139 Wash. 2d 557 | Wash. | 1999
Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff, recently divorced former spouse of Decedent David A. Egelhoff,
QUESTION PRESENTED
The question presented in this case is whether under RCW 11.07.010 Decedent David A. Egelhoff’s designation during their marriage of his then-spouse, Donna Rae Egelhoff, as beneficiary of his pension plan and employment-based life insurance policy was revoked upon dissolution of their marriage and whether any disposition under the insurance policy and pension plan is preempted by ERISA.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are stipulated.
During their four and one-half year marriage, Decedent David A. Egelhoff designated Donna Rae Egelhoff as beneficiary under his Disability and Life Insurance Plan
The parties stipulated that ERISA governs administration of David A. Egelhoff’s Boeing fife insurance policy and pension plan. Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff filed a pro se petition for dissolution of marriage in the Pierce County Superior Court on December 30, 1993.
On June 23, 1994, two months after the dissolution, Decedent David A. Egelhoff was injured in an automobile accident.
The proceeds of Decedent David A. Egelhoff s fife insurance plan, totaling $46,000.00, were paid to his former spouse, Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff, on August 3, 1994.
On October 10, 1997, the Pierce County Superior Court, the Honorable Frederick B. Hayes, granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff.
On May 30, 1997, while asserting a claim to their father’s life insurance proceeds, the heirs also moved for summary judgment to recover his pension plan benefits then held by Boeing.
On August 8, 1997, the Pierce County Superior Court, the Honorable Karen L. Strombom, ordered that the pension plan benefits “should be administered in accordance with the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (‘ERISA’) and that the designated beneficiary, Donna Rae Egelhoff shall have all legal rights thereto[.]”
Respondents, the statutory heirs, on August 15, 1997 filed in the Court of Appeals, Division Two, an appeal of the order disposing of their father’s pension plan benefits?
DISCUSSION
Prior RCW 11.07.010 provided:
(1) This section applies to all nonprobate assets, wherever situated, held at the time of entry by a superior court of this state of a decree of dissolution of marriage or a declaration of invalidity.
(2) (a) If a marriage is dissolved or invalidated, a provision made prior to that event that relates to the payment or transfer at death of the decedent’s interest in a nonprobate asset in favor of or granting an interest or power to the decedent’s former spouse is revoked. A provision affected by this section must be interpreted, and the nonprobate asset affected passes, as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent, having died at the time of entry of the decree of dissolution or declaration of invalidity.
(5) As used in this section, “nonprobate asset” means those rights and interests of a person having beneficial ownership of an asset that pass on the person’s death under only the following written instruments or arrangements other than the decedent’s will:
(a) A payable-on-death provision of a life insurance policy, employee benefit plan, annuity or similar contract, or individual retirement accountf.]
(Emphasis added.)
Petitioner claims RCW 11.07.010 is preempted by ERISA. She contends the broad preemption provision under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) precludes application of the state statute,
Preemption
ERISA is a comprehensive federal statute which regulates employee pension and welfare plans.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) reads:
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
(Emphasis added.)
In earlier United States Supreme Court cases, the Court characterized ERISA’s preemption clause as “having a broad scope”
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the United States Supreme Court concluded that state law “relates to” an employee benefit for purposes of § 1144(a) “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”
This court previously adopted the expansive interpretation of § 1144(a) announced by the United States Supreme Court in Ingersoll-Rand, and has consistently held that if the court’s attention must be directed to an ERISA plan, the cause of action then “relates to” the ERISA plan.
Recently, however, ERISA preemption analysis by the United States Supreme Court, as evidenced by New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
While the Court in Travelers again noted the expansive scope of the language of the preemption clause, it stated, nonetheless, that “[w]e simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA stat
United States Supreme Court decisions following Travelers
Similarly, the Court in DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund concluded that ERISA did not modify the initial presumption against preemption.
The effect of Travelers and its progeny favors a retreat from the expansive preemption doctrine this court has previously followed to ensure ERISA’s objective of protecting workers and Washington’s sovereign interest in exercis
Life Insurance Proceeds
The Court of Appeals decided the issue of entitlement to Decedent David A. Egelhoff’s life insurance proceeds by reference to statutes and case law,
Amicus Curiae Secretary of Labor
Pension Plan Proceeds
The interpretation of “field preemption” and “conflict preemption” clarified in Travelers is pivotal to any discussion of ERISA preemption. In determining the scope of the “field” occupied by ERISA, federal laws will not preempt state statutes in areas that are “remote from the areas with which ERISA is expressly concerned — ‘reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like.’ ”
Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff and amici curiae
A state law “relates to” an ERISA plan if it either “refers to” or has a “connection with” such a plan.
This court must address whether RCW 11.07.010 has a sufficient “connection with” an ERISA plan to compel preemption. This is characterized as “conflict preemption analysis.” Generally, a state law has a connection with an ERISA plan if it mandates plan benefit structures
However, the mere fact that RCW 11.07.010 may operate upon the beneficiary designation in an ERISA plan is not of itself a sufficient connection to require preemption. The statute operates under the legal fiction that “the former spouse [did not] survive the decedent, having died at the time of entry of the decree of dissolution . . . .”
The Ninth Circuit ERISA preemption analysis currently represents a minority view among other United States Circuit Courts,
Amicus Curiae Boeing claims a “connection” exists because requiring plan administrators to investigate the marital status of beneficiaries and to determine whether a beneficiary designation remains valid under state law increases the administrative burdens on the plan, with resultant increase of costs and depletion of plan resources available for benefits to employees.
Petitioner and supporting amici rely upon the amendments to ERISA in the antialienation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1),
The United States Supreme Court in Boggs determined “conflict preemption” may defeat application of state law, without considering whether it “relates to” an ERISA plan, if the relevant law conflicts with a specific ERISA provision.
RCW 11.07.010 does not conflict with ERISA’s antialienation provision because it does not operate to divert benefit plan proceeds from distribution under terms of the plan documents.
RCW 11.07.010 does not require distribution of benefit plan assets to a third party, nor does it in any way direct payment of proceeds. It merely invalidates designation of a former spouse as beneficiary of a non-probate asset by creating the legal fiction that the spouse predeceased the now-deceased owner.
Despite the reality of her survival, under RCW 11.07.010 Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff is legally considered to have predeceased the plan participant, Decedent David A. Egelhoff, with the result that there is no valid beneficiary designated in the plan. Without reliance upon any state distribution scheme, his children and heirs, Respondents, would receive his pension plan benefits. The resulting statutorily effected change in the underlying circumstances for administration of the plan does not impede the plan administrator’s obligation to pay under the terms of the plan documents. There is no conflict with the specific ERISA provision proscribing alienation of benefits.
We conclude that RCW 11.07.010 is not preempted by ERISA. This statute, involving domestic relations and family law, is an area of law historically left to state control. RCW 11.07.010 does not “refer to” or have a significant “connection with” an ERISA plan to require preemption. Nor does RCW 11.07.010 conflict with any specific ERISA provision, including the antialienation clause under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Under this reasoning, we conclude that Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff is not entitled to benefits under her deceased former husband’s pension plan. We need not address the question of waiver under the property settlement incorporated in the dissolution.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff’s claims for benefits under Decedent David A. Egelhoff’s employment-based life insurance and pension plans were properly denied by the Court of Appeals, Division Two.
Recent United States Supreme Court cases following IVeu;
Respondents’ conclusion that the decedent’s life insurance plan is a “welfare benefit plan” and not subject to ERISA preemption under its antialienation and preemption provisions has merit. RCW 11.07.010 invalidates Petitioner Donna Rae Egelhoff’s designation as beneficiary under Decedent David A. Egelhoff’s life insurance plan because she is by legal fiction considered to have died at the time their decree of dissolution was entered. Respondents were properly awarded the proceeds of their father’s life insurance by the Court of Appeals.
Under the interpretation of “field preemption” and “conflict preemption” clarified in Travelers, RCW 11.07.010 does not “relate to” an ERISA plan. This statute neither “refers to” nor has a sufficient “connection with” an ERISA plan to justify preemption. Nor is RCW 11.07.010 directly in conflict with any specific provision of ERISA, including the antialienation provision under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Respondents were properly awarded the benefits under their father’s pension plan.
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, which reversed the orders of summary judgment of the Pierce County Superior Court, and conclude that Respondents Samantha Egelhoff and David A. Egelhoff, Jr., the children and heirs of Decedent David A. Egelhoff, are entitled to receive the benefits under their father’s pension plan and the proceeds of his fife insurance.
The caption of the case illogically refers to Petitioners as “Donna Rae Egelhoff and John Doe Egelhoff, wife and husband.” The Estate of David A. Egelhoff declined to participate in this appeal.
Pet. for Review to Washington State Supreme Court of Court of Appeals’ Decision Terminating Review, filed Jan. 27, 1999, at 1-5; see also Clerk’s Papers (No. 96-2-12626-3) at 122-24.
Pet. for Review at 1.
Id. at 2.
Clerk’s Papers (No. 96-2-12626-3) at 100-14. (An incomplete “summary” of the Boeing Company’s Disability and Life Insurance Plan is included in the record).
Clerk’s Papers (No. 94-4-01619-1) at 38-52. The Boeing Company’s employee “pension plan” is also referred to as a Voluntary Investment Plan.
Pet. for Review at 2-5.
Clerk’s Papers (No. 94-4-01619-1) at 87.
Clerk’s Papers (No. 96-2-12626-3) at 61-69. David A. Egelhoff and Donna Rae Egelhoff agreed on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, incorporating Exhibits “A” and “B.” Exhibit “A” identifies property awarded to David A. Egelhoff and Donna Rae Egelhoff individually, while Exhibit “B” identifies liabilities of each party.
Id. at 67 (Ex. “A”).
See 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) and 26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (Definitions of “401K” and “IRA”).
Clerk’s Papers (No. 96-2-12626-3) at 27.
Id.
Pet. for Review at 2.
Id. at 3-6.
ld.
Clerk’s Papers (No. 96-2-12626-3) at 95-97.
See RCW 11.04.015, which provides in pertinent part:
“11.04.015 Descent and distribution of real and personal estate. The net estate of a person dying intestate, or that portion thereof with respect to which the person shall have died intestate, shall descend subject to the provisions of RCW 11.04.250 and 11.02.070, and shall be distributed as follows:
“(2) Shares of others than surviving spouse. The share of the net estate not distributable to the surviving spouse, or the entire net estate if there is no surviving spouse, shall descend and be distributed as follows:
“(a) To the issue of the intestate; if they are all in the same degree of kinship to the intestate, they shall take equally, or if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree shall take by representation.
Pet. for Review at 2.
Clerk’s Papers at (No. 96-2-12626-3) 1-5.
Id. at 6-10.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 13-26 (The heirs also submitted to the trial court a certified statement of Kate Breiner purporting to establish that “D[onna] EEgelhoff] knew that D[avid] EEgelhoff] intended to remove her as beneficiary and that it was the apparent agreement of D[onna] EEgelhoff] and the decedent.”).
Id. at 42-44.
Id. at 43.
Clerk’s Papers (No. 94-4-01619-1) at 1-2.
M at 45.
Respondents valued their father’s pension plan benefits on May 28, 1997 at $35,000.00, subject to federal taxes. Id. at 6-22.
M at 115.
Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 120.
Notice of Appeal to Ct. of Appeals, Division II (No. 96-2-12626-3) filed Oct. 22, 1997.
Letter of the Clerk of the Ct. of Appeals, Division II, dated Nov. 13, 1997.
In re Estate of Egelhoff, 93 Wn. App. 314, 968 P.2d 924 (1998), review granted, 137 Wn.2d 1032 (1999).
Id. at 327.
Id. at 324-25.
Order Granting Pet. for review (No. 67626-7) dated June 1, 1999.
Laws of 1993, ch. 236, § 1 (emphasis added). The statute was amended in 1994 and 1997, but the amendments are not relevant to this case.
David A. Egelhoff’s Voluntary Investment [pension] plan provides:
“The VIP Office will only recognize beneficiary designations and changes that are filed on the official VIP beneficiary designation form and received before your death. You may not designate or change a beneficiary by using other documents such as divorce decrees, prenuptial agreements, wills or trusts. If you have not designated a beneficiary on the appropriate form, you have an invalid beneficiary designation, or your beneficiary is no longer living, benefits will be paid in the following sequence:
“1. To your surviving spouse.
“2. If there is no surviving spouse, to your children in equal shares.
“3. To another relative designated by the Voluntary Investment Plan Committee or to your estate.”
Clerk’s Papers (No. 94-4-01619-1) at 45.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. See Cutler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 Wn.2d 749, 756, 881 P.2d 216 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 115 S. Ct. 2634, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995).
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2896, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1983); see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
Additional United States Supreme Court cases broadly interpreting ERISA’s preemption language include: Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2896, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1983); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829, 108 S. Ct. 2182, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1988); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 113 S. Ct. 580, 121 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1992); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 119 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1992).
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2388-89, 85 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1985).
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1552-53, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1987).
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407, 112 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1990) and Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 46) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523, 101 S. Ct. 1895, 68 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1981)).
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.
Id.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990); Cutler, 124 Wn.2d at 763 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140); see also Puget Sound Elec. Workers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Merit Co., 123 Wn.2d 565, 568-70, 870 P.2d 960 (1994); Boutillier v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, Inc., 42 Wn. App. 699, 713 P.2d 1110, review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1005 (1986).
514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1995).
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47.
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
See Kahn v. Salerno, 90 Wn. App. 110, 951 P.2d 321 (1998); Ironworkers Dist. Council v. Woodland Park Zoo Planning & Dev., 87 Wn. App. 676, 942 P.2d 1054 (1997).
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
M at 657.
Id. at 658.
The New York statute, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807-c (McKinney), required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers but not those covered by Blue Cross or Blue Shield Plans.
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-60.
See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 117 S. Ct. 832, 136 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1997); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99, 114 S. Ct. 517, 126 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1993).
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 336 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (“Relate to” is not a test for preemption but simply an identification of the field in which ordinary field preemption applies — the field of laws regulating employee benefit plans).
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 331-32, 117 S. Ct. 832, 136 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1997) (the Court upheld a law prohibiting payment of lower wages to apprentices trained in unapproved programs).
Stating an “assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id. at 325 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947)); see also Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383, 120 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1992) (State law is preempted by ERISA where it is “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”).
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330-31.
520 U.S. 806, 117 S. Ct. 1747, 138 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1997).
DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 809. (The statute, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807-d (McKinney), imposed a tax on a medical center operated with ERISA funds).
Id. at 814-15.
Id. at 813.
Egelhoff, 93 Wn. App. at 320-21. The Court of Appeals relied upon the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (USDA), chapter 11.05 RCW, and RCW 48.18.390 (beneficiary treated as having predeceased policyholder, leaving life insurance proceeds to the policyholder’s estate) and case law (statutory heirs inherit the life insurance policy proceeds when policyholder dies intestate).
See Br. of Appellant, Ct. of Appeals, Division II, at 34-36; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) which states “[t]he term ‘employee benefit plan’ or ‘plan’ means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan . . . .”
Br. of Appellant at 35 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829, 108 S. Ct. 2182, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1988); Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S. v. Crysler, 66 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1995).
Briefs Amicus Curiae were filed in support of Appellant Donna Rae Egelhoff by the Secretary of Labor; the Boeing Company; the Boeing Company Employee Benefit Plans Committee; Puget Sound Energy, Inc.; Safeco Corporation; Weyer
Amicus Br. of the Secretary of Labor at 11.
The antialienation provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), states “[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) “appl[ies] to any employee benefit plan . . . other than — (1) an employee welfare benefit plan[.]” Under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) “[t]he terms ‘employee welfare benefit plan’ and ‘welfare plan’ mean any plan, fund, or program . . . established or . . . maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment. . . .”
486 U.S. 825, 108 S. Ct. 2182, 100 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1988).
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661).
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114, 109 S. Ct. 1668, 104 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1989).
See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661-62.
153 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1122, 119 S. Ct. 903, 142 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1999).
Emard, 153 F.3d at 961.
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330.
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation does not join in these assertions.
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 840, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 138 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1997); See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S. Ct. 802, 808, 59 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1979); see also Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987).
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-55.
DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 814.
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830 (A Georgia anti-garnishment statute which applied solely to ERISA pension plans had a sufficient “reference to” ERISA plans, while a garnishment statute, general in scope, which applied to both ERISA and nonERISA plans did not).
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325.
As in Dillingham, the Court rejected the argument that mention of “joint apprenticeship committee” related to ERISA plans where approved class of apprenticeship sponsors also included non-ERISA plans.
See Emard, 153 F.3d at 954.
See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97 (ERISA preempted New York laws prohibiting employers from structuring benefit plans in a way that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy, and mandated payment of other specific benefits).
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657-58.
Conflict preemption analysis requires a two-step inquiry to determine (1) whether the state law at issue conflicted with any specific provision of ERISA and (2) whether application of the state law would frustrate Congress’ purpose in enacting ERISA. See Emard, 153 F.3d at 957-59.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 12 F.3d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1993), identified four factors to determine whether a state law has a “connection with” an ERISA benefit plan: “(1) whether the state law regulates the types of benefits of ERISA employee welfare benefit plans . . .; (2) whether the state law requires the establishment of a separate employee benefit plan to comply with the law . . .; (3) whether the state law imposes reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements for ERISA plans . . .; and (4) whether the state law regulates certain ERISA relationships, including the relationships between an ERISA plan and employer and, to the extent an employee benefit plan is involved, between the employer and employee.” Id. (citations omitted).
RCW 11.07.010(2)(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) provides in pertinent part that “(1) ... a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and — (A) for the exclusive purpose of: . . . (D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter . . . .”
Egelhoff, 93 Wn. App. at 326 (quoting Emard, 153 F.3d at 959).
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pettit, 164 F.3d 857 (4th Cir.1998); Mattei v. Mattel, 126 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1120, 118 S. Ct. 1799, 140 L. Ed. 2d 939 (1998); Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321 (5th Cir. 1994); Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hanslip, 939 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1991); MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1987).
Emard, 153 F.3d at 959.
See Br. of Amici Curiae Boeing Co. et al. at 6-11.
See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-61 (preemption rejected based on indirect economic influence on plan administration). DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 815-17 (Direct tax reducing fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits was not sufficiently connected to ERISA plans to require preemption. “Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have some effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre-empted by the federal statute.”).
The Court in Travelers recognized the possibility that “a state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state law might indeed be pre-empted.” Id. at 668. As stated by the Court of Appeals and argued by the Respondents, such “major damage” to ERISA’s objectives cannot be shown
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) states that “[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) “appl[ies] to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order, except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a ‘qualified domestic relations order.’ ” See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (defining a “qualified domestic relations order”). In general, the antialienation provision restricts diversion of plan benefits to someone other than a payee under the plan documents, unless executed in a specified manner to be recognized as a qualified domestic relations order” (QDRO). See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). ERISA provides a limited exception to the antialienation provision for QRDO’s. This provision, enacted as part of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 amendments, is intended to protect spouses and dependents of employees who participate in ERISA benefit plans. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 846-48.
520 U.S. 833, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 138 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1997).
Pet. for Review at 16-17; Secretary of Labor Amicus Br. at 5-11; Boeing Co., et al. Amicus Br. at 4-6.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841.
Id. at 836. (An “alternate payee” under a QDRO is considered a plan “beneficiary.” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(J)).
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 846-51; see also Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991). (California community property law providing for testamentary transfers to third party of plan beneficiary’s equitable share in ERISA pension plan directly conflicted with antialienation provision).
See Amicus Br. of the Wash. State Trial Lawyers Ass’n Found, at 14.
Amicus Br. of the Secretary of Labor at 10.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 836-37.
Id. at 851-52 (testamentary transfer under state law condemned as a diversion of retirement benefits in violation of ERISA).
RCW 11.07.010(2)(a).
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851-52.
Id.