14 Mo. App. 234 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1883
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a proceeding by a judgment-creditor of defendant Schieferdecker, to expose to sale, in satisfaction of plaintiff’s judgment, a certificate of membership of Scheiferdecker in the Merchants’ Exchange of St. Louis.
On hearing, the circuit court made a decree that plaintiff is entitled to subject a certificate of membership, No. 2394*, issued by said Exchange to said Scheiferdecker to sale
On the hearing, certain acts of the legislature and rules of the Merchants’ Exchange were offered in evidence. These are not copied in the bill of exceptions, but the bill stipulates that counsel may, in this court, introduce a certain book of the rules of the Exchange which was introduced on the hearing below, and which contains all these documents. This book does not appear to be filed with the transcript, nor have we seen it. But there seems to be no dispute about its contents; and, for the purposes of this opinion, we shall assume that these acts and rules, so far as needed, are correctly set forth in the briefs of counsel.
It appears from the pleadings and evidence, that plaintiff is the assignee of a judgment rendered in December, 1876, in the St. Louis circuit court against Scheiferdecker for $10,666.74, which is unpaid; and that Scheiferdecker has no property subject to execution, if his membership in the Exchange be left out of question. Scheiferdecker is, and since 1873 has been, a member in good standing of the Merchants’ Exchange of St. Louis. His dues are paid. A certificate of membership in the Exchange has been duly issued to him, and is in the hands of the secretary of the Exchange for delivery to him. This certificate, No. 2394, is sealed with the seal of the Exchange and signed by its president and secretary; and sets forth that Scheifer
The question presented by the record is one that has arisen of late years and as to which the authorities are not in accord. It is, whether the seat of a member of a merchants’ exchange, such as is established in the large centres of commerce, and having a constitution and rules such as usually govern these exchanges and stock exchanges in America; is a species of property which, if not subject to execution by the ordinary process without the intervention of equity, may by proper
The question seems to have been first considered in the district court for the northern district of Illinois, on argument of a motion for a rule on a bankrupt, a member of the Chicago board of trade, that he assign and transfer to the assignee his certificate of membership in the board. In re Sutherland, 6 Biss. 526. The board of trade, in that case, was incorporated, its objects were similar to those of the Merchants’ Exchange of which the defendant in the case at bar is a member. As in the present case, membership conferred no pecuniary profit upon the member, except what was derived from the incidental use made of his privilege of membership by the member. Persons were admitted to membership by ballot — -a vote of two-thirds being requisite to elect — and were liable to expulsion for violation of the rules, or dishonorable conduct. The admission fee was $1,000. A member in good standing might transfer his certificate to any person eligible, after ten days’ notice, approved by a vote of two-thirds of the directors. The selling value of the membership was $500, where buyer and seller could comply with the conditions. It was held, that this membership confers no property rights, represents no interests in property, and conferred privileges similar only to those given by membership of a club or lodge. As the certificate expressed nothing that the assignee could use, except by consent of others, in the absence of authority, and from these supposed analogies, the learned judge detei’mined that the bankrupt’s membership can not be treated as a portion of his assets or pass to his assignee, and the motion was denied.
In the same year, the case of Hyde v. Woods was decided in the supreme court of the United States (94 U. S. 523). The case was this : The San Francisco stock and exchange board was a voluntary association, whose objects ai’e ex
Following this case, it was held, in 1877, by the New York superior court at special term, (Ritterband v. Baggett, 4 Abb. (N. C.) 67), that membership in a board of exchange which has a money value,.and is transferable subject to the purchaser’s procuring himself to - be elected a member, is property, thebeneficial interest in which passes to a receiver ; and that the receiver may maintain an action to compel the debtor to convey to a member elect with whom the receiver may contract for its sale. The board in question was the New York cotton exchange, an incorporated body. The initiation fees were $5,000. By a by-law, the property could not be assigned to anyone but a member or member elect. Other provisions were similar to those noted above in the San Francisco stock exchange.
Three years afterwards the same question came up for consideration in the district court of the United States for
The next cases to be considered, in chronological order, are Thompson v. Adams, and Pancoast v. Cowan, reported in ninety-third Pennsylvania Reports (pp. 55 and 66).
The question is carefully considered in an opinion of the superior court of Cook County, Illinois, per Gardner, J., reported in twenty-first volume of the American Law Register (p. 408). It is there held that certificates of membership in the board of trade of Chicago are property, and, as such, liable for the debts of the owner on a creditor’s-bill to subject them to the payment of his debts ; and that the debtor will be restrained from disposing of his certificate of membership, and ordered to execute a blank assignment thereof to the receiver appointed in the cause. On appeal, this judgment was reversed by the supreme court (Barclay v. Smith, 16 C. L. J. 437), which refers expressly to the Pennsylvania cases cited above, and says, generally, that it. has been referred to other cases holding a different view, but declines to review these cases, and says that it does not think they establish a correct rule, and that the supreme court of Illinois is not inclined to follow them.
These seems to be all the cases directly in point. To these might be added cases in which patent rights and similar interests have been subjected in equity to the payment of judgments. There can be no doubt that the weight of the authority is, that a seat of a member in a stock board or merchants’ exchange is a species of property not subject to ordinary execution, but which may be reached by equity processes in such a way as to respect the rules of the
With the concurrence of all the judges, the judgment is affirmed.