EL RANCHO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
L.A. No. 31581
Supreme Court of California
May 31, 1983
33 Cal. 3d 946
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Paul M. Loya and Brian M. Libow for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael R. White, Kirsten L. Zerger, Raymond L. Hansen, Penn Foote, Henry R. Fenton and Levy & Goldman for Defendants and Respondents.
Dennis Sullivan, Jeffrey Sloan, Elaine B. Feingold and Andrea L. Biren as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
BIRD, C. J.—Does the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB) have exclusive jurisdiction over a school district‘s complaint for damages resulting from a teachers’ strike led by noncertified employee organizations?
I.
This case, which began in the trial court over five years ago, is still in the pleading stage. It was before this court on one prior occasion. Although it has a complicated procedural history, the events giving rise to the litigation are essentially without controversy.
Plaintiff is the El Rancho Unified School District (District). Defendants are four labor unions—the National Education Association, its affiliates, the California Teachers Association and the El Rancho Education Association, and the California Federation of Teachers and its affiliate, the El Rancho Federation of Teachers (Unions).
When the students enrolled in the District returned to school in the fall of 1976, they were met with a teachers’ strike in which a large number of the District‘s teachers participated. The strike, which was called for and led by the Unions, lasted from the first day of school, September 13, 1976, until October 7, 1976, and allegedly cost the District over $1 million. At the time of the strike, none of the Unions had been recognized or certified as the exclusive representative of the District‘s teachers under the then newly enacted Education Employment Relations Act (EERA). (
On June 15, 1977, PERB‘s general counsel ordered the first of the unfair practice claims dismissed without leave to amend after concluding that the District lacked standing to assert its employees’ rights. The District appealed and on December 30, 1977, PERB reversed this ruling and remanded the case to the general counsel for settlement or hearing. (See El Rancho Federation of Teachers, et al. (Dec. 30, 1977) EERB Dec. No. 45.)
On September 30, 1977, while its PERB appeal was still pending, the District filed the present tort action against the Unions in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Seeking actual damages of $1.1 million and punitive damages of $10 million, the District charged the Unions with (1) inducing the El Ran-
The Unions demurred to the complaint on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. (See
In support of their argument, the Unions directed the court‘s attention to
The Unions’ demurrers were overruled on March 15, 1978. Undeterred, they petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition commanding the trial court to dismiss the action. Alternative writs were issued, but on July 19, 1978, the appellate court continued the hearing on the writs pending this court‘s decision in San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 1 [154 Cal.Rptr. 893, 593 P.2d 838], a case involving similar issues.
The decision in San Diego Teachers was filed in April of 1979. In it, this court held that PERB had exclusive jurisdiction over a school district‘s action to enjoin an allegedly illegal strike led by an exclusive representative, since the strike arguably constituted an unfair practice under EERA. (Id., at p. 14.) However, this holding was explicitly limited to actions seeking “injunctions against strikes by public school employee organizations recognized or certified as exclusive representatives.” (Ibid., citation omitted.)
Confronted with this unquestionably cryptic order, the Unions filed a petition for rehearing. When it was denied, they petitioned for hearing in this court. By order filed September 26, 1979, their petition was denied “without prejudice to [their] right to seek reconsideration by the trial court of its prior rulings in light of the intervening decision of San Diego Teachers....”
Thus armed, the Unions returned to the trial court and promptly moved for reconsideration of the order overruling their demurrers. The trial court reconsidered its ruling and on January 14, 1980, sustained the demurrers but gave the District leave to amend.
The District subsequently filed an amended complaint. The first three causes of action in the amended complaint are virtually identical to the three causes of action stated in the original complaint. The only additions or deletions of interest are these. First, the District eliminated the allegation that the Unions coerced the teachers into participating in the strike. Instead, the amended complaint merely avers that the Unions “encouraged, advised, and induced” the teachers to strike.
Second, the District added to the first and third causes of action an allegation stating that the District‘s unfair practice charge was “dismissed” by PERB and “such dismissal was stipulated by the parties to be without prejudice to [the District] in this litigation.”7 In addition, the third cause of action now charges the Unions with conspiring to coerce and coercing the District not only to negotiate with the Unions in violation of section 3543.3 but also to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with them.
The Unions again demurred, and on July 15, 1980, the trial court finally sustained their demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the action.9 Their victory, however, was short-lived.
The District appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment insofar as it dismissed the first and second causes of action. Although the Court of Appeal agreed that San Diego Teachers was controlling, it concluded that PERB had no jurisdiction over the Union‘s strike activity because there was no arguable basis on which the strike could be found to constitute an unfair practice under EERA. In all other respects, the trial court‘s judgment was affirmed.
This court granted the Union‘s petition for hearing because of the importance of the issues presented.10
II.
The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether EERA divests a superior court of jurisdiction to entertain a school district‘s tort suit for damages arising out of a teachers’ strike led by noncertified unions.
In San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d 1, this court held that PERB has exclusive jurisdiction over actions to enjoin strikes by public school employee
In reaching the conclusion that a superior court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin a strike by an exclusive representative, San Diego Teachers embraced the preemption doctrine developed by the federal courts under the
Stated broadly, under the federal preemption doctrine, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is held to have exclusive jurisdiction over activities arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. (San Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) (Garmon II) 359 U.S. 236, 244-245 [3 L.Ed.2d 775, 782-783, 79 S.Ct. 773]; see also Local 926 v. Jones (1983) 460 U.S. 669, 677-678 [75 L.Ed.2d 368, 378-379, 103 S.Ct. 1453].) As the Supreme Court has explained on numerous occasions, the aim of this rule is to avoid conflict “in its broadest sense” in the regulation of labor-management relations, “conflict with [the] complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy and administration.” (Garmon II, supra, 359 U.S. at p. 243 [3 L.Ed.2d at p. 782]; accord Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters (1978) 436 U.S. 180, 197, 202-203 [56 L.Ed.2d 209, 225, 228-229, 98 S.Ct. 1745]; Farmer v. Carpenters (1977) 430 U.S. 290, 305 [51 L.Ed.2d 338, 353, 97 S.Ct. 1056]; Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge (1971) 403 U.S. 274, 285 [29 L.Ed.2d 473, 482, 91 S.Ct. 1909].)
The conduct complained of in the District‘s complaint is, of course, the Unions’ strike. Count I charges the Unions with inducing teachers to strike and thus to breach their employment contracts with the District. Count II charges the Unions with engaging in an “illegal strike,” and count III charges that the Unions, by engaging in a strike, forced the District to negotiate and enter into a collective bargaining agreement with them in violation of its duty to “meet and negotiate with and only with... exclusive representatives....” (
The Unions first contend that the strike arguably could have involved a violation of
PERB, the Unions suggest, might find that teachers were induced to participate in the strike at issue here against their will and by means prohibited by this section. Indeed, it might. In fact, in its unfair practice charge (and in its original complaint), the District alleged that the Unions engaged in coercive, threatening and intimidating conduct toward teachers during the strike. Moreover, under the test of coercion and intimidation which PERB has adopted, strike-related conduct will be found to violate
The Unions reason that “meeting and negotiating” with a noncertified union constitutes unlawful support because a public school employer thereby accords a union which does not represent a majority of the employees in a unit the authority and status of an exclusive representative.
The assumption underlying this argument—that the representation rights afforded noncertified unions are not equivalent to the representation rights afforded exclusive representatives—appears well-founded. Exclusive representatives clearly have the right to “meet and negotiate” with a public school employer. (
In construing analogous provisions of the State Employer-Employee Relations Act (
Thus, two separate theories support the proposition that the Unions’ strike was prohibited under EERA‘s unfair practice provisions.
This being so, only one question remains to be considered in deciding whether preemption is justified in this case under the arguably prohibited branch of the preemption doctrine. That question is “whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to... or different from... that which could have been presented” to PERB. (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, 436 U.S. 180, 197 [56 L.Ed.2d 209, 225].) As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “it is only in the former situation that a court‘s exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board....” (Id. at p. 197 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 225-226].)
A recent Supreme Court decision, Local 926 v. Jones, supra, 460 U.S. 669 [75 L.Ed.2d 368], provides guidance for this case. There, the plaintiff sued a union in state court for causing his dismissal from a supervisor‘s position with a utility company. He contended that since federal labor law only prohibited a union from coercing an employer to discharge a supervisor, his state claim was distinct from that which he could have presented to the NLRB. Therefore, his state action was not preempted by federal law.
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff‘s argument on three grounds. First, the court reasoned that to the extent that the state cause of action “cover[ed] coercive influence on the employer,” it was identical to the federal unfair labor practice claim, and was, therefore, preempted. (Id., at p. 682 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 379].) Secondly, if the plaintiff‘s claim that the union noncoercively interfered with his employment relationship were permitted to go forward, it “would... require the state court to decide in the first instance whether the
In this case, strikes are an unfair practice under EERA only if they involve a violation of the act‘s provisions. (See San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 13.) As a result, the District argues that the issues which it could present in court are broader than the issues it could present to PERB. In the District‘s view, PERB would be concerned only with the existence of unfair labor practices—asserted to be a minor aspect of this case—and not with the harm to the District and to the public flowing from the allegedly illegal strike itself.
The District‘s argument fails for two reasons. First, the issue before PERB would have been whether the strike itself was unlawful as it was the means by which the Unions allegedly caused the district to meet and negotiate with them in violation of sections 3543.6, subdivision (a) and 3543.5, subdivision (d). Similarly, in its court action, the District challenges the legality of the strike itself. Thus, as in Local 926, the controversy presented in both forums may fairly be termed the same.
Second, and more fundamentally, the District‘s argument hinges on an assumption rejected by this court in San Diego Teachers. It “presupposes a disparity between public and PERB interests.” (24 Cal.3d at p. 11.) As this court explained, “The public interest is to minimize interruptions of educational services. [A]n identical concern underlie[s the] enactment of the EERA. ... PERB‘s responsibility for administering the EERA requires that it use its power... in ways that will further the public interest in maintaining the continuity and quality of educational services.” (Ibid., italics added.) Thus, there is little chance that PERB will ignore “the larger harm” involved in a teachers’ strike. Moreover, it is equally clear that PERB has the authority to take steps to alleviate that harm in order to effectuate its duties and the purposes of the act. (
Application of the arguably prohibited branch of the preemption doctrine is, therefore, fully justified in this case.
As an independent and alternative ground for finding the superior court‘s jurisdiction preempted, the Unions assert that their strike may be protected under EERA. They argue by analogy to decisions under the NLRA which
While conceding that EERA does not provide express protection for economic strikes,17 the Unions reason that strikes undertaken in response to unfair practices on the part of a public school employer—i.e., unfair labor practice strikes—may be ruled protected. That idea may seem anomalous. In fact, it is not. The proposition finds substantial support in this court‘s decision in San Diego Teachers which recognized that “EERA gives PERB discretion to withhold as well as to pursue” a remedy and that the overriding consideration is whether imposition of a remedy will effectuate the purposes of the act. (24 Cal.3d at pp. 12-13; see
The proposition also finds support in a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court interpreting that state‘s Public Employment Relations Act (see
It is equally clear that some of the employer unfair practice provisions contained in EERA are as applicable to noncertified unions as they are to exclusive representatives.
This possibility provides a further reason for concluding that the District‘s tort causes of action are within PERB‘s exclusive jurisdiction. (Cf. Lamphere Sch. v. Lamphere Fed. of Teachers, supra, 252 N.W.2d at pp. 824-825.)
As the Supreme Court has explained, the arguably protected branch of the preemption doctrine “unquestionably requires that when the same controversy may be presented to the... court or the [Board], it must be presented to the Board. But [this rule] does not extend to cases in which an employer has no acceptable method of invoking, or inducing the Union to invoke, the jurisdiction of the Board,” unless there is “a significant risk of misinterpretation of [the governing labor law] and the consequent prohibition of protected conduct.” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 202-203 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 228-229], see discussion at pp. 199-202 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 226-228].)
Applying this rule to the case before this court, to the extent that the Unions’ conduct is arguably protected, there exists a “potential overlap” between the controversy presented to the superior court here and the controversy that might have been presented to PERB. (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 200 [56 L.Ed.2d at p. 227].) Prior to granting the District an award of damages based on the Unions’ strike, the superior court would of necessity have to decide whether the strike was protected under EERA. (See, e.g., Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier (1941) 18 Cal.2d 33, 35 [112 P.2d 631].) Resolution of that question would require a decision as to whether the District had engaged in unfair labor practices. In a proceeding before PERB on an unfair practice charge, it too would have been required to make this same decision.
Moreover, it appears—at least under the circumstances of this case—that the Board could have obtained a PERB decision on whether the Unions’ conduct was protected. It had only not to withdraw its unfair practice charge. In deciding whether a remedy should be imposed against the Unions, PERB could have investigated and determined whether the Unions’ strike was protected.19
Having concluded that the Unions’ strike was arguably protected or prohibited under EERA and that application of the preemption doctrine is fully justified under either prong, it follows that the superior court would not have had jurisdiction to enjoin the strike. (San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d 1; cf. San Diego Unions v. Garmon (Garmon I) (1956) 353 U.S. 26 [1 L.Ed.2d 618, 77 S.Ct. 607] [a court may not enjoin conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA].) Nor does it have jurisdiction to award the District damages arising out of the strike. (Cf. Garmon II, supra, 359 U.S. at pp. 246-247 [3 L.Ed.2d at pp. 783-784].)
EERA establishes a comprehensive scheme of law, remedy and administration through PERB. (San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 12.) In delimiting the areas of conduct which are within PERB‘s exclusive jurisdiction, the courts must necessarily be concerned with avoiding conflict not only in the substantive rules of law to be applied, but also in remedies and administration, if state policy is to be unhampered. The United States Supreme Court put the matter well when, 24 years ago, it made the following observation. “Nor is it significant that [the court] assert[s] its power to give damages rather than to enjoin what the Board may restrain though it could not compensate. Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from... regulation [by the courts] if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. ... [S]ince remedies form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation, to allow the [courts] to grant a remedy... which has been withheld from the... Board only accentuates the danger of conflict.” (Garmon II, supra, 359 U.S. at pp. 246-247 [3 L.Ed.2d at pp. 783-784].)20
III.
Through the preemption doctrine “[b]oth federal and state courts seek to avoid conflicting adjudications which may interfere with [a labor] board‘s abili-
PERB can assist in mediating employer-union differences when strikes occur or are threatened. It can seek injunctive relief, and if an injunction is violated, contempt sanctions may be sought. These remedies are far more likely to accomplish the Legislature‘s goal of “foster[ing] constructive employment relations (
Moreover, “[a] court... cannot with expertise tailor its remedy to implement the broader objectives entrusted to PERB.” (San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 13.) PERB, however, can, for “EERA gives PERB discretion to withhold as well as to pursue, the various remedies at its disposal.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Accordingly, this court holds that EERA divests the superior courts of jurisdiction to entertain a school district‘s complaint for damages arising out of a teachers’ strike led by noncertified unions. To paraphrase San Diego Teachers, PERB has exclusive initial jurisdiction to determine whether such a strike is an unfair practice and what, if any, remedies should be pursued.
The trial court‘s order sustaining the Unions’ demurrer to the District‘s complaint and dismissing its action is affirmed.
Mosk, J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., Reynoso, J., and Grodin, J., concurred.
RICHARDSON, J.—I concur in the judgment, but only under the compulsion of San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 1 [154 Cal.Rptr. 893, 593 P.2d 838], in which I dissented.
As I explained in my dissent in that case, public employees’ strikes are illegal in this state. (Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1960) 54 Cal.2d 684, 687 [8 Cal.Rptr. 1, 355 P.2d 905]; see
Unfortunately, a majority of the court in San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d 1, ruled in favor of PERB‘s exclusive jurisdiction in illegal public employee strike cases. In the absence of some remedial legislation clarifying EERA or abrogating the majority‘s San Diego Teachers holding, the principles expressed in that case probably control here.
GRODIN, J.—While I concur fully in the opinion of the Chief Justice, which I have signed, I am inspired by Justice Richardson‘s concurring opinion to write a brief response.
Justice Richardson takes the court to task for failing to recognize, and to “honestly, openly, and forthrightly enforce” what is, in his view, a “central legal principle” that “public employees’ strikes are illegal in this state.”
There is no denying the fact that the principle which Justice Richardson propounds finds verbal support in numerous judicial opinions, some of which he has cited, as a statement of the common law. With all respect, however, I suggest that California law pertaining to public employee bargaining has progressed beyond the common law stage, and that the Legislature has taken hold of the field in such a way as to cast substantial doubt upon the continuing validity (assuming it was once valid) of the familiar generalization concerning the illegality of public employee strikes.
That generalization got its start, in California, with a Court of Appeal decision in City of L. A. v. Los Angeles etc. Council (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 36 [210
The court began its analysis by observing that the constitutional protections which had been afforded strikes and picketing were subject to qualification for “illegality of purpose“; and this qualification extended to situations where the “illegality consists of violation of settled public policy.” It was therefore necessary to consider the “peculiar nature of public employment, and particularly... the legal foundations of such employment in the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.” (94 Cal.App.2d at pp. 42-43.) That “peculiarity” consisted in the fact that “[t]he employer-employee relationship in the city‘s service is governed by statutory law and administrative regulation; it is not fixed, either in whole or in part, by contract, as in the field of private industry.” (Id., at p. 44.) Thus, it was “self-evident that defendants may not, consistently with the public policy expressed in the Los Angeles City Charter, lawfully either strike or picket for the purpose of enforcing demands as to conditions of employment in respect to which neither the city nor the department of water and power is obligated to bargain collectively. To hold to the contrary would be to sanction government by contract instead of government by law.” (Id., at p. 46.)
The premise underlying the court‘s opinion in City of L.A.—that it is necessarily contrary to public policy to establish terms and conditions of employment for public employees through the bilateral process of collective bargaining rather than through unilateral lawmaking—has since been rejected by the Legislature. The heart of the statute under consideration in this case, for example, contemplates that matters relating to wages, hours, and certain other terms and conditions of employment for teachers will be the subject of negotiation and agreement between a public school employer and organizations representing its employees. (
There are, to be sure, other policies which might be asserted in justification of a ban on public employee strikes, or at least some public employee strikes (see, e.g., Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment (1969) 78 Yale L.J. 1107, and Justice Richardson‘s dis. opn. in