106 P. 939 | Utah | 1910
This case was submitted to the district court upon an agreed statement of facts, substantially as follows: That the appellant is, and at all times since January 1, 1907, has been, the duly elected, qualified, and acting clerk of the district court of Salt Lake County, "Utah. That pursuant to the provisions of Act Cong. June 29, 1906, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 97), entitled “An act to establish a bureau of immigration and naturalization and to provide for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens throughout the United States,” the appellant has collected from the applicants for citizenship the fees provided by said act to be collected by him, and that he has accounted for one-half of the fees so collected by him as provided by said act, but that he has retained and now has in his possession the remaining one-half of said fees, -amounting to the sum of $632. That the services for which said fees
Under the laws of this state appellant discharges the duties of cleric of the district court of Salt Lake County as the county clerk of said county. The laws applicable to county clerks are therefore applicable to appellant. By section 1 of article 21 of the Constitution of this state it is, among other things, provided that “all city, district, state, county, town, and school officers . . . shall be paid fixed and definite salaries.” By the section following the foregoing it is, in substance, provided that the Legislature shall by law provide the fees which shall be collected by the officers referred to in the preceding section, and that all such officers “shall be required by law to keep a true and correct account of all fees collected by them, and to pay the same into the proper treasury, and' the officer whose duty it is to collect such fees shall be held responsible on his bond for the same.” Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the Legislature, from time to time, has passed certain acts in which the fees for the services rendered by the different officers mentioned in the ■Constitution, including appellant, are fixed. The law also provides that the fees collected by the county officers, includ-: ing appellant, shall be paid into the county treasury monthly. Among other fees provided for by the section of the statute which applies to appellant, and which he, before the act of Congress aforesaid was in force, was required to collect and account for, are the following items: “B'or declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, two dollars; for final citizenship certificate, three dollars.” By section 2057, Comp. Laws 1907, the maximum amount of what appellant’s salary may be fixed, and by section 2062 the
Up to the year 1906 the naturalization laws of the United States were found in the different acts of Congress, commencing with the act passed in the year 1802 (Act April 14, 1802, chap. 28, 2 Stat. 153). This act was amended from time to time, as appears from title 30 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which title comprises sections 2165 to 2174, inclusive (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1329-1334), and was entitled, “Naturalization.” These naturalization laws are also found in Rev. St., Utah 1898, pp. 87-90. It was by the act of 1802, that Congress first conferred the authority upon state courts to admit qualified aliens to citizenship. It seems that up to 1906, the naturalization laws were neither rigorous nor very explicit, and during all of the time from 1802 to 1906 Congress had left it to the several states to determine and fix the fees that the state or county officers should be permitted to collect for the services rendered by them in hearing and passing on application for and in making a record of the proceedings by which qualified aliens were admitted to citizenship-. The matter of fixing, collecting, and accounting for fees accruing in said courts was thus a matter with which Congress did not concern itself until the passage of the act of June 29, 1906, known as the present naturalization act. This act is set forth in full in the Compiled Laws of Utah of 1907, at pages 114 to 130, inclusive. That act is the only comprehensive law ever enacted by Congress upon the subject of naturalization in which the entire procedure is provided, and in which provision for the collection of fees is made, and the manner of accounting for them is provided for. In section 3 of that act jurisdiction to naturalize aliens is conferred on all the Federal courts, and also upon “courts of record in any state . . . having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdictions of action at law or equity ... in which the amount in controversy is unlimited.” In section 13 of the act the clerk of each court is required to “charge, cob leet, and account” for fees as follows: For receiving and
Upon the facts and the laws as above outlined, the district court found in favor of respondent county, and entered judgment requiring appellant to account for said sum of six hundred and thirty-two dollars received by him as fees in naturalization proceedings. Appellant presents the record to this court for review on appeal.
The only question, in view of the record, to be determined is whether 'appellant, as ex officio clerk of the district court of Salt Lake County, should be required to account to said county for the fees collected by him in naturalization proceedings. Stating it in another form, does appellant receive such fees by virtue of his office, so that the
The question as to whether the state courts continue or cease to be state courts while acting in naturalization cases, while interesting, is not material. It is enough for the present to know that in so doing such courts are merely agencies of the national government. It, however, does not follow that because Congress has the power to authorize appellant to act as an agent of the national government in naturalization proceedings Congress may likewise make his acts in that regard a paid of the duties of the office held by him. The office held by him is and can be created by the state alone. The state within its sphere of sovereign power may thus impose any duties it sees fit upon the office it has
From the foregoing it seems clear to us that the duties which appellant discharged and the services rendered by him by virtue of the act of Congress aforesaid are not duties which are imposed on nor services which are rendered as a part of the county office to which he was elected and of which he was the incumbent during the time in
It is conceded by counsel for respondent- that the State is powerless to fix or impose fees in naturalization proceedings without the consent of Congress. That this must be so seems clear, because to admit aliens to become citizens is a function belonging exclusively to' the national government. But Counsel for respondent nevertheless insists that, although the Congress fixed the fees and authorized appellant to retain one-half thereof as compensation for services rendered by him under the congressional act and required him to account to the national government for the other one-half, that not
The case of Finley v. Territory, 12 Okl. 621, 73 Pac. 273, is also relied on by respondent. In that case the office in question was a territorial office. By an act of Congress certain duties were imposed upon the incumbents of certain offices for which certain fees were provided by the act. Under the laws of the territory of Oklahoma, the officers were paid salaries for official services rendered. One of those officers, a probate judge, performed the duties imposed by the congressional act aforesaid, and claimed the fees allowed by the act as compensation, in addition to his official salary. It was held that the duties imposed by the act of Congress
Under the view we have taken of the questions involved in the case at bar, we do not deem it necessary to discuss further the other cases that are cited by the respective counsel in support of their respective claims and theories. Counsel have not cited nor have we been able to find any case in which the precise question involved in the case at bar has been passed on. We have, therefore, determined the questions involved in accordance with fundamental principles as we understand them.
The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded to said court, with directions to enter a judgment upon the facts as stipulated, in favor of the appellant, appellant to recover costs.