3 Paige Ch. 296 | New York Court of Chancery | 1831
it is evident, from the affidavit on the part of the defendants, that here are two corporations, or bodies claiming to be corporations, contending for the possession of this meeting house. If the_ only contest between these parties is as to which is the corporation legally entitled to the possession of the temporalities of the church or society originally formed in Hartford, I think the complainants have mistaken their remedy. They should have settled that right either by an action of trespass against the individuals who took possession of the pulpit, or by an action of ejectment to recover possession of the meeting house. By referring to the statute relative to the incorporation of religious societies, (S R, S. 295, § 4,) it will be found that the trustees of a church or society, when legally incorporated, are authorized to take into their possession all the property of the society, whether the same was given directly to such church or society, or to any other person for their use; and they are to hold such property as fully and amply as if the right or title thereto had been originally vested in the trustees. I think the only rational construction which can be given to this part of the statute is, that if the grantor or any other person held the estate originally in trust for the church or society, the legal estate is transferred to the corporation whenever the requisites of the statute are compli
In the case of The Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors, (4 Wheaton's Rep. 1,) the supreme court of the United States decided that an unincorporated association could not take land by devise to them in the name of their society, and that a devise of that description could not be executed by a court of chancery, as a charity by the common law. But, in a subsequent case, the same court sustained a bill by the nominal trustees of an unincorporated religious society, to protect their right to a lot of ground, granted for the use of such society by the name of “ The German Lutheran Church.” (Beatty & Ritchie v. Kurtz, 2 Peters' Rep. 566.) And in the late case of Inglis v. The Sailors' Snug Harbor, (3 Idem. 114,) they held a devise valid, which provided for the vesting of the property in a corporation to be thereafter created. Similar decisions have been made in several of the state courts in respect to lands granted or devised for pious uses, or other purposes of charity. (1 Greenl. Rep. 271. 9 Mass. Rep. 44.) At the time the deed of Norton and wife was executed, conveying the property to this society, by their associate name, the statute was in existence, by which the members of the society were authorized to incorporate themselves whenever they thought proper ; and by which statute it was declared that the legal title to property thus conveyed should, in that event, vest in the corporation. The legal title being in the corporation which was first properly constituted, the parties must be left to their legal remedy to ascertain whether the complainants are entitled to the possession of the property, or the corporation of which a part of the defendants are trustees, if there can be any doubt on that subject.
It may, however, be proper, as it may save unnecessary litigation to these parties, to state briefly my views on that question. The complainants appear to have acted on the supposition that the decision of the ecclesiastical judicatory, that a certain portion of the members of the Baptist church in Hartford were heterodox in doctrine or practice, and were not the true church, must have a legal effect upon the incorporation of the members of this religious society. But I apprehend that in
The affidavit on the part of the defendants shows that the incorporation of the society, on the 6th of September last, was
The fact that the corporators whom the complainants represent own two thirds of the pews, cannot alter the rights of the parties. The grant of a pew in perpetuity does not give to the owner an absolute right of property, as in a grant of land in fee. The grantee is only entitled to the use of the pew, for the purpose of sitting therein during divine service. (Sayer's Rep. 177. 1 Phil. Rep. 323. 3 Picker. Rep. 344. 4 New-Hamp. Rep. 480. 7 Picker. Rep. 138.) But the owner of the pew may maintain case, trespass or ejectment, ac
The question whether the trustees of this society can lawfully change the nature of the institution, as originally established, cannot be decided between the present parties. If the defendants, as trustees of the corporation which has the legal control of the temporalities of this society or congregation, abuse the trust reposed in them by the corporators or those for whose benefit they hold the property, and misapply the funds of the society, I am inclined to think this court, at common law, has power to compel them to account for such misapplication; notwithstanding the provision in the revised statutes excepting religious incorporations from the visitorial power which is expressly given to the chancellor in relation to ordinary corporations. (2 R. S. 461, art. 2.) But it must be 'a most plain and'palpable abuse of power, which will induce this court to interfere as to any dispute growing out of religious or sectarian controversies. In the case of The Attorney- General v. Pearson, (3 Meriv. Rep. 264,) to which I was referred, on the argument, as a leading case on this subject, Lord Eldon did interfere to prevent the trustees of a church erected for Trinitarian Protestant dissenters from being converted into an Unitarian chapel; although a great portion of the members of the congregation were said to have embraced the new doctrines. It must, however, be recollected that the chancellor was there administering the equity of the statute, (43 Eliz. ch. 4,) relative to charitable uses; which statute is not in force here. His lordship puts his decision upon the ground that the court is bound to see the trust executed according to the intention of the original founders of the charity, without enquiring whether the doctrines intended to be taught in that particular church be right or wrong. In the case under consideration I presume the original founders of the Baptist church in Hartford, in conformity with the generally received opinion among calvinistic Baptists, believed the holy sabbath was of Divine institution; and that they intended such doctrines should be taught in that church and congregation. Upon that supposition, if Elder Witherell is permitted by the trustees to inculcate a different doctrine in his public discourses in this church.
Without pursuing this subject further, it is sufficient for the decision of this application to say, there is nothing in this bill to authorize the court to grant the relief which is now asked for against these defendants.
The motion for an injunction is therefore denied, with costs,