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Effie Stewart v. J. Kenneth Blackwell
444 F.3d 843
6th Cir.
2006
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 not a basis that he was on the application purposes. for EAJA

“prevailing party” deter- remand, court must the district

On record,

mine, on the administrative based (1) position the Commissioner’s

whether (2) justified,” special “substantially

was unjust. made award

circumstances STEWART, al., et Plaintiffs-

Effie

Appellants, BLACKWELL, al., et Kenneth

J.

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-3044. Appeals,

United States Circuit.

Sixth

Argued: Dec. 2005. April and Filed:

Decided *3 Tokaji,

ARGUED: P. Ohio Daniel State Law, University College Moritz of Colum- bus, Ohio, Appellants. for Richard N. General, Coglianese, Attorney Office Columbus, Ohio, Stankunas, Jeffrey A. Teetor, & Isaac, Brant, Ledman Colum- bus, Ohio, BRIEF: Appellees. for ON P. Tokaji, University Daniel Ohio State Columbus, Law, Ohio, College Moritz Saphire, University Dayton Richard Ohio, Law, Dayton, Laughlin School McDonald, Bell-Platts, E.B. Meredith American Civil Liberties Union Founda- Atlanta, tion, Moke, Georgia, Paul F. Wil- Ohio, mington College, Wilmington, for Coglianese, Holly N. Appellants. Richard Hunt, General, Attorney J. Office of the Columbus, Ohio, Stankunas, Jeffrey A. Landes, Isaac, Brant, Mark D. Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, Ohio, T. Victor Whis- man, Prosecuting Attorney Office of the County Montgomery, Dayton, for the Ohio, Davis, Hamilton, County voting equipment Anita L. Summit card Mont- (3) Office, Akron, Ohio, Counties; gomery, Prosecutor’s David Summit Stevenson, County using optical voting sys- Todd Hamilton Prose- non-notice scan Office, Cincinnati, Ohio, cuting Sandusky County. Appel- tems lees. 14, 2004, On December the district court rejected plaintiffs’ granted claims and MARTIN, COLE, Before: summary judgment in favor of the defen- GILMAN, Judges. Circuit suggest- dants. Some commentators have MARTIN, J., opinion delivered the types voting rights ed that these chal- court, COLE, J., joined. which lenges taking us into a brave new suggest world. Others are sim- GILMAN, 880-97), (pp. J. delivered *4 ply variations of old challenges. Regard- separate dissenting opinion. characterization, proper

less of the we find OPINION by Supreme prece- ourselves bound dent, therefore, regard and with to the MARTIN, JR., BOYCE F. Circuit plaintiffs’ claim Equal under the Protec- Judge. Clause, tion we REVERSE the district plaintiffs are African-American and judgment. regard court’s With to the Hamilton, residing Caucasian voters plaintiffs’ Voting Rights claim under the Montgomery, Sandusky, and Summit Act, we judg- VACATE the district court’s They Counties Ohio. filed their com- proceedings ment and REMAND for con- plaint on alleging October that: opinion. sistent with this (1) unreliable, the use deficient ballot, equipment, including punch card I. Ohio some counties but not other coun-

ties violates Protection Clause A. Background Voting on Information (2) Amendment; of the Fourteenth the use Technology prone voting of error equipment deprives process voters of their due right to have Ohio law empowers Secretary (3) accurately; their votes counted and certify voting the State to equipment. Ohio of punch voting systems § use card in Ham- Secretary Rev.Code 3506.15.1 The has ilton, Montgomery, general and Summit Counties two types equipment: certified (1) disparate impact has a on African-Ameri- “Notice” equipment Digital such as Re- (DRE) can voters in violation of cording Section Electronic precinct- and Voting Rights Act of 1965. The optical equipment count scan that prevent (when sought declaratory injunctive relief overvotes a voter votes for more (1) prohibiting the defendants permissible from: con- than the number of candidates office) tinuing to allow the use of “non-notice” for a given and warn voters when (when punch deficient card optical casting scan vot- undervotes a voter ing equipment in some Ohio counties while does not vote in a particular race or votes using more voting equipment reliable in for permissible fewer candidates than is (2) counties; other using punch given non-notice for a office) together, overvotes — Secretary already Help The Ohio of State requires America Vote Act of 2002 states campaign replace embarked on a both who choose to receive federal funds under the punch optical card and central count scan punch systems Act to discontinue use of card machines, but as of the November 2005 elec- by 2006. tions, Moreover, entirely has not done so. polling place “residu- to scan the ballot at the are referred to as ers and undervotes (2) equipment thereby providing independent notice of votes”; and “Non-notice” al opti- opportunity to correct residual card and central-count punch such as votes, do provide systems, not or central-count which equipment cal scan do op- opportunity provide independent to correct notice or the notice of and the portunity In the elec- to correct general mistakes. residual votes.

tion, voters 72.5% of Ohio approximately DRE Electronic machines come sev- used equipment and 27.5% used non-notice varieties, eral but most resemble au- often equipment. notice tomated teller machines or ATMs used election, most general banks. Voters either touch the name the 2000 preferred candidate on the frequently equipment used Ohio was screen card, system press punch corresponds non-notice button Votomatic preferred card candidate. DRE pre-scored, on a ballot All forms of relies currently or “chad” that corre- used in Ohio make square perforations impossible names of the candidates listed to overvote for the same office spond to the systems in an Names of or initiative. DRE can also accompanying booklet. ballot information if their identifying programmed or other be warn voters candidates systems DRE appear measures do not ballots contain undervotes. ballot *5 (like punch system precinct-count optical systems), actual The card does scan ballot. therefore, provide independent provide independent not notice of an over- notice by A is recorded votes. vote or undervote. vote residual passes light through the machine when election, general sixty-nine In ma- holes. with the detached Problems punch eighty-eight Ohio counties used that re- “hanging chines can cause chad” optical card ballots. Eleven counties used one, two, main to the ballot attached equip- six equipment, scan used electronic corners; are “pierced three chad” that ment, and two used automatic or “lever” stylus dislodged penetrated by the but not systems machines. utilize These ballot; “dimpled from the and chad” counting and reading different methods penetrated not or dis- dented but voters systems votes. Some of allow chad lodged. Because of these inherent their residual votes. to check ballots for through often cannot problems, light pass example, part one of an- county For and a vote the holes and is not recorded. optical utilized county precinct-count other in the ma- punch Problems inherent card and use elec- equipment, scan six others by the build chines are sometimes caused voting equipment that allows a voter tronic up may it difficult or chads which make their ballot on a screen before verify cleanly and impossible punch the card howev- systems, final is cast. Most ballot a vote. record er, by the four including operated the ones defendants, Optical systems county answer scan and count ballots scan resemble have polls in The location after the testing. sheets standardized at a central used total, Thus, eighty-one listing voter a ballot the names closed. given is non-inde- Ohio counties used eighty-eight all candidates and ballot initiatives technol- pendent-notice equipment voting the circle pencil either uses darken — provide a voter with draws a that does preferred ogy next to the candidate or a prob- straight connecting parts line two notice from device finally systems exist the ballot Optical might scan can be either lem before arrow. general vot- the 2000 election. precinct-count systems, which enable cast—in Only three counties collected statistics counted as a using voter reliable electronic on County, overvotes—Hamilton which voting equipment. In spe- some counties 2,916 overvotes, had County, Summit precincts cific encountered more severe 1,470 overvotes, which had Montgom- problems voting. with residual In Akron ery 2,469 County, which had overvotes. City Precinct 3-F the residual vote rate 6,855 This is a total of overvotes those Dayton City’s was 15% and in 14th Ward counties, represents three which approxi- Precinct C the residual vote rate was 17%.2 mately 34% of the total residual votes cast addition, experienc- the counties in Ohio County those counties. Franklin used ing highest percentage of residual notice and there zero ov- were votes in the 2000 presidential election were ervotes. those in which punch voters used card technology while the experiencing counties B. The Statistical Evidence percentage the lowest of residual votes plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Kropf, Martha technology. used other twenty-nine regarding testified estimates of intentional counties in highest Ohio with the residual undervoting unintentional based on percentages vote were all counties that data collected National Elections Stud- machines; punch used card the seven ies Survey and the News Voters exit counties with the per- lowest residual vote polls surveys in presidential elections centages were all counties that did not use between 1980 and 1996. Kropf testified punch card machines primary as their vot- that intentional undervoting presidential ing system. relatively elections is a rare event that is Saltman, Roy formerly of the National estimated to involve between .23% and Bureau of Standards and the author of two .75% of all Kropf residual votes. Dr. con- federal computers studies the use of cluded that when undervoting levels of ex- *6 vote tallying testified that his studies ceed this vary by threshold and equipment punch “demonstrate that probable cards are inher- they is that resulted from unin- ently fragile, undervoting tentional that become less is stable associated problems with of when ballots are punch manipulated card handled or ballot. reader, She also found or through no difference Afri- sent a resulting between in over- votes, undervotes, can-American and non African-American and inconsistent vote voters in levels of intentional undervotes. tabulations.” explained Saltman that lost Kropf performance measured the voting of votes are not solely attributable to voters’ equipment by examining presidential and failure to follow According instructions. Saltman, Senate races at top of the ballot “[w]hen the ballot is then han- because these are statewide elections manipulated dled or through or sent a where all candidates, reader, voters face the same likely it is more that additional and media coverage, levels of candidate dislodged chads will be fall out. And competition, and voter mobilization if happens, are rel- the votes indicated on the atively uniform. Kropfreported an overall ballot are changed presence because the of statewide residual vote rate of Walch, 2.29% for holes indicates votes.” Dana Di- punch systems card and 2.14% for central- rector of Election Reform for the Ohio is, count optical scans. That Secretary Office, voters in of State’s confirmed punch card counties are approximately plaintiffs’ evidence that there is “a higher four likely times as not to have their votes punch residual vote rate in card counties- presidential 2. The 2000 by margin election in Ohio was decided a of 3.51%. repeated ballots types punch through in ... with other of card times

than counties machinery voting technology.” counting Walch further testi- will result in dif- punch card problems fied that ferent results.” physical the result of some ballots “were MIT Voting Technology Caltech error.” The failure of the ballot or voter Project report joint venture between —a Tim includes letters from record also study, part, the two institutions to Burke, the Chairman of the Board of Elec- reliability existing voting equipment— of County, tions Hamilton which state that: record, throughout which is referenced I While continue believe notes, is also informative. As report system reasonably card functions punch equipment “[i]f has no effect on price, for the it does have faults well ability of express pref- voters to their that the electronic machines do not have. erences, then the residual vote should be very I a problem believe the chad is types.” unrelated to machine See Cal- problem of here in Hamil- part small our Voting Technology Project, tech-MIT Re- In County. though. ton It does exist sidual Votes to Technology: Attributable fact, of part punch it is an inherent Reliability An Assessment Exist- hand, system. the other chads card On (Version ing Voting Equipment 2: March totally eliminated with electronic 30, 2001), available http://www.vote.cal- systems. (last 2006). April tech.edu accessed Another letter authored Burke U.S. report concluded that the error rate from stated that: Senator Mike DeWine punch percent higher cards is 50 than Having closely punch at the card looked technologies pattern other and that system voting we use here in Hamil- turnout, up “holding holds when constant County, ton I am convinced that income, counties, composition age racial having dispa- outdated a counties, rates, literacy distribution impact depriving significant rate year technology, shift the number of having voters their elector- number ballot, of offices and candidates on the al given.... technology, choices Newer county operate other factors that sys- particularly the touch screen particular year.” Report at 22. con- tems, provide both a more accurate clusion, the stated that inci- report “[t]he count and a voter prevent [overvot- from punch of such votes with dence residual *7 ing]. forty seventy ... per- card methods is higher cent than the incidence of residual Finally, a third letter from Burke stated technologies,” Report votes with the other that: and cautioned that election ad- “[i]f punch I am not as confident that our , catastrophic ministrators wish to avoid voting system precise card tells us with failures, they may warning ... heed th[is] accuracy partic- the number of votes cards,” using punch Report at 11. Stop ular individual received or should have if received the intent of the voter had expert Defendants’ Dr. John Lott exam- properly been accounted for.... In the performance voting technology ined the punch system you card can and cycles, across three election objectively that provable hundreds and Congression- in presidential, people hundreds of lose their vote each al, Senate, and House elections. Ohio Ohio year. findings presidential His for the and U.S. evidence, response Kropf to this the district Senate elections mirror s acknowledged “running reported court election. Lott an overall state- that punch study wide residual vote rate of 2.4% for In a ‘over’ and ‘under’ Ohio, systems. dearly card it was demonstrated punch-card voting that was unreliable report Dr. Lott’s findings stresses from to the by [that] extent votes cast thou- the down-ballot contests —contests listed sands being Ohioans were not count- presidential below the candidates farther ed in the election tabulation.” final down the ballot—that were not uniform added). (Emphasis Additionally, the re- across the state included non-competi- port stated that: tive and uncontested elections. The ex- officials, perts on As election if appear agree both sides we know voters are likely explanations legitimate- the most disenfranchised and that the fall-off discounted, ly being in down-ballot cast ballots are voting are that voters we delib- erately only obligation have not a moral im- choose not to vote or that elections solution, mediately competitive. were not embrace a but a report legal Lott’s does specific obligation remedy not include to find a findings on and enact overvotes. Further, experts prevent the defendants’ measures to that from happen- made no ing. effort to If distinguish intentional from unin- even one voter is denied the vote, undervoting obligated, law, tentional we the down-ballot forge elections. Lott also determine the cause and admitted a re- solu- view of tion. The the literature evidence is overwhelming revealed no major other agreed scholars have thousands Ohio with his voters have been findings regarding analyz- antiquated voting relevance of disenfranchised ing equipment non-uniform and that many down-ballot races. thousands have lost reliability confidence Help State’s America Act Vote re- accuracy of voting currently devices port provides also problem evidence of the in use in most of Ohio’s 88 counties. of deficient electoral technology. At the added). (Emphasis outset, report “[pjublic notes that con- accuracy fidence punch card vot- Finally, response legislature’s ing systems seriously has been under- response slow to the electoral problems, Thus, mined.” “Boards of election should Secretary of State wrote a letter stat- upgrade new, their voting systems to more ing that possibility “the of a close election trustworthy technology.” Additionally, punch cards as the primary state’s “[tjhese goals demand immediate atten- voting device invites Florida-like calami- tion, or our state runs the risk of repeating ty.” problems of our nation’s most recent C. The Voting Rights Act

presidential election—and suffering irrepa- Plaintiffs’ Claim damage rable important the most concepts basic of democracy.” Regarding claim, On their Voting Rights Act *8 the deficient technology currently in use plaintiffs alleged punch that the sys- card State, throughout the report the stated Hamilton, tem used in Montgomery, and that: produces Summit higher Counties a resid- Secretary

“While the of State notes that ual vote rate for African-American voters punch-card voting is not explicitly pro- than for white voters. plaintiffs pre- The hibited under Help America regression sented analysis Vote that the corre- Act, requirements other of the Act make lation between overvoting percent- and the impractical it punch to use voting age card in given African-American voters as a primary voting in precinct device the state. in County Hamilton was .517 and among and non County plain- in it was .682.3 The African-American African- Summit these experts tiffs’ characterized correla- American voters. Montgomery In “strong.”

tions as Coun- Responses D. The of overvotes mixed Defendants’ ty, only where data pre- was available with undervotes plain- The that the defendants contend smaller, level, cinct there was but never- tiffs did not factual provide evidence correlation. “strong” theless .440 prove violation of the Constitution or Rights Voting heavy emphasis Act. With Dr. plaintiffs’ expert, Eng- The Richard plaintiffs’ on the that stipulation were strom, on analyzed the data based methods not denied physical polls, access to analysis approved by of statistical the Su- allege plain- defendants seem to Court and other federal courts in preme tiffs were not denied the to vote. voting rights e.g., Thornburg cases. See v. State Defendant’s Br. at 8. The defen- Gingles, 478 U.S. attack plaintiffs’ expert, dants Ohio, Martha (1986); Mallory L.Ed.2d (6th Cir.1999). Kropf, who that intentional testified un- F.3d 377 three meth- rare, dervoting is on the fact based that analysis, are homogeneous precinct ods exclusively polls relied on exit she commis- ecological ecological and infer- regression, Survey Dr. sioned the National Election Engstrom ence. used all meth- three They them Voters News Service. fur- triangulated among verify ods and election, point his ther out that in the 1988 findings consistently moved in the direction; Survey the National expert same the defendants’ did Election determined that between of those who Eng- not use of these methods. Dr. 3-5% claimed (1) to have of actually strom concluded that: African-Ameri- voted had no record Thus, in County voting in according cans Hamilton overvoted at a election. defendants, plaintiffs than non the data the higher rate seven times African- re- (2) Americans; consistently over-reports Afri- lied on County, Summit voter thereby inflating at a can-Americans overvoted rate nine residual turnout — African-Americans; higher vote also times than non statistics. The defendants criti- (3) (where County cize the Montgomery examining voting state in- only combined over and statis- results of the entire undervote Hamilton, basis), focusing Sandusky, stead precinct tics are available on a Afri- Summit, Montgomery Counties. The can-Americans had a residual rate poke 2.5 times that of non African-Americans. defendants further claim holes out punch plaintiffs’ theory pointing contrast to the three card coun- ties, study Franklin County plaintiffs’ had no own shows Afri- overvotes card using punch DRE machines can-Americans technolo- pre- because used gy County had lower overvoting. vent Hamilton resid- rate ual vote than non African-Americans information, Eng- Based on this Dr. using punch card Sum- punch equipment strom testified that card County. mit conditions, interacts with re- socioeconomic to their sulting statistically significant point also ex- dispari- defendants Lott, Dr. pert, of residual John who examined the ties between the levels (a Regression perfect relationship). 1.0 HUBERT M. coefficients measure *9 BLALOCK, strength JR., two of association between variables. STATISTICS396-97 SOCIAL (a They range perfectly ed.1979). inverse (2d from -1.0 rela- (no tionship), through relationship), to + cards, presidential punch optical and 2000 elections 2.4% for 2.0% for Senate, scan, such technology, and down-ballot races as U.S. 1.4% for level and 1.0% races, Congress, legislature technology. fig- state and for DRE Based on these ures, punch punch local races. Dr. Lott found that plaintiffs’ alleged outperformed cards electronic machines in optical cards and central-count scan tech- races, (but congressional lever, that punch nology precinct-count opti- cards reli- scan, ability improved for down-ballot races rel- DRE technology) cal violate the technologies, punch and that ative other and Due Process clauses. produced cards fewer non-voted ballots for Citing this Court’s decision in Mixon v. 1992, 1996, than and races either Ohio, (6th Cir.1999), State 193 F.3d 389 electronic machines or lever machines and determined, footnote, the district court a produced virtually op- the same results as appropriate that rational basis is the stan- tical scan machines. evaluating systems. dard by stating: The footnote concluded “How- rely The defendants also on Dr. Herb ever, if apply the Court were to strict findings precincts high- Asher’s with a scrutiny, ruling the Court’s would be the poverty er concentration of had a residual same.” The court then stated that “[t]he rate than higher average vote Ohio. primary litigation thrust of this is an at- Thus, race, education, pointed Dr. Asher tempt by judicial to federalize elections poverty as the cause. Dr. Asher also rule or fiat via the invitation to this Court pointed Appalachian counties where the voting technology to declare a certain un- population percent is less than one Afri- remedy. constitutional and then fashion a can-American and concluded that because This Court declines the invitation.” Ac- is a there residual vote rate those coun- court, cording to ties, the district determination education and income levels are con- voting process always been left tributing factors and one factor alone— branch, legislative “subject to the race—cannot explain everything. amendment, constitutional is where E. Opinion The District Court’s the determination should remain.” The court went on to state that trial, “[t]he Prior to the the district court de- punch use of the card technology is plaintiffs’ nied the motion for class certifi- confusing neither nor oper- difficult to cation. They appeal this decision. The Then, taking ate.”4 estimates for inten- court four-day district then conducted a undervoting tional into account and multi- trial bench and found favor of the defen- plying it the residual vote rate across outset, dants. At the the district court state, the district court concluded that: laid parties’ arguments out the noted —it according plaintiffs’ expert, Viewing Dr. plaintiffs’ light case Kropf, the them, residual vote rate was 2.29% for most favorable to leads to the cards, punch precinct-count opti- 1.15% for conclusion that seven to thirteen voters scan, [i.e., cal technology, 1.04% for lever out of using 0.7% to 1.3%] 0.94% for DRE technology. punch The defen- card technology accidentally expert produced dants’ year similar results: failed to record vote voting tray 4. The court also later found that label to determine "[t]o if mistake has been punch voting technology card a non-no- made in the context of an undervote or an system ignore reality tice request is to overvote or a mistaken vote every opportunity recognized careful voter has to scruti- new ballot in the event of a mis- nize his or her ballot after from the take.” removal *10 (2000) (Souter, J., presidential in the election. Such de L.Ed.2d 388 dissenting), conclusion, assuming arguendo minimis the district court concluded that states justified, prove that it fails to a consti- may freely variety use a different violation, tutional either on a Due Pro- technologies running without afoul of the Equal analysis.5 cess or Equal Further, Protection Clause. the court concluded that the defendants have a Regarding plain- the African-American continuing rational basis for to utilize claim, Voting Rights tiffs’ Act the district punch card in that it is cost court found that their “fail[s] because effective and security there are concerns injury alleged does not amount to a vote technology. § 2 with electronic Voting Rights denial under Act.” plaintiffs The court noted that can

bring vote denial or vote dilution claims II. Act,

under the but found that the plaintiffs Standing A. only a brought vote denial claim and that turning Before to the merits of plaintiffs the admitted that were not case, the we address the argu defendants’ physical denied polls. access Be- ment cause, court, plaintiffs standing. lack according to the district “[a] The district court stated that it “is of vote denial arises when a state or munici- view that the pality employs ‘practice procedure’ defendants have the better argument that results in the ‘actual’ denial of on the standing, issue of race,” right to vote on account of see declines the invitation to dismiss the case 1973(a), § plaintiffs U.S.C. did not standing.” on The district court erred in bring cognizable Voting Rights Act not determining plaintiffs whether the had claim.6 The court that: stated “When cou- standing. Steel Co. v. Citizens a Better for pled previously with the referenced de Environment, 83, 94-95, 118 523 U.S. S.Ct. ballots, minimis punch affects of the card (1998) (courts 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 have these facts do not allow this Court obligation satisfy jurisdiction, includ conclude that an ‘actual’ denial of the ing standing, though parties even to vote on account of race occurs.” it). prepared to concede The defendants (1) argue that: because one of the four

Finally, the court concluded that “the did not vote in previous elec operation of voting systems by different tion, (2) fact, injury she suffered no different counties within the same state no plaintiff standing bring suit does not amount to a violation of against County, Hamilton Relying heavily Protection Clause.” because none of dissenting opinion Justice Souter’s the four voters have ever lived or voted in Bush Gore, 98, 134, 121 525, 148 County. Hamilton generalized plain- 5. The district court’s state-wide 6. The district court did not address the average residual vote did not take into ac- challenged tiffs’ statistical evidence in the plaintiffs' count the extent statistics. According plaintiffs’ counties. com- example, Sandusky County, For the rate in plaint, precincts County in the 57 in Summit optical equip- which used central-count scan comprise where African-American voters examples ment was of the resid- 2.64%. Some majority, average residual vote rate was using punch ual vote rate for counties cards precincts In the 567 where voters white 6.7%. County were for Summit 3.19% for 2.78% comprise majority County, in Summit counties, Montgomery County. Within these average residual vote rate was 2.9%. specific precincts higher had residual rates: City for Akron Precinct 3-F and 15% 17% Dayton City 14th Ward Precinct C. *11 however, reject arguments Lujan, B'ryant. does not overrule We the defendants’ fact, Lujan, In after courts have continued that plaintiffs and conclude have stand- recognize that the increased risk of ing bring against suit the State of Ohio injury harm constitutes an sufficient to It and each of the four counties. has been support standing. example, although For stipulated plaintiffs, that at least one of the relief, Supreme him ultimately denying voters, registered all of whom are resides Court considered the merits of the claims Furthermore, defendant-county. in each brought by plaintiff who had been ex- plaintiffs’ standing depend does not on asbestos, yet had not mani- posed to any injury previous suffered in elec- any symptoms fested of asbestos-related tion, probability but rather on the that R. disease. Metro-North Commuter Co. upcoming their votes will be miscounted in 424, 2113, Buckley, v. 521 U.S. 117 S.Ct. elections. (1997). L.Ed.2d 560 This Court Yellen, 352, Bryant In v. in that recognized also the medical context 2232, (1980), S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d 184 the Su- injury a risk of in the future can be preme group Court held that a of farm grounds standing. See Sutton v. St. injury workers had suffered an sufficient Inc., (6th S.C., 568, Jude 419 F.3d 573-74 standing to confer based on an increased Cir.2005) (finding standing on an based likelihood that land would available for be of harm requiring increased risk medical Canyon if a sale section of the Boulder monitoring); but Natural see Resources Project Act applied had been to 160 acres EPA, v. Council F.3d 476 Def. Valley, in Imperial of land California. The (D.C.Cir.2006). that circuit Supreme Court concluded context, this Court and finding standing court was correct in recognized others have that voters can basis, though plaintiffs even could standing have based on an risk increased not establish that would be able their improperly votes will be dis- purchase if the Act land section In Sandusky County counted. Democrat- 366-67, applied. were Id. at Blackwell, Party ic v. 387 F.3d 2232. The farm workers did in fact have (6th Cir.2004) curiam), (per this Court held standing, unlikely because was plaintiffs standing bring had of the land would be available for sale claim on alleging behalf of voters applicability without the the section Secretary provisional of State’s issuance of Act, likely that the land would be Help ballots Ohio elections violated the prices available at less than market after America Act. Act Vote The allowed voters application of the Act. Id. at 100 to provisional cast ballots those instanc- Bryant S.Ct. 2232. indicates that the in- es where their names could not be located probability injury creased of a future qualified on the list of voters. Id. sufficient to III standing. confer Article Secretary The of State issued a directive The Court restated the ele prohibit casting that would voters from standing Lujan ments of provisional poll votes unless the worker Defenders of Wildlife, 504 was able to confirm that the voter was (1992). There, L.Ed.2d 351 the Court em specific vote in that eligible precinct. phasized that in standing, order to have members, Id. 571. On behalf of their plaintiff must an injury voters, have suffered plaintiffs alleged ie. that the di- fact, particu which must be concrete and Act rective violated the because the di- larized, imminent, opposed and actual or “poll rective would allow workers to with- conjectural hypothetical. provisional anyone Id. at 560. hold a ballot from who inju- on- here have according poll alleged worker’s is not— polling ry fact to confer III sufficient Article the-spot determination which precinct standing. probability increased place resident —a *12 their will provi- improperly votes be voter desires to cast a counted the would-be punch-card op- based on Id. central-count sional ballot.” tical scan is speculative neither had plaintiffs held that the This Court nor remote. though they unable to standing, even were voters who would seek to specific name B. Mootness that be polling places vote at would The defendants that also claim wrong by voters: deemed to be there is no case or controversy because of specific Appellees have not identified the America Help Vote Act of 2002. polling will seek to vote at a (codi voters who 107-252, Pub.L. No. 116 Stat. 1666 by elec- place wrong will be deemed 15304). that § 42 fied at 102 of U.S.C. Section understandable; workers, but this is tion requires the Act States receiving federal nature, spe- be by their mistakes cannot' funds under the Act to discontinue the use Thus, in cifically systems identified advance. punch card time for the first know advance that his or voter cannot federal election 2006. The Act also rolls, dropped her will be from the on voting system name contains a section stan precinct, § an incorrect or listed dards. 42 15481. re U.S.C. The Act correctly subject human quires listed the independent technology, notice election mistak- by opportunity change error worker who the ballot before enly wrong cast, the believes voter is the is FEC compliant and an error rate. however, inevitable, It polling place. comply Ohio has its declared intentions to will be thereby that there such mistakes. with the Act and fed will receive specula- Appellees issues raise are not eral under the Act. funding Id. remote; immi-

tive or are real and ground The mootness doctrine is nent. controversy” ed Article Ill’s “case or here, Thus, juris requirement. Id. at So too are as plaintiffs 574. mootness is a will requirement, judicial unable to articulate which voter be dictional courts lack equip- power harmed in future deficient to entertain and decide moot cases. inevitable, however, Davis, County ment.7 It is that er- Los v. U.S. Angeles See 440 625, 631, 1379, 642 rors have made and will be made 99 S.Ct. 59 been L.Ed.2d (1979) (“[A] found, As the issues the future. district court case is moot when the par is its no punch presented longer flaw in card ballot ‘live’ or the “[a] fragile running legally cognizable and the fact ties lack a in the nature interest outcome.”) McCormack, punch repeated (quoting card ballots times Powell v. 486, 496, 1944, through counting machinery will result (1969)). different results.” The of the L.Ed.2d 491 The standard claims speculative determining are not or re- whether a case has been here mote, con- voluntary but real and imminent. mooted the defendant’s Earth, right.” plaintiffs in It is irrelevant San- sue in their own Friends County organi- dusky Party (TOC), Democratic were Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services standing “An zations. association has 693, Inc., 167, 181, 528 U.S. 120 S.Ct. bring behalf of when its suit on its members (2000). L.Ed.2d 610 standing would otherwise have members suffrage is a (“Undoubtedly, right might ‘A case become stringent: “is

duct and demo- matter in a free fundamental made it abso- subsequent if events moot century society.”). For more than cratic allegedly wrongful lutely clear acknowledged reasonably expected be could not behavior right to vote. nature fundamental ‘heavy per- burden of to recur.’ Hopkins, Yick See Wo challenged suading]’ the court (1886) (acknowl- 30 L.Ed. expected to reasonably be conduct cannot voting” franchise of edging political “the party asserting up again lies with start right”). “Espe- political “a fundamental Laidlaw, U.S. at mootness.” the fran- cially exercise since *13 v. Con- (quoting 693 United States S.Ct. unimpaired manner is chise a free and Ass’n, 393 Phosphate Export centrated politi- of other basic civil and preservative 203, 361, 199, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 89 S.Ct. U.S. infringement of the rights, any alleged cal added). (1968)) The State has (emphasis carefully of citizens to vote must be right voluntary compliance that its asserted meticulously Reynolds, and scrutinized.” the case. is sufficient to moot We HAVA 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362. Careful 377 U.S. voluntary compliance disagree. Ohio’s necessary scrutiny meticulous is be- just voluntary. Act with the is that — infringements minor on the cause even State, of the Act’s opt should it wish to out in other franchise can have reverberations demands, may any time and the do so at throughout contexts and democratic soci- only prorated is the return of a penalty by ety. [the “A consistent line of decisions proportion funds in amount of the federal at- Supreme] involving cases accept- not converted precincts deny right or restrict of tempts of technology. type This is not the able indelibly has made this clear.” suffrage case, voluntary action that moots a 554, (“Undeniably 84 S.Ct. 1362 Id. fact, just the of action that we have type protects of the United States Constitution carry “heavy burden” found does vote, in right qualified of all citizens to Am. demonstrating e.g., mootness. See of elections.”); see state as well as federal City Ass’n v. Louisa Water & Canoe of Const, XV, XVII, XIX, also U.S. amends. (6th Comm’n, 536, 543 Sewer 389 F.3d XXIV, example, qualified all XXVI. For Cir.2004) (defendants voluntary conduct constitutionally protected have a voters for moot- “stringent” failed to meet test parte Yarbrough, vote. 110 right Ex Cincinnati, ness); City v. 310 Johnson of 656, 152, 651, 4 28 L.Ed. 274 S.Ct. U.S. (6th Cir.2002) 484, (city’s 490 assur- F.3d (1884). cannot be denied the Citizens the chal- longer ance that it no enforced outright. v. right to vote Guinn United insufficient to lenged ordinance deemed States, 347, 362, 926, 238 35 S.Ct. 59 U.S. case); Deja Nashville v. Met- moot Vu of Wilson, (1915); Lane v. 307 L.Ed. 1340 Co., Davidson 274 ro. Gov’t Nashville & 872, 268, 274-75, 59 S.Ct. 83 L.Ed. U.S. (6th Cir.2001) (amendment 377, F.3d 387 (“The 1281 Fifteenth Amendment secures case). ordinance did not moot challenged on account of freedom from discrimination of the case. We now turn to the merits franchise,” affecting race in matters as well as sim- sophisticated and “nullifies III. discrimination.”). ple-minded modes of Right A. The to Vote may right Dilution of to vote not be Voting right. accomplished by stuffing is a fundamental the ballot-boxes. See Siebold, 371, Sims, 533, 100 25 L.Ed. e.g., Reynolds parte v. 377 U.S. 561- Ex (1964) (1879). 1362, 62, may right Nor to vote be L.Ed.2d 506 S.Ct. improper equal are to have an vote—whatever by diluted alteration ballots race, v. Clas- counting sex, of ballots. United States their whatever their whatever sic, 299, 315, 313 U.S. income, their occupation, whatever their (1941). Classic, the Court L.Ed. 1368 may wherever their home be “Obviously stated that: included within geographical required by unit. This is choose, secured the Constitu- right Clause tion, qualified voters within right is the Fourteenth concept Amendment. The them a state to cast their ballots and have the people’ Sve under the Constitution consistently ... This Court has counted no preferred visualizes class of voters right is a held secured equality among those who meet the added). (emphasis Id. Di- Constitution.” qualifications. every basic The idea that through various lution of the to vote equal every voter is other voter in his techniques, including gerrymander- racial State, when he casts his ballot in favor Lightfoot, v. ing, Gomillion candidates, competing one of several (1960), L.Ed.2d many underlies of our decisions. Terry conducting primaries, white 379-80, Id. at 83 S.Ct. 801. The Court *14 809, Adams, 461, 469, 345 73 S.Ct. 97 U.S. by stating continued and concluded that: (1953), L.Ed. 1152 likewise violate conception political equality “The of from denying due to the effect of Constitution Independence, the Declaration of to Lin- right some citizens the to vote. isWhat Address, Gettysburg Fif- coln’s to the vot- Supreme clear from all of Court’s teenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth ing rights right cases is that to vote “[t]he can only thing— Amendments mean one freely of one’s choice is for candidate 381, person, one one vote.” Id. at 83 S.Ct. society, and of the essence of a democratic 801. at any right restrictions on that strike Also, Sanders, 1, Wesberry v. 376 U.S. representative government.” heart 555, 526, (1964), 11 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 84 S.Ct. 1362. 84 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 481 Supreme Court’s cases have also The Court addressed the constitutional test for principle another unmistakable: made determining validity congressional suffrage by can right of be denied “[T]he districting schemes and held that weight of a debasement or dilution of the requires equality substantial just effectively by citizen’s vote as as whol- amongst population the districts estab- fran- ly prohibiting the free exercise of the legislatures for the election lished state chise.” Id. House of of members United States 18, at Representatives. Id. 84 S.Ct.

Nearly year Reynolds, Gray before (‘While may possible it not be to draw Sanders, 368, 381, 801, v. 372 U.S. 83 S.Ct. congressional, districts with mathematical (1963), 9 L.Ed.2d 821 ignoring for precision, is no excuse Georgia’s county unconstitutional unit held objective of plain our Constitution’s mak- system primary in statewide elections. num- ing equal representation equal for system The Court found the to be uncon- people goal the fundamental for weight of bers stitutional because diluted the Representatives. That is the Georgia votes cast certain residents the House 379-80, justice high based on where lived. Id. standard of and common sense us.”). 83 S.Ct. 801. The Court stated: the Founders set for which right that: “No high standard establishes geographical Once the unit for which country than precious is more a free desig- to representative is be chosen nated, having a in the election of participate all who in the election that of voice which, deny equal pro- one would who make the laws under No

those prohibit also a law citizens, rights, tection clause would we must live. Other good citi- basic, expressly give if that would certain illusory even the most 17, a full vote zens a half-vote and others undermined.” Id. at right to vote is Constitutionally guaranteed ... [T]he S.Ct. right to vote and the to have one’s right favorably cited Reynolds Court also clearly imply policy counted vote Peters, in South v. Douglas’s Justice dissent systems, matter that state election no 94 L.Ed. 3 designed form, their should be to what (1950), he stated that: where approximately equal weight to each give right to vote than There is more Thus, legislature a state vote cast.... right piece paper to mark a deny right voters the eligible cannot right pull it in a or the drop box Congressmen right and the vote right lever in a booth. The It can no more have their vote counted. right includes the to have the ballot vote their vote in destroy the effectiveness of counted. It also includes the accomplish this in the part and no more at full have the vote counted value with- ‘apportionment’ name of than under out or discount. dilution other name. (citations omitted); Id. at 70 S.Ct. 641 569-70, (emphasis Id. S.Ct. 1198 Reynolds, also see added). (“And, provide if a State should Additional cases are-relevant to our de- part of citizens in one votes Virginia Harper cision. State Bd. times, given or five State should be two *15 tax Virginia poll Elections held invalid times, weight the of votes of 10 times that “a the and declared State violates State, part in another it citizens Fourteenth Equal Protection Clause the hardly right could contended that the be Amendment whenever makes the afflu- residing in the disfavored vote those payment any fee an ence of the voter of diluted.”). effectively areas had not been 663, 666, electoral standard.” 383 U.S. 86 dilution, course, just Vote while as effec (1966). 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 To S.Ct. franchise, outright tive as an denial of the conclusion, reach the noted that: this Court may accomplished many ways, be both long been mindful that where “We have unintentionally, in man intentionally and rights fundamental and are as- liberties immediately the ner does not shock Clause, Equal Protection serted under the outright senses as would an denial. This might classifications which invade or re- reason, however, is not a to be less closely strain them must be scrutinized cognizant Equal Protection the Clause 670, carefully Id. at and confined.” 86 implications. “One must be ever aware 1079. S.Ct. sophisticated that the Constitution forbids simpleminded as well as modes of discrimi Next, Blumstein, in Dunn v. 405 U.S. 563, Reynolds, nation.” 377 U.S. at 84 995, 330, (1972), 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (internal quotation S.Ct. 1362 marks omit the Court struck down Tennessee’s dura- ted). strict Applying tional residence statute. scrutiny, the Court stated: analysis Reynolds

Helpful favorably repeat There is no need to now the cited the Court-was Justice Green, v. in earlier cases to Colegrove Black’s dissent 328 labors undertaken 549, 1198, analyze right explain 66 90 L.Ed. 1432 to vote and to S.Ct. (1946), judicial in reviewing where he stated that: in detail the role

859 (internal Id. selectively quotations ence.” statutes that distribute and cita- state omitted). decision, franchise. In decision after tions the clear that a citizen

this Court has made recently Somewhat more decided is constitutionally protected right has a Gore, Bush v. 98, 525, 121 531 U.S. S.Ct. equal on an participate elections basis (2000),8 388 L.Ed.2d which reiterated jurisdiction. other citizens with long princi- established (citations omitted). (“When 336, 104, Id. at ples. at Id. 92 S.Ct. 995 S.Ct. Thus, right be “unconstitutional state legislature law would vests the vote for people, right unless the State can demonstrate that such President in its vote as promote compel- necessary legislature prescribed laws are is fundamen- Id. tal; , governmental interest.” one ling source of its fundamental omitted). an- (quotation equal Stated nature weight S.Ct. lies accorded to way, justification “a burden of heavy equal dignity other each vote and the owed to voter.”). State, the statute be each Echoing long-revered prin- [ ] is on will closely light ciples, emphasized states, scrutinized in of its asserted the Court 343, 92 Id. purposes.” granting right equal S.Ct. 995. after to vote on terms, not, “affecting “may further stated laws arbitrary Court later treatment, must be rights disparate person’s constitutional drawn value one Id. ... 104-05, and must be tailored to vote that of precision serve over another.” 525 (citing Harper Virginia legitimate objectives. if their And there Elections, other, to achieve Bd. ways reasonable (1966)).9 goals with a burden on those lesser consti- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 169 That is, tutionally activity, may protected encompasses a State to vote “more greater choose than way interfer- the initial allocation of the franchise. note, framework, appears Of Bush v. Gore to be the first 9. Within this then in- quired procedures “whether recount recognized developing case where a court adopted [whereby Florida Court has problem with that we confront it instructed the intent of the voter be today. per opinion curiam noted that the *16 obligation are determined] consistent its with common, “brought sharp case focus a if into arbitrary disparate to avoid treatment of unnoticed, phenomenon” heretofore na- —that Bush, of its members electorate.” 531 of do tionwide "estimated ballots cast 2% 104, U.S. at 121 S.Ct. 525. Court an- register a vote President for for whatever "[t]he swered that recount mechanisms im- reason,” "punchcard balloting ma- that satisfy plemented ... do not the minimum produce can of chines an unfortunate number nonarbitrary requirement for treatment of clean, punched ballots which are not in a necessary to fundamental voters secure the Bush, Thus, complete way by right.” counting the voter.” U.S. 531 votes Id. standards for 104, vary county county” "might ... to that from at 121 S.Ct. We also note 525. that single county, a and sometimes from within begins by criticizing dissent our "reliance on Equal Clause. Id. at violate the Protection Supreme murky Court's decision in Bush 106, correctly, Quite S.Ct. 525. at 121 transpar- Op. Murky, Gore." Dis. 880. v. at per opinion, end the Court of the curiam ent, tall, illegitimate, wrong, right, big, short its is limited noted that "consideration to the small; regardless adjective of the one circumstances, present problem for decision, might proper use to describe the gener- equal protection processes in election precedes "Supreme noun that Court”— it — 109, ally many presents complexities.” Id. at weight carries more with us. else Whatever 525. The 121 S.Ct. Court's substantial be, may it Bush Gore is first and foremost rights precedent as much. The demonstrates decision of the Court of the United change, principles facts but the fun- and we bound to it. States are adhere right nature to vote damental remain More on this later. the same. 860 Last, contrary argu to the dissent’s

Equal protection applies as well ment, manner of its exercise.” Id. decision in Burdick v. the Court’s Takushi, 428, 2059, 112 S.Ct. Protection, therefore, requires Equal (1992) require L.Ed.2d 245 does not a dif that procedural safeguards” “minimal such Burdick, the Court approach. ferent there “at least some assurance that the is prohibition considered whether Hawaii’s rudimentary equal treat- requirements voting violated the First and ment and fundamental fairness are satis- on write-in 109, Echoing 430, at 525.10 fied.” Id. S.Ct. Amendments. Id. at Fourteenth other, “if holding Dunn’s that there began by noting 2059. The Court S.Ct. ways goals those reasonable achieve any way election law will some constitutionally a lesser burden on with “impose upon some burden individual vot may not choose protected activity, a State ers,” and, result, scru applying as a strict interference,” 405 U.S. way greater claim tiny tangentially related 343, 995, held that 92 S.Ct. the Court unnecessarily tie right to vote would to de- formulation of uniform rules “[t]he seeking regu the hands state officials recurring on these termine intent based 433, 112 orderly late elections. Id. at S.Ct. and, practicable we con- circumstances 2059. The did reassert Court Bush, clude, necessary,” 531 U.S. at fundamental, right to vote is but noted Furthermore, 525. the Court cau- S.Ct. principle that from this it does not follow must remembered that “[i]t tioned be right the “the to associate [with suffrage can be denied ‘the particular political purposes for candidate] weight or dilution of the of a debasement through the ballot Id. In [is] absolute.” just effectively citizen’s vote as whol- Burdick, therefore, found the ly fran- prohibiting the free exercise of the ” affecting only burden to be minimal and (quoting chise.’ Id. at S.Ct. Ha failing comply those voters 1362). Reynolds, 377 non-discriminatory waii’s reasonable and finally, And expressed the Court its reluc- for a procedures qualifying election issue, having tance at to decide the 434-45, place on the ballot. Id. contending parties asserted that “[w]hen Thus, case, 2059. unlike the instant ... process invoke the of the courts technological where the burden is not with unsought responsibility becomes our to re- voters, any the control burden solve the federal and constitutional issues Burdick was the result of the voter’s fail judicial system has been forced to con- timely identify front.” Id. at S.Ct. 525. ure to candidate seek dissenting interpret- Implications Bush v. Gore Several of Justices Administration, majority opinion question ed the to call into & on Election 19 J.L. Pol. *17 practices procedures. additional state 299, (Oct.2003) (noting Supreme 299 system example, For a that allows coun- "[I]n holding a Court's in Bush v. Gore—’"that state types voting systems, ties to use different adopt adequate must uniform standards in already polls voters arrive at the with an conducting a a manual recount of ballots in unequal chance that their votes will be count- presidential applied election—can be in other ed. I do not see how the fact that this results contexts, rendering government some local from counties’ selection of different practices chal- vulnerable to constitutional machines than a court order makes the rather Nevertheless, lenge.”). recognize we 552, outcome more fair.” Id. at 121 justices agreed seven of the that the recount J., Likewise, dissenting). (Breyer, S.Ct. 525 by Supreme Court violat- ordered Florida speculated impact. scholars have on Bush’s Clause; disagree- ed Sauer, "Arbitrary e.g., See Edmund S. remedy. ment was over the Disparate” Democracy: to Obstacles vote,” 438, id. at 2059. In on the ballot. Id. at S.Ct. this place person such case, however, through no failure on their 436-37, (“Consequently, any S.Ct. parts, facing Ohio voters deficient technol of choice and on voters’ freedom burden ogy approach position ballot in a un only by those who fail is borne association equal portion from the of the electorate until identify candidate of choice their using adequate technology. As the State’s But in Storer v. days primary. before the report HAVA stated: “The evidence is Brown, 724, 736, 1274, [415 U.S. overwhelming that thousands of vot Ohio (1974)] gave little L.Ed.2d 714 we ers have been antiquat disenfranchised interest the candidate and weight to ‘the voting equipment.” ed The burden on the making a late supports may have his pales comparison franchise Burdick early decision to seek inde rather than to the burden in this case. status.’”). Finally, noting pendent ballot compliance procedures with Hawaii’s Burdick, The dissent’s reliance on there access,” the “adequate afforded ballot fore, First, Burdick, misplaced. “[i]n a only ban on write-in was State’s plaintiffs’ rights First Amendment rights to make “limited burden on voters’ issue,” ballot access were at Southwest politically and to associate free choices Voter, 899, 344 F.3d at the plaintiffs’ not 438-39, 112 through the vote.” Id. at S.Ct. vote, right to is at issue this case. which dismissing problem 2059. We have little Second, the dissent’s claim that “[f]ederal Burdick, relevance of the context of applying courts the Burdick framework to vote for a which is a voter’s desire challenges have evaluated to various state failing properly after write-in candidate voting regulations under a rational-basis get comply procedures with the state’s 35, Op. standard of review” is cor Dis. ting that candidate on the ballot rect, point. but misses the Burdick was The voter in Burdick had place. ballot; first about a candidate’s access to the equal access to the ballot on terms with was not a case that addressed a voter the rest of the electorate. being equal denied an chance to have her viewed the burden in Burdick as vote counted. Each of the cases cited dissent, little more than a minor burden on those frame employing Burdick’s hour,” work, having who waited until “the eleventh id. are likewise cases little to nothing to decide whom vote to do with the exercise Moreover, “protest adopts the dissent recording for or the interest franchise.11 Merrill, 11. The dissent cites Werme v. 84 F.3d tions are evaluated under the rational-basis (1st Cir.1996) (upholding under ra- Op. standard of review.” Dis. at 884. These Hampshire a New law that tional basis review cases, however, support do the dissent's prevented Party a member of the Libertarian applies to claim that rational basis review serving as a ballot clerk on Election from claim; merely proposition support Day). Whom a state authorizes to serve as involving election law are some claims cry challenge ballot clerk is a far from a reviewed under the rational basis standard. alleging that a denial of the to vote. Likewise, that the dis- the law review article Moreover, the dissent cites Donatelli v. Mitch- heavily upon, specifically sent relies so refutes ell, (3d Cir.1993), 2 F.3d which apply basis would claim that rational review, upheld, under rational basis state involving disparate technolo- review case plan temporarily reapportionment as- *18 gies. discussing When the law that would signed a senator to a different district. state apply challenge disparate to a based on tech- "[tjhese goes The dissent on to state that cases nologies, Hasen concludes Professor a from our sister circuits serve as reminder that, appears v. to mandate strict scru- "Bush Gore majority opinion notwith- the tone of the standing, many voting regula- tiny, application basis review.” and local not of rational state the Ending proper of on overly interpretation narrow the this section an review, briefly Supreme of now review vote” and the standard we “right ignores to of right treatment that the to other lower courts similar Court’s statement Bush in recent encompasses voting rights challenges years.13 than the initial vote “more protec Equal of the allocation franchise. manner as well the its applies

tion to of Protection Equal B. Similar Chal- Bush, 104, 121 exercise.” lenges Technology to Voting added).12 also note that (emphasis We presiden- to Relatively us is more similar Bush after the 2000 the case before soon election, it necessary did not find tial challenging where Court the first case applying or cite when to address Burdick use of certain as viola- standard review. heightened Equal of tive of the Protection Clause was of heard District California. Central protection right Zealous to use plaintiffs alleged punch rights Few vote has been norm. have systems to card amounted vote de- extensively protect vigorously been so and nial in violation of the Fourteenth Amend- to vote. Its fundamental ed as the Voting ment as well as a claim under defense, vigilance in its nature and Act. Rights See Common Cause Southern courts, Congress, from the both Leadership Christian Great- Conference pro amendment through constitutional Jones, Angeles 213 F.Supp.2d er Los v. cess, recognition stem from the our (C.D.Cal.2001). 1106, 1107-08 The Secre- preservation democratic structure and the tary judgment of State moved for on the rights depends great of other to extent pleadings and court the district denied the effect, on franchise. To from Yick motion. Id. 1108. Bush, Reynolds Supreme to to Court Wo State, precedent Secretary apply is clear: we must strict Like Ohio’s Califor- voting practice Secretary power nia’s “has the scrutiny challenged of State voting systems a list of from publish at issue here. which Hasen, Gore, dissent, response we Bush v. 29 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at are of 13. course aware of these were that some cases 395. pleadings on a reviewed or motion to 12(b)(6). Coming dismiss under Rule from informative, Additionally disposi- but not circuits, they district courts and other are not question, is how tive constitutional (as binding upon Supreme us Court decisions Congress "right has defined to vote” un- have, are). however, These do decisions Voting Rights der the Act. Under U.S.C. power persuade, irrespon- and it would be (c)(1), Rights provides: § Voting Act reasoning sible not to consider their —both good simply because are not bad— "voting” The terms "vote” or shall include binding. agree If we with then their reason- necessary all a vote effective action to make ought ing, apply we If it here. we do not election, any primary, special, general or agree, adopt we then should not their reason- to, registration, including, limited This, course, ing. Supreme differs from listing pursuant subchapter, or other decisions, Gore, such as Bush where required by prerequisite to action law vot- apply reasoning regard- we are bound to their ballot, ing, casting having such ballot them, agree less of whether we with find them properly appro- counted and included in the "murky,” Op. Dis. or believe that the respect priate totals with votes cast its decision Court issued public party candidates for office seriousness,” Op. (quoting at 886 "lack of Dis. propositions Hasen, votes are received in which L. Gore and Richard Bush v. the Fu- Elections, election. ture Law in added). (2001)). (Emphasis Fla. St. U.L.Rev. *19 In may comprehensive counties choose.” Id. 1107. This a more fash ion, punch systems included card which the list district court for the Northern alleged were than plaintiffs less reliable District of Illinois addressed a similar systems, and therefore those other listed claim. Black McGuffage, See (N.D.Ill.2002). living punch counties where the card F.Supp.2d 889 The court system substantially used were less began by noting many was prob election likely to have their votes counted in viola- lems have come to light years. recent tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. plaintiffs Id. at 891. The in Black made alleged also that the counties plaintiffs essentially the same claims now before this systems high is, card “have ra- using punch Court —that claims under the minority comparison Clauses, cial populations Protection and Due Process using voting systems” counties other a claim for minority plaintiffs well as alleged right and therefore denial under Voting Rights Section of the Act. (“Plaintiffs to vote on the basis of race under Section Id. at allege that African Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1107-08. American and Latino voters are dispropor tionately forced to dispropor use—and are court The district concluded tionately injured they when use—-the chal alleged sufficient facts to survive lenged voting systems.”). judgment pleadings a motion for on the scrutiny under both strict and rational ba- (and Like Ohio and California most oth- (“Even sis review. Id. at 1109 if the more states), er may counties Illinois ultimately by lenient standard is applied systems choose from several voting certi- Court, Plaintiff alleged facts indi- fied the Illinois State Board of Elec- cating Secretary per- of State’s jurisdictions tions. Id. Illinois could adopt punch- mission to counties to either choose from four technologies precinct- — voting procedures card or more reliable (with notification), count optical scan error voting procedures is unreasonable and dis- (without optical central-count scan error criminatory.”). notification), precinct-count punch card (with notification) error and central-count claim, Regarding Voting Rights Act (without notification) punch card error plaintiffs’ the court characterized the claim Id. election technologies. Of the 110 local being “disproportion- as racial minorities Illinois, election, boards in in the 2000 ately denied the to vote because their ninety-five boards used central-count in disproportionate votes are uncounted punch systems. card Id. Various residual numbers as result mecha- vote rates were listed the district court: supplied.” nism that Id. at 1110. again average The court denied the defendants’ residual vote rate across Illinois, Following president motion to dismiss. Id. the deci- for ballots cast for sion, November, parties agreed presidential to and the court elec- tion, requiring a consent This rate approximately entered decree was 3.85%. juris- using punch substantially among the nine counties in Illinois California varied [In][j]urisdictions using optical card convert to “other certified dictions. voting equipment” by March 2004. scan with error notification the See ballots Jones, than average Common Cause v. No. 01-03470 residual vote rate was less (C.D.Cal. (RZX), ranged from 0.32% in SVW 2002 WL 1766436 1%. The rates 2002), Feb.19, in Franklin by, McHenry County enforced No. 01-03470 to 1.07% (C.D.Cal. (RZ), County. jurisdictions using punch SVW 2002 WL 1766410 2002). without error notification May card ballots *20 omitted)). 2(a) Act prohibits of the Section more rate was average residual vote proce- any practice use of electoral Chicago, in example,

than 4%. For abridge- in a denial or in the that “results citywide, 12.59% dure 7.06% rate was citizen of the ward, and of the ward, in the 37th ment 12th 12.4% of race or on account 29th to vote precinct of the United States in the 48th 36.73% 1973(a). § Section in color.” U.S.C. Similarly, the rate was 5.23% ward. and includes the franchise County, broadly protects in the 8.8% Cook suburban effec- necessary to make a vote County and “all action Township of Cook Cicero having including “casting a ballot The rate County. in tive” Alexander 7.48% 42 U.S.C. properly.” counted County, 2.48% such ballot- was 3.17% Whiteside 2(b) (c)(1). pro- of the Act § Sangamon 1973Í Section County, and 2.15% in Will proce- practice an electoral jurisdic- vides that In the three election County. the franchise in a with- results violation scan ballots dure optical tions which use (a) average residu- under section out error notification For more than 4%. al vote rate was circumstances, if, totality on the based in all of rate was 10.88% example, the processes political that the is shown Louis, 20th but 22.30% the St. East in the nomination or election leading to Louis. precinct of East St. are not subdivision political State or by mem- open participation case, equally based As in the instant Id. at 893. protected citizens of a class of rates, bers plain- vote various residual (a) in that its of this section subsection living in argued tiffs “individuals than opportunity have less members greater have a jurisdictions card punch par- electorate to other members of the having then- probability statistical process and to ticipate political ... that the counties counted [and] votes of their choice. representatives elect larger system card have punch with the counties minorities than do populations of 1973(b). § 42 U.S.C. thus use voting systems, and using other statutes, the district on these Based machines has a dis- of those less accurate are two “[t]here court in Black found at minority voters.” Id. impact on

parate statutory to a claim under Sec- elements 894. 2:(1) ‘standard, of an electoral tion the use the claim The district court addressed (2) procedure,’ resulting practice or 12(b)(6)motion to dismiss. the context of a [minority] opportunity of the diminution rejected court first the defendants’ political pro- in the participate ‘to voters mootness, id. standing claims based on representatives of then- cess and to elect ” 894-96, rejected the defen- and also (quoting 42 U.S.C. choice.’ Id. 12(b)(6) claim as to the merits. dants’ 1973(a)-(b)). court then concluded § met this re- plaintiffs’ complaint that the plaintiffs’ The court first addressed by identifying prac- an electoral Rights quirement Voting claim under Section (“deficient system”), alleged ballot that “the tice Act of 1965. The court stated system, the of the deficient that because emphasized [that opportunity have less minority plaintiffs interpreted ‘should be Voting Rights Act] members of electorate than other provides in a manner that the broadest repre- and elect process in the combating participate racial discrimi- possible scope in choice. Id. of their (quoting sentatives nation.’” Id. at 896 Chisom could dem- 380, 403, alleged that the facts Roemer, Finding (1991) (internal “participation quotations onstrate 115 L.Ed.2d 348 significantly political process applicable could be The third case involved the *21 diminished,” gubernatorial the district court denied the California recall election. Following to Id. disposition motion dismiss. defendants’ Common Cause, prior gubernatorial but to the recall plaintiffs’ The court turned to the then in in plain election California various Equal Protection Clause. claim under suit in tiffs filed the same district court as Black, Equal claim and The Protection Cause, seeking injunction Common an that case, instant is not that classifica- prevent would of punch the use card tech race, on tion has been drawn based nology in the recall election. See Sout rather that “the counties’ use different Registration Project hwestVoter Education voting systems parties different of the (C.D.Cal. Shelley, F.Supp.2d v. 278 1131 Equal state violates the Protection Clause” 2003). The district court denied the re by valuing person’s one vote more than quest injunction, for the that finding res another’s. at 897. there Id. Because was judicata and were laches viable defenses classification, explicit no the defendants based on Common Cause consent de argued was that rational basis the stan- cree, that unlikely were to plaintiffs argued dard review while the on the succeed merits their claims based scrutiny appropriate that strict is the stan- election, on short time until the voting system dard because the affects the hardships pub the balance of and the to vote. Id. plaintiffs’ fundamental lic weighed interest in favor of allowing the directly The district did court not decide go election to as forward scheduled. Id. determination the issue and reserved its In a moving process, fast the district court trial. for Id. August 20, 2003, ruling issued its on Supreme The court then turned to Court argued the case was before Ninth Cir precedent plaintiffs’ allega- and found the September cuit on 11. The court issued fitting squarely tions within the Court’s opinion its on September 15 and reversed Equal Protection admonitions. The dis- Regis the district court. Southwest Voter plaintiffs’ trict court did find the claims Project Shelley, tration Education v. more v. analogous be Bush Gore than (9th Cir.2003), F.3d 882 vacated Supreme previous other of the Court’s (en banc). F.3d rev’d F.3d by 344 cases, voting rights principle but the be- panel stayed decision the court The its each hind of them remained the same. Id. Sep decided hear the case en banc on court, According at 898-99. 22. tember The en banc court reversed arbitrary dispa- result the state’s following day, decision panel rate treatment of voters in different coun- which to proceed days allowed the election ties, “voters in some counties are statisti- later. cally likely less to have votes their counted plain- than in other in the panel voters counties same The had concluded that the “Equal for mir- state the same election the same tiffs’ Protection Clause claim Similarly persons recently analyzed by office. situated one the Su- rors the differently in v. arbitrary preme treated man- Bush Gore.” Southwest Thus, Voter, Id. at F.3d at cited panel ner.” because 894. “ used, voting system Reynolds the state which the Court held ‘value[s] another,’ person’s repeatedly recognized one vote over that of ... has been “[i]t ‘equal dignity qualified does afford voters have a constitu- all [and] ” vote, protected right and to (quoting tionally owed each voter.’ Id. Bush 525). Gore, 104-05, counted.” 377 U.S. at have their votes omitted). argument, (citations outright Cit- claims advanced similarity to the noting its panel wrote ing precedent, Gore, reject outright nor did it in Bush v. voting- “a classic presented case before claim. Voting Rights Act plaintiffs’ Southwest claim.” rights equal protection Voter, panel cited F.3d at 895. emphasized that repeatedly The court Sanders, held the Court where Gray v. is the standard of discretion abuse vote is entitled be “Every that: voter’s pre- of a court’s denial reviewing a district *22 correctly count- must be once. It counted Shelley, 344 F.3d at liminary injunction. 368, 380, 83 reported.” 372 U.S. ed and (“The standard discretion] [abuse (1963). 801, Also dis- 9 L.Ed.2d 821 S.Ct. to our resolution important is review the Court Reynolds, where cussed was (“We case.”); review the id. at 918 vote weight “the of a citizen’s held that deny a grant court’s decision district he depend on where be made cannot injunction for of discre- abuse preliminary 567, 377 U.S. at 84 S.Ct. Reynolds, lives.” and deferen- tion. review is limited Our 1362. tial.”) omitted). (internal The citation that: are met with court then stated “We all that the Con-

According panel, to the contest. authority on both sides of the legal that requires is some assurance stitution right that the to vote is There is no doubt requirements equal rudimentary fundamental, cannot a federal court fairness are and fundamental treatment (cita- enjoin a state elec- interfere with or lightly Id. at satisfied. (citation omitted). In a omitted). at 918 concluded tion.” Id. panel The also tions of the paragraph discussion scrutiny ordinarily appro- short one that strict claim, en banc court Equal Protection in a situation akin to the standard priate previously had occa- have not the use of deficient stated: “We presented one because precise equal protec- sion to consider technology right the fundamental affects panel That a tion claim raised here. vote counted. Id. at have one’s Nevertheless, unanimously the claim this court concluded the court found S.Ct. argu- that the provides had merit evidence question not reach the because that it need jurists of ment is one over which reasonable a likelihood demonstrated Nevertheless, great may of the differ.” Id. regardless on the merits success a paid principle federal employed. Id. at 900. heed of review standard enjoin a state elec- lightly court should not tendered sufficient evi- “Plaintiffs have tion, court that the “dis- the en banc held to demonstrate a likelihood of suc- dence discretion in ration- trict court did not abuse its establishing that theré' is no cess plaintiffs have not systems holding estab- using voting al basis for have on the probability a clear of success ‘unacceptable’ some lished been decertified as claim.” equal protection merits of their and not others.” Id. counties added). (emphasis Id. then heard en banc and The case was plaintiffs’ court then turned to the was South- panel decision reversed. claim, Voting Rights Act which referred Registration Project Education west Voter Cir.2003) (en Nevertheless, (9th noting Id. “stronger.” to as Shelley, v. 344 F.3d banc). record, court, dispute in the howev- opinion “significant in a curiam per er, dissents, degree significance of the that the dis- as to the with no concluded court con- disparity,” the vote] [residual trict court did not abuse its discretion shown “although plaintiffs have preliminary injunction. Id. cluded denying merits, court, however, reject of success on we possibility did not 918. The stage grants right at this have to vote to some residents say cannot others, denying while the vote to then Id. at we strong likelihood.” 918- shown subject legislation must to strict scru 19.14 tiny and determine whether exclusions A the lower court cases dem- review of necessary promote compelling application onstrates consistent (citing state interest.” Id. Dunn v. principles established Blumstein, 330, 337, Each the cases discussed above Court. (1972)). legis 31 L.Ed.2d 274 “If the protection equal recognized lation, however, not infringe does on the Voting implications Act of the use Rights right vote simply regu instead [and disparate of non-notice and tangential franchise], lates a aspect reasoning of their persua- we find much challenged we examine the statute under turn to sive. We now this Court’s treat- Id.; the rational basis standard.” see ment of vote cases. Giles, Craigmiles also 31 F.3d *23 (6th Cir.2002) (“When regu 223 a statute C. Sixth Circuit Precedent rights’ (e.g. lates certain vot ‘fundamental yet This has to review a claim Circuit abortion) ing distinguishes or or between precise this ilk. court of The district be- people the of ‘suspect on basis certain to point low and the defendants Mixon (e.g. characteristics’ race or ori national (6th Ohio, Cir.1999), 193 F.3d 389 as es- subject gin), the statute is to ‘strict scruti relevant framework for this tablishing the ny.’”). The proceeded Mixon court to analysis. Court’s Mixon addressed the analyze the claim presented under ration constitutionality of a allowing state the al basis because statute not in the did mayor to for appoint new school board is, fringe upon any to right vote—that School the Cleveland District. This Court “[although have Plaintiffs a fundamental Court Supreme precedent cited acknowl- right them, to vote in elections before is a fundamental edging right, no right there is fundamental to elect an differing and then discussed the standards body such as school administrative equal protection applicable board, of review to if cities in the even other state (ci Mixon, According 402. this may claims. Id. at to do so.” 193 F.3d at 403 omitted). Court, the challenged legislation tations “[i]f disagree 14. We with the dissent’s character- en banc decision a "rather firm rebuke” was (“We Shelley. panel’s ization of en banc decision in of the rationale. See id. have the Calling previously the en banc reversal a “rather not had to the firm occasion consider decision, panel precise equal protection rebuke” of the the claim here. dissent raised finding insight panel unanimously panel chastises us That a of court con- event, Op. provides decision. Dis. In our cluded that the claim had merit evi- reading argument en banc is of the decision that the dence that the is one over which differ.”). may jurists court believed the issues needed further Neverthe- reasonable less, issue, development analysis, authority and both counter- with on sides of the i.e., vailing did the imminent recall the court held that the “district court not concerns— contrary holding plain- election—dictated outcome. See abuse its discretion in that the (“We Shelley, probability 344 F.3d at 918 are met tiffs have not a clear of with established legal authority equal protection on both sides of the contest. success on the merits of their added). right (emphasis language There is no to is claim.” Id. This doubt vote fundamental, light- hardly but a federal cannot of a "rather firm re- court features election.”). ly enjoin placed emphasis interfere a state buke.” The decision instead fact, consistently days opinion banc on that a election the en the fact state was mere Here, away. stressed the abuse of discretion standard we have no imminent election thus, weighing we that case and do not believe that the on the other side of the scale. 868 equal part counted on terms is vote

IV. pos- vote. conclusion right to No other is A. Standard Review thus, from the law and sible case strict judgment from a entered appeal “On scrutiny applies.15 trial, following a bench we review dis- precedent All of the indicates that hav- findings factual for clear error trict court’s vote counted funda- ing properly one’s is conclusions de novo.” Press- legal its Bush, e.g., Bank, franchise. See 182, mental v. Franklin Nat. F.3d man 384 (indicat- 104-05, (6th Cir.2004). 525 531 U.S. S.Ct. having counted ing equal one’s vote on Analysis B. jurisdic- with others in the relevant terms quintessential “right tion is the to vote” precedent our Reynolds, case); Mixon framework instructs that if S.Ct. own (“[T]he suffrage right can be de- permitting Ohio statute localities use “infringe[s] nied or dilution voting technology on debasement deficient vote,” scrutiny just effectively of a vote as right ap weight strict citizen’s then wholly prohibiting free plies; “infringe if the statute exercise does South, vote,” franchise.”); merely regulates right U.S. at franchise, J., aspect (Douglas, tangential dissenting) some (“There Mixon, applies. right basis than then rational review more vote begs question piece paper F.3d at 402. This mark a *24 in a to “right encompasses. drop right pull what the to vote” it box or the a lever We right that in easily right conclude the to have one’s booth. The includes the fraud, Again, misinterprets right the dissent restricted to vote. Burdick the There was ” "harmonizing] our decision allegation when it with no the case that the electronic Op. prop- at dissent Mixon. Dis. 885. As the system to its inherent nature —was less —due notes, regu- erly distinguished Mixon between likely previously to count votes than the "infringe right to vote” lations that on the place system. any could there be Nor conclu- those that do not. The dissent then concludes paper sion that the lack of a trail restricted together reading Mixon and Burdick re- Thus, right applied to the the vote. court apply quires we rational basis review. is, basis rational review—that whether the (and dissent) by the These cases others cited government's conclusion that the risk of fraud however, distinguishable, because do manipulation prevent was insufficient to infringe right on the to vote or the man- change system to the electronic was ration- Burdick, ner of its exercise. the First al. With no that the evidence decision was right Amendment to ballot access was is- is, irrational —that no evidence that some- sue, right properly to not the have one’s vote unlikely one’s vote to be was counted—the Likewise, Mixon, was counted. there no upheld way court decision. That is the in no Thus, right to vote for office at issue. (or controlling) inquiry inconsistent over our allowing the appointment law of the offi- light cases here. Even in of the the dissent vote, away any right cials did not take to cites, simply we cannot subscribe to the dis- right because the to vote did not exist for that sent’s belief that in the case before us—-where office. The dissent also relies on Weber v. technology a disparate deficient results in (9th Cir.2003), Shelley, 347 F.3d case counting proper likelihood of votes— directly Op. point.” claims "is Dis. right infringed. that the is not to vote Under Weber, however, no 885. In there was claim apparent understanding the dissent's residing parts that voters in different vote, right right to that the it seems to vote having state had a lesser likelihood of their Rather, infringed would not have been in Bush v. counted. issue was votes over Gore because voters were electronic-voting system all allowed to cast whether an without a trail, equal alleged properly paper ballots on terms and marked which the was susceptible potential correctly manipulation to ballots would counted. be compelling justification ballot counted. It also right light to have the of the fun- right. counted damental nature of the right have the vote See Fron- includes discount.”) Richardson, 677, 690, tiero v. 411 U.S. at full value without dilution or (1973) (citations omitted); (plurali- S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 583 Colegrove, 328 U.S. (“[W]hen ty) we enter the realm of ‘strict 569-71, (Black, J., dissent- S.Ct. judicial scrutiny’ (“The there can be no doubt Constitutionally guaranteed ing) ‘administrative convenience’ is no right have right to vote and the one’s shibboleth, the mere recitation of which clearly imply policy vote counted Moreover, constitutionality.”). dictates systems, election no matter what state Ohio’s reliance on the upgrading cost of form, designed give their should be fails in light of the monies equal weight to each vote approximately already process. devoted See Sha- cast.”); Classic, 313 U.S. at 618, 633, piro Thompson, (“Obviously right included within the (1969) (“[CJosts 22 L.Ed.2d 600 choose, Constitution, secured justify cannot an otherwise invidious clas- right qualified voters within a state sification.”); Dunn, see also 405 U.S. at to cast their ballots and have them count- (“And other, 92 S.Ct. 995 if there are (c)(1) ed.”); (defining U.S.C.1973Z ways reasonable to achieve goals those “having to vote to include such ballot with a burden on constitutionally lesser properly ap- counted and included in the protected activity, a may State not choose cast”). law, propriate total of votes Case interference.”). way of greater Addi- definitions, statutory and common sense tionally, Ohio has used if it cost as were “right infring- indicate that the vote” is Any change silver bullet. from the status ed in this case the use of the two quo necessarily involves some cost. The technologies challenged by deficient to put State has failed forth evidence plaintiffs. The distinction Mixon be- indicating manage that it cannot the costs persons tween elections where are entitled instead, the evidence indicates (strict scrutiny) to vote and a statute au- *25 budgeted State has either for the transi- thorizing appointment of administrators in- through tion from its own funds or funds (rational basis) having stead of an election provided by government. the federal reasoning confirms our here. further mere fact that there is involved some cost scrutiny requires us to Strict compelling. not factor does make chal determine whether the use of the two Further, alleged the State’s concern with lenged technologies jurisdictions in some likewise, case, fraud, voter in this is not practice “narrowly not others is a tai but Secretary of the of compelling light compelling governmental lored to further report concluding State’s the technol- Bollinger, interests.” Grutter v. U.S. securely ogy implemented. can be See 306, 326, Assem., 123 S.Ct. 156 L.Ed.2d 304 Reg. HB also Gen. Sess. (2003). standard, (Ohio 2004). this Under State’s Finding compelling no rea- justifications proffered training of cost and certi- supporting son State’s continued wholly are insufficient to sustain its contin fication the deficient non-notice technol- of i.e., technologies. ogy, punch-card system ued certification of the Ad and central- systems,16 light and in simply optical ministrative convenience is not a count scan sufficiently high justi- nology and the state's 16. We have focused on the inherent and easi- ly punch system support retaining sufficiently flaws in the card fications in identifiable goes optical but count weak such that we conclude that decertifica- the same central and, technology practicable we technology. that tech- tion of “is scan The error rate for wealth, func- looking with to that it correlates right of the nature the fundamental struck poll tax tionally violate the like vote, actions the State’s ”). certifi- Harper The continued Clause. down Secretary by the technology of this cation Furthermore, in Reynolds: the minimal ade- provide does State of the Overweighing and overvaluation safeguards prevent quate procedural county with living [in votes of those of votes based dilution the unconstitutional ef- technology] has the certain adequate Bush, 531 See a voter resides. on where of the and undervaluation fect of dilution Unequal 109, 121 525.17 S.Ct. U.S. living county with [in of those voters are perpetrated unfairness treatment and resulting dis- technology]. The deficient to remain cer- allowing technology this those individual vot- against crimination maintain- reasons for tified and the State’s easily areas is living in disfavored ers system are far from ing disparate Them mathematically. demonstrable compelling. simply not the same to vote is binding consistent with decision is Our living in a that of those right to vote as Harper, precedent. Supreme Court ... Weighting part favored State using wealth or held Supreme Court differently, by any citizens the votes of in the ability pay power as a factor means, merely because method or capricious “is to introduce the franchise reside, hardly they happen where Harper, 383 U.S. irrelevant factor.” justifiable. seems Likewise, the mainte- (emphasis technologies disparate nance of —that added). system in which By maintaining a inherently recognized is itself has State utilized, voters technologies these two is over- and that evidence “[t]he flawed separate standards. vote under two Ohio thousands of Ohio voters whelming that polls Although approach voters by antiquated been disenfranchised have in the same elec- opportunity vote devalues voting equipment” —debases candidates, once tions for the same arbitrary capri- citizens’ votes and is booth, they have an step into the technology provided to a voter cious. The being their vote count- unequal chance of wealth, State, voter’s by the like that ed, part action on the not as a result voting qualifications or the no relation to voter, because of the different right to vote is of that vote. “[T]he value utilize technology utilized. Voters able to so precious, too fundamental to be too candidates and notice choose Harper, 383 burdened or conditioned.” *26 counted, turned in and their vote is Hasen, before 1079; see also any of errors technology notifies them and the Future Bush Gore of being disre- result the vote Elections, would Fla. Law in St. non- forced to use garded. Those voters (concluding dispa- U.L.Rev. at 395 any are not notified of technology notice that results from “different rate treatment and, errors in their ballot should rates errors with different error voting systems exist, more- disregarded; their votes are disturbing to the extent ... is all the more Bush, conclude, right vote counted to have one's necessary.” 531 U.S. at tects the recount, during to con- properly a but for us 525. does not cover the clude that the Clause Additionally, for it would be odd indeed 17. properly counted to have one’s vote have held in Bush v. Court to instance. first pro- Equal Protection Clause Gore that the over, challenged damage important the two tech- rabie to the most using voters and nologies have an additional likelihood (“The concepts democracy.”); basic id. due to the inherent de- disenfranchisement overwhelming evidence is thousands punch-card and central- ficiencies of Ohio voters have been disenfranchised optical count scan.18 by antiquated voting equipment....”). alleged have dilution vote punch The use of the card and central- disparate voting use of certain tech- due optical count technologies scan result in a nologies. They have demonstrated their greater likelihood that vote one’s will not allegations mathematically and from the be counted on the same terms the vote testimony of witnesses on both sides of the a county.19 of someone in notice contests. The State’s own documents and technology State’s continued use of this plaintiffs’ public support statements weighting results differently votes claims. The of Ohio concedes that State hardly justifiable. and this is Technology, punch-card technology substandard. a as method or means to dilute See, Secretary e.g., Help of State’s Amer- strength, a is no less violation than (“Boards of ica Vote Act election Report According other invidious method. systems upgrade should their below, presented allowing data and new, technology.”); trustworthy more id. votes, 0.75% of approx- intentional residual (“These goals demand immediate atten- 55,000 imately presidential votes were lost tion, repeating or our runs the risk of state by using in 2000 punch those card technol- problems our nation’s most recent suffering irrepa- ogy.20 presidential election —and This is also conservative estimate. glass finding way, problems In half-full kind of the dissent no with the be- all, not, points out that should after lose properly "[w]e cause marked ballot is counted sight nearly of the of the fact votes 98% superflu- would have rendered Bush v. Gore punch-card case, cast even in counties were properly ous. In that marked ballots properly presidential counted in the 2000 problem, were counted without the Court Op. comparative election.” Dis. 893. For equal protection still found an violation. simply point purposes, we out that the would presidential election was de- in Florida 20.3,593,958 using punch votes were cast vote; by cided of the New Mexico was 0.009% cards; 81,767 votes, there were residual vote; Wisconsin, decided 0.22%; Iowa, 0.31%; of the 0.061% 26,955 arguably explained by which in- 0.44%; Oregon, New Thus, undervoting. ap- tentional were there 1.27%; 2.4%; Minnesota, Hampshire, Mis- 54,812 proximately lost residual votes due souri, 3.34%; Ohio, 3.51%; Nevada, 3.55%; interesting following error. Also is that 3.86%; Pennsylvania, Tennessee 4.17%. election, disputed CalTech MIT election, presidential the 2004 Wisconsin Voting Technology launched the Caltech/MIT 0.38%; 0.67%; Iowa, was decided Mexico, 0.79%; New Project, joint venture the two between insti- 1.37%; Hampshire, New study, part, reliability tutions to Ohio, 2.11%; 2.5%; Nevada, Pennsylvania, existing voting equipment, see Caltech-MIT 2.59%; 3.42%; Minnesota, Michigan, Voting Technology Project, nearly That vote was 3.48%. of the 98% http://www.vote.caltech.edu, produced nu- deserving counted seems less of the dissent's titled, including reports, merous one Residual light margin accolades in of decision in *27 Technology: Votes An Assess- Attributable those states. Reliability Existing Voting ment of of (Version 2001). Equipment 2: March Ac- by stating problem Additionally, 19. is cording report, punch sig- cards have technology, with the with vot- not but rather nificantly higher average of residual rates properly voting, incorrectly ers not the dissent systems the difference votes than other and understands re- the issue. The Caltech-MIT punch system between the "best” and cards port demonstrates the error rates due to approximately ballots technology up was of all cast. deficiencies in the hold when 1.5% Moreover, Report Report that across other factors are held at 2. The also found constant. reasonably con- any if there is challenge resid- cards had using punch counties Ten a provide in the 2000 that could rates in excess 3% ceivable state of facts ual vote challenged election. action. rational basis” for the however, mean, not that state This does scrutiny, we apply strict Although we proffered if the State’s action survives technology would that the use of this note justifications by the actual facts are belied rational basis review.21 also fail under arbitrary justifi- simply of the case or are rational basis review This is true under here; is the case no facts cations. Such Law searching and deferential. See both Texas, 558, 579, contin- provide 123 S.Ct. a rational basis for Ohio’s 539 U.S. rence v. (2003) (O’Connor, J., 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 technolo- ued certification of the deficient judgment). An individual’s concurring always at- almost gies. Governments democracy. of a To vote is the lifeblood justify conduct on tempt their based extent, conjure we find difficult convenience, but cost and administrative legitimate interest is up what the State’s not reliance on these factors is State’s technology that dilutes the by the use rational, certainly is not in necessarily and says that its to vote. The State put has failed to this case. The State decertify non-notice failing interests in that it can- indicating forth evidence on and substandard is based instead, the evi- manage the costs training work replacement the cost of that the State has either dence indicates new machines. fail to see ers We budgeted for the transition from its own justified the interest is or rational how through provided by the funds or funds of votes. expense of tens thousands many government federal The loss of so because of the continued use ma- votes Beach Under FCC v. Communi chines that the admits are substand- cations, Inc., 307, 313, State (1993), arbitrary ard is and cannot be considered legislation 124 L.Ed.2d so-claimed, light unsup- rational in upheld against equal protection “must be up patterns data These hold to closer statistical all counties in the United States where turnout, income, technologies, all scrutiny, holding was available and across constant average Report at 7. counties, residual rate was 2.3%. composition age distribu- racial Report punch further concluded that counties, rates, literacy year tions of approxi- cards have a residual vote rate of technology, the number of offices shift mately compared technologies at to other 3% ballot, and other and candidates on the thus, "the residual residual 2% rate — county operate or in a factors that punch percent ... rate of card methods is 50 particular year. higher paper, than the residual rate” of conclusion, Report Report at 22. In stat- level, optical Report scan machines. ed that incidence of such residual votes "[t]he strongly Report worded 9. The contained forty punch card ... to sev- methods admonition: enty higher percent than the incidence of punch consistently cards have Votomalic technologies.” residual votes with the other high average residual vote rates. Report at 17. again punch 1996 and cards had substantially higher rates of over under panel 21. This is also what the Ninth Circuit technologies. other available votes than concluded: have tendered suffi- "Plaintiffs particular ap- is of concern because This cient evidence to demonstrate a likelihood of proximately punch one in three voters use establishing success in that there is no ration- cards. If election administrators wish to systems using voting that have al basis for failures, they may catastrophic heed avoid unacceptable' in some been decertified as warning using punch Stop ... cards. th[is] Voter, and not others.” Southwest counties Report at 11. Of additional interest is the following Report: 344 F.3d statement from the *28 Moreover, problem the ex- tion “properly cost concerns. arises because ported, the counties Ohio who have perience of marked ballots are counted and accorded using the non-notice substandard stopped everywhere same value in the state.” heavily against technology weigh Op. Dis. at 34. The dissent attributes of counties argument. None these State’s mistakes to the voters themselves and con technological significant have encountered cludes only problem “vot difficulties or undue financial burdens. ers in some counties have a reduced Secretary of report State’s and Ohio chance of a turning properly marked legislation a to concludes that switch elec- actually ballot that will be counted because securely imple- tronic machines can be voting certain do methods not catch the mented there been no instances have voters’ own mistakes.” inadvertent Id. voter fraud in with use of Ohio fundamentally This mischaracterizes the Moreover, voting electronic machines. problem with the substandard tech the evidence demonstrates that more ac- nology. The evidence cited above demon technologies readily curate are available. problem punch strates that with the finally, And while the State’s intentions design card ballot its is that a vast insufficient comply are with HAVA number properly marked ballots not case, they moot cast do considerable Thus, counted due to error. machine doubt on its claims that is not economi- states, issue is not the dissent but rath cally decertify feasible for it to the tech- er, a “may whether state allow the use of fact, nology. report the State’s HAVA types different equipment with prof- sufficiently belies each the State’s substantially accuracy.” levels different justifications decertify fered failing for See Black v. McGuffage, F.Supp.2d Thus, technology. the substandard while (N.D.Ill.2002) added). (emphasis scrutiny appro- we hold that strict is the review, priate standard of we also deter- Next, the main basis for the dissent is decertify mine that the failure to State’s “question precedential some val- [over] technologically the use of non-notice v. Op. ue Bush Gore.” Dis. at 881. The unsound punch op- card central count question by concluding dissent answers the scan tical machines would also fail rational prece- that Bush v. Gore is “a case whose basis review. Decertification of the tech- ... questionable.” dential value is at best and, conclude, nology practicable “is we Op. Dis. at 886.22 The dissent endeavors Bush, necessary.” explain doubting three “reasons for 525. precedential Bush v. ‘[T]he Gore’s value: Now, limiting language opinion, in the the lack response few words start, with under- seriousness which Court dissent. To the dissent misunder analysis, plaintiffs’ stands the nature of the claim. took its own and the inconsisten- dissent, According protec cy majori- no equal jurisprudence by other Respectfully, does not review articles with "Bush v. Gore" in the title, Moreover, Westlaw, non-precedential opinions. by conducting issue on accessible JLR, ("Bush questioning using the basis for dissent's search in the database TI "). precedential value based v. A of Bush Gore is Gore search for book titles on the single Op. University Library page review New web law article. Dis. York Law (concluding deserving published discussing v. Gore is Bush reveals at least books ably respect of stare decisis Bush v. "reasons Gore election. The dissent, however, by leading expert”). only articulated election-law has cited the Hasen We 116 law would note that are at least article. there *29 therefore, Convinced, and that Robinson point all in the direction ty of Justices23 case, good governed is not the Seventh Cir- assuming that Bush v. Gore this Smith reading them, precedent expansive though for an to even apply cuit felt bound ” Dis. law in equal protection elections.’ light in expressed grave doubts Kon- it Hasen, v. Gore Op. (quoting at 887 Bush course. prudent This was a It nei- trick. Law Future and the by the what the upsetting forced issue ther 391). Elections, 29 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. our Appeals took to be settled Court two then on the first The dissent focuses by pro- nor the issue precedents, buried apparent lack of serious- reasons: the the By ceeding summary fashion. adher- case the the with which Court decided ness understanding precedent, yet its ing to inconsistency jurispru- other the with and doubts, it expressing its facilitated plainly bases It is curious that the dissent dence. review.”). our Supreme analysis its on the belief that the Finally, reject we the dissent’s claim Gore, Bush v. a case Court decided article has that Professor Hasen’s over- election, presidential the 2000 decided seriousness,” Supreme Court’s decision to ruled choose “lack of and we Further, Supreme v. Gore because “the approach. with that Bush Court disagree prove fast and playing ample opportunity even if the Court was has had to him we, court, law, an inferior citing to, loose with wrong by explaining, or even its position disregard Supreme in a to not Op. in Bush v. Dis. at 887. decision Gore.” they got we think precedent Court because correct, perhaps If the dissent were Presumably, if in the dissent’s wrong. must be said about the hundreds of same “precedential v. Gore val- view Bush had law discussing other review articles opin- all Supreme ue”—as we think Court legitimacy applicability and decision’s join be us. compelled ions do—he would factual other scenarios. Court has Term, fact, early In Supreme sought pro- these other law debate approach when proper Court discussed fessors commentators under by prece- court finds itself bound -lower articles reasoning, dissent’s those must which it Eber- disagrees. dent with See fact, logi- also be correct. taken its — States, U.S.-,-, hart v. United extreme, reasoning cal means dissent’s (2005) L.Ed.2d 14 every claim in a law review article curiam) (“We (per finally add a word about has failed to re- Court by Ap- taken approach the Court Thus, actually fute is law of the land. peals. Although we disposition find its find the claim that we dissent’s Bush error, fully appreciate have been we precedential has no value Gore because cir- among that it is an error shared “prove has not sought [Professor cuits, part that it in large was caused wrong” empty. Hasen] by prior in our cases. Our imprecision Moreover, the its analysis dissent bases repetition phrase “mandatory entirely upon sugges- Hasen’s jurisdictional” understandably led the Professor serious, that Bush v. is not to err on of caution tion Gore lower courts the side acknowledge 33 and fails to the second half of giving the limitations Rules subject-matter jurisdiction. force of Hasen’s article he concludes that: where this, likely By 23. Hasen the five member be extended or embraced means that them strong Gore, majority Hasen, "constitutes break from cases.” Bush v. Fla. future majority's approach to conservative usual U.L.Rev. at St. and, therefore, equal protection, it will not *30 sum, Thus, prece- “In Bush v. sis. if Gore indeed because the dissent has not value, clearly apply provide any legitimate it should to endeavored to dential basis voting principled or the use of these different manner of prevent distinguishing Hasen, v. systems Bush Gore—-and presumably in the same election.” has not Gore, 395; “[ejmbar- adopted argument that Bush v. 29 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at Hasen’s provides only hope rassment (stating see also id. S.Ct. 525 value,” Hasen, that, precedential if case will have article that his “concludes case Gore, v. Bush Fla. St. U.L.Rev. seriously, were taken Bush v. Gore should argument 391—his simply that we precedential should great changing have value in not follow the case not give any does us voting procedures a host of and mecha- pause. nisms, particularly procedures when those challenged prospec- mechanisms are end, In ulti- reasoning dissent’s Thus, tively”).24 argument dissent’s mately flounders. The dissent concludes

easily premised solely It is deconstructed. “persuasive that our decision is to only suggesting on Professor Hasen’s article that controlling. extent Bush v. Gore is given that v. Gore should be Bush not I], Neither Shelley my [our decision or value. precedential Because dissent view, successfully the compelling refutes that concludes the decision should not be supplied reasons Professor for Hasen (because precedential value given refusing to ‘take equal Bush v. Gore’s ” seriously did not take the case and protection holding seriously.’ Op. at Dis. inconsistency apparent prec- with other Hasen, (citing 29 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at edent) it not mention the fact 380). does that dissent, however, men- fails to Hasen on to goes Professor conclude that tion Professor Hasen’s ultimate conclusion followed, if Gore it Bush v. were would that “if Bush prece- v. Gore indeed has result reach value, dictate the we here.25 Unfor- clearly dential it to apply should dissent, tunately for the inferior courts do prevent of voting use these different luxury suggesting Hasen, not have the that a systems in the same election.” Gore, simply should not v. Court decision Bush 29 Fla. U.L.Rev. at 395. St. luxury legal power be followed without some tenable ba- Without the to decide course, for, judged 24. This conclusion is correct be under the standard of strict scru- earlier, suspect is, we noted to would be hold tiny that the state must have a —that equal protection protects right that compelling treating interest in voters differ- recount, have vote in a one's counted ently narrowly and that the must be means pro- us to conclude that the Clause does not to meet that The Court tailored interest. right tect the to have vote counted one’s in the nothing suggest Bush v. did [in Gore] Bush, first instance. See also 531 U.S. at anything scrutiny, that less than strict such L, (“Thus, dissenting) (Breyer, test,’ as an easier to meet ‘rational basis system in a that allows counties use differ- apply analyze should the burdens on the systems, already types voting ent voters fundamental in this context. polls unequal arrive at with an chance Hasen, Gore, Bush v. 29 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at votes I do not their will be counted. see dis- 389. Professor Hasen further refutes the how the fact that this results from counties’ claim rational review would sent’s basis selection of different machines rather challenge apply involving to a case than a court order the outcome makes fair.”). disparate technologies. more use He concludes appears "Bush v. to mandate strict Gore 25. Hasen’s article contradicts the dis- also scrutiny, application rational basis re- basis sent’s conclusion that rational review Gore, Hasen, St. view.” Bush v. 29 Fla. applies. U.L.Rev. infringing It is hornbook law that laws rights, including voting, fundamental must of this sort decision. Future claims we want Ohio’s Supreme Court decisions which factors follow, these various Hasen’s ultimate will evaluated with find Professor be we If, conclusion, reasoning hypothetical Bush in mind. the dissent’s here, applies sound. technology yields be Gore where one example, another *31 error rate and 0.1% us Finally, criticizes for not the dissent rate, is and a lawsuit a 0.01% error precise a mathematical formu- articulating one, ques- the same filed similar this voting technology determining la for when the context will have to be asked and tions and it is not. Pre- is constitutional when If challenge and of the studied evaluated. formulas, however, have cise mathematical technology would switching to the new rights or part never a of cases been State, technology the was bankrupt the or A involving judicial scrutiny. strict cases or development phase, potential in its formula judicially imposed mathematical of any for or for number high, fraud was evaluating rights cases would be for that the not believe reasons State did say arbitrary. simply cannot purely We implemented, be technology properly could that x% rate raises constitutional error then, today, of our decision light even y% concerns error rate does not. Nor If, however, may switching the claim fail. so re- has the Court done only mini- technology provided new applying so in case quired us to do inconvenience, Rather, rea- scrutiny.26 strict when confronted mal then State’s questions, a than com- might with difficult constitutional be found to be less sons analytical necessary. case, is approach reasoned we do not seek to pelling. that strict plaintiffs Once the establish procedures, election constitutionalize local scrutiny put must a applies, State forth uniformity and nor we seek to mandate do infringement a reason its of compelling voting procedures, nor equality in absolute we, reviewing right fundamental and consti- do hold that notice is we court, against evaluate that reasons must mandated; tutionally merely we evaluate analysis plaintiffs’ claims. This neces- light of the State’s vote sary fac- includes consideration various justifications for the two proffered using tors, financial, including the and legal, at and hold challenged technologies issue Dunn, 343, e.g., 405 U.S. at practical. See compel- State’s reasons are not (“And other, 995 if there are S.Ct. inquiry Our here is aided Ohio’s ling. ways goals reasonable achieve those adopt litigation position decision constitutionally awith lesser burden on public is undermined its actions and may protected activity, not choose State hold that the two words. We therefore interference.”). way greater satisfy technologies challenged here fail to “rudimentary treat- requirements equal do review such claims a vacu-

We not Bush, fairness,” ment fundamental um but so with a focus on the real do 525, justifications and that based implications world U.S. S.Ct. We are example, Reynolds, philosophy on their citizens. 26. For the Court stated: cal entering dangers apportioning We cautioned about are told matter legislature representation in is a a state political into thickets mathematical complex many-faceted one. We a denial quagmires. Our answer this: oi rationally States advised that can consider rights constitutionally protected demands population apportion- other than factors ing judicial protection; our office our oath and representation. legislative ad- We are require no us. less of power not to monished restrict impose differing politi- views as States to below, presented plain- on the evidence in “aa manner that provides the ‘broadest tiffs established a violation of possible scope’ combating racial discrim Protection Clause.27 Chisom, ination.” (internal omitted).

S.Ct. 2354 quotation Moreover, under the 1982 V. amendments to Act, section 2 of the we are concerned with Voting Rights Act Claim Plaintiff’s practice, the results of a govern African-American also ad- Chisom, ment’s intent. 501 U.S. at vance claim under 2 of Section the Vot- 2354; 1973(a). § U.S.C. Hamilton, ing Rights against Act Mont- 2(a) Section prohibits the Act

gomery, and Summit Counties based on *32 any the use of practice electoral or proce their punch technology. use of card After dure that “results a denial or abridge trial, the bench the district court concluded right ment of the any citizen of the that plaintiffs’ “Voting Rights Act United to States vote on account of race or claim fails because their alleged injury color.” We have noted that § does not amount to a vote denial under Voting Rights of the Act.” This conclusion Section unlike other legislation federal was based on the legal interpreta- court’s that prohibits discrimination, racial does Voting Rights tion of the Act that a vote not require proof of discriminatory in- cognizable only denial claim is “when a Instead, tent. plaintiff a only need show municipality state or employs ‘practice a that challenged require- action or procedure’ that results the ‘actual’ deni- ment has a discriminatory effect on right al of the to vote on account of race.” protected members of a group: A viola- Finding that plaintiffs “none of the ... (a) tion of subsection of this section is claim that have been denied to access if, established totality based on the polls,” the court held that “these facts circumstances, it is shown that the do not allow this Court to conclude that political processes leading to nomination ‘actual’ right denial of the to vote on ac- or election in political the State or subdi- Further, count of race occurs.” the dis- vision are not equally open partic- to trict court concluded that the contention ipation by members of a class of citizens “punch that subject card ballots Afri- [the (a) protected by subsection of this sec- can-American plaintiffs] greater to a prob- tion that its oppor- members have less ability that their votes will not be counted tunity than other members of the whites,” than is insufficient to constitute a electorate to participate political Thus, denial right of the to vote. process and to representatives elect district court plaintiffs held “that the have their choice. not established their vote denial claim.” Bd., Moore v. Detroit School Reform (6th Cir.2002). The Court has that said F.3d right The Act, in interpreting (c)(1) § we should read it in 42 vote is defined U.S.C. 1973l 27. we plaintiffs Because find in favor of the ments would also be free to turn the ratchet grounds both cheaper technology.” down to non-notice Id. —under scrutiny strict and under rational basis re- engage We choose not to in the dissent in this view—we do not reach their claim under the Instead, simply ques- battle. we note that the dissent, however, Due Process Clause. The day tion remains for another as to whether points alleged grasp out our failure to the idea ratcheting such a would down violate the Due equality one-way Op. is not a street. Dis. Process Clause. Thus, view, "govern- in the dissent's necessary, Voting of the necessary to make a tent is “Section include “all action requires only showing Act a Rights including “casting ballot

vote effective” Mixon, 193 discriminatory effect.” F.3d properly.” having ballot counted such at 70- (citing Thornburg, 478 U.S. clearly encom- at 407 language of Act 2752). Moreover, claims un- citizen of “right within passes Voting require Act “an Rights der the right the United States to vote” design intensely appraisal local of the properly.” Be- such ballot counted “hav[e] prac- electoral plaintiffs impact” challenged the African-American cause 78, 106 Thornburg, de- they are tice. disproportionately claim that omitted). (internal quotation right their ballots counted nied have erred con- the district court properly, alleged punch plaintiffs here not state cluding did cards in these three counties have dis to vote right for a violation of the claim criminatory presented effect and evidence Voting Rights under the Act. support their claim. Akin to Southwest Voter, plaintiffs presented evidence Finding plaintiffs’ evi demonstrating “minority voters dis supports denial of the dence proportionately punch-card reside in coun 2(b) vote, the next under section inquiry is *33 that, counties, even those ties within Act to the evi of the determine whether minority discard punch-card machines of the dence establishes violation Act. higher votes at rate.” 344 F.3d Chisom, 394, 111 S.Ct. See According to the en Ninth Circuit banc only incorporated not (“Congress the court, violation, “[t]o establish Section formerly in the that paragraph results test only need ‘a plaintiffs demonstrate causal desig § the also constituted entire challenged between the connection (a) paragraph nated as subsection practice prohibited discriminatory and [a] (b) a new to make clear added subsection ” (quoting result.’ Id. v. Salt Smith River application that an the results test re Agric. Project Improvement & Power inquiry totality quires into ‘the the (9th Dist., Cir.1997)). 109 F.3d ”). 2(b) states that circumstances.’ Section practice procedure an electoral or violates part analysis, On this of the the (a) franchise under section very findings district court made few if, circumstances, totality on the based on its based determination under section political processes it is shown 2(a). These included the finding finding leading to in nomination or election in many Ap that there residual votes political are not State subdivision palachian virtually counties with non-exis by mem equally open participation minority populations, and that under- tent a class protected bers of of citizens (which County Franklin was not (a) of in that subsection this section its Act) than higher sued under is opportunity have than members less (which County Hamilton was sued under par other members of the electorate to Act). Essentially, the court found political in the and to ticipate process white in other counties with because voters representatives their choice. elect minority from populations minimal suffer 1973(b). § likelihood votes will 42 U.S.C. Consistent similar that their not test, counted, this noted that un- here have results Court has be not race based under the a sufficient under the Act. like claims made claim any findings Protection Clause of Fifteenth Amend- district court did not make 2(b) ment, discriminatory in- Act and did where evidence of under section not make the ultimate determination as to present The defendants did not contradic- their claim plaintiffs proved whether the tory evidence and dispute did not totality under the of the circumstances. exist, racial disparities but instead assert- Thus, appropriate course for ed that education and socioeconomic condi- Court is to remand to allow the district tions, race, account for the disparities. court to make findings detailed the first note, however, We that “[t]he essence of a below, analysis instance. To aid § 2 law, claim is that a certain electoral however, we do note that De Johnson v. practice, or structure interacts with social rejects Grandy argument that vote and historical conditions to cause an in- part dilution in one can the state be equality opportunities enjoyed by part remedied another of the state. black and white voters to elect pre- their 997, 1019, representatives.” ferred Thornburg, 478 (1994) (rejecting premise L.Ed.2d 775 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. 2752. With these rights minority that “the of some voters mind, considerations in we vacate the dis- § may under against be traded off ruling trict court’s in favor of the defen- rights of other members of the same mi- Voting dants on the Rights Act claim and class”). Thus, nority what occurred in remand for further proceedings consistent County Franklin necessarily is not rele- opinion. with this plaintiffs’ vant to the success of the claims Hamilton, Summit, Montgomery VI. Counties. Because the plaintiffs properly stated a also We reverse the district Act, claim question under the then for judgment court’s denying class and sub court, 2(b), the district under Section class certification. The district court’s *34 totality whether under the of circum- nine-line order states that plaintiffs the stances, the evidence demonstrates dis- only reside in four of eighty-eight the Ohio remand, criminatory result. On the dis- they counties and therefore prop “are not trict court will consider the voluminous representatives er for in voters other coun evidence, amount plaintiffs’ includ- ties.” court The also concluded that al ing regression analysis the showing the though Secretary the of is the State chief correlation overvoting between and the officer, county elections each has its own percentage of African-American voters in of powers. board elections with substantial given precinct. County In Hamilton the plaintiffs sought certify The two .517, regression coefficient was Summit plaintiff classes. The first class would con- .682, County it was and in Montgomery vote, of: “All persons sist who or who are County plaintiffs’ expert it was .440. The registered jurisdictions to vote in within “strong.” described these correlations as the State of Ohio which do not employ plaintiffs claim that put the evidence marking ballot or (1) voting machinery other forth demonstrates that: African- in-precinct with error notification technolo- County Americans Hamilton overvoted class, gy.” purposes The second for at a rate seven the higher times than non (2) African-Americans; Voting Rights Act claim “All consists of: County, Summit vote, African-American persons African-Americans who or overvoted at a rate jurisdictions higher registered nine times than non who are to vote African-Ameri- (3) cans; and the Montgomery County, Afri- within State of Ohio which do not can-Americans had a employ marking residual rate ballot or other ma- 2.5 chinery times that of non in-precinct African-Americans. error notification Hamilton, Summit, Montgom- and step in class within

technology.” The first ery Counties. process requires plaintiffs certification 23(a). is, satisfy Rule That VII. may or more members of class One Violations of representative parties or be sued as sue deserving protection no less Clause are (1) only if the class is so on behalf all accomplished are with a because joinder of all is numerous that members preju- modern machine than with outdated (2) questions there are impracticable, to caution not- appeal dices. The dissent’s (3) class, to the or fact common law [ju- withstanding, ingredient “the basic representative claims or defenses of principle, is and should decision dicial] typical are of the claims or de- parties parceled out a compromised not be and (4) class, the represen- fenses of case, another, little in one a little more fairly and parties adequately tative will eventually until the full someone receives protect the interests of class. principle If the and con- benefit. is sound 23(a). Fed.R.CivJP. stitutional, birthright every it is the American, begrudging- not to be accorded plain- The district court found “the ly special groups only, or to piecemeal representatives are not for proper tiffs everyone entirety in its whenever it disagree. in other counties.” We voters WARREN, play.” is into EARL brought satisfy clearly require- THE OF JUSTICE MEMOIRS CHIEF 23(a) Rule and have ments of satisfied (Madison 2001) EARL WARREN Books See proving. their burden so Senter (1977). The district court’s decision with (6th F.2d Corp., Motors Gen. regard plaintiffs’ equal protection Cir.1976). The class is so numerous is RE- claim is REVERSED. The case joinder impracticable, ques- there are judg- MANDED with instructions to enter class, of law fact common tions plaintiffs. ment in favor of With re- representative parties claims of gard plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act class, typical of claims of the and the claim, the district court’s decision is VA- representatives fairly adequately will CATED, proceed- REMANDED Further, class. protect the interests of the *35 ings opinion. consistent with this have plaintiffs we find the satisfied step their burden under the second of the GILMAN, LEE RONALD Circuit 23(b). analysis Rule Under section Judge, dissenting. (b)(2), party opposing “the the [Sec- class majority today by judicial retary imposes State] has acted refused to act important changes on to the Ohio elec- [by decertifying technology] deficient decree class, generally applicable system, doing largely toral so reliance grounds the murky on thereby making appropriate injunc- final the Court’s decision Gore, Bush corresponding declaratory tive relief or re- v. S.Ct. (2000) curiam), respect (per lief with to the class a whole.” L.Ed.2d Thus, panel opinion district Ninth Circuit we reverse the court’s order vacated dispute, and ap- and conclude that class certification is California recall-election two plaintiffs pursuing district court cases that never reached a propriate the state- view, my final on the In judgment relief under the merits. wide weight these cannot the appro- and sub-class certification is sources bear Clause them, majority places the on plaintiffs for the African-American should priate subjecting not form the basis for an inde- conclude reading majority after the opin- local terminate number of state and elec- ion that federal courts long have dealt with tion strictest level of con- decisions the challenges analogous to the one made in scrutiny. stitutional case, present and that strict scrutiny universally recognized been ap- I would a more as the approach, take cautious recognizes primacy propriate one that majori- standard of review. The legislative executive and branches in the ty’s lengthy exposition of the fundamental process significant electoral and the costs nature of to vote cites many majority’s holding place will purportedly effect, cases to that taking governments, state and local the entities quotations out of their factual and legal charged that are aspects most of elec- context. A closer examination of those tion administration. I Although agree cases, however, reveals that the challenges majority with the that the have upheld in significantly them were different moot, standing and that is not I the case from case, the one before us in present join majority’s analysis cannot of the appropriate standard of re- equal protection Voting Rights Act in voting-rights view cases is far from set- challenges brought plaintiffs, or its tled. cursory reversal the district court’s de- nial of class certification. I Accordingly, Voting-rights precedents A. respectfully dissent. My analysis equal protection Sanders, Gray question proceed in I steps. will four will (1963), 9 L.Ed.2d 821 for exam- explain why

first I believe that the Su- ple, the Supreme Court invalidated Geor- preme voting-rights precedents cit- gia’s “county system” unit for counting majority ed are distinguishable in party primaries votes that were held to establish, from present case and do not nominate candidates for the United States asserts, majority scrutiny as the that strict Senate and several state offices. Under is the proper constitutional standard of original county system, unit a resident review. parts my The second and third in the populous county least the state analysis question precedential value of “had an influence the nomination of Bush v. and the other Gore authorities on equivalent candidates to 99 residents” of relies, which majority demonstrating county. the state’s populous most Id. at why expansive reading authori- those 371, 83 S.Ct. 801. The state amended the ties threatens to pro- constitutionalize the system to increase the influence of the cedures and mechanisms used cast counties, populous more but the district guise advancing vote under the still court still found “the vote each equality. Finally, unsettled notions of I citizen counts for less and less as the explore practical will effect of the ma- *36 population county of the of his residence jority’s holding Help the wake of the 372-73, increases.” Id. at 83 801 S.Ct. (HAVA) America Vote Act and Ohio’s (citation omitted). Articulating famous its promise comply with the terms of 381, standard, person, “one one vote” id. at HAVA. 801, 83 S.Ct. the Court held that the coun- I. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD ty-unit system Protec- Equal violated the

OF REVIEW gave person tion it “one Clause because ... or 10 of power A unfamiliar twice times reader with the voting-rights precedents might person Court’s another in a statewide election 882 rural area or that the Court announced standard of

merely because he lives in a strict-scrutiny similar to the stan- in the rural coun- review he lives smallest because reviewing Court, currently laws 379, applied dard ty[.]” Id. at 83 S.Ct. 801. against suspect discriminate classes review, that announcing a of standard .without constitutionally infringe pro- on certain infirmity explained constitutional 562, rights. See at 84 S.Ct. 1362 tected id. sys- in the Georgia system inhered (“[A]ny alleged infringement provide “equality failure to tem’s carefully and of citizens vote must be 381, power.” Id. at 83 S.Ct. scrutinized.”). meticulously Again, howev- 1, Sanders, 84 Wesberry v. 376 U.S. er, the Court announced this standard in a 526, (1964), 11 L.Ed.2d also cited 481 S.Ct. “weighting case that dealt with the pro- by majority, equal is not even votes;” populated specifically, unequally not Wesberry case. The Court did tection legislative See state districts. Lowenstein states, hold, majority “Equal as the Hasen, 114; 105, Reynolds, supra, at & requires equality substantial Protection (“Over- 563, at 377 U.S. 84 S.Ct. amongst the districts estab- population of the weighting overvaluation votes of legislatures state for the election lished living those here has the certain effect of House of of members United States dilution undervaluation votes of (em- Maj. Op. at 857 Representatives.” there.”). living Although it those invali- added). phasis contrary, To the the Court Alabama’s legislative apportionment dated exclusively sections found relied two and held in a plan that both houses bicam- Constitution, stating explic- I Article of legislature apportioned state must be eral not itly that it did need to “reach the “substantially basis,” equal population on a vio- arguments Georgia statute not ground the Court did do so on the Process, Due Protection Equal lates the narrowly the law was tailored fur- Privileges and Immunities Clauses of interest, a compelling governmental ther the Fourteenth Amendment.” 376 U.S. see, Constructors, e.g., Adarand Inc. v. 10; 8, Hays 526 n. Daniel 84 S.Ct. see also Pena, 200, 235, 515 U.S. Hasen, & Lowenstein Richard L. Election (1995), 132 L.Ed.2d 158 but instead be- (2d ed. Law: Cases Materials 113 existing plan cause the apportionment vio- 2001) (“Wesberry under was not decided person, princi- lated the “one one vote” under Clause but ple “the of a citizen’s weight vote —that I, Constitution, §§ 2 and 4 Article depend cannot be made to on where he applicable only and was thus to the United Reynolds, lives.” S.Ct. Representatives.”). House of Arti- States added). (emphasis I, Constitution, §§ 2 and 4 of cle subjecting The two other cases state held, drawing Court barred from states voting practices scrutiny to strict cited congressional districts in which “a vote is majority are inapposite. likewise worth more one than in anoth- district Elections, Harper Virginia Board er.” Id. 526. Because S.Ct. 663, 668, L.Ed.2d equal pro- addressed the plaintiffs never (1966), the the appli- Court invalidated challenge, tection did not need Court remaining cable laws the four states appropri- to—and did not—articulate charged poll to vote in tax state ate standard of review. applied elections. strict scruti- *37 pathbreaking Reynolds in in ny Harper, citing Reynolds decision for the Sims, 1362, that, 533, v. 84 S.Ct. “where proposition fundamental (1964), time under rights L.Ed.2d 506 marked the first liberties are asserted Clause, Equal simply, classifications Stated none of Supreme these precedents Court resembles the claim might invade or restrain them must [that] made plaintiffs present in the case. closely carefully scrutinized and con- be These do not allege that Ohio has 670, at Virgi- fined.” Id. 86 S.Ct. 1079. imposed impermissible an voter-qualifica- tax, reasoned, poll nia’s the Court deter- requirement, tion Harper as in and Dunn. qualifications mined the of voters on the Nor do they argue that the in votes Ohio wealth, ground basis of a that is “tradition- is, are “weighted” differently that a —that disfavored,” 668, 1079, ally id. 86 S.Ct. properly marked ballot “is worth more in and was therefore unconstitutional. one district than in another.” Wesberry, 8, The second of the two cases is Dunn v. 526; 376 U.S. at 84 S.Ct. Reyn- see also Blumstein, olds, 330, 334, 995, 563, 92 S.Ct. U.S. 84 S.Ct. 1362. In- stead, they maintain that voters in (1972), counties 31 L.Ed.2d 274 where the Court that employ inferior equipment “are that, requirement struck down Tennessee’s subjected significantly to a greater risk voter, qualify registered order to as a that their votes will not be counted.” person must have resided the state for words, properly other marked ballots are year county least one for at counted and accorded the same value ev- least three months. scrutiny Strict was state, erywhere in the voters some (cid:127) review, appropriate standard of counties have reduced chance of turning held, because the durational-resi- in properly marked ballot that will actu- dency requirement affected two fundamen- ally be counted because certain voting rights tal right right to vote and the —the methods do not catch the voters’ own inad- 338, to travel. id. at See 92 S.Ct. 995 vertent mistakes. (explaining scrutiny applied, that strict de- challenge This to the nuts-and-bolts of spite durational-residency-re- earlier administration, election regardless of its quirement using stringent case a less stan- merit, equated cannot be with either dis- review, dard of because the Tennessee law criminatory voter-qualification require- “penaliz[ed]” only people recently who had generally ments or applicable state laws travel). right exercised their Dunn is deny “equality voting power,” unique therefore because the Court faced a 801, Gray, 372 U.S. at which state that impinged law on two fundamen- principal types are the of state actions rights tal protected by the Fourteenth Supreme subjected Court has to strict Indeed, Amendment. courts since Dunn Hasen, scrutiny. generally See Richard L. emphasized importance have of both v. Bush Gore and the Future of impact Tennessee law’s on two consti- Elections, Protection Law in 29 Fla. St. tutionally protected activities and Dunn’s (2001) U.L.Rev. (explaining voter-qualification precedent. status as a precedents govern only the Warren Court See, Mitchell, e.g., Donatelli v. 2 F.3d the equal opportunity to vote and the (3d Cir.1993) (explaining that votes, equal weighting “equality Court Dunn reviewed a law both procedures and mechanisms used for denied access to ballot and “directly voting”).

burdened citizens’ fundamental constitu- proper B. Rational basis is the stan- travel”); tional Greidinger dard of review Davis, (4th Cir.1993) F.2d (classifying Dunn “involving case vot- Court has never adhered access”). qualifications er legislation and ballot to the view that all or practices *38 884 interests, “taking into consideration right must sub- lated

that to vote be affect Greidinger, make jected scrutiny. strict See the extent to which those interests to (collecting cases in which rights.” 988 F.2d at 1350 to necessary [voter’s] burden (citations Supreme rational- applied 434, Court has and Id. at S.Ct. of scrutiny upholding omitted). basis denial marks con- quotation The Court and pretrial to detainees absentee ballots tinued: sustaining requirement per- a state that standard, rigorousness Under seeking primary sons to vote in a must judicial] into inquiry propriety [the register political party specified a a depends upon a law state election election). days general number of before a challenged regulation extent to which a succinctly explained, As the First Circuit First Amend- burdens and Fourteenth a Court has eschewed Supreme “[t]he Thus, ... those rights. when ment rule, hard-and-fast and instead subjected to restric- rights severe testing adopted a flexible framework tions, narrowly regulation must be regulations.” validity of election to a state interest drawn advance (1st Merrill, 479, 84 F.3d Werme v. a But when compelling importance. Cir.1996). That framework” was “flexible only provision imposes election state law recently by the most articulated Court reasonable, nondiscriminatory restric- Takushi, 428, 112

Burdick 504 U.S. and upon tions the First Fourteenth (1992), S.Ct. 119 L.Ed.2d 245 a case voters, Amendment the State’s rights majority to attempts limit to regulatory gen- interests are important political ac- specific setting candidates’ justify erally sufficient to the restric- I Maj. Op. cess to at 859-63. the ballot. tions. believe, however, sets a that Burdick forth (citations Id. quotation and marks omit- general evaluating challenges test for ted). words, only In other state laws practices state laws under the regulations impose “severe restric- Amendment, Fourteenth and therefore on the vote sub- tions” should be Maj. easily cannot so “dismiss[ed].” be jected scrutiny. to strict atOp. Burdick applying Federal courts in Burdick began challenges to framework have evaluated “[ejection in- observing laws will voting regulations under various state variably impose upon some individ- burden See, rational-basis standard review. Burdick, ual at voters.” 504 U.S. Werme, e.g., (upholding 84 F.3d at 485-86 2059; Harper, S.Ct. see also Hamp- under rational-basis review New (Black, J., dissenting) prevented shire law member of (“Allvoting persons laws treat some differ- Party a ballot serving Libertarian from ently respects.”). from others in some Donatelli, 2 Day); clerk on Election F.3d “every Subjecting voting regulation to (upholding 514-15 under rational-basis warned, scrutiny,” strict the Court “would plan a state reapportionment review seeking tie the hands of assure States a state temporarily assigned senator operated equitably that elections are him); district that had not elected see also Burdick, efficiently.” (collecting court-of-appeals id. at 515-16 facing challenges S.Ct. 2059. Courts district-court cases that reviewed laws practices state election should “temporary claims of disenfranchisement” “weigh[ing] therefore start charac- reapportionment under a rational- magnitude injury” ter and asserted due to standard). our against These from voting rights the state’s articu- basis cases *39 that, sister circuits serve as reminder tices do “severely] the not the restrict[ ]” majority opinion tone of the notwithstand- plaintiffs’ right to vote. id. See many voting ing, regula- state and local Also consistent with Burdick is the tions evaluated under the are rational-ba- Ninth Circuit’s decision Weber v. Shel- sis standard review. (9th ley, 347 Cir.2003), F.3d 1101 a case I that this court’s decision in by believe relied on the district court below and (6th Ohio, Mixon v. 193 F.3d 389 Cir. one that I directly believe is on point. See 1999), Blackwell, establishes a framework consistent Stewart v. F.Supp.2d (S.D.Ohio 2004). by Supreme Weber, with the one articulated the In voter Mixon, Court in Burdick. brought Equal this court an Protection to a challenge held state legislation “grants county’s that that the California to replace pa- decision vote right deny to to some residents with per sys- while ballots an electronic-voting ing subject the vote to others” is to strict tem. 347 F.3d at 1102. The computerized scrutiny, system, maintained, whereas that legislation “does not the voter suscep- was infringe on the to vote” right manipulation is examined tible to potential fraud “under the rational Id. basis standard.” at a paper because lacked audit trail. Id. aspects of this statement Two stand at Applying 1104-1105. the Bwrdick might framework, out. The first is that Mixon the Ninth Circuit held that the apply present readily to the case because “use of paperless, sys- voting touchscreen challenged any leg the have not tems severely [did not] right the] restrietf “grants right vote,” islation that the to vote to to and that voting procedure some while denying subject only vote to others.” was to therefore rational-basis Instead, See challenging id. review. Id. 1106. Because elec- practices,” pur “electoral none of which tronic-voting machines rea- constituted a port grant right anyone. to vote to ameliorating sonable method of prob- yet ballots, This court has not decided in paper whether the lems inherent change analysis practices applies voting Mixon state procedures rationally was related legislation. other than state’s interest “ensuring Id.; fair orderly.” elections are see Assuming that apply, Mixon does how- id. at 1107 (opining also the state and ever, noteworthy aspect there is a second reasonable, county had “made a politi- standard enunciated that case— cally neutral and non-discriminatory choice namely, that this court drew a distinction certify touchscreen systems [and use] state and regulations between laws ballots”); anas alternative to paper accord “infringe to vote” and those People Am. Ass’n with Disabilities not. approxi- do Id. This standard Shelley, F.Supp.2d by mates the line drawn (C.D.Cal.2004) (reviewing the Calfiornia Burdick, Court in empha- where the Court Secretary decertify of State’s decision to sized the difference between laws that se- (DRE) Recording voting Direct Electronic verely rights restrict and those that machines under the rational-basis standard reasonable, only “impose[ nondiscrimina- ] review). Burdick, tory rights. restrictions” on such significant 2059. If we are Weber is for a number of Burdick, First, harmonize Mixon and as I reasons. when faced must, challenge type think we then we should review the challenged voting practices under ra- certified the California Sec- prac- retary county, tional-basis standard because those and utilized State the state’s must be length why practices the appropriate Circuit found Ninth judged strict-scrutiny standard. in Burdick —not under of review standard *40 Dunn, or any other Reynolds, Harper, review, in my The proper standard of Weber, 347 precedents. See pre-Burdick judicial inquiry critical to the opinion, is that, reason F.3d at 1106. The second is I this Because believe that the Su case. Burdick, the applying Ninth Circuit has preme decision in Burdick Court’s potential voter held increased for factually legally distin supplanted the voting technology the did fraud with new majori on guishable precedents which the restriction” the not constitute a “severe relies, the ty and that use of different vote, right imple- to that the decision to so types voting not con technologies does subject changes ment such electoral was the to stitute a severe restriction on Id. only to review. rational-basis vote, challenged I evaluate the vot would Finally, ing practices most under the rational-basis stan perhaps importantly, I the its the dard review. reach this conclusion is closest on facts to Weber plaintiffs notwithstanding post in the the Court’s -Burdick challenge levied the Gore, Indeed, opinion case. is in Bush v. present Weber the exact (2000) (per case. 148 L.Ed.2d 388 present converse the Whereas value, curiam), precedential decry the of the a case whose the here refusal as I is at improved voting explain, questionable. counties to utilize technol- will best complained the ogies, pre- voter in Weber EQUAL II. ANALYSIS

cisely county had PROTECTION because her abandoned AND BUSH Y. paper traditional of the GORE ballots favor newly technology. available The contrast above, explained As I have neither the epitomizes pre- the cases the between two Court nor precedents venerable Warren dicament which election officials find voting-rights current cases they upgrade if vot- themselves—damned support to majority’s either the decision machines, ing if do not—and damned subject challenged voting practices the supports adopting further constitutional scrutiny strict the majority’s conclusion standard of that affords review state practices those are unconstitutional. flexibility necessary local officials the actually analytical provides What basis system an regulate constantly election then, majority opinion, for Su- flux. preme decision in Bush v. Court’s Gore note, however,

I cannot and a help but series of lower-court cases that have majority’s purported adopt reasoning insistence that result here of that applied if it ably would be same even ration- decision. For the reasons articulated Maj. Op. scrutiny. leading expert al-basis 872. The election-law —reasons majority unsupported thoughts my to which I will add a makes assertion few having the district for own—I that we despite chided court believe should heed is, doing thing summarily Supreme warning own and limit same Court’s —that concluding peculiar the result the reach of Bush v. Gore to the would be regardless appropriate extraordinary same stan- facts of that case. See Hasen, Maj. atOp. dard review. 852-53. If the Bush v. Gore and the Future Elections, justifications proffered employ- Equal state’s Protection Law in Fla. ing truly (“Language certain methods St. at 379 were U.L.Rev. flimsy them, per majority portrays opinion holding] as the then curiam limits [the case, or, most, majority no need cases would have to discuss facts of the jurisdiction-wide variety where recounts or- the use of mechanisms dered.”). majority jurisdiction, a dif- within a though chosen even different path, unjustifiably expands ferent one that mechanisms will have different levels of in recording Bush into a landmark effectiveness precedent v. Gore voters’ inten- tions[.]”); fundamentally Amar, Vikram designed transform fed- David Adven- Democracy: eral tures in Direct Top election law. Ten Constitutional Lessons from Califor- given A. Bush Gore should not be Experience, nia Recall 92 Cal. L.Rev. reading expansive *41 (2004) 955 (explaining Supreme that the Court in Bush v. “explicitly Gore disa- Professor Hasen summarized his three vowed” the notion that “the Equal Protec- for doubting prec- “reasons Bush v. Gore’s tion ... Clause invalidates statewide edential value” as follows: election where different kinds of voting limiting opinion, language [T]he machinery throughout may the state lead of lack seriousness with which the to nontrivial differential error rates across analysis, Court undertook its own counties”). inconsistency jurispru- with other majority dence of all Justices case, course, In present of no state- point assuming in the direction of that issue, court order is at governmen- and no good precedent Bush v. Gore is not for entity tal has ordered a “statewide reme- an expansive reading equal of protection dy.” allegations The these plaintiffs of are law in elections. far cry a from the lack uniform rules for discerning the meaning already votes I Id. at will first two 391. focus cast, which is what Court in Bush v. per opinion, these reasons. its curiam Gore found to be a constitutional violation. that majority Court cautioned its Hasen, See 29 Fla. U.L.Rev. 384 St. analysis present was “limited to the cir- v. (explaining majority that the Bush Gore cumstances, for problem equal pro- Supreme identified the Florida Court’s tection in election processes generally failure to formulate uniform rules for de- presents many complexities.” Bush v. termining voter intent the reason the Gore, 109, 121 531 U.S. at 525. The S.Ct. procedures state court’s recount violated Court elaborated as follows: Clause). Equal sig- These question is not [us] before whether a nificant differences alone constitute “le- entities, local in the exercise their gitimate principled basis manner of [and] may expertise, develop systems different Maj. distinguishing Op. Bush v. Gore.” See Instead, for implementing elections. we a presented where a situation power state court with the to assure article, Since Professor the Su- Hasen’s uniformity has a ordered statewide re- preme ample opportunity Court has had procedural count with minimal safe- prove wrong by explaining, him or even guards. When a court orders state- to, See, citing its decision in Bush v. Gore. remedy, wide there must be least Beaver, 581, e.g., v. 544 Clingman U.S. 125 rudimentary some assurance that 2029, (2005); 161 920 Vieth S.Ct. L.Ed.2d equal requirements of treatment and Jubelirer, 267, 1769, v. S.Ct. fundamental fairness are satisfied. (2004); Fed. L.Ed.2d McConnell v. Id.; Comm’n, 93, see also id. at 525 Election 540 U.S. S.Ct. (“It (Souter, J., (2003); Georgia dissenting) is true 157 L.Ed.2d 491 Ashcroft, Protection Clause does not forbid omitted). (2003). guid- taking marks The absence despite But tion L.Ed.2d 428 cases, on these crucial matters leaves lower ance steady of election-related load just to evaluate themselves courts cited even has not Bush v. Gore Court jurisprudential complexities arise in a con- majority opinion, in a once—not impression, law of first in election cases currence, in a the more than or dissent—in implications of potential policy also the decided. since that case was years five precedent extending words, Court, adhered in other has rationale is from clear. whose far language conspicuously limiting opinion. in the I included Bush v. Gore view, my policy implications, Those the same that we should follow believe extending the strongly ra- against counsel path. of Bush v. to the distinct area tionale Gore Professor Hasen voting technology. provides support also little Bush v. Gore concerns, significant focused on three majority’s deci- for the conclusion ones, monetary beyond the raised obvious government sion a state local governments’ by constitutionalizing local *42 technology must be employ voting certain voting mechanisms. The first is choice Professor subjected scrutiny. to strict As doing way so for “eases federal explained, v. Gore the Bush Hasen and local court intervention in state elec- a fundamental voting described as Court disputes over better tions nuts-and-bolts to under- right, bother[ ] but did “even at 400. left to local Id. Like authorities.” analysis asking “hornbook” take” the Posner, Judge I not think that do meeting the state’s whether interest legal more meant invite chal- federal deadline was impending election lenges to election methods and results. enough the fun- “compelling” to overcome Posner, A. 2000: A Richard Florida See right of have their vote damental voters to Analysis and Legal Statistical Elec- Hasen, counted. See 29 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. Litigation, Ensuing tion Deadlock and the I am not at 389. convinced (2001) (“The 1, 41 Sup.Ct. Rev. last unexplained Reynolds Court’s citation litigation.”). need is thing we more election Harper displacing can be and read instructing Burdick framework and lower gives This first concern rise sec scrutiny, employ particular- courts to strict namely, federal ond that a constitu one' — applied ly when the Court itself neither on voting tional rule “under that standard nor articulated standard a by imposing mines federalism” uniform of review. national standard localities that might in a otherwise allocate their resources dif An Bush v. Gore expansive reading of yet equally just ferent manner. See Ha problems simply far than portends graver sen, Fla. at 401 {“Bush St. U.L.Rev. v. heightened a standard of review. Profes- holding a Gore is tantamount convincingly sor Hasen has shown that very purchase poor of ambulances a applied Bush v. Gore county important than a move is less from entirely area of law to an election Clause scanners.”). optical punch cards to caselaw, prior from but did so different concern, explaining proce- kinds of Professor third without “which Hasen’s how- ever, I voting important used for con- is what the most dures mechanisms see as arbitrary disparate extending stitute treatment downside to Bush v. Gore to (read- technology. another” at 401 person’s that value one vote over See id. creating v. ing and therefore violate the Constitution. Bush Gore as “disineen- Hasen, (quota- jurisdictions experiment ... for 29 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at 393 tive[s] voting”). aspect If the of Bush v. we all agree new methods Gore that county- Equal Protection Clause bars one clear: unequivocal the Court’s statement adopting in a state from a new that it was not a announcing general rule because the mech- simply Maj. Op. mechanism new cases. future See at 859 n. 9 may disparity anism (acknowledging create between limiting the Court’s lan- county neighbors, its offi- local guage). my colleagues, Unlike I cannot cials will have little incentive to innovate. past look the Court’s own words and at- simple: county The reason is each time a tribute the Court a per intention —in implements change equipment, curiam opinion day issued one after oral becoming party alleging risks to a lawsuit argument midst of national cri- disparities voters’ chances of properly sis—to revolutionize the election laws and completing having that ballot practices ballot country. powerful

counted. of this disin- Because B. innovate, Gore, improperly Other lower courts have centive to Bush v. absent expanded solutions, the reach Bush v. other Gore legislative might “have freezing the unintended effect of our vot- This is not first case which ing mechanics at the current level of tech- plaintiffs have utilized Bush Gore as nology.” I Id. at 402. will return to this principal effecting their tool for change in point Part III below. policy. electoral Mulroy, See Steven J. analysis, In the final I Lemonade Can believe that the Lemons: Advocates from *43 Convert Bush v. best course is to understand the Gore Into Vehicle Supreme for Reform?, Poverty Court’s in 9 Geo. Pol’y decision Bush v. Gore as a J. on L. & (2002) preserve cases, to quo (citing shield the status in an 358-59 various Gore, all in process by extraordinary beset filed the wake Bush v. electoral temporal pressures. challenge there- that the certain political I use of join Equal fore decline to the in methods under the majority permit- Protection Act). ting litigants Voting use that Clause and the Rights to decision as a majority analysis bases much sword to strike down state election of its on policies that, cases, the ripe improvement, strength including while for were these test McGuffage, F.Supp.2d on Black v. 209 889 previously ground. solid constitutional (ex- (N.D.Ill.2002), Posner, Sup.Ct. See Rev. at 41 and Common Cause v. Jones, (C.D.Cal.2001). F.Supp.2d in plaining that differences the 862-67; Maj. Mulroy, at vote-counting Op. methods coun- see 9 Geo. by used (cit Poverty J. on L. at previously Pol’y ties “had not been to & 358-60 thought laws”). deny ing equal protection of the Black Common as cases Cause “voting rights advocates” filed an conclusion, not, In reaching I as am attempt push “to use [Bush ] v. Gore majority charges, making the the nonsen- reform, in long by overdue electoral claim sical that Professor Hasen’s law re- very voking equal protection theory the view article has overruled Bush Gore. v. by relied the conservative Bush ma Maj. Op. I am See at 874. instead faithful- below, jority”). Like the court district ly following explicit the Court’s however, unpersuasive. I find these cases analysis admonition its decision that the employed was “limited to cir- present the The chief weakness of these cases is Bush, 109, 121 per opinion cumstances.” 531 U.S. at their reliance on the curiam majority’s primary S.Ct. 525. Lost in the rebuttal Bush v. as the basis for their Gore my recognition key Registra- dissent is the decisions. See Southwest Voter Despite the firm rebuke that the Project Shelley, 344 F.3d rather tion Educ. Cir.) curiam) I), panel (9th court dealt the decision (Shelley en banc (per I, (9th Cir.2003) Shelley majority insists that banc, en 344 F.3d 914 rev’d outright reject Ninth Circuit “did not curiam) Black, II); (Shelley (per pursuant argument Cause, 898; Common F.Supp.2d ....” Maj. Op. Bush v. rationale Gore set at 1109. the reasons F.Supp.2d For rejection I was at 866. concede that above, not view in Part II.A. I do forth banc “outright,” the en court’s precedent as a Bush v. Gore landmark rationale description panel’s as “one vastly the reach of the designed to extend may jurists over which reasonable differ” Equal Protection Clause. hardly a ringing can be en- construed relies on openly The case most precedential dorsement Bush v. Gore’s now- is the Ninth Circuit’s Bush v. Gore application value or its issue of I. In Shelley decision in panel vacated technology. in voting Shelley variations strikingly opinion that looks and sounds II, least, very At the 344 F.3d majority present like that of the in the unanimous decision in Ninth Circuit’s Shel- case, enjoined panel of the Ninth ley panel Circuit II divested decision of what- punch-card precedential the 2003 it otherwise use of ballots ever value would had. recall have gubernatorial election California. theory at 888. The of the Cali- F.3d Undeterred, majority struggles to plaintiffs, fornia which is identical I Shelley accord such value because in this one the Ohio advanced adopted majority rationale is virtu- case, using error-prone voting “that was ally provided by identical the one counties, in some but not in equipment I Shelley panel namely, plain- — others[,] being result in will votes counted equal claims protection tiffs’ novel are con- differently among the Id. counties.” by Supreme precedents trolled *44 plaintiffs’ Describing allegations 895. the the equal weighting mandate votes. equal stating voting rights as “a classic Maj. Compare atOp. (holding 870-71 claim,” panel protection id. at the technology the counties’ use of outdated plaintiffs had “demon- concluded in weighting “results the of votes different- a sufficient likelihood of success on strated I, ly”), Shelley 344 F.3d 894-95 regardless”

the whether strict merits the (describing plaintiffs’ contention “that scrutiny appro- or rational was the basis in Angeles Diego a vote cast Los or San is priate Id. at standard review. 900. weight as a entitled same vote cast likely, in the Success on the merits was Francisco”). I explained in San As in Part view, panel’s because claim plaintiffs’ the above, however, plaintiffs I.A. the are not “present[ed] precisely almost the same is- asserting that properly one marked and sue [Supreme] as the considered in Court another, vote than tabulated has less value Bush," Equal where the Court found an technologies but instead that certain de- violation. Protection Id. at 895. Within a a voter’s handing crease chance of in a however, decision, panel’s week of that will properly marked ballot then be review, granted va- Ninth Circuit en banc claim, tabulated. when properly This opinion, unanimously panel characterized, cated the fall within does not the am- conclusion to that opposite reached a Gray, Wesberry, Reynolds, bit II, Shelley F.3d at panel. establishing caselaw Court’s to an equally-weighted vote. Stripped long- using of their connection counties lever or electronic-voting precedent, standing Supreme the machines. The rely also on di- majority Shelley I opinion persua- inter-county comparisons, rect pointing out only Cuyahoga County, sive to the extent that Bush v. Gore is punch- which used view, controlling. opinion, my presidential issue, Neither cards in the elections at successfully compelling refutes the reasons had an error four higher rate times than supplied by refusing County, Professor Hasen for Franklin where electronic-voting equal protection to “take Bush v. Gore’s machines were used. Hasen, holding seriously.” 29 Fla. St. indicate, majority What does not I U.L.Rev. 380. What believe makes however, is which of these numbers is majority’s more opinion troubling even constitutionally significant. Is the consti- than that panel of the Ninth Circuit is its problem tutional fact that voters in precisely aspects failure to articulate which punch-card districts face an error rate voting system of Ohio’s violate Equal high precinct-count twice as as voters in Clause, and what state and local so, optical-scan districts? If improve- then officials should do the future to amelio- technology ments in will necessarily perceived problems. rate the constitutional equal protection cure the problem. This is I turn now to these concerns. so because a voter in county with a much-improved residual vote rate of 0.2% EQUALITY

III. AND VOTING point neighboring county could to a where PROCEDURES say the rate is 0.1% and thing— same majority namely, holds that the certification that the error rate in county her is voting technology use of non-notice in twice high neighboring county. as as county Moreover, one but not another violates the technology improves Equal decline, “punch Protection Clause because dispari- error rates whatever optical among card and central-count scan tech- ties remain types different nologies greater result likelihood that equipment magnified. will be That one’s vote will not say, technology yields be counted on the same is to even a terms as the vote of someone in a negligible might notice error rate of 0.1% violate county.” Maj. Op. juris- at 871. Notwithstand- Protection Clause if other cautionary ing language employ its to the con- dictions within the state 876-77, 0.01%, trary, Maj. Op. majority see with a rate of which is one-tenth as virtually calling equality high. majority “greater absolute refers to a *45 voting counted, methods procedures across all likelihood” that a vote will not be electoral districts in a Ohio. but fails to articulate coherent constitu- point tional threshold —a at which a such A closer look at some relevant voting practices likelihood renders state story. key numbers tells much of the The unconstitutional. statistic, it, plaintiffs present as the is that Inter-county comparisons the residual-vote rate across the state was likewise fail to machines, punch-card clarify majority’s ruling. 2.29% for 0.94% for constitutional machines, electronic-voting According plaintiffs, disparity 1.04% for lever a such machines, precinct-count op- Cuya- and 1.15% for as the between Franklin and one words, tical In hoga scanners. other the error Counties—where the residual-vote in in punch-card rate districts is twice that of rate the latter is four times that of the and, scrutiny in precinct-count optical triggers counties with scan strict all former — likelihood, challenged county than that of equipment, and more twice dooms least restrictive however, constituted the course logic, that practice. Under meeting goal? its optical scan means and central-count punch cards only voting mecha are not the equipment para- above majority reads the The Protec might violate nisms that for not articulat- my faulting it graphs as which used a County, Lucas tion Clause. formula for mathematical ing precise “a (Automatic Ma Voting lever-style AVM voting technology determining when chine), rate of 0.4% a residual vote had Maj. it is not.” and when constitutional Stew election. See presidential the 2000 to a “coher- my But reference Op. at 876. Blackwell, 791, 826 F.Supp.2d art v. does not re- threshold” ent constitutional 2004). election, (S.D.Ohio In that same error rate of quire a concrete numerical voting and County used electronic Ross Rather, I have criti- y%. id. x% or See times rate of 1.2%—three had a residual majority failing provide for cized the County. Do these Lucas See id. that of the nu- determining when framework that, by a voter in a suit numbers dictate that are unavoidable merical differences County, county’s decision to from Ross constitutionally setting become election electronic-voting machines should be use responding aspect to this problematic. strict-scrutiny standard? under a reviewed dissent, however, majority does my all, voting use of the After the continued that its conclusion no more than reaffirm subjects “greater to a machines that voter of non-notice tech- the certification and use in Lucas counterpart than her likelihood” unconstitutional. in this case is nology vote will be excluded as County that her why these majority explain does not The improperly cast. voting technology particular differences strict-scrutiny standard exacerbates failing exposes unconstitutional —a majority’s inex- posed hazards something other than the approach as its Any change approach. act incremental analytical” urges one that it “reasoned disparity voter- potential that leads to employ “when confronted with courts susceptible legal error rates becomes Id. The questions.” difficult constitutional challenges in which the state must show facing the “difficult constitution- next court regulation is practice its chosen questions” al inherent a statistics-based state “necessary promote compelling equal protection challenge to state Ohio, Mixon v. 193 F.3d interest.” that, only will therefore know practices (6th Cir.1999); Craigmiles see also numbers, use these and these Ohio’s facts (6th Cir.2002) Giles, F.3d violated the of varied methods challenged regula- that a state (explaining Clause, not know Equal Protection but will if scrutiny only strict tion survives why. compelling purpose state “serve[s] Moreover, I am not the one who has narrowly achieving tailored to [is] number-crunching a dominant factor made guarantee But there is no purpose”). analysis. equal protection satisfy governments local would be able did so when plaintiffs themselves making standard when stringent *46 premise is brought a case whose central decisions, replac- such as most mundane that differences voter-error statistical ing electronic-voting equip- one brand rate) a viola- rates suffice to show constitutional (with, say, a ment 0.2% residual-vote squarely numbers are tion. Because these a 0.4% happens another that to have issue, provided hypo- I have the above justifica- rate. kind of residual-vote What majori- suffice, highlight in order to gov- could the theticals tion would and how limiting principle a ty’s failure to articulate body prove that the chosen ernmental casting not an- a beyond its assurances that is same chance ballot that is “[fjuture and that nouncing general a rule later deemed not to have been properly words, sort will be evaluated with claims of this In other majori- marked. while the financial, factors in [legal, practical] ty presumes requiring that substantial Maj. atOp. mind.” equivalency in residual-vote rates across prompt governments districts will local to majority responded by compar- up” “ratchet equipment, notice those ing apples oranges, implying governments would also be free to turn the “margin narrow of decision” across all vot- ratchet down to cheaper non-notice tech- presidential ers recent elections infuses nology. in the pres- the residual-vote rates at issue signifi- ent with added constitutional case all-or-nothing approach This carries with Maj. Op. again cance. at 871 n. 18. But practical it substantial concerns. As Pro- majority explain does not how these observed, fessor Hasen when one district numbers state-by-state margin-of-victory adopts a voting designed new method all, affect, analy- if equal protection error, decrease percentage of voter assume, example, I for that the ma- sis. yet voters in imple- districts have

jority suggest does not mean to mented the new method would have a col- voting machines comparative error rates claim, majority’s theory, orable under the would than the 0.009% have be less that their rights constitutional have been margin-of-victory in presi- Florida’s 2000 Hasen, violated. See 29 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. pass dential election order to constitu- at 401-02. The risk of a lawsuit each time tional muster. improved technology emerges accordingly end, my colleagues attempt In the a perverse “freezing creates incentive for quantitative disclaim their reliance on dif- ... voting mechanics at the current level ferences, describing judicially imposed “[a] at 402. technology.” Id. evaluating voting formula for mathematical Maj. rights “purely arbitrary.” cases” as Beyond the concern that the threat formula, however, Op. at 876. a Such innovation, lawsuits will halt the all-or- arbitrary than strikes me as no more nothing approach increases the risk that majority’s specific that the declaration dif- technological setbacks could invalidate the voting ferential error rates across dis- electoral results on a statewide basis. As- present tricts case violates the sume, example, that one or more coun- Equal Protection Clause. experiment ties in want to with Inter- Ohio voting net such a mechanism because majority

I also fails to believe might serve to decrease the error rate. If grasp “equality” one-way is not a permitted to trail-blazing counties are If street. what own, implement system on their new requires is that counties across Clause that call security logistical problems yield utilize mechanisms that Ohio question validity into of election results rate, substantially similar residual-vote counties, only leaving would affect those pre- then is punch-card the use ballots intact results from the rest of the every coun- sumably permissible long so hand, every county if state. On the other ty punch uses cards. That simultaneously relatively high percent- required adopt still method leads to system, widespread technical age imperfect of discarded votes statewide should wipe failure could out the entire state’s equal protection make no difference to the equality, while analysis, every face the election results. Instant since voter would *47 894 Weber, omitted); marks accord quotation for these theory, not account

fine in does F.3d at 1106. system. 347 realities' of the electoral foun- In of the uncertain doctrinal light court, I believe Like the district problems practical and the dations of proffered have government defendants I believe majority’s approach, posed by the to sur- reasons for their actions sufficient course is to review proper rational-basis highly deferential vive county prac- election challenged state and Beach See FCC v. standard review. standard. the rational-basis tices under 307, 313, Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. this course followed The Ninth Circuit (1993) 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (9th F.3d Shelley, Weber legislation presumably (explaining Cir.2003), voter con- in which the a case upheld against equal “must be valid and ballots, punch-card use of tested not the if reason- protection challenge there is punch to abandon rather the decision of facts that could ably conceivable state In voting. computerized cards in favor of provision for the” provide a rational basis claim, the Ninth Cir- rejecting the voter’s issue). majority dismisses framework, the Burdick con- applied cuit the cost and admin- state’s concerns about fraud the increased risk of cluded Maj. istrability voting systems, new did not in the new inherent 869-70, but does not even mention a Op. vote, right severely restrict justification given the state primary as “a reason- upheld the officials’ decision accepted by the district court—that able, neutral and non-discrimina- politically potential “com- security. Concerns about tory choice.” Id. at 1107. manipulation voting,” and fraudulent puter according experts to one of the who testi- result should follow The same fied, delay enough in counties that em- were substantial present case. Voters of DRE machines voting technology certification ploy non-notice —wheth- leading up to the November punch-card op- ballots or central-count months er Stewart, slightly elections. See equipment tical-scan face —do F.Supp.2d that a believe at 803 n. 15. Recent events have elevated chance ballot far be found revealed that these concerns were from properly was marked will later Marinow, view, however, Ann my slight illusory. See E. Touch- invalid. Fallible, Says, marking Voting Screen Ehrlich improperly increase the risk (dis- Post, 6, 2006, at a “se- March B01 simply a ballot does not constitute Wash. Maryland’s cussing on the to vote. See decision to abandon its vere restriction” Burdick, electronic-voting system million be- 504 U.S. at S.Ct. $90 not, all, system sight of the cause of concerns that was We should after lose nearly tampering”). votes cast even “vulnerable to The state fact that 98% the properly might counties were also have worried about the all-or- punch-card nothing aspect voting sys- of some DRE presidential in the 2000 election. counted tems, which, ballots, certify do Secretary punch-card decision to unlike State’s mistakenly and not allow a voter who casts an types voting equipment, different fill incomplete those mecha- ballot to out new ballot. the counties’ decision to use Stewart, nisms, n. 14. subject F.Supp.2d to rational- See are therefore review, justifications important “the These suffice show basis where State’s had a rational generally government interests suffi- defendants regulatory challenged voting justify” government choosing action. basis for cient to (citation 434, 112 and methods. Id. at

Furthermore, Again confusing I the refusal to count an for the reasons above, I I briefly in Part cannot improperly mentioned marked ballot with a state’s classify majority’s attempt accept the ascribing greater value to the votes of covered plaintiffs’ claims as people living in one area rather than an- precedents on voter- older other, majority asserts voters in weight- and the qualification requirements unequal non-notice districts “have an majority cites ing of votes. counted, being chance of their vote not as Harper, 383 U.S. at Court’s decision any a result of part action on the of the 1079, insisting 86 S.Ct. that “[t]he voter, but because of the different technol- provided to a voter technology Maj. ogy Op. agree utilized.” at 870. I State, wealth, has no rela- like that voter’s court, however, with the district voting qualifications tion to or the value improper marking of a ballot primarily is Maj. Op. (emphasis that vote.” at 870 actions, due to the voter’s own however added). This statement conflates two dif- may unintentional those actions have been. inquiries. Harper and other cases ferent Stewart, (“[T]he F.Supp.2d See at 803 that a state can determine voter recognize every opportunity voter has to check the discrimina- qualifications absent invidious punch card ballot before submitting it to Blumstein, See, e.g., tion. Dunn v. polls the election official at the and to be 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 31 L.Ed.2d 274 U.S. given a new if a ballot mistake is discover- (1972) (citing Harper and other cases that ed.”). although technology So utilized impose have the power hold that “States ahas statistical correlation to residual-vote qualifications, regulate voter and to access rates, person’s attempted failed to cast a ways”). to the franchise other Other primarily is vote the result of human error. recognize generally that states decisions technologies admittedly Some account for the ad- controlling have wide latitude such human error better than others. Un- See, e.g., ministration of elections. Storer however, today, Equal til Protection Brown, 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. Clause has not served as a check on hu- (1974) (“[A]s practical L.Ed.2d 714 man error federal elections. matter, regula- there must be a substantial they elections if are to be fair and Technology voting strength, tion of that dilutes order, and if some sort of rather us, honest majority tells “is no less a [consti- chaos, accompany than democratic violation than other invidious tutional] processes.”). plaintiffs’ challenge Maj. But the Op. method.” use goes case present latter different mechanisms has little to ground administration —not vot- type do with the of “invidious discrimina- —election qualifications. Harper, empha- er and its Equal tion” that the Protection Clause was sis on the irrelevance of wealth as a factor designed why That is I believe prevent. determining eligibility, voter is thus many statements in the the broad inapposite. majority opinion, although eloquent, are Maj. ultimately E.g., Op. hollow. at 879-

Reynolds also does not control the out- (“Violations of the present come of the case.- The use of non- deserving protection Clause are no less technology assuming notice —even accomplished because with a mod- appreciably that such leads to preju- ern machine than with outdated of residual not the higher rates votes—is dices.”). pros- unpleasant However “[weighting same as the votes of citizens part Maj. pect, human error remains differently.” Op. (quoting 1362). no constitutional Reynolds, process, democratic *49 (6th Cir.2004) Blackwell, F.3d 565 v. change that fact. See going rule is (2d Blackwell, curiam); Power, v. (per Cir. White v. 436 F.2d Powell (N.D.Ohio 2006); 1970) Equal Bay Pro (holding F.Supp.2d that neither the Land, of the Party and Due Process Clauses County tection Democratic I, (E.D.Mich.2004). § 2 Amendment nor Article Fourteenth These F.Supp.2d 404 “guarantee against er of the Constitution of obli- generally seek enforcement suits election”). of an rors the administration recently imposed by Congress on gations potential have more to reduce does What accept choose to federal those states that human error on election re the effect of administration. The funds for election change of the sults is incremental kind suit, contrast, sig- eschews the present Help Amer Congress that enacted changes by mandated nificant but balanced Act ica Vote of 2002. HAVA, and instead seeks a broad constitu- But HAVA is coex- tional rule. because IV. THE HELP AMERICA majority’s with the constitutional tensive (HAVA) VOTE ACT require partici- in so far as both rule majority’s If hold- the end result of implement states like Ohio some pating all counties ing requirement is a Ohio system, of a notice that constitutional form technology, then adopt some form of notice unnecessary. compliance Ohio’s rule my colleagues to the Congress has beaten give with HAVA will substan- impose punch. Key provisions HAVA tially all the relief that claim seek. on notice-technology requirements detailed majority’s me about the What concerns receiving federal funds for election states decision, therefore, is not the effect that administration, em- whether those states equal protection holding will have on lever, DRE ploy optical-scan, practices upcoming in Ohio in the election 15481(a)(1)(A) § systems. See U.S.C. Rather, I am November elections. trou- (2005). short, however, of stops HAVA aspects of the decision. bled two other punch-card banning paper the use of majority has inscribed The first is ballots, such explicitly permitting ballots preferred principles of federal election its state long be used so as the establishes Constitution, thereby taking law into the program explain voter education gov- critical decisions out of the hands of error, in- possibility provides of voter officials more familiar with the ernment to correct those errors structions how problems possible realities of the and the prior casting ballot. Id. This course of action should be solutions. 15481(c)(2) 15481(a)(1)(B); § § also id. see especially disfavored at a time when the (preserving power paper a state’s to use process through democratic HAVA and elections). Punch-card — ballots federal engendered the discussions and debates voting systems thus survive HAVA even legislation responded na- though, recognized, court as the district —has for plan tional still allows variations pro- Act primary “purpose of the was among states and localities. replace punch vide federal funds to card Stewart, voting systems.” F.Supp.2d My second concern stems from the un- n. 1. at 792 scope majority’s equal pro- of the certain I in Part holding, explored tection which expect, one would HAVA has become As requires III that states above. HAVA litigation, spawn- point a focal election system, of a notice re- employ type some ing a series of lawsuits this court and See, voting equipment used. gardless the circuit. the district courts within But, demonstrated, majori- I have e.g., Sandusky County Party Democratic premature notice conclusion strikes me as both might render even some ty’s holding majority’s if other notice inconsistent with deci- unconstitutional systems substantially found to have a of fact. systems findings sion to remand for further say, That is to vote-rate. lower residual in disagree majority’s I also with the interpretation of the majority’s novel court on remand. structions to the district sweeps far more Protection Clause *50 majority purports The aid” the dis “[t]o HAVA, and threatens to broadly than does analysis by citing trict court’s to Johnson ability gov- of state and local eliminate the 997, 1019, DeGrandy, 512 114 S.Ct. v. U.S. experiment procedures ernments (1994), 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 a case that security, technology that maximize majority says “reject[s] argument cost, voting pro- make the minimize part that vote dilution in one of the state as it should be. New cess as inclusive Cf. by part can be remedied another Liebmann, 262, v. State Ice Co. added). Maj. Op. at (emphasis state.” (1932) 76 L.Ed. however, DeGrandy, provides guid little (“There J., (Brandéis, must be dissenting) reasons. present ance case for two the nation to re- power the states and plaintiffs The first is that the here have mould, our ... through experimentation, claim, not a vote alleged vote denial changing to meet practices and institutions addressed in dilution claim like the one needs.”). I therefore social and economic Stewart, DeGrandy. F.Supp.2d See join majority’s to de- cannot decision (S.D.Ohio 2004); also Johnson v. see the use of different clare unconstitutional Fl., the State 405 F.3d Governor voting technologies across the state Cir.) (en banc) (11th (explaining 1227 n. 26 Ohio. a claim of requirements proving ACT V. VOTING RIGHTS — denied, -, denial), cert. vote analysis (2005). court’s Although the district L.Ed.2d 526. by plaintiffs under brought the claim Second, DeGrandy a reapportionment is Act been Voting Rights could have speak gen in terms so case that does I thorough, more am not convinced in voting to cover differences tech eral as an erroneous conclusion. the court reached nology across counties. Indeed, majority recognizes the dis- majority’s from the I therefore dissent finding that the residual-vote trict court’s and from to vacate and remand decision per- minimal rate in rural counties with provided instructions it has imprecise of African-American residents centages court. But because the to the district whose higher than the counties

was opportunity court will have an district challenged here. See Stew- practices are supplement the factual record remand to art, findings F.Supp.2d at 820. These claim Voting Rights Act and to address fully consistent with the district court’s anew, analyzing this point fully I no see political process in the defen- view that the interlocu- essentially claim on what “equally open partic- dant counties was Indeed, Ninth as the en banc tory basis. See by” African-American voters. ipation circumstances found under similar Circuit 1973(b). majority § never- 42 U.S.C. II, Voting application Shelley plaintiffs’ to remand the theless decides like those made allegations Act to Rights additional findings claim for further close, fact-sensi- presents determinations, plaintiffs that “the and holds legal 344 F.3d 918-919. questions. tive See claim under the properly stated a if explore questions those I will therefore Maj. Op. at This latter Act ....” claim under the plaintiffs’ and when the CHURCHWELL, Glenda

Voting Rights Act returns to this court. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VI. CONCLUSION MARINE, INC., Mar- BLUEGRASS reading of expansive Bush Gore Co., Inc., quette Transportation panel the Ninth Circuit lasted less then Hendrick, Marie Defen- Motor Vessel banc, days being vacated en ten before dants-Appellees. today’s only one leaving decision as the No. 05-5185. appeals to invali- from a federal court practices date state-election on the basis of Appeals, United States Court of equal protection holding. Bush v. Gore’s *51 Sixth Circuit. Because I believe that Argued and Submitted: March 2006. precedents outside of Bush v. Gore Court’s significant leeway in the permit states April Decided and Filed: elections, administration of that the Con- require govern- stitution local does employ voting technology

ments to every statistically

assures voter a identical turning properly

chance of marked

ballot, already and that HAVA mandates

many majority changes I requirements,

elevated constitutional summary affirm grant judg-

would

ment in favor of the defendants re-

gard to the claim under the Protec-

tion respect Clause. With to the claim Act, Voting Rights

under the I am not

convinced that the district court erred ei- deny-

ther its ultimate conclusion or in

ing plaintiffs’ request certify class.

I respectfully therefore from dissent

majority’s contrary conclusions.

Case Details

Case Name: Effie Stewart v. J. Kenneth Blackwell
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 21, 2006
Citation: 444 F.3d 843
Docket Number: 05-3044
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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