of the if to a law agency. enforcement or other State known, to a law agency enforcement having policy law or should dictate when and to requisite or, jurisdiction the in the case of rape whom a reported. or a case of incest must be pregnant incest where a victim, is the minor However, my noted in December county to the protective child agency service letter, the reporting require- State-established stating and the name of the law enforcement ments requirement not serve as an coverage additional agency protective or child agency service to deny to impede payment or for report which the was made and the date pregnancies abortions where rape result or from made; report was (sic). incent (2) physician receives from the facility or The State procedures must establish per- seeking payment, signed the statement of the mit requirements waived, the reporting to be and pregnant woman para- which is described in reimbursed, procedure the physi- the treating graph The statement shall bear the no- that, ciаn opinion, professional in his or her certifies any tice that false statements made therein unable, patient the physical or for punishable by are law and shall state that reasons, psychological comply to with the re- pregnant the woman aware that false re- porting requirements. ports to law enforcement authorities are Letter, Richardson, Sally Director, from K. Med- punishable law; by and Bureau, icaid to All State Medicaid Directors (3) verifies with the law agency enforcement (Mar. 25, 1994) (emphasis added), App. at 116— protective or child agency service named in 17. the pregnant statement of the woman wheth- 4. 3215(j) Section Pennsylvania report Abortion rape er a of or incest was filed with provides: Control Act agency in accordance with the statement. No agency Commonwealth any shall report make Commonwealth any shall payment statements, from Federal or State appropri- funds evidence of false reports of false to by ated perfor- Commonwealth for the law enforcement authorities or fraud in the any pursuant mance of procurement abortion attempted procurement subsection or (c)(2) or payment unless the Commonwealth from appropri- Federal State funds first: by ated pursuant the Commonwealth to this (1)receives physician from the facility section attorney appropriate district seeking payment signed by and, statement jurisdiction appropriate, where to the At- physician performing stating torney abortion General. that, prior abortion, performing he 3215(j). Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. pre- invalid, under familiar nía statute Pa.Cons.Stat.Aim. procedure. principles. emption 3215(c) (Supp.1994).5 Id. at challenge commenced

The Providers 3215(c) Penn- 3215(j) of the to sections for support found court also The district Act, their own Control Abortion sylvania kinds that “the same holding in the fact Medicaid-eligible behalf and on behalf requirements set and certification reporting Medicaid-eligible victims incеst ap- had Pennsylvania statute in the forth who endangered but whose lives Hyde women versions in earlier peared certification. second-physician obtain cannot cur- in the They removed were Amendment. court district argued oppo- The Providers version, abortion and efforts rent cer- reporting and rejected the Commonwealth’s Con- were them to include nents omitted). (citation are inconsistent The dis- tification Id. at gress.” Amendment, therefore invalid thus concluded trict court elim- congressional the United intent history Supremacy Clause of indicates at 5. Id. requirements. reporting inate the Constitution.6 States held that Further, also district court granted the Providers’ court The district advanced interests crime-fighting and other judgment on the Su- summary motion justify chal- by the Commonwealth Blackwell Elizabeth premacy Clause claim. inconsistent provisions were lenged Knoll, No. 94- Women Center Health were Act and of the Medicaid purposes (E.D.Pa. 1994 WL slip op. at at 4. impermissible. Id. therefore 1994). Relying on decision our Sept. enjoined the Common- court The district (3d Cir.1980), the Casey, Roe v. 3215(c) and enforcing sections wealth that Penn- acknowledged first court district Control Pennsylvania Abortion 3215(j) for which all abortions must cover sylvania Court This appeal followed. Act. This under the provided reimbursement federal stay motion granted the Commonwealth’s then rea- The court Hyde Amendment. ap- pending court of the district the order soned: expedite request peal, and Providers’ restricts requested whereas *7 appeal. this We incest, rape or of funding to cases of the the issue abortion as amicus HHS to address pregnancy require reporting can continuation a state or where extent to which mother, the second-physician the certification endanger the life of the would in imposes additional Act the Pennsylvania statute Medicaid an abor- be entitled to addi- for a woman to these order To the extent of limitations. therefore, Pennsylva- tion. limitations, the tional requisite jurisdiction and having agency the 3215(c) Pennsylvania Abortion

5. Section reported by personally the victim. part: pertinent been provides, in has Act Control (3)When performed the case in abortion no Federal funds and Commonwealth No which, prior by incest by appropriated pregnancy the Common- caused which are funds abortion, expended by State or local has been performance of the be shall to the wealth government performance of by for the a law reported the victim personally abortion, except: jur- having requisite enforcement isdiction, necessary to avert the minor, When abortion or, to the case of a certification mother death agency and protective service county child per- physician will such physician. When has party act the incestuous other pecuniary or or has abortion form report. named been the abortion there proprietary interest 3215(c). 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. physi- separate from a certification be a shall has no such interest. who cian (2) second-phy- challenged the providers also 6. The performed case When abortion provision of Title as violative sician certification which, prior by rape pregnancy caused Four- Clause of the Due Process XIX and abortion, has been performance of the did district court The teenth Amendment identity of together reported, with claims. these additional address known, offender, to a enforcement law II. REQUIREMENTS REPORTING The Commonwealth maintains that on its

FOR RAPE face, OR INCEST the 1994 Amendment is a simple prohibition on the use of money federal HHS, Secretary The who administers specified certain purposes. It sets neither program, the Medicaid interpreted requirements prohibitions nor states; on the Medicaid statute as modified the 1994 says it nothing explicit about reporting or Hyde Amendment, provide that, absent a procedures. certification The Common- provision, waiver reporting requirements for wealth concludes the principles articulat- rape or incest unduly impede abortions Pennhurst, ed in applied when case, to this deter a woman’s right exercise of her require that the district holding court’s medically necessary procedure. Letter, reversed because it cannot reasonably be (Dee. 28, 1993), (Mar. 93; App. Letter, at said Congress has “unambiguously” for- 1994), App. at 117. The does not bidden reporting and require- certification regard reporting requirements per as se in- ments such as those contained the Penn- valid. Id. If judgment is a reasonable ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‍sylvania law. exercise of Secretary’s discretion, it is The entitled to Commonwealth’s due deference. reliance on Our inquiry is Penn- misplaced. hurst is upon therefore focused Pennhurst whether involved Secre- obligations tary’s interpretation states under the warrants our federal deference. Devel- opmentally Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 (“DDA- §§ A. BRA”). In reversing our holding that The disputes Commonwealth both the Sec- “bill rights” provision of the DDABRA retary’s and the district interpreta- court’s created rights enforceable and obligations, tions of the Hyde Amendment mandates re- the Supreme Court found no evidence that garding reporting requirements. The Com- Congress intended grant to condition the monwealth maintains that federal funds on the states’ “assum[ing] the are valid and upheld should be in their en- high cost of providing ‘appropriate treatment’ tirety. in the ‘least restrictive environment’ to their mentally retarded citizens.” Commonwealth acknowledges U.S. that un 101 S.Ct. at 1540. der The Court program, the Medicaid reasoned that states are free to Congress because speak failed participate fit, clearly or not re- see but if a garding the obligations, state’s state does could participate, elect to it must comply “fairly say that the State could conditions make an has set. informed choice” Commonwealth, participation about however, citing Penn joint program. Id. at hurst State S.Ct. at School and Hospital v. Holder man, Here, the byAct its terms re- *8 (1981), L.Ed.2d 694 argues that in setting quires stаte plans Medicaid to cover all medi- conditions, those “Congress speak [must] cally necessary services that fall -within the awith clear voice.” It pro contends that a mandatory areas of care. See 42 U.S.C. gram like Medicaid: 1396a(a)(10)(A). § Moreover, nearly fifteen is much in the nature aof contract: years in ago, we made clear in Casey, Roe v. funds, return for federal agree the States that participating states pro- Medicaid to comply federally imposed gram condi- provide must the abortion services that can, tions .... course, There be no are enumerated in Hyde the Amendment. knowing acceptance if a is State unaware at F.2d 836-37. Hyde The 1994 Amend- of the conditions or is unable to plainly puts ascertain ment participating states on no- what expected of it. Accordingly, if tice of obligations their to fund abortions impose intends to a condition on where necessary to save woman’s life or grant the of federal it moneys, must do so pregnancy where the the result of or

unambiguously. [Pennhurst, 451 at incest. Accordingly, the Commonwealth was (citation 101 S.Ct. at 1540 and given that, footnote clear notice if it elected to contin- omitted).] participate ue to program, the Medicaid it (citing 20at plans. Amicus Brief their state funding for such obligated provide to 590-93, Hogan, 457 U.S. Furthermore, any participating Schweiker abortions. 73 L.Ed.2d re- reporting realized that have state should (a option provide to the has defeat as to so onerous could be quirements needy); medically funding partial benefits be that Medicaid Congress’ intent Heckler, Ass’n, Inc. v. Hospital Mississippi categories of abortions the provided for Cir.1983) (5th (Congress 511, 515 the defen- claims of the Unlike question. experiment with to be free to intended states Pennhurst, can- the Commonwealth dants payment standards methods and unaware reasonably that was claim Secretary’s reg- plans)). The Act, as their Medicaid the Medicaid obligations under long recognized states ulations have and its Hyde by the Amendment modified cover- impose to reasonable such, have discretion the Sec- regulations. As implementing objectives of limits, with the age consistent Hyde the interpreting retary is reasonable duration, amount, scope and Act, on the require- reporting prohibit Amendment en- services, respect particularly with coverage operate as additional ments 42 C.F.R. suring “utilization control.” women deny impede some requirements (d). Indeed, Secretary ac- 440.230(b), § ser- receiving abortion the mandated from re- are not knowledges that while states vices. requirements, reporting adopt quired to maintains further The Commonwealth requirements can reporting properly tailored Title authorize provisions of XIX other Act and purposes of the Medicaid serve Participating states challenged provisions. Amendment. adopt standards required to “reasonable However, eligibility re- reconciling these for and determining eligibility ... for statute quirements of the Medicaid 42 U.S.C. assistance.” of medical extent Hyde Amend- history of the language and 1396a(a)(17). required States are likewise ment, purposes the other and with may be neces- safeguards as adopt “such Secretary maintains program, eligibility for care and sary to assure reporting requirements determined, that state-established plan be will services under coverage an additional “may not serve provided, be care and services will and such deny payment impede requirement simplicity of consistent with in a manner pregnancies result abortions where the best interests administration (Mar. 25, 1994), Letter, rape or 1396a(a)(19). ince[s]t.” Addi- recipients.” thus con- App. such methods tionally, “provide must states require- reporting cluded that reasonable of, utilization relating to procedures they only if contain waiver ments are valid for, avail- care and services payment provision. necessary ... as plan able under the unnecessary utilization.” against safeguard Moreover, B. 1396a(a)(30)(A). 42 U.S.C. re- current version of that the dis аrgue Providers to the Secre- “make known” quires states to Supremacy correctly held that trict court funding is tary that abortion Pennsyl requires the invalidation Clause of the mother in which the life sought is one second-physician certi reporting vania’s re- pregnancy endangered or where the directly because fication *9 rape incest. The Common- or sulted Supremacy law. The federal conflict with Pennsylvania’s reporting argues that wealth state con requires invalidation Clause further these procedures and certification statutory provision that con stitutional or statutory mandates. Sims, law, Reynolds v. see flicts with federal 1393, brief, 377 U.S. ac- In her amicus (1964), compels compliance and L.Ed.2d 506 Congress intended that

knowledges that pro aid in Title XIX federal by participants developing in flexibility states be allowed regulations. law grams federal statutory with their administering procedures for 309, 316-17, Smith, 88 King v. statute and obligations the Medicaid (1968); eligibility requirements Roe cannot be so onerous Casey, they 623 F.2d at 837. that inhibit or deter women who are eligible to receive the abortion services from The maintain that Providers district receiving not, v. Casey them. Roe does how- in properly Casey court relied on Roe v. ever, per se all reporting require- invalidate holding all programs that state Medicaid used eligibility purposes. ments for must fund all for which abortions federal Casey, funds are available. In Roe v. argue The Providers legis- further earlier of Pennsylva- invalidated an version history provides lative a clear indication of funding pro- nia’s Medicaid restriction that congressional prohibit intent to reporting coverage except scribed of abortions when requirements certification contained in necessary pregnant to save the life Pennsylvania statute. The Providers Hyde then-applicable woman. The Amend- past note that Hyde versions of the ment, Amendment, Hyde the 1994 per- like Amendment, Congress specifically had in- expenditure mitted the funds for abortion reporting requirements raрe cluded for pregnancy where a rape resulted from or victims, incest second-physi- contained incest, life-threatening as as in well circum- cian for abortions in cases of stances. We reasoned: long-lasting physical severe and health dam- XIX, [by Title as now modified the current 96-536, age. § See Pub.L. No. 94 Stat. Amendment], Hyde requires the states (1980) (1981 Amendment) Hyde categories: fund abortions two where (providing funding rape for or incest victims endangered mother and where the rape “when such within reported has been pregnancy rape was the or result incest. seventy-two hours to law enforcement Pennsylvania ... would not fund the sec- public service”); or health Pub.L. No. category. Pennsylvania’s ond Because 96-123, (1979) (1980 93 Stat. statutes are consistent with the modi- Amendment) Hyde (providing Medicaid fund- that, written, fied Title XIX is as clear ed or rape abortions incest victims “when they stand. cannot rape such reported incest has been promptly Id. at to a 836-37. law enforcement service”); public 95-480, health Pub.L. No. argue The Providers that the district court (1979 Hyde 92 Stat. correctly Pennsylvania’s concluded ef- Amendment) (restricting funding coverage fort to restrict Medicaid of abor- long-lasting cases of severe and health dam- reported tion to eases of and incest and age by to those “so cases determined two dually-certified endangerment life di- runs physicians”); No. Pub.L. rectly contrary Casey’s to Roe v. mandate (1977) (1978 Amendment) Hyde Stat. Pennsylvania must all fund abortions (same). Additionally, Congress con- which According federal funds are available. rejected sidered but a version Providers, Pennsylvania reporting Hyde Amendment that contained such a re- requirements would be invalid under Roe v. quirement. Cong.Rec. (daily See 139 H4304 Casey even if provi- contained waiver 30, 1993) (showing previous ed. June version sion. reporting of amendment which included re- agree Casey We that Roe v. holds that the quirement). The Providers contend mandatory establishes that, properly repu- district court inferred services, floor required below which states diating previous versions ruling, not fall. Under its all women Amendment, Congress clearly intended to eligible who are must receive the benefits provisions eliminate those issue that have been made available to them here. Congress. question we are today faced eligibility reading focuses the issue of district court’s requirements that legislative history are utilized goes states too far. Con While *10 clearly determine a gress longer requires whether woman entitled to the no the states to implement reporting proce services enumerated in the Amend- and certification dures, ment. Casey Roe v. that indicates these it does not follow that are now states however, hand, Supreme most, rejec the other On At have them. forbidden that estab- law that a state has held Hyde Court of the versions earlier of the tion a federal criteria for eligibility benefit lishes Congress did not sign that is a than the that are more restrictive program on requirements reporting to mandate wish invalid. by Congress is criteria established Mutual John Hancock states. Life Cf. — Smith, 88 S.Ct. Bank, King v. Trust & Sav. v. Harris Ins. Co. (1968). Like- —, —, Casey a wise, in Roe v. sets (courts by our decision (1993) guided L.Ed.2d must be that mandatory of services floor legis words, by draft discarded statute’s the Medicaid by states under provided Congress’ lation). Moreover, that we note Amendment, Act, by the as for modified requirements reporting rejection of the re- onerous undermined be expressly which cannot was Hyde Amendment the 1994 Furthermore, requirements. porting procedural considerations. based 1396a(a)(19) provide the state requires that proce rejection on A Cong.Ree. H4307-08. plan will be that safeguards to assure basis, any in for no grounds provides dural consistent with “in a manner administered Congress’ about views regarding ference in- and the best administration simplicity of legislation. We provisions substantive recipients.”7 terests of the from the guidance no are therefore left history. legislative argued that the Penn- reasonably be It can are inconsis- reporting requirements sylvania

C. a they create mandate bеcause this tent with women who for some formidable barrier competing inter- thus faced with We are eligible to obtain abor- be would otherwise as amended statute ests within the The Penn- rape and incest. of tions cases On one Hyde Amendment. by the 1994 hurdles creates numerous sylvania require- statute hand, Pennsylvania reporting (1) a woman rape incest victims: for and averment require physician’s that ments rape incident of report the personally must signed a state- the woman setting forth that authori- law enforcement or incest to state the result of pregnancy her was ment that offender; ties, together with the name ground on the be defended rape or incest can (2) they that required to aver physicians are under interest they further the state’s that from the signed statement have obtained being able “make Hyde Amendment preg- verifying that she pregnant woman Secretary that an abortion was known” to the incest, that she rape nant as a result or representation upon a woman’s performed reporting requirements, complied with was the result pregnancy that reporting false that is aware that Pennsylvania and she requirement incest. The law; the Common- and punishable rape or incest to report the that a woman law verify law enforcement must with a wealth agencies be defended as can law enforcement protective service agency or child repre- that the woman’s attempt to ensure reasonably made. It can report that part state’s are true as sentations can be argued that these unnecessary against “safeguard obligation to rape or 1396a(a)(30)(A). incest for a victim insurmountable utilization.” 42 quality the care to be availability history provision estab- of this 7. The expects provided. that under The committee added it to ensure states lishes eliminating complicated provision, the States will be and impose bureaucratic would eligibility policies determining unrewarding unproductive for mechanisms obtaining recipients care. investigation deter and that will would methods procedures assure that the develop will pro- in order to provision was included This relationships working with med- most effective will not States vide some assurance facilities, suppliers practitioners, ical unduly complicated of determin- methods use encourage their service in order care and delaying effect of ing eligibility which have the provi- cooperation participation in the full fashion the decision on in an unwarranted plan. State under the sion of services or that the eligibility medical assistance reprint- Cong., S.Rep. 1st Sess. No. 89th provisions administer States will not 1943, 2017. U.S.C.C.A.N. adversely ed in 1965 way affects the services in a *11 ion, unable, may patient who be traumatized the event. We the physical for or vastly rape underreported reasons, psychological are aware is a comply to crime, reasonably argued it can be requirement. Pennsylva-

reporting requirements such as (Dec. Letter, 28, 1993), App. also See substantially nia’s can deter some women (Mar. Letter, (reiterat- 25,1994), App. at 117 receiving services intended to be avail- ing the for provision need waiver in state- able to them under the statute. reporting requirements). established Secretary responsi- HHS bears of the Under Secretary’s interpretation, phy- bility reconciling competing of these interests may sicians take into account both the imme- Comí; Supreme has not- the statute. The long-term psychological diate and conse- appreciating complexi- “[p]erhaps ed that quences reporting rape of or incest to au- ty wrought, Congress of what it had con- thorities that could leave a woman to unable Secretary exceptionally ferred on broad reporting requirements. fulfill those A waiv- authority prescribe to applying standards for reporting er thus ensures that requirements certain [Medicaid] sections Act.” prevent impede do not or coverage cov- for Panthers, Gray Schweiker v. Pennsylvania’s ered abortions. Without as- it surance that will waive the reporting re- Secretary com- has concluded that these quirements if physically the woman is or peting interests are best reconciled psychologically comply, unable to the Penn- reporting requirements pro- contain a waiver sylvania requirements Abortion Control Act allowing treating physician certify vision a comprise impermissible eligibility criteria. comply that the woman was unable to with requirements reporting physical psy- or The December 1993 HCFA directive chological reasons. Secretary’s attempt give constituted the interpretive guidance to states in advance explained point The Director of HCFA their plans.8 submission of state Medicaid in her December 1993 directive all state interpretation The HCFA directive is an Medicaid directors: Amendment mandates as recon mandatory As with all other medical ser- with competing ciled interests within funding vices which Federal is avail- statute. Since directive clari able, required States are abor- cover law, explains existing fies and deem medically necessary.... tions that are “interpretive.” Sullivan, Bailey v. may impose reporting States reasonable or (“If (3d Cir.1989) the rule in requirements recipients documentation merely question explains existing clarifies or providers, necessary may or be as- regulations, or be law it will deemed inter sure an themselves that abortion was for pretive.”); American Min. v. purpose terminating pregnancy MSHA, (D.C.Cir.1993) rape an caused act of or States incest. (setting distinguish out factors to between impose reporting or documenta- rules). interpretive As deny impede tion or rule, interpretive Secretary’s pronounce coverage pregnancies for abortions where exempted ments are from the APA result from or incest. notice- To insure requirements. and-comment reporting requirements do 5 U.S.C. prevent 553(b)(A) (notice abortions, requirement ap impede coverage does not for covered rules, reporting requirement interpretive “to ply general must be statements procedure policy, agency organization, waived and the considered or rules of treating physician reimbursable if the cer- procedure, practice”). This Court opin- Supreme validity tifies that his or her professional upheld Court have action, Ridge yet grounds 8. We aware related tional because the has not Shalala, currently pend- No. which is hearing called for nor issued decision about Court, ing in this in which the Commonwealth plan conformity Pennsylvania’s challenging requirement HHS's "waiver” as vio- Shalala, Casey Amendment. No. 94-390 lative of the Administrative Procedures Act. The (M.D.Pa. 28, 1994). Nov. jurisdic- district court dismissed action on *12 182 interpretation 62; It true that Bureau’s is Bailey, F.2d at 885 rules. interpretive — “Program only in a Statement”— appears Hospital, Guernsey Memorial v.

Shalala than guideline 1237, agency 1232, an internal 131 —, —, 115 S.Ct. U.S. —rather subject to the regulations “published (1995). 106 L.Ed.2d Procedure] Administrative rigors of the long recognized have Courts comment.” Act, including public notice and must be conferred to weight” “considerable agency internal at 562. But BOP’s 21 F.3d of a department’s construction an executive “interpretive is akin to guideline, which it is entrusted to statutory scheme notiee-and- require that “do[es] rule” has an Supreme Court The administer. comment,” Guernsey Memorial v. Shalala of deference to principle nounced ——, [115 S.Ct. Hospital, 514 U.S. interpretation: administrative (1995) (slip 1239, 1232, 106] 131 L.Ed.2d consistently this followed has been deference, 11), to some is still entitled op., at meaning to the decision as whenever Court Safety ., Occupational v. Martin cf reconcil has involved statute or reach 144, Comm’n, 499 U.S. Review and Health a full under conflicting policies, and ing 1171, 1179, 113 117] L.Ed.2d [111 157 S.Ct. statutory poli force of standing of the construc (1991), “permissible it is a since depended has given situation cy U.S.A., Chevron, Inc. statute.” tion of the knowledge ordinary re upon more than Council, Natural Resources v. Defense subjected to specting matters 2778, 837, Inc., [104 843 S.Ct. 467 U.S. reprеsents If this choice regulations.... 694] 81 L.Ed.2d conflicting accommodation reasonable — —, -—, Koray, U.S. Reno v. agen committed policies that were 2026-27, 132 L.Ed.2d statute, should by the cy’s care omitted). (1995) (footnote stat appears from the unless it disturb it of the com- Secretary’s reconciliation The history that the ac its ute or statute and in the Medicaid peting interests Congress not one that commodation Because Hyde is reasonable. Amendment sanctioned. would have contemporane- Secretary’s consistent and Chevron, U.S.A., v. Resources Inc. Natural of the Medicaid ously expressed construction 844-45, Council, Defense statute as amended (1984) 2782-83, 81 L.Ed.2d one, considera- it is accorded is a reasonable omitted). (citations appro- deference Such principles announced weight under ble Secretary’s though the in- priate here even Chevron. “legislative in a not contained terpretation is See, Ass’n to the Secre- e.g., Health Insurance we will defer Accordingly, rule.” Shalala, 23 F.3d Amend- interpretation tary’s America Cantrell, Pennsylva- (D.C.Cir.1994); ment, 803 F.2d Hicks v. that because and hold Cir.1986). (4th Indeed, the Su- lack a reporting requirements waiver 791-92 nia recently may deprive eligible our decision preme procedure Court reversed therefore Sizer, has Koray v. benefits which women them, Cir.1994), to defer are to we had declined made where available interpretation law and are of Prisons’ in conflict with the Bureau extent federal 3585(b). Supreme Court ex- Service § Louisiana Public invalid. 368-69, F.C.C., plained: Comm’n. 90 L.Ed.2d Bureau, agency charged with S.Ct. as the (under Clause, a Supremacy federal ... administering the credit statute scope congres- of its 3585(b)’s acting within detention” “official interpreted power delegated authority has sionally spent time require language to credit 3142(e) regulation and render unen- preempt “deten- by a defendant laws). Thus, Pennsylva- until forceable state explained, have As we tion order”.... law, adopts a nia, waiver pursuant to state interpretation is the most ... the Bureau’s Secretary’s accordance with reading provision in natural reasonable enjoined directive, 3585(b)’s Commonwealth language. “official detention” enforcing and incest reporting give We must substantial deference requirements. to an agency s construction of regula its own

tion. Martin v. Occupational Safety and *13 Comm’n, Health Review 144, 499 U.S. 150- III. SECOND PHYSICIAN 51, 1171, 111 S.Ct. 113 L.Ed.2d 117 REQUIREMENTS CERTIFICATION (1991); Lyng v. Payne, 926, 939, 106 476 U.S. (1986). S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 921 As reporting requirements Like for abortions Supreme the Court recently announced, pregnancies where incest, result or courts “must defer to Secretary’s the inter certification for abortions nec- pretation unless an ‘alternative reading essary is to save the life of the mother are not compelled by regulation’s the plain language expressly addressed in Hyde the Amend- or other indications of the However, Secretary’s pursuant ment. the broad au- intent at the regulation’s time the thority promul to promulgate regulations in adminis- gation.’” Thomas tering see, University v. the Medicaid program, e.g., Jefferson — Shalala, Schweiker, U.S. —, —-—, 43, 114 453 2640, U.S. at 101 S.Ct. at 2381, 2386-87, (1994) 129 L.Ed.2d Secretary, shortly (quot the after passage the ing Gardebring Jenkins, 415, Hyde 430, the 1977, first U.S. Amendment promul- 108 S.Ct. (1988)).9 gated L.Ed.2d regulation a concerning abortions where the mother’s life endangered. We regulation believe provides:

The that the Secretary’s con comports struction plain with the language of funding] [Federal is in expendi- available regulation. the phrase The “[Federal fund tures for an physician abortion when a has ing] is available ... for an abortion when a found, and in writing certified to the Med- physician has found and certified [that the agency, icaid that on the pro- basis of his life is endangered]” mother’s not limit does fessional judgment, the life of the mother physicians class who have the authori endangered would be if the fetus were ty certify. We believe that reading this carried to term. regulation gives phrase physician” “a added). ordinary 42 C.F.R. its (emphasis 441.203 meaning. natural This — regulation Meyer, has not F.D.I.C. v. —, been altered substance —-—, since its promulgation. initial 114 S.Ct. (1994) (“[W]e construe a statutory term in Secretary The construes regulation accordance with ordinary or natural provide any if physician including a wom- — meaning.”). attending an’s physician that —certifies life of the mother endangered, would be Further, fed- the history physician of certi- funding eral is “available.” Consistent regulation with fication indicates that the Secre- holding our Casey Roe v. that tary states are intended this construction at the time of

required by the Medicaid Act to fund all the regulation’s promulgation. The 1976 abortion services are allowed under provided for federal fund- Hyde Amendment, the Secretary ing concludes “where the life of the mother would be that a regulation state that attempts, in endangered ef- if the fetus were earned fect, require physician’s second certifica- 94^39, term.” Pub.L. No. 90 Stat. tion addition ato given by certification “a The 1976 Amend- physician” is inconsistent regulation. ment did require physician’s certifiea- Gardebring, recog- reading Court, while Supreme regulation’s is compelled by plain nizing that had not taken Secretary language position other indications the Secre- litigation, until held that: regulation's intent the time of the tary's when regulation it is the that we Secretary's promulgation. construing, and when there is no claim 485 U.S. at 430, 108 S.Ct. at 1314. Thus, we regulation this Court violates con- will defer construction of her Secretary's stitutional or mandate, we are statutory prop- regulation own even interpretation put hesitant to substitute erly alternative read- litigation. forth in ing for the unless Secretary's alternative pro- a notice issued

tion. §§ (citing 42 U.S.C. L.Ed.2d stated that: rule-making which posed objective to as 1396a(a)(10)). further A finan- provide Federal will Department plans are adminis sure that abortions cost of participation cial simplicity consistent a manner tered “in on the attending physician, only where interest of and the best administration judgment, professional her of his basis 1396a(a)(19); Hodg 42 U.S.C. recipients.” necessary the abortion certified Secretary’s con son, at 607. would be mother life because regulation implementing struction carried to were if the fetus endangerеd provision certification endangerment term. *14 In objectives. these to further said could be added). (1977) (emphasis Fed.Reg. 42 40486 441.203, § 42 promulgating C.F.R. mean- notice as this Secretary construed The Secretary noted: the fraud, physi- the of “in absence ing that the require- the certification purpose of The 43 conclusive.” be judgment would cian’s to Department the to enable is not ment (1978). Fed.Reg. 4574 judgment, but rather physician question Amendment, the 1977 enacting In in fact judgment has physician that ensure Hyde Amend- 1976 the retained most This is efficient the exercised. been for abor- concerning funding language ment a agency or by a State which manner endangered. is life mother’s when the tions Department the project or program —or 1460 § 91 Stat. No. Pub.L. re- other enforcement conducting audits that the Secretary concluded The statutory the that ascertain views— the manner question Congress to of failure finan- Federal a claim for for requirements imple- previously Secretary had the which been in an have abortion participation cial its reenactment exception, the mented met. as con- understood be change, should without Thus, to the will defer Fed.Reg. 4574. Secretary’s inter- approval gressional regulation of her Secretary’s interpretation Thus, not- Fed.Reg. pretation. eligi- triggering condition that the sufficient silence, the Secre- Congress’ withstanding certi- abortion is funded bility a Medicaid con- regulations implementing tary’s life a woman’s any physician that by fication be that Congress to the intent strued carrying the by fetus endangered would be by physi- a endangerment life certification term. Fed.Reg. 4570 required. be should cian Secretary’s construction to the In Secretary’s contrast 50.304). con- (§ Accordingly, ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‍the Penn- regulation, certification the federal C.F.R. regulation, of her struction narrow requirements certification sylvania’s funding 441.203, for federal providing § as part pertinent Secretary’s criteria. the a woman’s “any physician” including when — 3215(c) Pennsylvania Abortion the life of attending physician —certifies or federal provides no Act consis- Control endangered, is be mother would abortion, ex- for an expended funds will regulation. history tent with cept: consis is also Secretary’s construction necessary avert the is abortion When XIX of Title requirements with other tent by a on certification of the mother death Section regulations. implementing per- physician mil When physician. 1396a(a)(17) establish that states mandates pecuniary or has abortion form “consistent that are eligibility there the abortion interest proprietary XIX. objectives” of Title separate abe shall certification Doe, Supreme 1396a(a)(17). In Beal v. such interest. has no who physician broadly “Title XIX’s explained Court 3215(c)(1) (emphasis Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. to enable each objective [is] primary stated Medic- added). Commonwealth’s Under furnish medical state, practicable, far as as attending physician scheme, even aid income and whose to individuals assistance certifies abortion provide who is costs of to meet insufficient resources life necessary because Doe, procedure Beal services.” necessary medical endangerment, yet there must be another I believe that what would have effect, certification. give Commonwealth’s us due, her is not deference but rather regulation renders the certification of an amok, at- deference run I reach a different re- tending physician reading irrelevant. This sult than majority, and must dissent.1 contrary Secretary’s regulation, I.

provides funding that federal un- available der such circumstances. A. Accordingly, Pennsylvania because the sec- Federal courts are by commanded Chevron ond-physician requirement certification and a host of give other cases to deference to necessary abortions to save the life of the certain legal conclusions of administrative mother conflicts implement- with a Medicaid agencies. But deference “cannot be allowed ing regulation by Secretary, construed sliр judicial into inertia which results in requirement is invalid. assumption unauthorized major policy properly decisions made CONCLUSION Congress.” FLRA, BATF v. hold Secretary’s We construction (1983); *15 Hyde of the Amendment is and reasonable accord EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. requires due deference. Under the Secre- (“ARAMCO”), 244, 260-62, 499 U.S. 3215(c) tary’s interpretation, both and (1991) S.Ct. Pennsylvania Abortion Con- (Scalia, J., (“deference concurring) 3215© is not ab- (1) trol Act are insofar as invalid fail to dication”); Hosp. St. Luke’s v. allow for a rape waiver of the and incest Servs., Health & Human 810 F.2d reporting requirements in with accordance (1st Cir.1987) BATF). (quoting It is there- (2) the HCFA require directives and certifi- fore carefully vital that we consider each case by physician cation a second in cases where to determine whether deference is warrant- endangered. life of the mother is Ac- ed, and, so, if how much to accord. Anything cordingly, we will affirm the order of the potential judicial less has the to be abdication district enjoins court to extent that it judicial rather than review. See Hi-Craft (1) Commonwealth requiring certifica- NLRB, Clothing v.Co. 660 F.2d 914-16 tion physician, a second enforcing and (3d Cir.1981); Bowen, West v. 879 F.2d rape and reporting requirements incest (3d Cir.1989) (Mansmann, J., concurring adopts, pursuant law, until it to state waiv- dissenting); Weis, Jr., Joseph Hon. A W. er in accordance with the HCFA directive. Perspective Judicial On to Ad- Deference In all respects, provisions other these remain Agencies: ministrative Some Grenades enforceable. We entry will remand for the Trenches, From the 2 Admin.L.J. of an order tailored accordance (1988). decision.

B. NYGAARD, Judge, Circuit dissenting. The full language Amendment provides Today, that, follows: majority as holds simple expedient letter, writing appropriated a sub- None of the funds under this eabinet-level preempt bureaucrat expended federal can Act shall be abortion statutory enactment of an except elected it is made when to the Fed- known legislature. holding It prin bases its entity eral or official to funds are ciple Chevron, set forth in appropriated deference pro- under this Act that such U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources necessary cedure save the life of the Defense Council, Inc., 837, 104 S.Ct. mother pregnancy or is the result (1984), L.Ed.2d 694 and later cases. rape Because of an act or incest. are, My back, doing

1. regrettably you reasons for so your for the should lean clutch the sides of whole, chairs, digest readers who must yourselves...." them somewhat steel Hon. Antonin Scalia, lengthy and involved. As Justice Scalia once Judicial Inter- Administrative Deference- said, Law, pretations "Administrative law is not for sissies—so 1989 Duke L.J. 511. 842-43, at 2781-82 at 107 Stat. No. Pub.L. omitted). (footnotes written, statutory lan- As re- requires nor forbids state guage neither appropriate level of recapitulate, “the To in cases of or porting requirements agency’s construction of a due an deference correctly re- incest, majority quite and the depends on the it administers statute providers jects position Pennsylvania clarity of the statute.” per requirements are court that such district Human Dep’t Health & States United se in conflict with Cir.1991). Servs., 928 F.2d 178-180). majority then (majority at one, step examine the statuto In we Chevron goes hold that we must defer on to Congress ry language whether to determine interpretation of the Director Chevron issue; has, if it we directly spoken to the has reporting Bureau that of the Medicaid Pennsylva step two. proceed to do not even requirements are invalid certification Snider, 886, 902 Soc’y nia Medical provision. Id. at 183- of a waiver absence (3d Cir.1994). spo Only Congress I this to be incorrect. believe step two of the Chevron apply ken limited to review analysis. And then we are C. ing agency’s construction of whether the reviewing “permissible.” Before a statute is Chevron, the Environmental Protection two, however, step can even reach court to de- Agency promulgated a rule explicitly implicit must find “stationary statutory fine the term source” authority ly delegated to the manufacturing plant. The Clean an entire statutory issue. provision сonstrue Act, requiring permits for new Air while *16 Barrett, 494 Adams Fruit Co. v. sources, gave stationary no indica- modified 1384, 1390, 108 L.Ed.2d defined. such a source should be tion of how (“[A] precondition to deference judicial re- approaching In the standard delegation congressional under Chevron is a choice, agency’s Supreme view of the simply I authority.”). do of administrative analysis: employed a bifurcated Court delegation was a here. See not believe there First, always, question of whether is the part IV. infra pre- Congress directly spoken to the question at issue. If the intent cise clear, the end of the Congress is that is II.

matter, court, agen- as well as the unambiguously cy, give must effect to the A. If, Congress. howev- expressed intent majority, relying Bailey v. er, Congress Sulli- has not .The the court determines Cir.1989) (3d van, and Amer- directly precise question at 885 F.2d addressed the Safety issue, Mining Congress v. Mine & simply impose its ican the court does not Admin., statute, Health 995 F.2d as would own construction (D.C.Cir.1993), concludes that the letters necessary in of an adminis- the absence Rather, interpretive validly promulgated interpretation. the stat- constitute trative (majority legislative rules ambiguous respect to rules rather than ute is silent or 181).2 that, issue, reluctantly agree I specific question for the must be binding precedent, circuit the letters agency’s answer is court is whether I unfet- interpretive as rules. Were permissible construction of the treated based on a however, by precedent, I would con- tered statute. Comm'n, Texaco, Cir.1992); majority's v. Federal Power hold- Inc. 2. This conclusion is vital to the Act, Indeed, (3d Cir.1969). ing. Under the Administrative Procedure 412 F.2d nonlegislative. legislative be either rules legislative promulgated in ac- which is not rale according legislative promulgated rule must be A APAis not cordance procedures of 5 to the notice and comment See, Chrys- e.g., of law. entitled to have the force which the did not do in Brown, Corp. ler E., E.g., v. United States this case. Inc. Beazer 60 L.Ed.2d Agency, Envtl. Protection 963 F.2d rules,” “spurious elude that the letters are [legislative]. yet Put way, another “what whatsoever, weight distinguishes entitled to no I interpretive shall legislative explain shortly. legal rules is upon base which the rule rests. If the rule is specific based on Bailey, opined “[i]f the rule statutory provisions, validity and its stands question merely explains existing clarifies or or falls on the correctness of the agency’s regulations, law or it will be deemed inter- interpretation of provisions, those it is an pretive.” majority 885 F.2d at 62. The interpretive If, however, rule. the rule is that, imply seems to because the two letters agency’s based on an power to exercise its clarify explain already-existing Med- judgment toas how best to implement a Amendment, icaid Act and they are general mandate, statutory the rule is like- interpretive. reasoning But proves this too ly legislative one.” Technologies United Indeed, much. it is difficult to conceive of EPA, Corp. v. any nonprocedural regulation that does not (D.C.Cir.1987). way explain in some clarify existing (some 34 F.3d at 1264 citations and internal federal statute. omitted).3 quotation Thus, marks to the ex- The reported nearly decisions have been majority tent the purports to hold that in adopting a more unanimous restricted def- rule that explains or clarifies an existing type inition of merely of rule what clarifies or statute or regulation interpretive notwith- explains existing position law. If the standing the fact that imposed duties directly takes its rule flows from thereby do directly not flow from the statuto- statutory itself, i.e., language the court ry language, holding contravenes earlier would reach the same construction court, decisions in violation of Third statute in the absence of regulation, even Circuit Operating Internal Procedure 9.1. interpretive. hand, the rule is On the other American Mining nothing more than a if the rule congressional exercises a delega- above; refinement of the law discussed power tion of binding to make rules that say, is to for a rule to be and have rights, assign create duties or impose obli- law, the force must have dele- gations, legislative. it is This distinction was gated legislative power and the aptly explained in *17 Navigation Dia Co. v. agency must have intended to exercise that (3d Pomeroy, Cir.1994), 34 F.3d 1255 where power in promulgating its rule. 995 F.2d at stated, relying part on Dep’t v. FLRA test, 1109. Under this to determine whether (3d Navy, 966 F.2d 14 n. a legislative rule is interpretive, or a review- Cir.1992) (in bane): ing factors, court uses four one which The critical legislative difference between legislative. indicates that the rule is interpretive first, and rules is that the former whether the absence of the rule have the force and effect of agency law while the could not succeed an enforcement latter do not. action, Stated differently, legisla- simply id. at restates the law effect, tive rules have legal substantive others, discussed above. which include interpretive while typically rules agency involve whether the published has its rule in construction or clarification of a or statute the Code of Regulations, Federal whether regulation. If a rights, rule creates agency explicitly as- legisla- invoked its duties, signs imposes obligations, or authority, tive or whether the rule amends a basic tenor of which already prior rule, id., is not legislative outlined are additional fac- itself, in the law then indicating substantive tors legislative. that a rule is — Guernsey 3. Accord Hosp., Shalala v. Mem. cooperative programs, the case of federal-state —, —, U.S. L.Ed.2d 106 Dep’t such as Medicaid. See Ohio Human (a change rule that a effects Dep’t Servs. v. Servs., States United Health & Human legislative comply law and must with (6th Cir.1988) 862 F.2d 1229-30 E., rulemaking requirements); APA Beazer (FICFA interpretive); Medicaid rule not v. Cabais (interpretive only par F.2d at 606 rule reminds Egger, (D.C.Cir.1982) 690 F.2d 238-239 Texaco, duties); existing ties of 412 F.2d at 744 (federal regulation program of state-administered (general policy impose rights statements of no interpretive). obligations). equally This distinction is true in subject- being criteria without Mining’s four B. spurious is a rule to notice and comment ed test, Mining the two American Under agree. validity. 15-22. I no Id. at and has distinctly legislative here are letters at issue Nevеrtheless, us to precedent constrains Looking only plain lan- at in character. interpretive rules. letters as treat these two statute, simply way no guage of the there is Mathews, Daughters In Ctr. Miriam itself can be con- Hyde Amendment (3d Cir.1978), 1250, 1255-56 & n. 9 590 F.2d reporting require forbid and strued to that, agency’s rules we stated because with or without requirements, certification promulgated accordance were not majority recog- Even the provision. waiver Act, 5 Procedure § 553 of the Administrative much, entirely it relies as because nizes must be consid “they perforce § holding deference to reach Chevron relied on interpretive rules.” We also ered majori- preempted. See Pennsylvania law is of the rules as agency’s characterization of the two ty at 181-83. absence later, years we fol interpretive. Id. Two letters, argument plausible no there would be approach, “tak[ing] the the Mathews lowed Pennsylvania’s reporting and certifica- that its rule was inter agency at its word” Accordingly, requirements are invalid. tion Marshall, Metal Prods. v. pretive. Cerro Mining fail the American the letters Cir.1980).4 (3d Thus, 620 F.2d tests; interpre- Navigation they are not Dia although strenuously disagree I tive rules. result, Operat Internal under Third Circuit to follow failed Because agency’s ing we must treat the Procedure 9.1 howev procedure, 553 notice comment rules, despite their interpretive as two letters letters, er, legislative in char her two while spurious character. See United States acter, no force of law whatsoever. See have Cir.1994).5 Monaco, Brown, at Chrysler Corp. v. 1718; at v. United States Alaska C. (D.C.Cir. Dep’t Transp., required Koch, that we to treat the 1989); & Ronald F. The fact H. Jr. Charles Jr., interpretive two as rules does Wright, Law and Prac letters Administrative Indeed, follow its failure to 3.13, excuse (Supp.1995). tice at 49 as out, rulemaking proce Anthony the notice and comment are not points Professor Where, here, dure, regulatory all, rather exam however. legislative true rules but public rules;” is, they or the “spurious intends to ples of invalid bind states, upon promulgate it to interpretation it is incumbent go beyond mere are rules that in Dia As we said existing purport binding to have valid rule. law and notice effect, Navigation, purpose yet to notice were not submitted *18 procedure public to insure Anthony, and comment rulemaking. Robert A. comment Rules, par by and fairness to affected “Legislative” participation “Interpretive” Rules authority lawmaking has been del Lifting Smog, ties when “Spurious” 8 and Rules: (1994). unelected, regula 1, 9-10, unrepresentative egated to Discussing L.J. 14 Admin. (quoting tory agencies. at 1255 Bat Mining, Anthony ar 34 F.3d American Professor Marshall, 694, 703 any 648 F.2d gues any meeting rule of terton American Servs., [legisla- action is in fact a Dep't control whether the Ohio Human 862 F.2d 4. See also Instead, rulemaking. is the substance (HCFA it legislative tive] rule was agency purported to do what the and pur deference in character but treated for was decisive. has done which is poses interpretive). as (citation to Cetro and other cases Id. at 734 omitted). language apparent from this It is the law of 5. There is some evidence court, Naviga- Dia the courts in the Limerick like years circuit has evolved the fifteen since over ap- Mining, took a functional tion and American Action, Ecology In Limerick Cerro and Mathews. distinguishing legislative proach from inter- Comm'n, Regulatory Inc. v. United States Nuclear Nevertheless, pretive evidence there is no rules. Cir.1989), (3d we stated that: 869 F.2d 719 cases, (which including FLRA of our action, banc), approach agency agency's al- heard in Cerro-Mathews The label of an considered, though has been overruled. factor to be does not one

189 (D.C.Cir.1980)). It inherently “avoid[s] this, Beyond all of the APA rulemaking arbitrary unpublished nature impose determina salutary discipline. Ruiz, discipline tions.” Morton v. That 94 deters casual and sloppy action, thereby and 39 L.Ed.2d forestalls No the confusion and litigation needless tice and that can comment also result salutary serves the such action. discipline And that purpose forcing reduces educatе tendencies toward over-regulation facts, bu- itself policy options issues and reaucratic overreaching, and discourages issuing binding available before regulations. low-profile attempts to create practically- FLRA, Texaco, (quoting F.2d at 763 binding norms that Congress or the Ad- 744); Marshall, F.2d at Batterton v. ministration would not have approved. (same); F.2d at 703-04 accord Marshall v. Anthony, Robert A. Interpretive Rules, Co., Western Union Tel. Poli- 621 F.2d Statements, cy Guidances, Manuals, (3d Cir.1980); and the ‘Well, Anthony, Robert A. Agencies Like —Should Federal Use Them to Permit, You Want the Don’t Agency You?” Public?, Bind the 1311,1373-74 Duke L.J. Nonlegislative Make Documents Efforts (1992), published also as Administrative Con- Public, Bind the 44 Admin L.Rev. States, ference of the United Recommenda- Anthony, Agency [hereinafter Efforts]. Reports, tions Report Recommenda- say I can it no better than Professor Antho tion 1992 ACUS 136-37.6 ny, who states: Jersey Department New Health & by Values served rule- Servs., Human Cir. making process large are ones. Fairness 1981), explained: by giving is furthered notice to those who APA The proce- notice comment bound, are to be proposed both when the good dures exist for reason: to ensure that rule is about to be considered and when administrators, unelected who are not di- the final rule is definitively published. rectly accountable populace, are accuracy thoroughness of an to justify forced quasi-legislative their agency’s by actions are enhanced the re- rulemaking before skepti- an informed and quirement that it invite and consider the public. cal procedures When these are not world, comments of all the including those followed situations where are directly able, persons affected who are applicable, fact promotes a court neither uniquely, often pertinent to supply infor- agency’s ultimate mission respect nor analysis. mation and acceptability by ignoring the law agency’s indis- and therefore the effectiveness of a final condoning cretion or agency’s shortcut. rule by openness elevated of the There great danger is indeed a giving procedures through it has been de- (and often, Chevron deference legislative ef- liberated public’s sense of use- fect) to rules promulgated without the bene- ful participation process in a that affects fit of notice and rulemaking. comment First them. legitimacy Its upon rests all of all, encourages agencies to flout the considerations, these as upon well the Administrative Procedure Act and issue foundational fact has ob- binding regulations in informal formats. See served the procedures laid down Con- Community v. Young, Nutrition Inst. gress for establishing rules the bind- (D.C.Cir.1987) (Starr, J., *19 F.2d con- ing force of law. The agency’s accounta- curring and dissenting) (agencies may yield bility for deepened its rules is by the temptation to legislative rules with issue requirement court-made aof reasoned ex- interpretive effect in formats to scruti- avoid planation upon based a substantial ny). all, rule- reviewing After once a court defers making record. rule, upholds as the The Administrative general Conference applicability United merits of that are intended adopted States Anthony's Professor impose binding recommen- substantive standards obli- 5, 1384; dation. 1992 ACUS 41 gations upon Duke L.J. at see persons using leg- affected without 1 C.F.R. 305.92-2. rulemaking procedures Recommendation (normally 92-2 islative ing includ- provides "[a]gencies notice-and-comment).” should not issue state- consideration, the validi- in its here, ness evident law without

majority it becomes does consistency reasoning, ty of its legisla agency taking true of the the bother and all pronouncements, later earlier and Worse, private par it results in tive action. give power per- case, those factors (and, in this Commonwealth ties suade, lacking power to control. by proposition “a Pennsylvania) ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‍being bound shape and will opportunity to had no decades approach reaffirmed three This was challenge meaningful opportunity to have no Gilbert, Elec. v. 429 U.S. later in General Co National Fаmi applied it is to them.” when 401, 411, 125, 141-42, 50 L.Ed.2d 97 S.Ct. Ass’n, Inc. v. Planning Reprod. Health ly & (1976), analyzed an EEOC where the Court (D.C.Cir.1992) Sullivan, 227, 240 interpretive rule under guideline as an 38; Efforts, supra, at (citing Anthony, Agency doctrine.7 Skidmore Anthony, Agency Which quoting Robert A. course, Chevron, a watershed deci- Bind Citizens Interpretations Should judicial regu- deference sion in the area (1990)); Courts, Reg. 7 Yale J. on however, latory agencies. Significantly, Richard J. 1 Kenneth C. Davis & see also promulgated properly involved Chevron 3.5, Pierce, Law Treatise Administrative simply That case did legislative rule. (Chevron (1994) inappro deference at 119-20 court of consideration a deal with the level rules). I find such priate nonlegislative rule, and give interpretive an did should juris- politically undemocratic and result both not overrule Skidmore. prudentially odious. Chevron, Indeed, years following III. that Skid- Supreme Court has reaffirmed appropriate stan is the more consideration majority, treating the two let- The while interpretive rules. of review for dard rules, gives interpretive nevertheless ters as Occupational Safety & Health Re Martin v. Chevron, a case them full deference under Comm’n, 144, 157, 111 S.Ct. view 499 U.S. of a rule that arose the context (1991), 113 L.Ed.2d 117 quite jurisprudential concerns. different Skidmore, Court, opined interpre citing this, too, I is incorrect. believe defer rules are not “entitled to the same tive the exercise ence as norms that derive from A. lawmaking pow Secretary’s delegated ARAMCO, Supreme And in ers[.]” Chevron, the amount of consider Before again upon and Gil Court relied Skidmore given interpretive rules was well- ation to be bert, Chevron, how much to determine statement from the Su settled. classic interpretive rule. 499 U.S. weight give given in v. preme Court was Skidmore Swift 1235;8 256-58, 111 accord Public S.Ct. at Co., & 323 U.S. 65 S.Ct. Justice, Dep’t Citizen v. United States (1944): L.Ed. 124 12, 109 n. 463 n. 2571-72 interpreta- rulings, that the We consider (interpretive rule opinions Administrator tions and Gilbert). weight, relying entitled less Act, controlling upon while not under this manifest that Skidmore and It is therefore authority, do the courts reason of their Gilbert survived Chevron. in- body experience and сonstitute a dicta, Recently, panels of this court liti- four judgment to which courts and formed questioned whether Skidmore Gil- guidance. have gants properly resort E.I. were overruled Chevron. See weight judgment partic- in a bert of such a Commissioner, thorough- duPont de Nemours & Co. depend upon ular case will concurred, Francis, opining in- 8. Justice Scalia 7. Accord Batterton n.9, n.9, & 53 L.Ed.2d terpretive & to Chevron deference rule was entitled Morton, (1977); *20 94 S.Ct. at 415 U.S. at 448 anachronism!.]” Id. at and that Gilbert was "an 258-60, Cerro, 1282; 1075; Jersey, 620 670 F.2d at New thus clear that 111 S.Ct. at 1236. It is Co., 980-82; Otis Elevator F.2d at Baker v. applica- majority held that Chevron was Mathews, 686, (3d Cir.1979); 590 F.2d F.2d ble. at 1258. (3d Cir.1994); which, Gilbert, 130, 135-36 citing Skidmore 41 F.3d n.23 Seku we re- Deposit Corp., jected Ins. 39 F.3d agency interpretation la v. Federal that contra- (3d Cir.1994); Reich v. Local 453-54 n.13 position. dicted its earlier Teamsters, 6 F.3d 987 n.14 Int’l Bhd. of language One of our cases contains some Materials, (3d Cir.1993); International Raw superficially that support seems to the ma- Co., v. 978 F.2d Ltd. Chemical Stauffer Heckler, jority’s position. — In Kean v. (3d Cir.1992), denied, n.9 cert. U.S. (3d Cir.1986), purported we 1588, 123 —, L.Ed.2d 154 agency interpreta- defer under Chevron to an opinions discussed the effect of None these Yet, tion. we went on to consider factors Martin or ARAMCO. normally only relevant in a Skidmore-Gilbert fact, In in several cases decided after analysis, including Secretary’s alleged Chevron, given Chevron-style have not we change position, interpre- the fact that her interpretive In deference to rules. Arm contemporaneous tation was enact- Dep’t Housing stead v. United States & statute, expertise ment of the and the of her (3d Dev., Cir.1987), 815 F.2d Urban agency. Id. 902-03. Nowhere did we interpretive we stated that rules are not even intimate that Chevron had overruled binding on the or the court. Like Serv., event, wise, any Skidmore or Gilbert. In in American Ambulance Inc. v. even (3d Sullivan, Cir.1990), 911 F.2d we Kean did hold that Chevron deference opined “[ijnterpretive that rules are entitled required agency interpretations, I con- judicial weight to no more review than implicitly clude that it was overruled persuasiveness their inherent commands” Supreme Court in Martin and ARAMCO. Marshall, (citing Batterton v. 648 F.2d at Many agree other courts that Skidmore-

705). Indeed, applied we this stan FLRA appropriate Gilbert is the standard of review interpretive an dard of review to an rule Atchison, interpretive rules. In T. & give it nounced letter form and refused to (7th Cir.1994) Peña, Ry. S.F. 44 F.3d 437 controlling weight. 966 F.2d at 762-64 & n. — (en banc), —, granted, cert. I 14. think the above line of cases makes it (1995), court, Supreme clear that neither the Court nor S.Ct. recognized any this court has erosion of making interpretive while clear that an rule deference, Skidmore or Gilbert. is entitled to some refused to stamp” agency’s action and re “rubber Snider, Chevron, apply we refused to jected that full the contention Chevron defer holding unambiguous that the statute was applies In ence to such rules. Id. at 442. step opining one of the test and stead, applied it the Skidmore factors and “[cjomplexity enough trigger alone is not did, however, interpretation F.3d at 902. held that the deserved no defe Chevron.” 29 We evaluating Secretary’s position, Significantly, look to court held rence.10 also (consideration) one of the factors to Skidmore determine deference due an give how much consideration to her inter agency’s interpretation must arise from “the Secretary pretation. Because had diligent study underly of the statute and the issue, changed position on the we her refused activity ing regulate.” it seeks to Id. at 443. deference,” “any give interpretation her Reivitz, Similarly, in Doe v. 830 F.2d 1441 id., although perhaps it is more accurate to (7th Cir.1987), a letter federal sent say gave it we consideration but not restricting to state welfare authorities controlling weight.9 In a similar vein is eligibility dependents of certain benefits from Health Mazza and Human Servs., Cir.1990), Secretary argued illegal aliens. The give agency's interpre- Again, 9. We would have been more accurate if consideration to (which deference), many tation then courts refer interpretation the court had said that the would weight interpreta- decide how much given controlling weight not be rather than it say give tion shоuld receive. To that we it "no given no deference. would be implies deference” that we do not even consider it, which is not the case. *21 Bowen, Health v. 811 F.2d defer- Samaritan Serv. regulation was entitled to Chevron his (D.C.Cir.1987), the court stated: ence, disagreed, opining: the court but in this case are The documents at issue typically char- substantive rules While legislative in na- rather than interpretive having the force and effect of acterized as ture, longstanding principles, and under law, enjoy interpretive rules a lesser defer- agency interpretations are not entitled part in because of the ab- ence—doubtless degree commanded the same of deference opportunity to com- public of sence ment_ regulations in high-powered Chev- interpre- Any deference that an pur- did not ron. The Court Chevron depends claim on “the thor- tive rule scope of tradition- port consideration, to alter the review oughness evident in its ally interpretive accorded documents. consistency validity reasoning, of its pronouncements, and later with earlier omitted). (citation It continued: Id. at 1446 give power all those factors which engage not in notice-and-com- HHS did lacking power to control.” persuade, if making issuing its AFDC-UP ment rule eligibility policy. Skidmore) (some cannot now (quoting cita Id. at 1529 courts must accord to this omitted); contend that quotation marks tions and internal policy the deference due a rule Donovan, American Fed’n Labor v. accord of not the nor- (D.C.Cir.1985) (inter when the followed 330, 341-42 procedures mal associated with force-of- rule, receiving pretive while “some” defer making. law rule deference); ence, full Bat does receive terton, (nonlegislative 648 F.2d at 702 rules analyze court then went on to Id. The carry weight no more than their inherent interpretive rule under the Skidmore doc- commands). persuasiveness trine, refusing give controlling weight to interpreta- grounds the rule on the however, majority, relies on Health pas- contemporaneous with the tion was not Am., Shalala, Ins. Ass’n Inc. v. 23 F.3d of sage agency's reason- of the statute and the (D.C.Cir.1994), 412, 424 de & n. 8 cert. ing defective. Id. at 1447-51.11 — was nied, —, 1095, Circuit, (1995), Indeed, proposition that D.C. the court of L.Ed.2d 1064 for the opinions appropriate “deference is even has issued a number of to Chevron appeals Secretary’s interpretation interpretive though do not re is not the effect that rules ” deference, but, most, ‘legislative majori full contained rule.’ See ceive Chevron said, There, ty parties panel consideration. As one at 182.12 because the Skidmore oxymoron.” agreed applied, the court did binding policy is an Viet that Chevron “[a] issue, Secretary not reach the but stated dictum that nam Veterans Am. v. of of (D.C.Cir.1988). applied it had “often Chevron deference to Navy, 843 F.2d deference); overwhelming given Hosp., majority Chevron St. Luke’s 11. The of the other feder Cir.) appeals essentially (1st has followed (interpretation al courts of 810 F.2d at 331-32 of consideration); reasoning. Kelley same v. E.I. DuPont de ambiguous given only even Capi statute Skidmore Co., (6th Nemours & 17 F.3d 841-42 Cir. Secretary Health & tano 1994) (policy interpretive rulings statements Servs., (2d Human 732 F.2d 1075-76 Cir. deference but are ana not entitled to Chevron lyzed 1984) (rule interpretive treated as failed Skid- factors); Motor Vehicle under Skidmore analysis); Secretary more Frank Diehl Farms v. Dep’t Ass’n v. New York State Envtl. Mfrs. Labor, (11th Cir.1983) 696 F.2d 1329-30 Conservation, 1994) 17 F.3d 534-35 Cir. (interpretive get legisla rules less deference than (no circular); advisory Chevron deference to EPA rules, Skidmore). citing tive Derwinski, Travelstead v. 978 F.2d (Fed.Cir.1992) only (interpretive rules receive Cantrell, majority also relies on Hicks v. 12. The KDFW-TV, consideration); Dalheim v. Skidmore There, (4th Cir.1986). 803 F.2d 793-94 (5th Cir.1990) (interpretive 918 F.2d very analysis, court held that Chev- little Skidmore); binding, relying rules not Ohio agency interpreta- ron deference was owed to Servs., (6th Dep't Human 862 F.2d at 1235 reasoning minimal tion. Because Hicks’ Cir.) (according only Skidmore consideration to overwhelming majority rule; its conflict agen interpretive thoroughness evident in (in- courts that have considered the same issue cy reasoning unimpressive”); "most Paxton Court), Servs., cluding Supreme simply I would not Health & Human (9th Cir.1988) (interpretive follow it. rule *22 Koray, comment.” Id. at In interpretive by rules without we held that time served cases). halfway defendant in a (citing 424 n. two house constitute detention, spent time in official entitling him the Health Insurance One of the cases against to credit his sentence under 18 Bush, Wagner court relied on is Seed Co. v. 3585(b). Id. at 567. We declined (D.C.Cir.1991), denied, 946 F.2d 918 cert. grant full Chevron deference to Bureau of U.S. agency guidelines. Prisons internal Id. at (1992), EPA in which the issued a rule in a did, however, citing 562. We Motor Vehicle rather than notice and decision letter Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Mfrs. rulemaking. Id. at 921. court comment Co., 463 U.S. 103 S.Ct. simply that “it is stated the law this (1983), L.Ed.2d 443 accord “some deference” interpretive regulation circuit that an does to the extent “engaged deference receive Chevron accorded necessary analysis ‘reasoned’ of this issue.” legislative regulation.” Id. at 922. Nowhere Although inquiry Id. that bears some simi- however, opinion, in its did it address its larity analysis, to a Skidmore we did not cite above, prior contrary holdings, discussed Skidmore, Gilbert, apply Martin, or AR- upon opaque it are the eases relied best Then, in Koray. entirely AMCO based on concerning interpretive deference to rules. plain statute, language we held notably, although Wagner And Seed was de the words “official detention” did not shortly Supreme cided after the Court’s deci mean, government argued, “official ARAMCO, in sions Martin and the court Attorney detention General or the opin in addressed neither these cases its Bureau Prisons.” F.3d at 563-64. ion. analysis Koray entirely Our within The other case cited in Health Insurance step Chevron one: whether had Ruckelshaus, Corp. is General Motors 742 plainly spoken issue, and the “defer- (D.C.Cir.1984), 1566-67 cert. de consideration) (really ence” gave nied, 105 S.Ct. 85 agency interpretation was likewise an aid to case, L.Ed.2d 509 In that which was step analysis. Herz, our one See Michael Chevron, only decided three months after Running Separating Riot: Inter- Deference apply court did Chevron deference tо an pretation Chevron, and Lawmaking Under rule, interpretive again, analyz but without (1992) (Skidmore Admin.L.J. ing prior holdings to determine whether one). analysis part step is a of Chevron We event, survived Chevron. Gener simply step never reached Chevron two. al Motors was Supreme decided before the Supreme Neither did the In re- Court. Court’s decisions Martin and ARAMCO decision, versing our the Court examined a and cannot survive them. using phrase number of related statutes best, then, At these eases indicate intra- — at-, “official detention.” U.S. split authority circuit in the D.C. Circuit entirely 115 S.Ct. at 2025-26. Based on its question interpretive on the of deference to 3585(b) pari construction of materia weight authority rules. against Given the with the other statutes and granting interpretive Chevron deference history, Supreme Court concluded rules, persuaded by I am not Health Insur- interpretation “the Bureau’s is the most nat- ance and the two cases it cites. 3585(b)’s reading ural and reasonable -, language.” ‘official detention’ Id. at support final holding As for its that inter 115 S.Ct. at 2027. pretive rules entitled Chevron defer ence, majority Supreme Supreme relies on Koray Court’s ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‍decision in — Koray, step holding; Court’s recent decision Reno v. a classic Chevron one —, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 Court construed the statute in accordance (1995), Sizer, rev’g Koray v. Congress, F.3d 558 with the clear intent of and con- Cir.1994). majority at 182. Careful ex cluded that our construction was erroneous. amination inappo- ambiguous, case reveals to be Because the statute was not simply step site. Court did not reach two of the support opinion Koray cannot only Court’s The Court stated analysis. Chevron Management Neely v. Club Med a conclusion. See interpretive rule “is still agency’s 93-2069, 93-2102, vs., Inc., deference, Nos. per- it is a since entitled to some Ser *23 — 19904, F.3d —, statute[,]”13 U.S.App. 1995 LEXIS id. of the construction missible (3d July added) (citations *26, quo- 1995 WL *9 Cir. internal (emphasis banc) (mere 1995) (in Supreme ambiguity omitted), “it opining that would marks tation change existing opinion insufficient say statute cannot Court much to that the be too law). I conclude that Bu- therefore adopted the decisional interpretation bear two, Gilbert, (citation step quotation Skidmore and Chevron and internal reau.” Id. omitted).14 provide appropriate standard of review marks interpretive rules. much into important not to read too It is agreed language, however. Both courts B. interpretation entitled agency’s was — at-, 115 to “some deference.” U.S. the standard enunciated Skid- Under 2027; 21 F.3d at 562. I believe all at S.Ct. more, letters, these two to which we Koray us in was Supreme Court told defer, In do not fare well. Skid- asked that, agency’s construction of the because the more, Supreme focused on “the Court intent of Con- best reflected the clear statute thoroughness agency’s] con- [the evident given controlling it gress, we should have sideration, reasoning, validity of its Koray hold that the statute weight. did not consistency pronounce- with earlier and later delega- ambiguous or that there was a was ments, give which it and all those factors gap in authority agency to the to fill a tion of persuade, lacking power to con- power to that, statutory as scheme. Because It is at 65 S.Ct. at 164. trol.” 323 U.S. earlier, Koray simply step not a discussed appropriate whether also to consider two case.15 interpretation contemporaneous agency’s addition, Koray passage of the statute and has been Court did not over- with In States, rule, long 495 earlier deci- use. Davis United U.S. limit or even criticize its Skidmore, Morton, Gilbert, 2014, 2022, 109 L.Ed.2d Martin 110 S.Ct. sions (1990). Finally, may examine wheth- disagree I 457 or ARAMCO. therefore developed agency expertise has over majority’s implicit assertion that the Su- er subject Pension Koray all of those matter at issue. See preme Court in overruled Corp. Corp., 496 Supreme Guar. v. LTV U.S. cases sub silentio. Had the Court Benefit 633, 651-52, change in 110 110 sweeping a intended to make such (1990) (agency expertise a L.Ed.2d 579 jurisprudence, law it would administrative deference); justification Kelley, explicitly. Supreme principal have done so case, Chevron, step Koray certainly applicable a two language 13. This is taken from one, step S.Ct. at where the Court sets at this case arise under Chevron step test. Because forth two of the Chevron deferential standard. less case, Koray step use is a one I conclude that the to, most, quotation “impre amounts at an of that 15.Compare Chapter v. Sweet Home Babbitt language,” implicit cision in the Court's -, Oregon, a Great - U.S. Communities for part holding. Pope of its v. East Brunswick There, (1995). 115 S.Ct. 132 L.Ed.2d Cir.1993). of Educ., 12 F.3d Bd. legislative agency promulgated proper rule meaning statutory giving to the term further Everhart, quoted 14. The Court Sullivan v. Act, Species Endangered "take” under the 83, 91-92, U.S. seq. Supreme et While the Court There, recipients L.Ed.2d 72 of federal analysis legislative engaged of the text and in an challenged Secretary's "netting” reg- benefits ulations, Act, analysis, history decided in the final promulgated which were "Congress unambiguously manifest did not proffered plausible recipients con- rules. The agency's view of the its intent” to contradict the deferring struction but the court held— accordingly to the most, Court deferred statute. The step recipients at two of Chevron—that - agency. interpretation of the "reasonable" proved tion, their construc- that the statute could bear at-, Sweet 115 S.Ct. at 2416-17. Secretary's but not that it could not bear the Home, Court, implicated That, Koray, clearly in contrast to according construction. was reasoning step Chevron two. insufficient. While the Court's 842; Pub. weight only 17 F.3d Colorado Utilities entitled to more because Harmon, 1578-79 light Comm’n shed meaning of the statute (10th West, Cir.1991); enacted); 879 F.2d at Posner, 1136-37 when Richard A. The Fed- (Mansmann, J., concurring dissenting); eral Courts: Crisis and Reform 1076; Mathews, (1985) (view Capitano, 732 F.2d at administration, of current F.2d at 1259. long-standing, absence of interpre- consistent tation, not weight). entitled to all, apparent it is

First thoroughly did not consider the issue re- Finally, I turn to the issue of ex- porting requirements. and certification pertise. If this case involved *24 directors, the two letters to state Medicaid typically issues we review under the Medic- agency provides explanation why no at all Act, I say aid would be the first to provision. states must have a waiver Other Secretary developed a tremendous explanation than the it offers in its amicus here, amount of it. That is not the case (which requested), agency brief we offers Hyde Amendment, however. Under justification no for its rule. This is similar to abortion, funding for in rape even cases of Mathews, the situation we faced in 590 F.2d incest, was forbidden through from 1982 1258, rejected agency’s at where we in- Quite simply, pregnancies abortion of terpretation. by rape caused and incest is something agency has had to deal with within recent brief, Secretary Even in her states memory. institutional certainly And it is no only that lack provision of a waiver could expert criminology rape on the and incest “insuperable become an barrier” to victims reporting. any It therefore compara- lacks rape seeking and incest Medicaid-funded advantage tive vis-a-vis this court with re- abortions, relying entirely on the fact that spect to the issue at hand. I would therefore “vastly underreported” is a crime. This agency’s not accord interpretation con- speculative reasoning, is both and shallow trolling weight. Clothing, See 660 and, event, any nothing is more than a Hi-Craft 915; Mathews, 1259; F.2d at 590 at F.2d litigating position weight. entitled to no See Director, 1318, Mangifest, OWCP 826 F.2d Martin, 499 U.S. at 111 at S.Ct. (3d Cir.1987) (Weis, J., 1333-34 concurring). 1179; Georgetown Hosp., Bowen v. Univ. 488 468, 473-74, 109 U.S. S.Ct. 102 C. (1988). Fundamentally,

L.Ed.2d 493 I re main unconvinced that the has re My philosophically conclusion is annealed ally necessary taken the “hard look” at this agency’s the fact that the letters do not question. Greater Boston Television Cf. merely regulate private party; at Corp. Comm’n, v. Federal Communications tempt preempt to a state statute. One of the (D.C.Cir.1970) (“hard reasons for Chevron deference is “feder necessary satisfy look” to reviewing court judges constituency al have no —who —have agency action not “impermissi based on duty respect legitimate policy to choices whim, improper ble misplaced influence or Chevron, made those who do.” 467 U.S. denied, zeal”), cert. 403 U.S. 91 S.Ct. argument at 104 at S.Ct. 2793. The (1971). 2233, 29 L.Ed.2d 701 agencies, theory which at least in Second, although agency’s position indirectly majoritarian responsive pres sure, temporally fairly legitimate policy close to the enactment of are more than makers Amendment, the 1994 respect regula it is not one of Article III courts. With factor, conduct, long-standing. accordingly, theory This private party does tion of true; according weight reasonably agencies not favor deferential holds are at least Davis, agency’s interpretation. delegates See and are often 2022; Kelley, U.S. at 17 the subordinates of the It is no Executive. however, (refusing give secret, F.3d at weight theory to con- that what is true use); temporaneous interpretation long may practice; superi- be less so in because of Peña, (Easterbrook, expertise “agency capture,” see also 44 F.3d at 445 actual J., concurring) majoritarian (long-standing interpretations action than less 2884, 90 106 S.Ct. grounds, 476 er N. Causb-El- hope. Sanford might (1986); England Tel. & New L.Ed.2d 972 Restoring the Bal lenbogen, Blank Checks: Comm’n, Era, Utilities Tel. Co. v. Public in the Post-Chevron ance Powers denied, (1st Cir.1984), so, cert. Even B.C.L.Rev. (1986)). 90 L.Ed.2d favor circumstances reasonable heads rather than

policy choices

judges. IV. considerably, howev That situation shifts finally Pennsylvania’s brings That me There, er, preemption. in the context requirement. certification physician second (1) are: une policymakers alternative two explaining its agency’s two letters Unlike bu theoretically accountable only lected and and certification reporting interpretation of balance; and on one side

reaucrats Secretary promulgat- requirements, here the the other. legislators state the elected purported legislative rule with the a valid ed tips case, the balance and I is our think That § 441.203 42 C.F.R. of law. See force law, not sharply upholding in favor of physician”). Her of “a (speaking terms interpretation. Under the agency’s federal *25 therefore, to interpretation, appear would Clause, agency only has Supremacy a federal her directly regulation, the text of flow clearly, consci preempt when it power existing duty. of an merely reminding states delegated lawfully entiously and exercises APA, not when authority under 553 believe, however, Congress I do not interpretive rule. Puerto an it issues Cf. any authority delegated for the Secre- ever v. Petro Isla Dep’t Consumer Rico Affairs recognize that I tary make a rule. 1350, 495, 503, 108 S.Ct. Corp., 485 U.S. leum “exceptionally au- Secretary broad has (“a clear and 99 L.Ed.2d itself, thority” interpret the Medicaid Act always purpose is re [federal] manifest Panthers, Gray 453 U.S. v. Schweiker Ray v. Atlantic quired” preemption); (1981); L.Ed.2d 460 Co., 151, 157, 98 S.Ct. Richfield Act is majority at but the Medicaid see (1978) (same). L.Ed.2d 179 statutory under at here. The text not issue circuit, Hyde to the interpretation is Indeed, an of this law appropriations bill that funds preempt law. interpretive rule cannot Sons, is not one scintilla Dunlap program, there & United States Walter See Cir.1986) (“Be- Hyde Con- Inc., Amendment that evidence 800 F.2d interpret Secretary to gress intended the FmHA regulations on which relies cause appropria- extent of her congressional scope either the of a do not have the force validity state-imposed second or the is no indication tion and because there directive requirements. Unlike physician agency regulation certification Congress intended statutes administered uniform state most substantive supersede long-standing law Hyde Amendment area, regulatory agencies, the accept govern- decline in this enabling the provision contains no regulations con- position that ment’s trol.”). sense, regulations with the force of law. to make good logical be- This makes best, law, mere At it is silent on the issue. The displace and an it takes law to cause silence, however, fact of does force of law. Oth- interpretive rule lacks the necеssarily imply existence of a deliber- appear to be in er and commentators courts statute, 3.59, gap much less a “gap” ate Wright, supra, See Koch & accord. Congress intended Secre- we must infer (Supp.1995) (citing South Central at 73-74 regula- Comm’n, through administrative tary to fill Pub. Tel. v. Louisiana Serv. Bell (5th delegation, the Cir.1984), was no on oth- tion.16 Because there vacated 744 F.2d 1107 mann, J., (mere dissenting) See, concurring si- e.g., Railway Ass’n v. Labor Executives’ 16. automatically imply Bd., ambiguity does not lence Mediation 29 F.3d National Weis, supra, banc) agency); at 305 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en delegation delegation (presuming ("If proper- clearly delegated virtually agencies "enjoy limit- enable would West, (Mans- power, agency should ly then the circumscribed hegemony"); at 1138 less upon majority relies is regulation which the only interpretive

properly treated as an rule. ASSOCIATES, In re INDIAN PALMS ARAMCO, 256-58, (WFT). LTD., at 111 S.Ct. U.S. B.C. 90-25765 Gilbert, 1235; at at Batterton, 410-11; 648 F.2d at 705. NANTUCKET II INVESTORS analysis

Applying a to 42 C.F.R. Skidmore 441.203, probably, it would under normal BANK; FEDERAL CALIFORNIA Indian circumstances, controlling be entitled to Associates, Palms Ltd. Office of all, weight. regulation, was enact- after United States Trustee ed soon after the first Amendment was changed passed and has not since. *Argo Partnership, Loan Limited Moreover, because the Amendment has Appellant. always permitted funding for Medicaid abor- No. 94-5265. tions the life of the mother where would endangered, does otherwise Appeals, United States Court of expertise have considerable in this area. Or- Third Circuit. then, majori- dinarily, agree I would ty Secretary’s interpretation is con- Argued Dec. 1994. trolling. July Decided III(C), already As I have discussed in Part however, ease, preemption this is a and an

interpretive preempt rule cannot state law.

Dunlap, Accordingly, F.2d at 1239. I Pennsylvania’s uphold physi- second

would requirement.

cian certification

V. incorrectly majority

Because the defers Secretary’s interpreta- to the Chevron

tions, and no basis for its because there is itself,

holding I

dissent. (1989) (“An delegation ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‍through legis- ambiguity simply

not obtain untrammeled discretion lative should not not a Herz, silence.”); ("Courts supra Sunstein, at 204 law-interpreting power.”); Cass R. equate clarity a mere lack of with a Deal, Constitutionalism the New 101 Harv. After delegation decision-making authority (1987) (same). L.Rev. Sunstein, agency.”); Interpreting Cass R. Statutes * State, (Pursuant order). Regulatory 103 Harv.L.Rev. to Court’s 9/12/94

Case Details

Case Name: Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knoll
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Jul 25, 1995
Citation: 61 F.3d 170
Docket Number: 94-1954
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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