Edwin R. Sage Co. v. FoleyEdwin R. Sage Co. v. Foley
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Greaney
Edwin R. Sage Company (Sage) operates a retail food store in Belmont in premises leased from the defendant trustees. Sage’s lease contains a covenant which
1.
The question of authority.
On a petition filed pursuant to
Additional support for the existence of this power can be found in Mass.R.A.P. 6(a) and (b), as appearing in 378 Mass. 930 (1979), and in the Legislature’s recent amendment of
2. The merits. A trial court’s decision to issue or deny a preliminary injunction requires “an evaluation in combination of the moving party’s claim of injury and its chance of success on the merits. If there is a substantial risk of irreparable harm to the moving party, it must be balanced against any similar risk to the other party in the light of the chance of each party to succeed on the merits.” Commonwealth v. County of Suffolk, 383 Mass. 286, 288 (1981), citing Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, supra at 617. See Westinghouse Bdcst. Co. v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 70, 72 (1980). “Only where the balance between these risks cuts in favor of the moving party may a preliminary injunction properly issue.” Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, supra at 617.
Appellate review of a trial court order disposing of a preliminary injunction application, either by a panel of this court or by a single justice acting on a petition under the first paragraph of
Sage’s application for a preliminary injunction was heard in the trial court on its amended complaint, which included a copy of the lease, an affidavit of one of the trustees, copies of correspondence between the parties, memoranda of law, and arguments and representations of counsel. These materials summarize the commercial setting for Sage’s lease and the insertion of the restrictive covenant. They indicated that Sage has been a tenant in the premises for over forty years, that the restrictive covenant was first introduced in a 1966 lease, and that it was continued in subsequent leases to protect Sage from a prescribed level of competition which would be generated by the location of a food market nearby which is operated by a smaller chain. Since Sage had originally sought a covenant which would prohibit rental to any owner-operated supermarket, it can be inferred that the existing covenant was the result of negotiated compromise between the parties. The submissions before the Superior Court also described the hasty and unanticipated closing of all the First National outlets in Massachusetts, including the one in Belmont Center, the course of un
Neither party appears to have argued below (nor does either claim here) that the covenant suffers from any ambiguity which would justify disregarding its integration clause to admit parol evidence of the circumstances in which the lease was negotiated (see
Stoops
v.
Smith,
100 Mass. 63, 65-67 [1868];
National Paper
&
Cordage Co.
v.
Atlantic Carton Corp.,
332 Mass. 651, 653-654 [1955];
Robert Indus., Inc.
v.
Spence,
362 Mass. 751, 753-754 [1973]) or of any special construction placed on it by the parties themselves
(see Pittsfield & No. Adams R.R.
v.
Boston & Albany R.R.,
260 Mass. 390, 397-398 [1927];
Cooley
v.
Bettigole,
1 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 520-521 [1973]). In these circumstances, we believe that the trial court’s written order expressed preliminary rulings of law that the covenant was unambiguous and that the trustees’ interpretation of it was the correct one. These rulings were subject to broad review by the single justice. Furthermore, since the matter was heard by her on essentially the same documentary record as was considered below,
5
she was entitled to draw her
The question of hardship involved balancing competing hardships between the parties. It appears that the Superior Court judge did not reach this issue because of his construction of the covenant. The single justice might have remanded the matter to the judge below for his consideration of the question, but because the case was before her on documentary evidence and because Foodmaster’s occupation of the store seemed imminent, she was not required to do so. We believe that the determination that the balance of hardships cut in Sage’s favor is justified. The preservation of legitimate economic expectations pending the opportunity for trial is a basis for granting preliminary injunctive relief. See
Semmes Motors, Inc.
v.
Ford Motor Co.,
429 F.2d 1197, 1205-1206 (2d Cir. 1970). Sage bargained for competition from a large chain and not from a smaller enterprise which might have many product lines like its own, and the potential competitor’s number of outlets in actual operation divided the permissible from the impermissible. A remedy which leaves Sage to remove an on-going business and to seek damages for diminished profits, if it is ultimately determined that the injunction was wrongfully withheld, is of dubious efficacy. Any harm that the trustees might incur is primarily of the sort that can be adequately redressed by an order under
Order affirmed.
Notes
We can eliminate at this point Sage’s contention that the appeal should be dismissed because an order by a single justice passing on an interlocutory order of the lower court is not reviewable. The single justice’s certification of an interlocutory appeal properly brings the enumerated questions before us. We also reject the trustees’ argument that Sage’s recourse to the single justice amounted to an appeal under the second paragraph of
It is worth noting that the opportunity for review of injunctive orders in the single justice session under the first paragraph of
The single justice has ample power to impose sanctions on a party who presents a groundless or frivolous petition under the first paragraph. See
No testimony was taken in the trial court and the only added material before the single justice was excerpts from a deposition of a representative of Foodmaster which confirmed the undisputed facts that it intended to
lease the store immediately, and that certain documents had been executed by the trustees and Foodmaster confirming a formal lease which were being held in escrow pending the disposition of the
It appears, as well, that First National remains liable to the trustees for payments under the existing lease.
The risk that a party will suffer irreparable harm between the preliminary injunction stage and entry of final judgment may be avoided by consolidating the trial on the merits with the preliminary hearing on the application for an injunction. See