Opinion by
The Western Maryland Railway Company, defendant, is a duly registered foreign corporation; York is its principal place of business in this State, as its registration certificate filed with the secretary of the Commonwealth declares, and its railroad is partially located in York County. The cause of action arose in York, but the suit was brought in Adams County, where the plaintiff avers the defendant “owned or leased and operated a certain railroad” and maintained “an office, depot and place of
The question to be determined is: Do the courts of a county where a summons in trespass for personal injuries is issued have jurisdiction against a duly registered foreign corporation, if its business headquarters are located, and the cause of action arose, in another county, the defendant having an office, depot and place of business in the first county, and its railroad being located and operated in both?
The court below decided that the answer to the question involved depended upon the Act of June 8, 1911, P. L. 710, which provides that process against, foreign corporations registered in Pennsylvania “may be issued by any court......having jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, in any county of the Commonwealth in which said corporation shall have its principal place of business, or in such county in which the right of action arose,” saying, inter alia, “The only jurisdiction given by this act to courts..... .is in the counties where the principal place of business is located or where the right of action arose; all other jurisdiction is excluded by thus indicating where such process may be issued.”
The correctness of the conclusion reached by the learned court below depends upon the consideration of several acts of assembly. ■ “At the common law a corporation could only be sued in the territorial jurisdiction where it had its legal domicile (Park Bros. & Co., Ltd., v. Oil City Boiler Works, 204 Pa. 453, 456); hence, without enabling legislation, no action could be maintained against a foreign corporation in the State of Pennsylvania. In 1817 an act was passed (Act of March 22, P. L. 128), in reference to suits against corporate bodies; but it was early doubted by the courts whether this legislation contemplated foreign corporations (see opinion of Judge Pettit in Nash v. Rector, Church Wardens & Vestrymen of the Evang’l Lutheran Church, 1 Miles 78; also, in connection with this act, see opinion of Mr. Jus
Thus, in 1911, when the act construed by the court below was passed, there were upon the books three statutes dealing with the subject now before us; the earlier two treating of service and assuming jurisdiction in certain instances, and the last definitely conferring it. The Act of 1911, supra, is entitled, “An act to regulate the doing of business in this Commonwealth by foreign corporations, the registration thereof and service of process thereon, etc.” While, in part, this act purports to deal with the jurisdiction of the courts, yet, so far as it relates to that subject, it seems merely to present an endeavor to make plain that which the legislature may well have thought was veiled in some uncertainty, rather than to inaugurate anything new. There is nothing in the language employed in the statute that expressly limits or cuts down any previously vested jurisdiction to entertain suits against foreign corporations; _ If the act has any effect upon the subject of jurisdiction, when it provides that process against a foreign corporation “may” be
It must be admitted that, although the Acts of 1836 and 1849, supra, deal more with the subject of service than jurisdiction, yet they have been repeatedly and, perhaps, conclusively treated by the courts as conferring jurisdiction; nevertheless, in view of Mr. Justice Mitchell’s opinion, in Park Bros. & Co., v. Oil City Boiler Works, supra, construing the Act of July 9, 1901, P. L. 614, where he points out the material difference between legislation relating “solely” to methods of service and that conferring jurisdiction, the draftsmen of the statute passed in 1911 probably became unduly alarmed concerning what construction might in the future be placed upon these earlier statutes, and this, more than likely, explains the insertion in the Act of 1911 of the provision as to jurisdiction which gives rise to the question in the present case; however that may be, we are not convinced it was intended thereby, in any measure, to restrict the previously existing jurisdiction of the courts.
The construction which we place upon the act in question makes for accord with the rule as to domestic corporations (Bailey v. Williamsport & North Branch R. R. Co., supra; Jensen v. Philadelphia, Morton & Swarthmore St. Ry. Co., 201 Pa. 603; Park Bros. & Co. v. Oil City Boiler Works, supra); or, at least, it avoids a more
In our review of the legislation upon the subject under discussion, we have not overlooked the Act of April 21, 1858, P. L. 403, entitled “An act to authorize the service of process in cases of nonresidents doing business in this Commonwealth”’ but, since this statute has to do only with “service of process,” it could not properly be construed as extending the jurisdiction of the courts: Park Bros. & Co. v. Oil City Boiler Works, supra. Neither have we failed to note Section 8 of the Act of March 21, 1842, P. L. 145, nor that of March 17, 1856, P. L. 388; nor the amendment to the Service Act of 1901, supra, passed on April 3, 1903, (P. L. 139); and, of course, we have given due heed to the historical aspect of the repealed Act of April 22,1874, P. L. 108, passed to carry into effect Section 5, Article XVI, of the Constitution, which expressly ordains that “No foreign corporation shall do any business in this State without having one or more known places of business and an authorized agent or agents in the same upon whom process may be served.”
Counsel for the appellant, in their printed brief, say, “We do not complain because the service of the writ was set aside, - for the service, it is admitted, was defective ......; our complaint is that the learned court erred in quashing the writ for want of jurisdiction.” Since
The assignment of error is sustained, and the judgment is reversed with a procedendo.