103 Wis. 373 | Wis. | 1899
This is the sole question we are called upon to decide in this case: If a citizen of a sister state, having a •claim against another such citizen, allow the period limited by laiv for its enforcement in the courts of such state to expire, can he then come into this state and enforce such claim in its courts if the necessary service can be obtained to give the court jurisdiction of the defendant in the action?
It is conceded that the effect of the statute of limitations of this state extinguishes the right upon which it has com-plétely operated. Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245; Sprecher v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Kahn v. Lesser, 97 Wis. 217. It is further conceded that if the statute of limitations of the state of Illinois has the same effect, plaintiff’s claim was extinguished before this action was commenced, and hence defendant was entitled to the judgment rendered-. It is the universal rule that so long as a limitation act operates on the remedy only, the law of the forum governs. When the right itself has been extinguished by the effect of the limitation act upon it, such effect attaches to and becomes inseparable from such right in the courts of this state.
Expressions of like character as above are found in numerous adjudications, yet the subject is frequently reviewed by the courts for want of an accurate understanding of terms. In Baker v. Stonebraker, 36 Mo. 338, this statement of the rule was made: “ The doctrine is well established that where the limitation operates to extinguish the contract or debt, the case no longer falls within the law of limitations on the remedy merely. In such cases when the debt or judgment is sued on in another state, the lex loci contractus and not the
What is meant by the term “ extinguish the right ” as used in the adjudications and by the text writers, in discussing the subject under consideration, is not actual satisfaction of the right by the operation of the statute of limitations. The-idea is that a right to insist upon the statutory bar is a vested property right protected by the constitution, the effect of which is to forever prevent the judicial enforcement of the-demand affected by it, against the will of the owner of the-prescriptive right. Deprivation of the remedy under such circumstances that there can be no adverse restoration of it. is a destruction or extinguishment of the right to which such remedy relates. The law deals only with enforceable rights, and if such a right be changed to a mere moral obligation,, in a legal sense it no longer exists at all.
It follows necessarily that when a defense to a right has-become vested beyond recall without consent of the person in whose favor it operates, so that his adversary is powerless, to enforce such right beyond power of adverse restoration, it is, to all intents and purposes, as effectually satisfied as if' paid or otherwise discharged. As the court put it in Woodman v. Fulton, supra, 'The bar created by the statute of' limitations is as effectual as payment or any other defense, and when once vested cannot be taken away even by the legislature.’ That is the doctrine of this court expressed in many cases. In Sprecher v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432, this rule-was approved as to the effect of a completed limitation period upon the title to property. A bar produced by operation of the statute of limitations to an action upon a contract is as effectual as payment or any other defense, and although.
The foregoing conclusion differs from -the views of the federal supreme court, as before indicated, in that it is there beld that a mere defense of the statute of limitations is not a property right upon which constitutional guarantees can operate; that unless coupled with title to property the bar of the statute in one jurisdiction will not be effective in another ; that as to mere money demands it operates on the remedy only, and the law of the forum governs. It is there recognized, as held in this opinion, that the point of difference between the two doctrines is whether a defense of the statutory bar to the enforcement of a right is itself property, and that the effect of an affirmative holding is that such property right extinguishes the right upon which it operates. In the leading case on the subject, Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, the court divided. Justice Millee, who delivered the opinion upon which the decision was based, remarked: “We are unable to see how a man can be said to have a property right in the bar of the statute as a defense to his promise to pay. In the most liberal extension of the use of the word ‘property’ it is new to call the defense of lapse of time, to the obligation to pay money, property.” On the other hand, Justice Beadley, with whom Justice IIaelaN concurred, in a dissenting opinion replete with unanswerable logic, said the constitutional guaranty against deprivation of property without due process of law “ was intended to protect every valuable right which a man has. The term ‘property’ ” in the constitutional provision “embraces all valuable interests which a man may possess outside of himself; that is to say, outside of life and liberty.” It “extends to every species of vested right.” “ An exemption from a demand or an im
Now, notwithstanding numerous statements by the Illinois supreme court that the statute of limitations acts on the remedy, if it holds that a completed statutory period of limitation in favor of a person charged with a liability, is a vested property right, that, as indicated, is the same as holding that it extinguishes the right affected by it. In other words, while the test of whether the statute of limitations of Illinois, when fully run upon a claim, bars the right to such claim in the courts of this state, is whether it extinguishes such right in Illinois, the test of whether such is its effect in such state is whether the right to the benefit of the statutory bar is there considered a constitutional privilege that cannot be taken from its possessor adversely.
In the light of the foregoing, we turn to Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, and there find the principle decided in Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21, announced as the law of that state. The court said, in substance,- that when the statute of limitations has run against a demand, the demand is gone because the defense of the bar of the statute is a vested right which the legislature cannot take away, either
Now, to go further with the Illinois cases would serve no valuable purpose. It may be conceded that there are many expressions found in them to the effect that limitation acts operate on the remedy, as in Suppiger v. Gruaz, 137 Ill. 216, to which our attention was particularly invited. Such expressions, however, are not inconsistent at all with the undoubted rule of the Illinois court that when the operation of the statute upon the remedy is complete the right to the benefit of the bar thus created is property and protected as such by the constitutional guaranty like any other property, and that such protection goes with its possessor into any jurisdiction into which he may travel.
So it is as plain as English words can state it, that the bar of the statute of limitations of Illinois, upon a remedy in its courts, is a vested property right which forever extinguishes, there, a cause of action upon which it operates, therefore such bar is likewise effectual here if seasonably pleaded and insisted upon. That was done in this case, and it warranted the judgment appealed from.
By the Court.— The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.