198 A.D. 10 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1921
This action was brought to recover damages for false arrest, malicious prosecution and slander and libel. The cause of action for slander and libel was ehminated on a demurrer for misjoinder of causes of action which was sustained. The issues with respect to the other two causes of action were submitted to the jury, but the verdict was rendered for malicious prosecution only.
The material facts which we regard as decisive are not controverted. The defendant was engaged in .buying motion picture films and renting them for exhibition purposes. It maintained exchanges for that purpose in the city of New York and in other cities. It employed one Rosenbluh as manager of its New York exchange. His duties were to supervise the making of contracts with exhibitors, the keeping of its books, the collection of rentals and the giving of orders to the delivery department for the delivery of films in accordance with contracts. The defendant maintained at its New York exchange a delivery room in which its films were kept until delivered to exhibitors. The plaintiff and one Stiegler were in the employ of the defendant in charge of its film room, according to the testimony of the plaintiff, but the manager testified that the plaintiff was only a clerk and that Stiegler was in charge of that room. The defendant maintained a leasing office, referred to as a salesroom, and those desiring to rent films made application there. The leasing contracts were negotiated in the first instance by an employee in charge of that room. When a tentative contract was thus negotiated, a formal one would be presented to the manager, and if approved by him, he would recommend its execution by the president, and if approved by the president, it would be returned to the contract register clerk who would enter it on the register giving it a number, and it would then be given to the bookkeeper, whose duty it was to verify the defend
On the part of the defendant testimony was presented tending to show not only that the plaintiff was without authority to lease the film but that he entered into a corrupt agreement with Barnatan and Latell for secretly leasing it without the knowledge of the employer of any of them and for their own benefit, and that they were to share in the rental received therefor. But the fact stands uncontroverted that the defendant’s manager knew that the film had been returned uninjured before the plaintiff was arrested and before the manager made the charge on which he was prosecuted. There is no evidence tending to show that there was any intent on the part of the plaintiff or of the others who were jointly charged with him with theft, to steal the film otherwise than by depriving the defendant of the possession thereof for that Saturday afternoon. According to the testimony offered in behalf of the defendant and to its theory of the case they intended to appropriate the film to their own use for that brief period of time, which would undoubtedly constitute larceny under section 1290 of the Penal Law, but since the plaintiff intended to restore the film and restored it before the defendant’s manager made the complaint to the magistrate, the manager was chargeable with knowledge that the plaintiff had a complete defense to the charge. (Penal Law, § 1307.) We are not, however, concerned with any question relating to the liability of the defendant’s manager to the plaintiff for malicious prosecution, for the first point presented for decision is whether the acts of the defendant’s manager in making the charge before the magistrate were authorized by the defendant or were within the scope of his employment. There is no evidence of express authorization or ratification. It was doubtless his duty to protect the property of the defendant and to recover any of it unlawfully appropriated or taken from its possession. We are of opinion, however, that his full duty to the defendant in the premises was discharged when he ascertained before making the complaint to the magistrate that the film had been returned uninjured and had ascertained all the facts essential for his determination whether the plain
It follows that the judgment and order should be reversed, with costs, and the complaint dismissed, with costs.
Clarke, P. J., Page and Merrell, JJ., concur; Smith, J., dissents.
Judgment and order reversed, with costs, and complaint dismissed, with costs.