OPINION
Plaintiff brings this breach of contract and defamation action against the United Arab Emirates (“U.A.E.”), the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates (“the Embassy”), and three individuals acting in their official capacities on behalf of the U.A.E. — Saif Rashid Al-Suwaidi (“Al-Suwaidi”), Magid Al-Khazragi (“Al-Khazragi”), and Nahyan bin Mubark Al-Nahyan (“Al-Nahyan”). Before the Court are defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint and related pleadings.
1
The Court treats this motion to dismiss as being made on behalf of all five defendants.
2
Upon consideration of the sufficiency of
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the complaint, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to Al-Suwaidi, Al-Khazragi, and Al-Nahyan, but denies the remainder of the motion. “Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a);
Summers v. Department of Justice,
Background
Plaintiff is an Egyptian citizen and a domiciliary of Virginia. For thirteen years, he was employed as an auditor of accounts in the U.A.E. Frоm January 1993 to February 1996, plaintiff was employed as an auditor in the Cultural Division of the Embassy in Washington, D.C. He claims that he was dismissed from his position without apparent cause or notice, and that his discharge was influenced by his discovery of damaging information about some of his superiors at the Embassy. In June 1996, the Embassy rehired plaintiff in the military attache’s office. Plaintiff claims that this employment was on an ad hoc basis and was intended to dissuade him from seeking a legal remedy for his previous dismissal. Plaintiff claims that he was summarily dismissed in August 1996, when he refused to discontinue his efforts to file a lawsuit. On August 22, 1996, plaintiff filed his original complaint against the U.A.E., the Embassy, Al-Suwaidi as Director of Financial and Administrative Affairs, and Al-Khazragi as Director of the State Audit Institution, alleging breach of contract and defamation. In October 1996, plaintiff amended his complaint to add Al-Nahyan, Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research; furthermore, рlaintiff alleged that defendants attempted to compel him to withdraw his original complaint, and when he refused, plaintiffs wife was dismissed from her position at the Embassy. Defendants UA.E., the Embassy, and Al-Su-waidi, through their attorney, stipulated to service of the original complaint on October 10, 1996. On February 19, 1997, defendants Al-Khazragi and Al-Nahyan also stipulated to service through counsel.
After the amended complaint was filed, but before defendants Al-Khazragi and Al-Nahyan stipulated to service, the U.A.E., its Embassy, and defendant Al-Suwaidi filed a motion to dismiss to the original complaint. An opposition and a reply followed. Thereafter, all five defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, seeking essentially the same relief as requested in the previously filed motion.
Analysis
Defendants assert six bases for dismissing some or all of plaintiffs claims: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to all the claims under thе Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”); (2) lack of personal jurisdiction over all the defendants; (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to plaintiffs defamation claim under the FSIA; (4) preclusion of judicial review under the Act of State doctrine; (5) lack of jurisdiction because the acts occurred within a foreign mission; and (6) immunity for defendants Al-Suwaidi, Al-Khazragi, and Al-Nahyan under the doctrine of Head of State immunity. The Court finds no merit in defendants’ six defenses, except the lack of personal jurisdiction as to the three individual defendants. 3
*73 I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The FSIA, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1830, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1994), is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts,”
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
The Court concludes, and defendants do not dispute, that all five defendants fall within the definition of “a foreign state” for purposes of the FSIA, and that the FSIA therefore applies to this action as to all five defendants. The Court thus must determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists under the FSIA.
A. “Commercial activity” exception
Under the FSIA, the plaintiff first must produce evidence that shows an exception to the FSIA applies; the foreign state then has the ultimate burden of persuasion that the exception does not apply.
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case—
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
The Court must therefore determine whether defendants’ actions with respect to plaintiffs employment are considered commercial activity.
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Congress has stated that the commercial character of the activity is determined by examining the nature, rather than the purpose, of the activity. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d). But Congress “deliberately left the meaning open and ... ‘put [its] faith in the U.S. courts to work out progressively, on a case-by-case basis ... the distinction between commercial and governmental.’ ”
Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia,
A foreign state’s employment of individuals can be characterized as either governmental or commercial activity depending on whether the employment relationship is “peculiar to sovereigns.” The existing caselaw and legislаtive history therefore have categorized employment relationships as such: “employment of diplomatic, civil service or military personnel is governmental and the employment of other personnel is commercial.”
Holden v. Canadian Consulate,
Given this categorization of employment relationships, defendants argue that termination of plaintiff’s employment was a governmental function because plaintiff was a civil servant. Defendants focus on
Holden v. Canadian Consulate,
in which the Ninth Circuit noted that “[b]ecause private parties cannot hire ... civil serviсe ... personnel, such hiring is necessarily governmental.”
Defendants’ argument, however, is inconsistent with the decisive factor in this case, as well as a D.C. Circuit case, Broad-bent v. Organization of American States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C.Cir.1980), and a key statement in House Report No. 94-1487, that lead the Court to conclude that defendants’ actions constitute commercial activity. In Broadbent, this Circuit clearly indicated, albeit in dicta, that the employment relationship at issue in this case is of a commercial nature. That court quoted the relevant portion of House Report 94-1487: “Also public or governmental and not commercial in nature, would be the employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel, but not the employment of American citizens or third country nаtionals by the foreign state in the United States.” Id. at 34 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals commented that “[t]his report clearly marks employment of civil servants as noncommercial for purposes of restrictive immunity. The Committee Reports establish an exception from the general rule in the case of employment of American citizens or third country nationals by foreign states.” Id. The D.C. Circuit explained the policy rationale underlying such a carve-out for American citizens and third country nationals: “The exception leaves foreign states free to conduct ‘governmental’ matters through their own citizens.” Id. In contrast, the Broadbent plaintiff was an American citizen employed by an international organization, not a foreign state, so that the exception was not applicable because “[international organizations’] civil servants are inеvitably drawn *75 from either American citizens or ‘third’ country nations. In the case of international organizations, such an exception would swallow up the rule of immunity for civil service employment disputes.” Id. at 34.
Similarly, in
Zveiter v. Brazilian Nat’l Superintendency of Merchant Marine,
In short, the only employment relationships of a foreign state that are governmental in nature are relationships with diplomatic, civil service, or military employees who are neither U.S. citizens nor third country nationals employed in the United States. The hiring of all other employees is commercial. Here, plaintiffs complaint alleges that plaintiff is a third country national (an Egyptian citizen) employed by a foreign state (the U.A.E.) in the United States (in the U.A.E. Embassy in Washington, D.C.). 5 Defendants agree in their Motion To Dismiss that plaintiff is an adult citizen of Egypt employed by the *76 U.A.E., which engаges in activities within the United States only through its Washington Embassy, at which plaintiff was employed. Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Am. Compl. at 1-2. This case therefore fits squarely into the type of employment relationships that this Circuit has recognized as being commercial activity. Whether plaintiff was a civil servant is irrelevant because even if he is a civil servant, he is a third country national employed in the United States.
Having determined that defendants engaged in a “commercial activity,” the Court finds that this case falls within the commercial activity exception, because it fits within the first sentence of § 1605(a)(2): plaintiffs claims of breach of contract and defamation are “based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state” since the employment was carried on in the U.A.E. Embassy in the United States. Subject matter jurisdiction therefore exists over plaintiffs claims.
B. ■ Jury demand
If, in a civil case, sovereign immunity does not apply, a foreign state is protected to the extent that the case must be tried without a jury.
See
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (for an action in which the foreign state is not entitled to sovereign immunity, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) .... ”);
Universal Consol. Companies, Inc. v. Bank of China,
II. Personal Jurisdiction
While the Court may have subject matter jurisdiction over this case, defendants argue that the Court must dismiss the complaint because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over each of them. When a defendant alleges lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must present a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction exists.
See Crane v. New York Zoological Soc’y,
Establishing personal jurisdiction over a foreign state requires a two-step analysis. First, personal jurisdiction under the FSIA is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b), which sets forth a simple formula: personal jurisdiction is obtained when subject matter jurisdiction exists over that claim and valid service of process has been accomplished pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608.
6
See Gilson v. Republic of
*77
Ireland,
Instead of making a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction exists under this analysis, plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by making two arguments: (1) that defendants’ counsel has waived any defenses based on personal jurisdiction by stipulating to accept service on behalf of his clients; and (2) that the three defendants who brought the first motion to dismiss (the U.A.E., the Embassy, and Al-Suwai-di) waived any arguments based on personal jurisdiction that they failed to raise in the first motion to dismiss. Plaintiff then states that if the Court allows any or all of the arguments made by thеse defendants to stand, the Court should afford plaintiff further opportunity to brief these issues.
First, plaintiff errs in arguing that defense counsel’s stipulation to accept service on behalf of his clients conferred personal jurisdiction over defendants. Defense counsel consented to service via special arrangement under 28 U.S.C. § 1608, which governs service on foreign states. It is clear, however, that simply consenting to service is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction because 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) requires both service in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608 and the existence of subject matter jurisdiction for personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, once the statutory requirements of § 1330(b) are met, a due process analysis must also be conducted to establish personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court rejects plaintiffs contention that mere stipulation to service confеrs personal jurisdiction.
Second, the Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs argument that the three defendants who brought the first motion to dismiss waived any personal jurisdiction arguments that they may not have raised in the first motion to dismiss. Because the motion to dismiss the original complaint was nullified once plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the Court considers the motion to dismiss the amended complaint to be defendants’ first opportunity to raise affirmative defenses.
Having rejecting plaintiffs only arguments regarding the issue of personal jur
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isdiction, the Court declines to afford plaintiff further opportunity to brief the issue. Plaintiff cites no legal authority for expecting a further opportunity for briefing. The Court has no desire to prolong this litigation by encouraging plaintiffs tactical decision to raise additional arguments in a piecemeal fashion. In the interest of efficiency and fairness to the parties, plaintiff should have submitted all his arguments in his opposition, making them in the alternative, instead of expecting the Court to afford a further opportunity.
Cf. Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp.,
The Court therefore considers defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based only on plaintiffs complaint and plaintiffs opposition to the motion to dismiss as presently before the Court. Applying 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b), the Court finds that the statutory requirements for personal jurisdiction are met as to all five defendants: subject matter jurisdiction exists through the commercial activity exception, and plaintiff has indicated in his opposition that all five defendants have stipulated to service in a manner acceptable under § 1608(a)(1) and § 1608(b)(1).
The Court finds, however, that personal jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible only as to the U.A.E. and the Embassy, but not the three individual defendants. The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate sufficient contacts with the forum.
First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co.,
As for the Embassy, the Court finds that the allegations in plaintiffs amended complaint establish personal jurisdiction over it. It is uncontroverted that the Embassy is located in the District of Columbia, obviously thus physically present in this jurisdiction. PL’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 4; Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Am. Compl. at 1. Furthermore, the actions which plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint were performed on behalf of the Embassy— among them, that someone in the Embassy fired plaintiff, rehired him in the military attaché’s office, dismissed him again, and made repeated phone calls to his home in Virginia to compel plaintiff to withdraw his complaint — were conducted in the United States, or at least established sufficient contact with this forum to justify maintaining personal jurisdiction over the Embassy. Defendants even state that “[t]he Embassy of the United Arab Emirates is actually managed by diplomats residing in the United States of America rather than by govеrnmental officials in Abu Dhabi.” See Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Am. Compl. at 13. Therefore, the actions of these diplomats, who coneededly do maintain minimum contacts with the United States, can be imputed to the Embassy.
Regarding the U.A.E., the Court also finds that the U.A.E. maintained sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia to satisfy due process concerns. The only argument defendants make about the U.A.E. is subsumed in a blanket statement in their motion to dismiss that “no Defendant had [purposeful availment] contacts with the forum, nor did any Defendant ever avail themselves, purposefully or otherwise, of the benefits of conducting activities within the District of Columbia.” However, they contradict themselves in their own motion, stating that the U.A.E. is a “sovereign nation which does not engage in activities within the United States,
except through its Washington Embassy.”
Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Am. Compl. at 1 (emphasis added). Because courts may look to the contacts between the forum and agеnts of the defendant in determining whether to exercise personal jurisdiction,
Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment,
Furthermore, it seams both reasonable and fair to exеrcise personal jurisdiction over the Embassy and the U.A.E. because the action at issue — namely, the termination of plaintiffs employment — occurred in the United States, the plaintiff is an Egyptian citizen domiciled in the United States, and the U.A.E. maintains an embassy in the District of Columbia.
See
*80
Sealift Bulkers,
The Court finds, however, that plaintiff has not established in his amended complaint exactly how the individual defendants were involved in plaintiffs case. In listing the parties, the amended complaint sets forth conclusory allegations about each individual defendant’s contacts with the United States and the District of Columbia, repeated verbatim for each individual defendant:
[defendant] is an individual who holds office in the Embassy of the UAE and who from time to time functions as an instrumentality, arm, agency or representative of the UAE in the United States and the District of Columbia and who has substantial contact with the United States and with the District of Columbia and who engages in and transacts commercial activity, and engages in a regular course of commercial conduct in the United States and the District of Columbia, and which did, engaged in and conducted the commercial activity, transaction and conduct which forms the basis of this action.
PL’s Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 6-8. Plaintiff provides no specific factual support for these allegations. In fact, beyond describing them as parties, plaintiff makes no other reference at all to Al-Suwaidi and Al-Khazragi in his amended complaint. Plaintiff mentions Al-Nahyan only one more time to say that plaintiff was dismissed from his position, “which dismissal ... was executed by Shikh Nahian Bin Mubark A1 Nahian.” Pl.’s Am. Compl. at ¶ 9. While the Court will consider all allegations of jurisdictional facts in a light most favorable to the assertion of personal jurisdiction, conclusory jurisdictional statements will not suffice. Plaintiff provides no specific factual information to allow the Court to infer that Al-Nahyan may have executed his dismissal, such as whether Al-Nahyan had authority to effect the dismissal or how Al-Nahyan executed the dismissal. The Court finds that this statement alone does not make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court dismisses the three individual defendants Al-Nahyan, Al-Suwai-di, and Al-Khazragi.
III. Defamation Claim
Count II of plaintiffs amended complaint asserts that defendants published statements that disparaged plaintiffs professional and personal reputation, called into question his professional ethics, abilities, and competence, and held him up to ridicule in the presence of third parties. Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Count II as a matter of law because the FSIA provides immunity for any claim arising out of libel or slander. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) provides an exception to sovereign immunity for any tortious act or omission of a foreign state in which money damages is sought for personal injury, death, or damage to or loss of property that occurred in the United States. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B) creates an exception to this exception, and states that foreign states are immune from tort actions based on malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. Defendants therefore claim that § 1605(a)(5)(B) bars plaintiffs defamation claim.
This Court disagrees with defendants’ reading of the concededly confusing structure of § 1605(a). Section 1605(a)(2) and § 1605(a)(5)(B) are mutually exсlusive provisions. This court has stated that “[t]he clear language of the statute declares that section 1605(a)(5) does not apply to section 1605(a)(2). Therefore, the exception to section 1605(a)(5) contained in section 1605(a)(5)(B) ... does not apply to claims brought under § 1605(a)(2).”
Foremost-McKesson, Inc.,
IV. Act of State Doctrine
Defendants contend that the Act of State doctrine precludes the Court’s review of the challenged conduct. Historically, the Act of State doctrine has been an absolute rule of judicial abstention, whereby “[t]he courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.”
Underhill v. Hernandez,
■ V. Acts Occurring Within a Foreign Mission
Defendants make a vague argument that the Court should not exercise jurisdiction over this case because the acts at issue occurred within the foreign mission of the U.A.E. Defendants rely in part on 22 U.S.C. § 254b, which entitles non-parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, such as the U.A.E., to the same privileges and immunities specified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Defendants also invoke Article 43 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which states that “Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.” Defendants stress that the principle of comity dictates that the government of the U.A.E. and the individual defendants not be subjected to American law. Furthermore, defendants state that they should not be subject to American law “especially when the law of the U.A.E. provides plаintiff with a forum in Abu Dhabi in which to address his suit.” Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Am. Compl. at 19.
The Court finds that while the U.A.E. may be afforded the same protections of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as parties to that treaty are, defendants never indicate what protection they are requesting or for which defendants. Furthermore, as plaintiff notes in his opposition, Article 43 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not provide defendants any protection from suit because none of the defendants has been alleged to be a consular employee or officer.
9
In addition, although defendants do not elaborate on their contention that plaintiff has a forum for his suit under
*82
U.A.E. law, this does not appear to affect plaintiffs ability to bring suit under the FSIA'. The FSIA allows foreign citizens to bring their disputes with foreign states in U.S. courts.
Verlinden B.V.,
VI. Head of State Immunity
Defendants assert that the three individual defendants — Al-Suwaidi, Al-Khazragi, and Al-Nahyan — are entitled to head of state immunity. Because the Court dismisses these three individual defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court need not dispositively address this defense. 10
Conclusion
The Court concludes that subject matter jurisdiction over all of plaintiffs claims *83 exists pursuant to the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, that personal jurisdiction exists over two out of the five defendants, that the Act of State doctrine and the Head of State doctrine do not preclude the Court’s review, and that the Court’s review is not precluded because the acts occurred within a foreign mission. Accordingly, the Court grants in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint only to the extent that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants Al-Suwaidi, Al-Khazragi, and Al-Nahyan.
Notes
. A motion to dismiss the original complaint also was filed. The Court considers only the motion to dismiss the amended complaint, because the previous motion to dismiss was mooted when plaintiff filed an amended complaint. "An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint specifically refers to and adopts or incorpоrates by reference the earlier pleading.”
King v. Dogan,
. The motion to dismiss the original complaint was hied on behalf of three of the four original defendants. The motion to dismiss the amended complaint was submitted by all five defendants ultimately named. In plaintiffs opposition to the motion to dismiss the amended complaint, however, he notes that the parties entered into a stipulation on April 7, 1997, setting the time for only defendants Al-Nahyan and Al-Khazragi, the two defendants who did notn join the first motion to dismiss, to respond to the complaint. Thus, plaintiffs opposition addresses only their arguments and requests that the Court strike the remaining three defendants from the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. If the Court does not, plaintiff requests an additional opportunity to brief the motion to dismiss the amended complaint as to those three defendants.
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s amended complaint nullified any previously filed pleadings, and thus, the first motion to dismiss and related pleadings are moot. Defendants also argue that, because plaintiff has addressed the motion to dismiss the amended complaint as to only two defendants, plaintiff has conceded the arguments of the remaining three defendants.
The Court declines to strike the three defendants from the second motion to dismiss. Simply because the parties stipulated to allow two defendants additional time to file disposi-tive motions does not bar the remaining defendants, who have a right to respond to the amended complaint, from filing a timely motion to .dismiss. While the remaining defendants may have responded to the amended complaint beyond their allotted time under Fed.RXiv.P. 12(a)(1)(B), plaintiff did not raise this argument, and the Court will allow their out-of-time filing.
The Court will not, however, afford plaintiff a further opportunity to brief the motion to dismiss the amended complaint as to the three defendants. The Court provides its reasoning further in this Opinion on pages 13-14. With the exception of the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the lack of opportunity for further briefing since the Court denies most of defendants' motion to dismiss. The *72 Court will not consider plaintiffs lack of opposition to be concessions to defendants' arguments, but rather, the Court simply will assess the motion to dismiss without the benefit of plaintiff’s opposition.
. The Court briefly considers plaintiff's argument that the motion to dismiss should be denied because defendants rely on facts оutside the record. Plaintiff argues that if the Court were to convert this motion pursuant to Fed.RXiv.P. 12(c) to a summary judgment motion because extrinsic facts are presented, defendants do not provide the proper supporting materials as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), and thus, the motion should be denied as procedurally defective. Alternatively, plaintiff urges the Court to disregard the extrinsic facts.
First, when considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
*73
conversion feature of Rule 12 does not apply, and the Court "may make 'appropriate inquiry’ beyond the pleadings to 'satisfy itself on authority to entertain the case.' ”
Haase v. Sessions,
. Some Circuits have not readily applied the exception that the D.C. Circuit has identified for a foreign state's employment of American citizens and third country nationals in the United States, or at least they have not treated this characteristic as dispositive in finding commercial activity.
See generally
Richard L. Garnett,
The Perils of Working for a Foreign Government: Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Employment,
29 Cal. W. Int'l LJ. 133 (1998). In
Holden v. Canadian Consulate,
the Ninth Circuit held that the employment of an American citizen as a marketing agent for the Canadian Consulate located in San Francisco was commercial activity, not because she was a U.S. citizen employed by a foreign state in the United States, but because she was not diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel.
The Seventh Circuit also has not considered dispositive a plaintiff's status as a third country national employed by a foreign state in the United States, although it noted that it might be relevant. In
Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain,
It is also worth noting that Segni is not a citizen of Spain. The legislative history of the FSIA suggests that an employee’s status as a 'third country national’ is relevant to the commercial nature of his employment. We need not determine how important this factor is, though; it is sufficient to observe that a person hired by his own country’s government to work abroad should havе a somewhat lesser expectation of suing his homeland in his host nation’s courts.
Id.
at 165 n. 7 (internal citation omitted).
But see Segni
v.
Commercial Office of Spain,
. The Court notes that while the premises of a foreign embassy are inviolable, they are also considered within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
See
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 466 cmt. a (1987) ("That premises are inviolable does not mean that they are extraterritorial. Acts committed on those premises are within the territorial jurisdiction of the receiving state .... ”);
Fatemi v. United States,
. Defendants focus on whether the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute has been satisfied. However, because the FSIA applies to defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) provides the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction, as it is "in effect, a Federal long-arm statute over
*77
foreign states.” Thus, the Court considers only whether § 1330(b), and not the D.C. long-arm statute, has been satisfied. H.R. Rep. 94-1487, at 13 (1976)
reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612;
see Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea,
. In
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
this court recently noted this constitutional analysis is unnecessary for a foreign state because it, like the federal government and the individual states, is not a "person” for purposes of the Due Process Clause.
. For the salte oí comparison, this piecemeal approach is prohibited in other contexts such as requests for federal prison medical records, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases, and arbitration contexts.
See Benavides v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
. "Consuls are in principle distinct in function and legal status from diplomatic agents. Though agents of the sending state for particular purposes, they are not accorded the type of immunity from the laws and enforcement jurisdiction of the receiving state enjoyed by diplomatic agents.” Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (4th ed.1990). See Gregory Dean Gisvold, Note, Strangers in a Strange Land; Assessing the Fate of Foreign Nationals Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authorities, 78 Minn. L.Rev. 771, 803 (1994) ("Consular authorities may differ from diplomatic authorities.... Where a *82 State has not established a formal diplomatic mission, it will often choose to conduct diрlomatic relations through consular posts."). Clearly, the U.A.E. and the Embassy are not consular employees or officers, and defendants have not alleged that the individual defendants — who are the Director of the State Audit Institution, the Director of Financial and Administrative Affairs, and the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research — are consular officials or employees.
. If the Court had not dismissed the individual defendants, this defense would not afford them any protection. At common law, this absolute immunity was afforded to heads of state as a matter of grace and comity, not of right.
Flatow,
None of the defendants invoking the head of state immunity is alleged to be the sitting official head of state of the U.A.E. Nor has the State Department submitted a suggestion of immunity on their behalf or offered any guidance. Defendants' argument primarily asserts that as U.A.E. government officials, each of these defendants acts as an official representative of the President of the U.A.E., and therefore, they should be afforded head of state immunity. This argument, however, misconstrues the current form of the head of state immunity doctrinе, which is limited only to the sitting official head of state.
See Flatow,