{¶ 3} In the 07CV39 complaint, the Eichlers acknowledged that this was the third time they filed a complaint alleging the same claims against MW. They also acknowledged that it was the second time they filed it under the savings statute.
{¶ 4} MW answered the complaint and asserted as a defense that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Thereafter, on March 5, 2007, MW filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the statute of limitations had expired and the savings statute was not applicable in this case because the savings statute does not permit a plaintiff to refile a cause of action more than once. The Eichlers opposed the motion and argued that while the prior version of the savings statute did not permit *3 a plaintiff to refile a cause of action more than once, the current version does not limit the number of times a plaintiff can refile a cause of action under it.
{¶ 5} After reviewing the motions, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of MW, finding that the savings statute was inapplicable. It explained:
{¶ 6} "Nothing in the revision of the savings statute, R.C.
{¶ 8} An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Bonacorsi v. Wheeling Lake Erie Ry.Co.,
{¶ 9} The statute of limitations for employer intentional tort is two years. R.C.
{¶ 10} Obviously at the heart of this analysis is the savings statute. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the prior version of the savings statute, which was in effect until May 31, 2004, could be used only once to refile a case. Thomas v. Freeman,
{¶ 11} However, the Eichlers argue that the current version of R.C.
{¶ 12} We begin our analysis comparing the prior version of the savings statute to the current version. The prior version stated, in pertinent part:
{¶ 13} "In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action at the date of reversal or failure has expired, the plaintiff, or, if he dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives may commence a new action within one year after such date." R.C.
{¶ 14} The current version of the savings statute states, in pertinent part:
{¶ 15} "In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the plaintiff's representative may commence a new action within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff's failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later." R.C.
{¶ 16} In arguing that that the current version, which was in effect at the time of the filing of the third complaint, allows more than one refiling, the Eichlers rely on the change in the first phrase of the statute from "In an action" to "In any action". *5
{¶ 17} This same argument was made to the Sixth Appellate District in a case factually similar to the one before this court. Dargart v. OhioDepart. of Transp.,
{¶ 18} "Prior to the amendment of R.C.
{¶ 19} "Despite the broadening language in the amendment of R.C.
{¶ 20} The Eichlers argue that this case is not binding and it was wrongly decided. While they are correct that it is not binding, we disagree that it was wrongly decided. For the reasoning that the Sixth Appellate District provides, the changing of the word "an" to "any" in the first phrase of the statute does not change the rule of law that the savings statute can only be used once. Holding otherwise would mean that the savings statute would permit actions to be kept alive indefinitely. If that were the case, there would be no finality to decisions and, thus, the purpose of the civil rules to prevent indefinite filings would be frustrated. Hancock,
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
DeGenaro, P.J., concurs. Donofrio, J., concurs.
