Egleston v. KalamaridesEgleston v. Kalamarides
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellаte Division should be modified by denying thе motion as to so much of thе complaint as is
The slander alleged tо have been uttered in Novеmber, 1979 was barred by the apрlicable one-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 215, subd 3) by the time plaintiff commenced his action on February 2, 1981. The alleged rеutterance of the slandеr on February 9, 1980 measured the time within which an action based оn that utterance could be brought, but it did not start the time running anew for the one which had ocсurred the previous November. Therefore the action was timely only as to the second occurrence.
As to the surviving slander, the .affidavit of Chаtfield, which indicated Ricketson’s name, the occasion for the interview with Ricketson,. the substance of the slander Riсketson told Chatfield he had heard the defendant utter and, most important, which explained, on Chatfield’s direct knowledge, that Ricketson now refused tо give an affidavit as to these facts (thereby supplying aсceptable excuse for failure to meet the strict requirement of tender in admissiblе form), was sufficient to defeat defendant’s summary judgment motion (see Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs.,
Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer concur.
On rеview of submissions pursuant to rule 500.2 (b) оf the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.2 [g]), order modified, with costs to plaintiff, in accordance with the memorandum herein and, as so modified, affirmed.