188 Ga. 65 | Ga. | 1939
The ordinance, for the purpose of licensing and fixing a graduated scale of fees upon meat markets, classifies them on the basis of the volume of sales made during the preceding year. It contains no provision for license fees to be paid by meat markets that were not operated during the preceding year. It was attacked on the grounds stated above, in that it lacks uniformity, and that it is arbitrary and discriminatory. In attempting to classify, the ordinance fails to embrace all of the class. The law recognizes the right and power of a municipal government to make reasonable classifications of subjects for taxation, and to make subclassifications of such classes. Sawtell v. Atlanta, 138
Counsel for the plaintiffs in error rely strongly on Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329 (22 Sup. Ct. 382, 46 L. ed. 569). While the ordinance in that case was very similar to the one here involved, the constitutional attacks were different. The grounds of attack were, as pointed out in Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (55 Sup. Ct. 525, 79 L. ed. 1054), that the classes were so defined that a merchant whose sales were just enough to come within a class paid at a higher rate than one whose sales were almost large enough to come within that class; that the lowest
Judgment affirmed.