delivered the opinion of the Court.
Guyneth Eigenbrode appeals from that portion of an order of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County which denied her motion to cite the appellee, Ralph F. Eigenbrode, for contempt of court for failure to make support payments. The question raised on this appeal is whether the elimination of an alimony provision from the parties’ divorce decree by a Nevada Court, which had previously granted the decree, precluded the Maryland trial court from citing the appellee for contempt for default in his support obligation under a separation agreement executed in Maryland, prior to the Nevada decree.
On July 24, 1970, the two parties entered into a voluntary separation agreement whereby the appellee agreed to pay $275 per month as alimony. This agreement was incorporated into a decree of divorce in Nevada on July 30, 1970. It was expressly provided in the agreement that its terms would be embodied in the decree and the agreement would survive any judgment or decree. Both parties personally appeared in the Nevada proceedings. Subsequent to this, the appellee initiated an action in Maryland to have the support payments reduced. In
Eigenbrode v. Eigenbrode,
In an attempt to collect alleged arrearages in the support payments, the appellant filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, the contempt motion now under consideration. The court ordered the appellee to pay within thirty days $4,868.65, the amount owed to the appellant pursuant to the divorce decree which had accrued prior to the striking of the alimony award. It stated in its oral opinion that the power to order payment was derived from the divorce decree and not the contract; therefore, any contemptuous conduct ended when the alimony provision of the decree was terminated. The court declined to rule on any contractual obligation.
Md. Code,
Art. 16, § 28 provides that an agreement between husband and wife respecting support is valid, binding, and enforceable to every intent and purpose. It is clear that equity courts are empowered to recognize and enforce separation and property settlements.
Reichhart v. Brent,
It has been established that an equity court can enforce a decree of another State, both as to alimony accrued and to accrue, and may use for its enforcement the same equitable remedies and sanctions it could use to enforce a decree it had duly entered in the first instance.
McCabe v. McCabe,
We now look to the effect of the elimination of the alimony by the Nevada Court when it modified its decree. The absence of a support provision in a divorce decree will not necessarily invalidate a support provision under a separation agreement. In
Shacter v. Shacter,
“A support or property agreement is not invalid nor unenforceable merely because it is not embodied in the divorce decree, if not in conflict with such decree. If the divorce decree does not provide for alimony, it does not terminate liability of the husband to make the payments provided for by a separation agreement. A support or property agreement is not affected by the subsequent decree of divorce, if such settlement is neither incorporated in the decree, disapproved by the decree, nor *561 superseded by provisions of the decree.” Id. at 307-308.
The effect of the striking of the alimony by the Nevada Court from its decree would not «affect the support provisions under the separation agreement unless the provisions are disapproved by the decree or superseded by the provisions of the decree. In order to determine whether the agreement was superseded by the decree we must look to the intent of the parties and the court. The agreement expressly provided that its terms would be embodied in the decree and that the agreement would survive any judgment or decree. Where a separation agreement is plain as to its meaning, there is no room for construction and it must be presumed that the parties meant what they expressed.
Pumphrey v. Pumphrey,
Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the court’s contempt power to order support payments was derived not only from the order of the Nevada Court but also from the contract, the support provisions of which also had been previously approved by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, after our mandate in Eigenbrode v. Eigenbrode, supra. Thus the trial court may use its powers of contempt not only to enforce the payment of arrearages under the Nevada decree but also the payment of any arrearages after the modification of that decree. The latter payments are *562 enforced under the agreement which had been approved, prior to the Nevada modification order, by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.
We, of course, do not decide whether or not under the particular facts of this case the court should use its powers of contempt. We decide only that the trial judge has such power if he chooses to use it.
Order vacated.
Case remanded to Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Appellee to pay the costs.
Notes
. Acts 1975, Ch, 849, amended Art. 16, § 28, in regard to any agreement occurring after January 1, 1976, to allow the court to modify support provisionSi unless the agreement specifically states that it is not subject to court modification.