*1 Partners, L.P., El Paso Below, Nominal Defendant RETIREMENT SYS- EMPLOYEES v. LOUIS, OF TEM THE CITY ST. OF Below, Appellant, Plaintiff BRINCKERHOFF, Peter R. Trustee Brinckerhoff Rev. Tr. the Peter R. Below, 10/17/97, Ap DTD Plaintiff U/A GP, INC., pellee/Cross-Appellant. Transcanada TC PIPELINES Ltd., Investments, American No. Corporation, Defendant Transcanada Below, Appellees, Supreme Court of Delaware. 19, 2016 Submitted: October 20, 2016 Decided: December LP, Pipelines, Nominal Defendant TC Below, Appellee. 291, 2016
No.
Supreme Court of Delaware. 14, 2016 December
Submitted: 19, 2016
Decided: December
Court Below: Court Delaware, No.
State 11603-VCG
AFFIRMED.
EL PIPELINE COMPA PASO GP Below,
NY, L.L.C., Defendant
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Corporation, Douglas
El L. Fosh Paso Suit, Kuehn, Jr.,
ee, L. John R. Ronald Leland, Arthur C.
D. Mark Reichstet
ter, A. and James C. William Smith
Yardley, Below, Cross-Ap Defendants
pellees, *2 Walsh, Jr., Esquire, Brian C.
Peter J.
Ashman,
Ralston, Esquire,
Berton
W.
Jr., Esquire, Potter Anderson & Corroon
LLP,
Bradley R.
Wilmington, Delaware.
Aronstam,
Sirkin, Es-
Esquire, S. Michael
VALIHURA,
Aronstam & Moritz LLP of
Justice:
quire, Ross
Of
Jo-
Wilmington, Delaware.
Counsel:
I.
INTRODUCTION
Allerhand,
(argued),
seph
Esquire
S.
Seth
Pooler,
Goodchild, Esquire,
decision,
K.
detailed,
Amanda
In a
well-reasoned
Kaplanov, Es-
Esquire,
and Nikolei M.
that a conflicts
held
*3
LLP,
Weil,
Manges
New
conflict
quire,
approved
Gotshal &
committee
transaction
York;
York,
Gugliel-
Di
it
in the best
Christine T.
did
believe was
New
&
mo,
Weil,
Manges
partnership
of the limited
Esquire,
interests
was
Gotshal
fact,
In
Delaware,
charged
protecting.
the court
LLP, Wilmington,
for Defen-
com-
found that the committee—and thе
Below,
El
Appellant/Cross-Appellee
dant
particular—
mittee’s financial advisor in
and
Company,
Paso
GP
L.L.C.
unduly
the transaction
knew
was
favorable
Below,
El
Cross-Appellees
Defendants
partnership’s general
to the
part-
limited
Foshee,
Douglas L.
Corporation,
Paso
post-trial opinion,
ner.
the Court of
Jr.,
Suit,
Kuehn,
D.
John
Ronald L.
R.
analysis
ex-
undertook
detailed
Reichstetter,
Leland,
C.
Wil-
Mark
Arthur
plaining why
million was
conserva-
$171
Smith,
Yardley.
liam A.
and James C.
overpayment approved
estimate of
tive
Rosenthal,
Zeldin, Esquire,
Jessica
by
figure
used
as
the committee and
Goddess, P.A., Wilmington, De-
&
Monhait
damages
the basis for its
award.
Jeffrey
Squire,
H.
laware. Of Counsel:
problem
plain-
But the
for the derivative
(argued),
Eagel,
P.
Es-
Esquire
Lawrence
tiff
at trial is
after the trial
who won
Stone, Esquire, Bragar
quire, and
J.
David
any judicial
completed
was
and
rul-
before
York,
P.C.,
Eagel
Squire,
&
New
New
merits,
on
ing
partnership
York,
Below, Appellee/Cross-
for Plaintiff
Del. C.
in a
acquired
merger.
was
Under
Brinckerhoff,
Appellant Peter R.
Trustee
17—211(h)1
§
analogous judicial
and
au-
of the Peter R. Brinckerhoff Rev. Tr. U/A
situations,2
thority governing these
DTD 10/17/97.
brought by
of
plaintiff
claims
behalf
partnership
limited
were transferred
Justice;
STRINE,
buyer
Before
Chief
merger.
plaintiffs
VAUGHN,
HOLLAND,
standing
only
and
extinguished,
VALIHURA
was
his
and
Justices;
RENNIE, Judge,*
challenge
and
of
recourse was
fairness
merger by alleging
constituting the Court en Banc.
of
value
*
designation
Sitting by
pursuant to Del.
surviving
resulting
Const.
be
or
vested
domes-
2(a)
Supreme
§
Art. IV 12 and
Court Rules
partnership or
limited
other business enti-
tic
4(a)
quorum
required.
up
to fill
as
added)).
ty
(emphasis
17-211(h) ("When any merger
§
1. 6 Del.
or
C.
2, See,
Anderson,
e,g.,
Lewis v.
shall
become
consolidation
have
effective un-
1984) ("A
plaintiff
who ceases to
section,
purposes
der this
for all
of the
laws
shareholder,
reason of a
whether
Delaware,
lights, privi-
all
the State
reason,
merger
any
standing
loses
for
other
leges
powers of
each
domestic limit-
suit.”);
to continue a derivative
Ark. Teacher
partnerships
ed
other business entities
Sys. Countrywide
Corp.,
Ret.
consolidated,
Fin.
merged
that have
and all
2013)
(en banc) ("[T]he
real,
mixed,
deriva-
property,
personal and
and all
clаim—originally belonging
ac-
tive
due to
of said domestic limited
debts
quired corporation—is
entities,
be-
transferred to and
partnerships and other business
acquiring corporation
comes an asset
things
well as all other
and causes
action
(citations
belonging
statutory
of such
as a
law.”
omit-
to each
domestic limited
matter
entities,
ted)).
partnerships
other business
shall
merger
sically
his
reflected
derivative.3 We decline
further
expand that
part-
case law the
consideration.
context,
especially in
case like
however,
Chancery,
reject-
plausible argu-
this when
no
there was
argument to
the defendants’
this effect
ed
ment that the transaction had the effect
opinion
thoughtful
arguing
and issued a
increasing
voting power
or control
claims,
al-
the derivative
general partner
expense
at the
though always
treated
him as derivative
the unaffiliated
From the
unitholders.
announced,
merger
could
before the
start,
sought
has
direct, or,
also be
even
deriv-
considered
only monetary
relief
ative,
mеrger
should survive the
for the
nership.
policy
core
reason that
would
dismissal
partners
Likewise,
leave
unaffiliated limited
part company
with the
*4
general
recompense
part-
without
for the
of Chancery
on its determination
prior
dealing.
ner’s
unfair
merger
extinguish
that
the
not
did
the
claims;
equi-
derivative
We understand
case,
troubling
In this
we reverse. We
ty court’s
to countenance
reluctance
the
plaintiffs
the
find
derivative
possible extinguishment of claims when
were and remain derivative
nature. That
is
suggesting
there
record evidence
bad
often,
partner
a limited
as is the case
by persons controlling
faith conduct
the
here, required
entity’s
to look to the
foun-
by
limited
a
partnership and
financial ad-
agreement
than to
dational
rather
default
visor,
persons
and when those
knew
principles
equity law for
does
protection
public
relying
the
limited
partners were
every
for breach of
not mean
good
their'
faith
only protection
as their
agreements is direct.
those foundational
overreaching by
genеral partner.
Rather, to
claim is
determine
a
deriva-
But,
question
to
here
whether
requires
tive
the usual examina-
change our
settled law
a substantial
tion who owns the claim.
way,
question that
to
requires
a
us
have
Here,
plain
part-
it is
under the limited
departure
confidence
that the benefits
nership agreement
part-
the limited
butweigh
situations,
In
will
the' costs. most
nership itself
in the first in-
entitled
was
pending
permitting
claims to
derivative
recovery against
to sue and
stance
obtain
merger
survive a
would be inefficient and
general partner
and its co-defendants
costly for
overly
public investors. Useful
any-
claim that
transaction
priced
transactions would be deterred or
economically
part-
unfair to
a
third-party
lower value because
ac-
nership.
partners
That individual limited
quirers
having
would find themselves
might press
partnership’s
morasses,
bought
litigation
persis-
into
rights
plaintiffs
as derivative
they
tence of
cannot control.
which
belonging
make the claims
to them
ones
law,
addition,
In
individually.
the claims of the
Under our
holders confront-
merger
here were
dual
ed’
which derivative claims
a
to
agree
pass
buyer
right
nature.
that some recent case
to
We
will
have
undercutting
challenge
merger
law can be read as
the tra-
itself
a breach of
cases,
they
many
ditional rule that
claims are clas-
are
dilution
duties
owed.4
v,
See,
Rossette,
e.g.,
Bally
Corp.,
Gentile
4. See Parnes v.
Entm't
Pictures, Inc.,
(Del.
(“In
2006);
1999)
Li
order to
a
In re Tri-Star
state
1993),
tig.,
respect
merger,
tive money recourse was file a challenge to
damages
merger
the
and
A. The
Transactions
prove that the failure to accord value to
the First Kinder
and
in
partnership
merger
the
Morgan Merger
rights.
of his
somehow violative
litigation
This
involves two transactions
We conclude
lost stand-
in
ownership
“dropped
which
interests
ing to continue this derivative action when
Partnership
down” from the
Parent
the
merger
as to the direct
closed—both
(the “Dropdowns”). Dropdown transactions
appeal
cross-appeal.
and
Because our hold-
support
typical
partner-
master limited
ing
litigation,
terminates
we do not
(“MLP”) scheme,
ship
corpora-
which a
reach the other issues
par-
raised
“sponsors”
by contributing
tion
an MLP
ties.
MLP,
assets to the
then
pub-
which
issues
lic
securities maximize the market value
II. BACKGROUND
time,
spon-
those assets. Over
an MLP’s
Partners,
El
Paso
L.P. was a
sor sells additional assets to the MLP
publicly
Delaware master
traded
dropdowns.
transactions known as
(the
Houston,
partnership based in
Texas
dropdown
ap-
The first
issue
this
“Partnership”).
plaintiff,
The
R.
Peter
(the
(“Brinckerhoff’),
peal
“Spring Dropdown”)
Brinckerhoff
is the
involved
Trus-
tee of the Peter R. Brinckerhoff Rev. Tr.
sale
51% of the Parent’s interests
(“South-
10/17/97,
Company,
DTD
which was a
Southern LNG
L.L.C.
U/A
LNG”)
partner
Partnership.
Exрress
ern
El Paso
Partner-
and
Elba
itself,
Indus., Inc.,
merger
usually by charging the di
Pac.
v. W.
(Del. 1988) (additional
omitted))).
fiduciary duty
citation
rectors with breaches of
result
ing
dealing
price.”
in unfair
unfair
and/or
Lewis,
n.10;
(citing
sufficiently
impact
merger
material”
Proceedings
D. Post-Trial
10, 2014,
August
Kinder
consideration. On
Morgan
jointly
an-
trial,
Shortly after
on November
Merger. Brinckerhoff chose
nounced the
2014, Merger
approval
closed after
challenge Merger
not to
in court.9
majority
of a
Partnership’s
holders
*7
days
Merger’s
outstanding
common units.
Within
announce-
On December
ment,
2, 2014,
Brinckerhoff
his
withdrew
Rule
Defendants moved
dismiss
87,
¶
Although
secondary liability
Compl.
Brinckerhoff’s
Pipeline
at 27
El
Edwards v. Paso
summary judgment,
L.P.,
Partners,
10160-VCL,
theоries also survived
No.
2014 WL
meaningful
Brinckerhoff
to "devote
ef-
(Del.
23, 2014).
failed
Sept.
They
4798234
Ch.
vol-
presenting”
post-trial
fort to
these claims in
untarily
Stipulation
dismissed that suit. See
&
briefing,
of Chancery
and the Court
deemed
Dismissal,
Morgan,
Order of
In re
Inc.
Kinder
Partners,
Pipeline
them
El Paso
waived. In re:
Corporate Reorganization Litig., No. 10093-
Litig. (Liability Op.),
L.P.
Derivative
VCL,
(Del.
Apr.
ary Second, Chancery the Court of never- applied Tooley theless and held that 20, 2015, April the Court of Chan- On Brinckerhoff had asserted a “dual-na- opinion a detailed which it cery issued claim, allowing litigate tured” him to for breach held the General Partner liable directly trial post-Merger. The court (the “Liability Opinion”).11 of the LPA that, apart from “con- concluded even holding, the court that the Fall so found Dropdown Fall angle,” tractual had through Committee the motions” “went injury Partnership on both the inflicted ap- believe that subjectively and “did and the unaffiliated unitholders. Dropdown Fall in the best proving the was prong Tooley—who As the first The court Partnership.”12 interests alleged court ac- suffered harm—the Partnership mil- suffered found $171 knowledged the “most obvious conse- damages. lion in the in- quence of the Fall 2, 2015, the December On Partnership.”17 fliction of harm on the Defendants’ motion denied injury court also to the limited found (the “Standing Opinion”). dismiss ners in the “reallocat[ion] [of] value court held because the claim partners the unaffiliated limited exclusively Partner[,]” LPA “injured breach of the which all of General derivative, Partnership propor- enforce the Brinckerhoff the investors in the could Merger. liability irrespective tionately.”18 The court award determined that princi- holding, In so the court formed “both” the two partners harmed
pal conclusions. 2010); Co., Anglo Liability Op., Ch. WL at *14. Fund, Fund, Sec. S.R. Int’l Am. L.P. v. Global Id. at *16. L.P., 143, 151, 2003); Partners, Income L.P. Lit In re Cencom Cable Op., Standing at 95. *8 (Del. 27, 130629, 2000 WL Ch. Jan. ig., 2000)). Donaldson, Jenrette, Tooley & 14. v. Lufkin Inc., 1031 845 A.2d at 104. 17. Id. Standing Op., 132 at 99. 15. A.3d (citing Pipeline Id. at Paso 18. Id. 16. 95 Allen v. El L.L.C., 1097, (Del. Co., GP 1109 E, 2014); v. Prods. Tex. Brinckerhoff
1256 distinguished party jurisdiction It of a court alleged breach. invoke the Partner’s transfers third-party insider between a grieva enforce redress a gains expense at the insider “[t]he where Accordingly, preliminary nce.”20 a “[a]s of investors.”19 The court rea- the other matter, party standing must have to sue that, received because insider soned jurisdiction in order to of invoke of the other inves- benefits to the exclusion Standing Delaware court.”21 is therefore tors, investors suffered a distinct the other properly as a viewed threshold issue injury. litigation “ensure that the before the tri Tooley’s prong—who second would -As to controversy’ ap bunal is a ‘case or that is recovery—the of a the benefit receive propriate for ju the exercise the court’s Chancery recovery by Court of stated powers.”22 party dicial has Whether the “most ob- partnership standing is a question is sub law However, remedy. the Court of vious” ject to de novo review.23 that, Part- because the decided partners nership and the limited were both standing is Derivative a “crea hаrmed, could recover for al- “either” equity”24 ture of that was to en created leged expressed court breach. The concern jurisdic able court exercise recovery, a direct absent Brincker- corporate tion over claims asserted again” hoff would to “start all over have “to prevent complete stockholders failure hold the General Partner accountable. The justice corporation.”25 behalf pro recovery by court allowed a rata all partners, though change have “[a] unaffiliated even We observed litigated the claim Brinckerhoff had deriv- parties’ may standing myriad result from a atively from no beginning, other limit- subsequent legal or factual causes that partners joined plaintiffs, ed as litigation progress.”26 occur while no class had been certified. instance, corporate For litiga tion, plaintiffs loss of a status as share
III. ANALYSIS generally extinguishes holder Standing A. is a Issue Threshold lost, standing.27 standing Once court matter,28 lacks power adjudicate concept standing,
“The
in its
sense,
procedural
right
refers
of a
and the action will be dismissed moot
(quoting
at 105.
202
Cyclopedia
Id.
Id. at
13 Fletcher
5940).
Corporations §
the Law Private
Smith,
196,
(Del.
20. Schoon v.
200
2008) (en banc) (quoting
Kingston,
Stuart
Inc.
(footnote omitted).
Id. at 208
Robinson,
(Del. 1991))
1382
v.
(internal
omitted),
quotation marks
Corp.
Cnty.,
26. Gen. Motors
v. New Castle
701
Co.,
1997) (citations
Corp.
(Del.
omitted).
By-Prods.
21. Ala.
v. Cede &
657
A.2d
(Del. 1995) (citing
King-
A.2d
ston,
Stuart
1382).
at
A.2d
Lewis,
27. See
mittee makes
or takes
Partner
breach the
Ac-
[LPA].”37
a determination
would
action,
any
declines to take
shall
cordingly,
other
concluded that Brinck-
court
or
or
make such determination
take
de-
erhoffs
“claim
General Partner
good
cline to take such other action in
faith
proceeded
with the Fall
without
subjeсt
not
to
or
and shall
other
7.9(a)
complying with
[Section
]
thus a
(including fiduciary
different
standards
direct claim for breach of contract.”38 The
standards)
imposed by
Agreement
this
then
on
court
relied
this
decision
Court’s
7.9(b)
Importantly,
.34
Section
defines
Holdings39
in NAF
support
to
its view
“good
as
faith”
follows:
Tooley
distinguishing
test for
be-
In
for
order
a determination or other
tween
and derivative claims
“does
“good
action to be
faith” for purposes
to
apply
rights.”40
contract
Agreement,
of this
the Person or Per-
Although the
analysis
Vice Chancellor’s
making
sons
or
such determination
tak-
7.9(a)
(b)
of Section
interest-
presents
ing
declining
or
such other action
take
issues,41
ing interpretive
need
ad-
must believe that the
determination
Instead,
dress them here.
we focus
action
other
best interests
question of
narrow
whether the
Partnership.35
'
standing post-merger.
had
The Court
concluded that
standing analysis
on the
centers
7.9(a)
Section
“barred
General Partner
LPA’s
duty
good
contractual
faith.
its
from causing
Partnership]
engage
[the
Liability Opinion, the Court of Chancery
(i)
in any transaction that
a poten-
involved
case,
observed
this
“[i]n
Section
(ii)
tial conflict of
interest
failed
7.9(b) established a
the Com-
duty:
known
comply
one of the four
with
contractual
subjective
mittee
had to form
view,
members
paths.”36 In
Part-
General
belief that
Fall Dropdown
was in
satisfy
ner
one of four
failed
“contractu-
ally specified
best
handling
Partnership.”42
routes”
a con-
interests
More
(e.g., Special Approval)
specifically,
comport
7.9(b),
flict of interest
set
with Section
7.9(a),
forth in Section
“then the
General Partner
and the Conflicts
interest”)
34. Id.
when confronted
conflict of
with a
(quoting
Transp.
Norton
K-Sea
Partners
L.P.,
2013)
(Del.
(en
35. Id.
364-65
banc)); Norton,
(rejecting
rights,
be
then the
will
considered
rivative.”
It identified this Court’s deci-
However,
sep-
direct.”70
the court saw “no
sion Gentile as one
such case.
Gen-
plaintiffs claim
aration” between the
and a
tile,
corporation’s
controlling
a
CEO and
MLP, noting
belonging
to the
forgave
portion
stockholder
com-
a
payment
the effect of the
MLP’s
too pany’s
exchange
million debt to him in
$3
“immediately
discretely
much
and
equity.
applicable
additional
The
con-
Thus,
upon”
the claim was
the MLP.71
tractual conversion rate was
of debt
$0.50
share,
per
company’s
derivative.
but the CEO and the
18, 2013).
66.
67.
conflict of interest between
Id.
[g]eneral [p]artner
part
and
Am.,
(quoting Anglo
70.
Id.
A.2d at
permitted
ap
and
ners ‘shall
deemed
proved by
[p]artners, and shall not
all
consti
...,
any duty
tute a
or of
71. Id.
[the LPA]
breach
implied by
equity,
law or
if the
stated
See,
Gentile,
respect
e.g.,
resolution or course
action in
906 A.2d
99.
at
(i) approved by
such conflict of
interest
" (alteration
(footnote
[sjpecial
original
[a]pproval.‘
Standing Op.,
added)).
omitted).
and
(which
species
overpayment
himself
of corporate
board of directors
included
claim”
person) agreed
other
one
and
that is’“both
and direct
char-
$0.05
disclosing the un-
per
Without
debt
share.
This
acter.”
Court concluded
“[u]n-
transaction,
derlying
a
board secured
like
typical
‘overpayment’
transac-
authorizing the shares
stockholder vote
tion,”
a dual-natured
claim “arises
equity.
needed
issue
additional
(1)
where:
having majority
stockholder
equity
share
increased
CEO’s
issuance
corporation
effective control causes the
93.49%, thereby
from 61.19% to
position
to issue
shares of its stock in
‘excessive’
in-
decreasing
minority
stockholders’
exchange
for assets of the controlling
38.81% 6.51%. When the
terest
value;
that have a lesser
stockholder
and
merger
later
between
negotiated
CEO
(2)
exchange
an
causes
increase
only competitor,
corporation
percentage
outstanding
shares
generous put agree-
the CEO received
shareholder,
controlling
owned
ment
to other
that was
disclosed
corresponding
per-
decrease
share
stockholders.
trial court dismissed
centage
public (minority)
owned
ensuing
litigation
stockholder
after deter-
reversed,
This
shareholders.”76
al-
exclusively
mining that
the claims were
lowing
proceed
with direct
derivative and that the
stockhold-
claims.
merger.
standing
lost
ers
after
Gentile concerned
controlling
share-
recognized
appeal,
On
this Court
two
holder
transactions
resulted
com-
independent aspects
plaintiffs’
improper
transfer
both economic value
claim and the mi-
plaint—the overpayment
minority
from the
voting power
stock-
nority’s significant
loss of cash value and
controlling
voting power.
claims constituted
holders
stockholder.77
These
“a
99;
Gentile,
interpretation of
see
avoid an
Gentile
"would
also Gatz
Ponsoldt,
general rule
1280-81
swallow the
dilution
derivative"),
solely
claims are
Feldman
aff'd
Gentile, 906
100 n.21.
A.2d at
II,
Here,
*15
Partner,
already
cоntrolled
the
II,
Id. at 100. In Feldman
this
reiter
suggestion
no
transac
and there
normally
ated that “dilution
are ‘not
claims
or Par
increased the General Partner's
tion
direct,
regarded as
because
dilution in
expense
control
the
of the
ent’s
at
limited
corporation’s
merely
of the
stock is
the
value
partners, or
the
affected the
that
transaction
(from accounting stand
unavoidable result
an
voting rights
any way.
partners’
limited
point)
of
value
the
of the reduction
of
entity,
corporate
of
of
which each share
entire
equity represents
"
(“[T]he
77. Gentile, 906 A.2d at
end result
100
equal fraction.’ Feld
an
type
improper
is an
of this
of transaction-
II,
Gentile,
(quoting
906
man
at
expropriation—of economic val
transfer—or
at We commented further that "[i]n
A.2d
public
voting power ’from the
share
ue and
claim,
plaintiff must
order to state a direct
controlling
majority
stock
to the
holders
harm
have suffered some individualized
not
added));
(noting
(emphasis
thát
holder.”
id.
large.”
suffered
of the
at
all
stockholders
results, namely,
"ex
separate
“a
Gentile,
99)
harm”
an
(citing
Id.
shareholders,
public
from the
and a
(citation omitted).
traction
We decline to extend Gen
controlling
shareholder
redistribution to
say
tile further to
that a direct claim arises
voting
portion of the economic value and
of a
controlling
stockholder extracts
wherever
(em
power
minority
interest”
embodied in
entity
value from an
to its benefit
economic
added);
Gatz,
phasis
see also
A.2d
minority
and to the detriment
stock
(determining
was dual
1280-81
that
claim
Any
interpretation
holders.
broader
would
fiduciary
exercise[d]
nature
"the
general
where
rule that
dilution
swallow the
benefit,
Cutaia,
expropriate, for its
control to
stock
are derivative. See
Feldman
claims
(Del.
2007)
power
voting
from the
(seeking
economic value and
Ch.
to
poration
satisfy
transacts with a controller on al-
Brinckerhoffs
presented by
legedly unfair
unique circumstances
terms.”79
corporate overpayment
“species
Gentile
prong
Tooley,
As to the
second
alleged
Brinckerhoff never
claim[s][.]”78
аny recovery
must
solely
benefit
flow
Partnership’s
prove
and did
Partnership.
Chancery
The Court of
overpayment increased
Part-
the General
recognized
“returning
the full amount
control at
ner’s
the Parent’s
the ex-
overpayment]
entity”
was the
[of
pense
partners.
Brinckerhoff
remedy,80
“most obvious”
and that Brinck-
argues
when the
over-
sought
damages
erhoff
to recover
“on be-
paid for the assets involved
the Fall
Partnership.81
half of’ the
Were Brincker-
Dropdown, the Parent was enriched at the
directly
hoff
alleged
to recover
for the
expense of the
He
unaffiliated unitholders.
Partnership’s
decrease
the value of the
“expropriation”
contends that this
consti-
assets,
damages
proportion-
would be
injury
tuted
unaffiliated
ownership
ate to his
interest. The necessi-
partners.
ty
pro
recovery
remedy
of a
rata
alleged harm
his claim
indicates that
Although Brinckerhoff
concedes
derivative.82
to a
expropriation
this
economic value
coupled
any voting
controller was not
In dеviating
entity-level
from an
reme-
dilution,
rights
argues
he
that this distinc-
dy, the Court of
relied on cases
tion is “immaterial.” We decline the invita-
involving “insider
transfers”
stock and
expand
tion to further
the universe
cases[,]”
“stock dilution
which it
read
“dually”
can
be asserted
level,
permit
“at
remedies
the stockholder
that the extraction of
eco-
solely
hold here
any payment
corporation,
without
minority by
nomic value from the
a con-
such
an
adjusting
rights
order
trolling
inju-
stockholder constitutes direct
invalidating
portion
the stock or
ry.
Tooley
above,
To do so would deviate
shares.”83 As discussed
cases
these
“largely
framework and
the rule
inapposite,
swallow
are
as Brinckerhoff does not
corporate overpayment
that claims of
are
claim that the Fall
affected his
by permitting
voting rights
derivative”
stockholders
or the Parent’s relative con-
directly
cor-
Partnership.84
“maintain a suit
whenever the
trol
shareholders”);
II,
Op.,
public
Standing
(citing
Feldman
C. The Brinckerhoff’s Claim above, For the reasons set forth Chancery’s reverse Court of decision Anderson,86 v. this Court Lems standing that Brinckerhoff to continue req had ownership forth the continuous set following Merger. his do We that “[a] We held uirement.87 cross-appeal, reach Brinckerhoffs which is shareholder, a whether who ceases by his lack of standing. mooted merger or for other by reason a reason, continue a standing loses deriva Justice, STRINE, concurring: Chief from the suit.”88 This rule flows fact
tive
merger, “the
following
derivative
I jоin fully
majority’s
well-rea-
belonging
acquired
claim—originally
I
opinion.
separately just
soned
write
be
corporation—is
transferred
highlight
reality
exempli-
that this case
acquiring corpora
comes an asset of the
confusing
fies. Gentile v. Rossette1 is a
statutory
tion as matter
law.”89
decision,
clarity
muddies the
of our
which
Here,
important
majori-
as-
Brinckerhoffs claims were an
law an
context. As the
clear,
Partnership.
passed
ty opinion
The claims
makes
a claim
set
Morgan
exchange
for
entity
to Kinder
has issued
operation
law
Merger
inadequate
there-
consideration—a so-called dilu-
Merger.
result of the
example of
standing
quintessential
tion claim—is a
extinguished
fore
Brinckerhoffs
But,
purported
Brinckerhoffs rem-
claim.2
Gentile
to assert these claims.
Lewis,
Teacher,
(citing
di-
stockholders controlled
But, to reconcile that decision difficult doctrine. All
with traditional dilution definition, involve, by dilution. To that, in
suggest any situation where other voting power
investors have less after a transaсtion, a direct claim ex-
dilutive also type turns the traditional
ists most de- argument enti- rivative claim—an LLOYD, Andrew Defendant ty got exchange too little value Below, Appellant, always prose- one to be shares—into able directly. cuted Gentile cannot be recon- strong weight prece- ciled with the our Delaware, STATE Plaintiff overruled, to ought
dent to be Below, Appellee. extent that it allows for a context the dilution when the issuance No. subjecting entity stock does not involve voting power Supreme whose was held a diversi- Court Delaware. group public equity fied holders Submitted: October But, control of particular interest. even situation, no gap there is our law Decided: December for Gentile to fill. Revlon4 already accords
a direct claim to when stockholders company shifts control
transaction of a single
from a diversified investor base a
controlling agree I stockholder.5 with the
majority require that this case does not us ongoing viability consider Gentile’s corporate law context. Sufficient for
today is that we refuse extend Gentile
further, to situation a limited where already firmly under the con-
trol of general partner and where the
transaction attack no under had effect partner voting
whatsoever But,
rights. refusing Gentile extend Gentile, QVC at 99. 5.See Net- Commc’ns Inc. v. Paramount Inc., (Del. 1994). work Revlon, Inc. & v. MacAndrews Forbes Hold- Inc., ings,
