Case Information
*1 Bеfore: GILMAN and WHITE, Circuit Judges; and THAPAR, District Judge. [*]
THAPAR, District Judge. Elias Debek, a native and citizen of Lebanon, asks us to review a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of his request for a continuance of his removal hearing. Because denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion, we deny the petition fоr review.
I.
Elias Debek (“Debek”) was born in Beirut, Lebanon in 1958. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 41. From 1979 until 2000, Debek lived and worked (with legal status) in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 121. Debek and his family left Lebanon in 1979 to survive the war going on at that time. at 45. He returned to Lebanon for fifteen to twenty days in the summer of 2000. at 121. Debek stated in *2 his asylum application that during that visit, Hezbollah members tried to recruit him. Id. at 45. After he refused to join them, Debek claimed that Hezbollah targeted him, and he became afraid for his safety. Id.
In July 2000, Debek traveled to the United States on a non-immigrant visitor visa that expired on July 4, 2001. Id. at 181. On January 10, 2003, the United States served Debek with a notice to appear and charged him with removability. Id. at 185-86. Debek appeared in front of Immigration Judge Robert Newberry (“IJ”) on June 1, 2004, and admitted his removability. Id. at 59. That day, Debek asked for “a couple of months” to put together an application for withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection, and voluntary departure. Id. at 60. When the parties reconvened on August 24, 2004, Debek had filed the application. Id. at 62. Debek notified the IJ thаt he also had an employment-based petition pending, and that he could soon be eligible to apply for an adjustment of status. Id. The IJ set Debek’s merits hearing for October 2005. Id. at [1]
63.
At his merits hearing, Debek’s attorney noted that he had filed for a continuance, which the IJ had already denied. at 69-70. Debek’s request was to postpone the hearing until his employment-based petition was adjudiсated. See Supplemental Appendix (“S.A.”) at 207-09. The IJ expressed concern over granting a continuance, since there was no guarantee Debek’s employment petition would ever be approved. J.A. at 70-71. Debek’s attorney proposed that if the IJ would continue the merits hearing, in return Debek would withdraw his asylum application. at 71. *3 Debek and his counsel believed that Debek’s employment application would be approved by July or August of 2006, and that he could apply for an adjustment of status at that time. Id. at 76-78. The government and the IJ agreed to the deal, with the added condition that if the employment application was not approved before the next hearing, Debek would voluntarily depart the United States. Id. at 76-79. After Debek consulted his lawyer outside of the courtroom, the IJ spoke with Debek to ensure that he understood the terms of the deal. Id. at 79-85. The IJ laid out the following:
[Y]ou would seek no further delays from [August 2006], that you would withdraw your application for withholding and its relief of asylum that might be viewed as part of that applicatiоn, not only as it now exists, but any application forever that you might have based on asylum and withholding, that if your application for adjustment was not ripe for a decision by this Court you would be given the chance of applying for voluntary departure and the Court would grant you the 60 days voluntary departure, assuming that you could meet all of the statutory and regulatory requirements.
Id. at 84. Debek agreed and the parties adjourned until August 4, 2006. Id. at 79, 87-89.
On July 21, 2006, Debek filed what the IJ called a memorandum of changed circumstances. Id. at 92. At the August 4, 2006, hearing, Debek informed the IJ that he was still not eligible for an adjustment of status—but that he no longer wished to voluntarily depart. Id. He asked for yet another continuance to preрare a new asylum application. Id. at 103-04. Debek claimed that he had been prepared to leave the United States voluntarily, pursuant to the terms of the October 2005 agreement, but Israel and Hezbollah were now in a violent conflict. Id. at 110-11. He feared that he may not have a home to return to in Beirut. Id. at 114. Debek stated he was аfraid that if he returned to Lebanon, one of the planes might bomb him and his family. at 117. He was also afraid of Hezbollah, although he stated that he had never dealt with them because he had been in Saudi Arabia. at 115. When asked why he feared them, he referred to the ongoing conflict and *4 said: “[b]ecause I am a resident of the suburb of Beirut and where аm I to go live, in a school or in a hospital?” Id. at 117.
The IJ denied Debek’s motion for continuance and ordered his removal. Id. at 36-37; 124. The IJ did not believe that Debek should have reneged on the October 2005 agreement and found Debek’s testimony incredible. Id. at 32-35. The IJ also focused heavily on the fact that Debek stated in his 2004 asylum application that Hеzbollah had tried to recruit him, id. at 35, while at the hearing he said he had never dealt with Hezbollah, id. at 115. He noted that if Debek had been pursuing voluntary departure, as he claimed, he would already have travel documents and could depart to a country other than Lebanon. Id. at 36-37.
Debek appealed the IJ decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). S.A. at 195-
205. The BIA noted that before granting a continuance to pursue relief, the agency considers
whether an alien can make out a prima facie case of eligibility for that relief. J.A. at 16. The BIA
affirmed the IJ’s finding that Debek was incredible.
Id.
at 16-17. It further found that Debek could
not establish a prima facie claim for asylum basеd on generalized fears. at 17. The BIA’s denial
of Debek’s appeal became the final decision of the agency, which is what we review here.
Khalili
v. Holder
,
II.
Debek asks that we grant his petition and reverse the BIA’s decision for several reasons. He contests the credibility finding, and argues that he should have been given an opportunity to explain thе discrepancies in his testimony. Pet. Br. at 21-25. He contends that his testimony and evidence meet the prima facie burden for asylum relief. at 29-33. Further, Debek alleges that the IJ *5 coerced him into withdrawing his asylum petition and in doing so violated his due process rights. Id. at 18-19. Finally, he argues that the IJ and BIA should have granted him a continuance to file a new petition based on Lebanon’s drastically changed conditions that occurred after Debek’s deal to withdraw his asylum petition. Id. For the reasons explained below, these arguments fail.
A.
The IJ has the discretion to grant a continuance for good cause. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. The IJ should exercise that discretion favorably when “a prima facie approvable visa petition and adjustment application have been submitted in the course of an ongoing removal hearing.” In re Hashmi , 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009). We review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial [2]
of Debek’s motion for continuance under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Ilic-Lee v. Mukasey , 507 F.3d 1044, 1047 (6th Cir. 2007).
Debek did not show prima facie eligibility for asylum. To show eligibility for asylum, Debek must demonstrate an unwillingness to return to his home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
Debek’s testimony was his only particularized evidence of a well-founded fear of
persecution; thus it follows that if he was not credible, he could not show prima facie eligibility for
asylum. J.A. at 16-17. Separate from the adverse credibility finding, the BIA also correctly held that
even if Debek’s testimony were credible, his fear of returning to Lebanon was too generalized to
meet the standard for asylum relief.
Id.
at 17;
see Harchenko v. INS
,
1. Credibility
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Debek was not credible.
See Ben
Hamida v. Gonzales
,
Debek argues that the IJ should have provided him the opportunity to reconcile the
discrepancies in his testimony. Pet. Br. at 21-22, 24. He contends in his petition, as he did before
the BIA, that his statement that he had nothing to do with Hezbollah did not contradict his еarlier
statements about Hezbollah’s attempted recruitment. Since he rejected their recruitment efforts,
Debek explains, he had nothing to do with them. at 21; S.A. at 202. We cannot say that the BIA
erred in rejecting this explanation, because Debek cannot show his explanation
compels
a reasonable
*7
adjudicator to find his testimony credible.
Yu
,
2. Failure to Show Reasonable Fear of Persecution
The BIA also addressed Debek’s failure to show a particularized fear of future persecution.
J.A. at 17. To prove eligibility for asylum, Debek would have to show “fear of persecution [ ] both
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.”
Lumaj v. Gonzales
,
To show a well-founded fear of future persecution, “an applicant cannot rely on speculative
conclusions or mere assertions of fear of possible persecution, but instead must offer reasonably
specific information showing a real threat of individual persecution.”
Mapouya v. Gonzales
, 487
F.3d 396, 412 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accepting Debek’s
testimony as credible, we are left with two possible grounds for an asylum claim. First, based on the
hearing, Debek feared the conflict in Lebanon. The BIA correctly points out that “random acts of
violence during a period of strife generally do not constitute persecution . . . .” J.A. at 17. A
generalized fear during оngoing conflict is insufficient to establish the individualized fear required
for asylum, withholding, and protection from torture.
Harchenko
,
Second, in his asylum application, Debek stated that he feared Hezbollah because they tried to recruit him in the past; he argues that his political opinion of being anti-Hezbоllah is protected grounds for asylum. Pet Br. at 30-31. Here Debek also fails to prove a particularized fear of future persecution. Debek argues that he need not prove that he would be singled out by Hezbollah, but instead he can show that “there is a pattern or practice in his or her country . . . of persecution of a group оf persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See id. at 28 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)). Although Debek is correct that an alien can show a pattern of persecution, he must also prove “his or her own inclusion in, and identification with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.” 8 C.F.R.§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(B).
We have held that imputed political opinion can be grounds for asylum protection.
Abdulnoor v. Ashcroft
,
Debek also argues that the changed circumstances in Lebanon gave him cause to file an asylum application in June 2006, even though the one-year deadline to file for asylum relief had passed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii). Because the continuance was not denied based on the one- year deadline, Debek’s changed circumstance has no bearing on the result here.
Debek’s continuance request was not limited to his asylum application. He also sought a
continuance for his pending applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection. Since
Debek cannot establish a prima facie case for asylum, the least stringent of all three remedies, he
necessarily cannot show eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection.
Hassan v.
Gonzales
,
B.
Debek argues that his case should be remanded because his due process rights were violated.
He maintains that the IJ and the government coerced him into withdrawing his asylum petition and
that he was denied a fair hearing. Pet. Br. at 18-21. However, Debek did not raise these arguments
to the BIA.
See
S.A. at 196-205. He notified the BIA of his perceived discrimination and hostility
from the IJ, but did not assert coercion and due process violations. This Court lacks jurisdiction to
review any issues that have not been raised and administratively exhausted below.
See
8 U.S.C. §
1252(d)(1);
Ramani v. Ashcroft
,
Even if we were to consider his arguments on the merits, they would fail. Tо show a due
process violation, Debek would have to demonstrate that (1) there was a defect in the removal
proceeding; and (2) the defect was prejudicial.
See Ndrecaj v. Mukasey
,
Debek asserts that his due process rights were violated because the IJ and government attorneys coerced him into making the October 2005 deal to withdraw his removal petition with prejudice. Pet. Br. at 18-19. We leave for another day the question whether an alien’s due process rights are violated where he agrees in a removal proceeding to concede some type of relief. The BIA did not base its denial of the continuance on Debek’s agreement to withdraw his 2004 asylum application. See J.A. at 15-17. Instead, the BIA focused on the likelihood that Debek could succeed on the merits of a newly filed asylum petition and, as discussed above, concluded he could not. Therefore, since the agreement did not affect the outcome of his case, Debek was not prejudiced.
Additionally, Debek repeatedly asserts that “[d]ue process dictates that an alien must have
a full and fair hearing on his applications for relief” and that the IJ and BIA refused to allow him to
apply for the relief to which he is entitled.
Id.
at 20-21. This argument also fails. Debek had the
opportunity to apply for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief. The IJ had already granted Debek one
continuance to wait for an employment visa. Debek’s August 2006 hearing had been set for eight
months so that Debek could prepare for a voluntary departure or obtain an employment visa. An
alien must have a full and fair hearing on his applications for relief, but he is not entitled to infinite
revisions of that application and opportunities to delay rеsolution of his case.
El Harake v. Gonzales
,
Since thе BIA acted within its discretion and Debek cannot show that he suffered any prejudice, his due process claims would fail on the merits. Moreover, because Debek failed to exhaust his claims, we lack jurisdiction to review them and must deny this portion of his petition.
III.
For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.
Notes
[*] The Honorable Amul R. Thapar, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designаtion.
[1] “[A]n alien physically present in the United States” who is the beneficiary of “an application for a labor certification under section 1182(a)(5)(A) . . . may apply to the Attorney General for the adjustment of his or her status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(i)(1). If eligible for an employment-based adjustment of status, Debek would not need to apply for withholding of removal based on any other grounds.
[2] The BIA follows its own internal regulations and IJs follow binding BIA decisions.
Aburto-Rocha v. Mukasey
,