*1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020
Syllаbus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See
United States
v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
Syllabus v . VANNOY, WARDEN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 19–5807. Argued December 2, 2020—Decided May 17, 2021 In 2007, a Louisiana jury found petitioner Thedrick Edwards guilty of
armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping. At the time, Louisiana law per-
mitted non-unanimous jury verdicts if at least 10 of the 12 jurors found
the defendant guilty. In Edwards’s case, 11 of 12 jurors returned a
guilty verdict as to some crimes, and 10 of 12 jurors returned a guilty
verdict as to others. After Edwards’s conviction became final on direct
review, Edwards filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that
the non-unanimous jury verdict violated his constitutional right to a
unanimous jury. The District Court rejected Edwards’s claim as fore-
closed by
Apodaca
v.
Oregon
,
Held : The jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on
federal collateral review. Pp. 5–20.
(a) A new rule of criminal procedure applies to cases on direct re- view, even if the defendant’s trial has already concluded. But the Court has stated that new rules of criminal procedure ordinarily do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. The Court has stated that a new procedural rule will apply retroactively on federal collateral review only if the new rule constitutes a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure. v. Lane , 489 U. S. 288, 311 (plurality opinion). When the Teague Court first articulated that “watershed” exception, however, the Court stated that it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” Id., at 313. And
Syllabus
in the 32 years since Teague , the Court has never found that any new procedural rule actually satisfies the purported exception. Pp. 5–7.
(b) To determine whether Ramos applies retroactively on federal col- lateral review, the Court must first ask whether Ramos announced a new rule of criminal procedure and, if so, whether that rule falls within an exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that apply ret- roactively on federal collateral review. The Court concludes that Ra- mos announced a new rule and that the jury-unanimity rule an- nounced by Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Pp. 8–14.
(1) The
Ramos
jury-unanimity rule is new because it was not “
dic-
tated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction be-
came final,” ,
(2) The new rule announced in
Ramos
does not qualify as a “wa-
tershed” procedural rule that applies retroactively on federal collateral
review. In an attempt to distinguish
Ramos
from the long line of cases
where the Court has declined to retroactively apply new procedural
rules, Edwards emphasizes three aspects of
Ramos
: (i) the significance
of the jury-unanimity right; (ii)
Ramos
’s reliance on the original mean-
ing of the Constitution; and (iii) the effect of
Ramos
in preventing ra-
cial discrimination in the jury process. But the Court has refused to
retroactively apply other momentous cases with similar attributes. In
DeStefano
v.
Woods
,
(3) Given the Court’s numerous precedents holding that landmark and historic decisions announcing new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review, the Court acknowl- edges that the watershed exception is moribund and that no new rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the purported exception for water- shed rules. Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never
Syllabus
actually applies in practice offers false hope to defendants, distorts the
law, misleads judges, and wastes the resources of defense counsel,
prosecutors, and courts. Moreover, no one can reasonably rely on an
exception that is non-existent in practice, so no reliance interests can
be affected by forthrightly acknowledging reality. The watershed ex-
ception must “be regarded as retaining no vitality.”
Herrera Wyo-
ming
,
Affirmed.
K AVANAUGH , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., T HOMAS , A LITO , G ORSUCH , and B ARRETT , JJ., joined. T HOMAS , J., filed a concurring opinion, in which G ORSUCH , J., joined. G ORSUCH , J., filed a concurring opinion, in which T HOMAS , J., joined. K AGAN , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which B REYER and S OTOMAYOR , JJ., joined.
Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 19–5807 _________________ THEDRICK EDWARDS, PETITIONER v. DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2021]
J USTICE K AVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Last Term in
Ramos
v.
Louisiana
,
This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision an-
nouncing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does
not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. See
Teague
v.
Lane
,
Opinion of the Court
U. S. 406, 421 (2007) (Confrontation Clause rule recognized
in
Crawford
v.
Washington
, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), does not
apply retroactively). And for decades before , the
Court also regularly declined to apply new rules retroac-
tively, including on federal collateral review. See,
e.g.,
DeStefano Woods
,
In light of the Court’s well-settled retroactivity doctrine, we conclude that the jury-unanimity rule likewise does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. We therefore affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Ap- peals for the Fifth Circuit.
I
On the night of May 13, 2006, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Thedrick Edwards and an accomplice kidnapped Ryan Eaton, a student at LSU. As Eaton was getting out of his car, Edwards and his accomplice confronted Eaton at gun- point and forced him back into the car. Edwards and his accomplice then jumped into the car with Eaton. They drove with Eaton to an ATM where they hoped to withdraw money using Eaton’s card. When they discovered that Eaton did not have any money in his account, they drove to Eaton’s apartment. Once there, they bound and blindfolded Eaton, rummaged through his apartment, and took some of his belongings to Eaton’s car.
After they were back in the car, Edwards and his accom- plice coerced Eaton into arranging a meeting with Eaton’s girlfriend. They then drove to the girlfriend’s apartment and, at gunpoint, forced Eaton to knock on the door. When Eaton’s girlfriend opened the door, Edwards and his accоm- plice rushed inside. Both Edwards and his accomplice were armed, and Edwards’s accomplice had his gun drawn. Ed- wards and his accomplice instructed Eaton, Eaton’s girl- friend, and two other women in the apartment to lie on the
Opinion of the Court
floor. Edwards then raped one of the women. His accom- plice raped another woman. As they left, they grabbed some personal property from the apartment. Edwards and his accomplice hurried back into Eaton’s car and drove around the corner. They then abandoned the car and fled.
Two days later, Edwards and his accomplice confronted another man at gunpoint and forced him to withdraw money from an ATM.
Within a day of the second incident, the police collected substantial evidence implicating Edwards in both episodes. The police obtained warrants to search his residence and to arrest him. The day after the police executed the search warrant but before an arrest, Edwards turned himself in to the police and confessed to his crimes. The police vide- otaped Edwards’s confession. (The video is part of the joint appendix. See supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx.)
Edwards was indicted in Louisiana state court for armed robbery, kidnapping, and rape. Edwards pled not guilty and went to trial. Before trial, Edwards moved to suppress the videotaped confession on the ground that the confession was involuntary. The trial court denied the suppression motion.
At trial, the jury heard Edwards’s confession and other evidence against him, including the testimony of eyewit- nesses. The jury convicted Edwards of five counts of armed robbery, two counts of kidnapping, and one count of rape. At the time, Louisiana law permitted guilty verdicts if at least 10 of the 12 jurors found the defendant guilty. The jury convicted Edwards by an 11-to-1 vote on one оf the armed robbery counts, the two kidnapping counts, and the rape count. The jury convicted Edwards by a 10-to-2 vote on the four remaining armed robbery counts.
At sentencing, the trial judge stated: “I can say without hesitation that this is the most egregious case that I’ve had before me.” Record 1113. The judge sentenced Edwards to
Opinion of the Court
life imprisonment without parole. The Louisiana First Cir- cuit Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. In March 2011, Edwards’s conviction became final on direct review.
After his conviction became final, Edwards applied for state post-conviction relief in the Louisiana courts. The Louisiana courts denied relief.
In 2015, Edwards filed a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana. He argued that the non-unanimous jury verdict
violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury. The
District Court rejected that claim as foreclosed by this
Court’s 1972 decision in
Apodaca
v.
Oregon
,
In
Apodaca
, this Court ruled that the Constitution does
not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials.
The
Apodaca
majority consisted of a plurality opinion by
four Justices and an opinion concurring in the judgment by
Justice Powell. In his opinion, Justice Powell acknowl-
edged that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous
jury in
federal
criminal trials.
In Edwards’s case, the District Court likewise followed
Justice Powell’s opinion from
Apodaca
and concluded that
a unanimous jury is not constitutionally required in state
criminal trials. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit denied a certificate of appealability.
Opinion of the Court
II
While Edwards’s petition for certiorari wаs pending, this
Court decided and rejected Justice Powell’s opinion
in
Apodaca
. See
Ramos
v.
Louisiana
,
The Court’s decision in Ramos directly affected Louisiana and Oregon, which were the only two States that still al- lowed non-unanimous juries. For those States, this Court’s decision in Ramos immediately triggered a pressing ques- tion: Does Ramos apply retroactively to overturn final con- victions on federal collateral review? We granted certiorari in Edwards’s case to decide that question. 590 U. S. ___ (2020). We conclude that Ramos does not apply retroac- tively on federal collateral review.
A
A new rule of criminal procedure applies to cases on
di-
rect
review, even if the defendant’s trial has already con-
cluded. See
Griffith
v.
Kentucky
,
[1]
Ramos
does not apply to defendants charged with petty offenses,
which typically are offenses that carry a maximum prison term of six
months or less.
Opinion of the Court
313–314 (1989).
In stating that new procedural rules ordinarily do not ap-
ply retroactively on federal collateral review,
Teague
rein-
forced what had already been the Court’s regular practice
for several decades under the retroactivity standard articu-
lated in
Linkletter
v.
Walker
,
As the Court has explained, applying “constitutional
rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final
seriously undermines the principle of finality which is es-
sential to the operation of our criminal justice system.”
Id.
,
at 309. Here, for example, applying
Ramos
retroactively
would potentially overturn decades of convictions obtained
in reliance on
Apodaca
. Moreover, conducting scores of re-
trials years after the crimes occurred would require signifi-
cant state resources. See ,
[2] Before
Griffith
v.
Kentucky
, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), the Court some-
times would decline to apply new procedural rules even to cases on
direct
review. See,
e.g.
,
Johnson
v.
New Jersey
,
Opinion of the Court
U. S. 66, 72 (1986). Even when the evidence can be reas- sembled, conducting retrials years later inflicts substantial pain on crime victims who must testify again and endure new trials. In this case, the victims of the robberies, kid- nappings, and rapes would have to relive their trauma and testify again, 15 years after the crimes occurred.
Put simply, the “costs imposed upon the States by retro- active application of new rules of constitutional law on ha- beas corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefits of this application.” Sawyer v. Smith , 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). For that reason, the Court has repeatedly stated that new rules of criminal procedure ordinarily do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
The Court has identified only one possible exception to
that principle. The Court has stated that a new procedural
rule will apply retroactively on federal collateral review
only if it constitutes a “watershed” rule of criminal proce-
dure.
Teague
,
[3] By contrast, a new
substantive
rule—for example, a rule that partic-
ular conduct cannot constitutionally be criminalized—usually applies
retroactively on federal collateral review. See
Welch
v.
United States
,
8
Opinion of the Court B To determine whether Ramos applies retroactively on federal collateral review, we must answer two questions. First, did Ramos announce a new rule of criminal proce- dure, as opposed to applying a settled rule? A new rule or- dinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
Second, if Ramos announced a new rule, does it fall within an exception for watershed rules of criminal proce- dure that apply retroactively on federal collateral review?
Ramos held that a state jury must be unanimous to con- vict a defendant of a serious offense. In so holding, Ramos announced a new rule.
A rule is new unless it was “
dictated
by precedent exist-
ing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”
, 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). In other
words, a rule is new unless, at the time the conviction be-
came final, the rule was already “apparent to all reasonable
jurists.”
Lambrix
v.
Singletary
,
The jury-unanimity requirement announced in Ramos was not dictated by precedent or aрparent to all reasonable jurists when Edwards’s conviction became final in 2011. On the contrary, before , many courts interpreted Apo- daca to allow for non-unanimous jury verdicts in state crim- inal trials. [4] In addition, in Ramos itself, six Members of the
[4] See,
e.g.
,
Timbs
v.
Indiana
,
Opinion of the Court
Court acknowledged that
Apodaca
allowed non-unanimous
jury verdicts in state criminal trials. See
Edwards responds that the Court’s decision in
Ramos
must have applied a settled rule, not a new rule, because
the decision adhered to the original meaning of the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s incorporation of that right (and others)
against the States. That argument conflates the merits
question presented in
Ramos
with the retroactivity ques-
tion presented here. On the merits question, the critical
point, as the Court thoroughly explained in , is that
the Constitution’s text and history require a unanimous
jury in state criminal trials. On the retroactivity question,
criminal trials, it does not require a unanimous jury verdict in state crim-
inal trials”);
Schad
v.
Arizona
,
Opinion of the Court
the critical point is that reasonable jurists who considered the question before interpreted Apodaca to allow non-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials. By renouncing Apodaca and expressly requiring unani- mous jury verdicts in state criminal trials, Ramos plainly announced a new rule for purposes of this Court’s retroac- tivity doctrine. And new rules of criminal procedure ordi- narily do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
Having determined that Ramos announced a new rule re- quiring jury unanimity, we must consider whether that new rule falls within an exception for watershed rules of crimi- nal procedure that apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
This Court has stated that the watershed exception is “extremely narrow” and applies only when, among other things, the new rule alters “our understanding of the bed- rock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Whorton , 549 U. S., at 417–418 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the abstract, those various adjectives—watershed,
narrow, bedrock, essential—do not tell us much about
whether a particular decision of this Court qualifies for the
watershed exception. In practice, the exception has been
theoretical, not real. The Court has identified only one pre-
procedural rule as watershed: the right to counsel
recognized in the Court’s landmark decision in
Gideon
v.
Wainwright
,
Moreover, the Court has flatly proclaimed on multiple oc- casions that the watershed exception is unlikely to cover any more new rules. Even 32 years ago in Teague itself, the
Opinion of the Court
Court stated that it was “unlikely” that additional water-
shed rules would “emerge.” 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality
opinion). And since
Teague
, the Court has often reiterated
that “it is unlikely that any such rules have yet to emerge.”
Whorton
,
Consistent with thоse many emphatic pronouncements,
the Court since has rejected
every
claim that a new
procedural rule qualifies as a watershed rule. For example,
in
Beard
v.
Banks
,
The list of cases declining to retroactively apply a new rule of criminal procedure extends back long before Teague to some of this Court’s most historic criminal procedure de- cisions. For example, in Johnson New Jersey , 384 U. S.
Opinion of the Court
719, 721 (1966), the Court declined to retroactively apply
Miranda
v.
Arizona
,
Edwards seeks to distinguish Ramos from the long line of cases where the Court has declined to retroactively apply new procedural rules. Edwards emphasizes three aspects of Ramos : (i) the significance of the jury-unanimity right; (ii) Ramos ’s reliance on the original meaning of the Consti- tution; and (iii) the effect of Ramos in preventing racial dis- crimination in the jury process.
But Edwards’s attempts to distinguish Ramos are una- vailing because the Court has already considered and re- jected those kinds of arguments in prior retroactivity cases.
First
, Edwards emphasizes the significance of the jury-
unanimity right for criminal dеfendants. But that argu-
ment for retroactivity cannot be squared with the Court’s
decisions in
Duncan
v.
Louisiana
,
Opinion of the Court
declined to retroactively apply the broader jury right itself.
Second
, Edwards stresses that
Ramos
relied on the orig-
inal meaning of the Sixth Amendment. But that argument
for retroactivity is inconsistent with
Crawford
v.
Washing-
ton
,
Third , Edwards says that Ramos prevents racial discrim- ination by ensuring that the votes of all jurors, regardless
[5] Edwards argues that the
Ramos
rule mirrors the rule announced in
Burch Louisiana
,
The Court’s decision in
Ivan V.
v.
City of New York
, 407 U. S. 203
(1972) (
per curiam
), is no more helpful to Edwards. In
In re Winship
, the
Court held that a jury must find guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 397
U. S. 358, 364 (1970). And in
Ivan V.
, the Court held that the rule an-
nounced in
Winship
applied in a case on
direct
review.
In any event,
Brown
and
Ivan V.
were pre-
Teague
decisions. See
Teague
v.
Lane
,
Opinion of the Court
of race, matter in the jury room. But that argument for ret-
roactivity cannot prevail in light оf
Batson
v.
Kentucky
, 476
U. S. 79 (1986), and
Allen
v.
Hardy
, 478 U. S. 255 (1986)
(
per curiam
). In
Batson
, the Court overruled precedent and
revolutionized day-to-day jury selection by holding that
state prosecutors may not discriminate on the basis of race
when exercising individual peremptory challenges. 476
U. S., at 92–93, 96–98. Nonetheless, the Court in
Allen
de-
clined to retroactively apply
Batson
.
The Court’s decisions in Duncan , Crawford , and Batson were momentous and consequential. All three decisions fundamentally reshaped criminal procedure throughout the United States and significantly expanded the constitu- tional rights of criminal defendants. One involved the jury- trial right, one involved the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, and one involved ra- cial discrimination in jury selection. Yet the Court did not apply any of those decisions retroactively on federal collat- eral review. Ramos is likewise momentous and consequen- tial. But we see no good rationale for treating Ramos dif- ferently from Duncan , Crawford , and Batson . Consistent with the Court’s long line of retroactivity precedents, we hold that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply ret- roactively on federal collateral review.
In so concluding, we recognize that the Court’s many ret- roactivity precedents taken together raise a legitimate question: If landmark and historic criminal procedure deci- sions—including Mapp , Miranda , Duncan , Crawford , Bat- son , and now —do not apply retroactively on federal
[6] The
Ramos
rule does not apply retroactively on
federal
collateral re-
view. States remain free, if they choose, to retroactively apply the jury-
unanimity rule as a matter of state law in state post-conviction proceed-
ings. See
Danforth Minnesota
,
Opinion of the Court
collateral review, how can any additional new rules of crim-
inal procedure apply retroactively on federal collateral re-
view? At this point, some 32 years after
Teague
, we think
the only candid answer is that none can—that is, no new
rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed ex-
ception. We cannot responsibly continue to suggest other-
wise to litigants and courts. In itself, the Court rec-
ognized that the purported exception was unlikely to apply
in рractice, because it was “unlikely” that such watershed
“components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” 489
U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). The Court has often re-
peated that “it is unlikely that any of these watershed rules
has yet to emerge.”
Tyler
,
Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that
never actually applies in practice offers false hope to de-
fendants, distorts the law, misleads judges, and wastes the
resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts.
Moreover, no one can reasonably rely on an exception that
is non-existent in practice, so no reliance interests can be
affected by forthrightly acknowledging reality. It is time—
probably long past time—to make explicit what has become
increasingly apparent to bench and bar over the last 32
years: New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on
federal collateral review. The watershed exception is mor-
ibund. It must “be regarded as retaining no vitality.”
Her-
rera Wyoming
,
16
Opinion of the Court
We respectfully offer four responses to the dissent.
First
, in the dissent’s view, if a right is important enough
to justify overruling or repudiating precedent (as in
Ra-
mos
), then it often is important enough to apply retroac-
tively as a watershed rule of criminal procedure. But the
Court’s precedents say the opposite and demonstrate that
the dissent’s position erroneously inverts
stare decisis
and
Teague
.
Teague
recognized that the Court would occasion-
ally announce new rules of criminal procedure by overrul-
ing or repudiating existing precedents.
Teague
further ex-
plained, however, that it was “unlikely” that such new
procedural rules would apply retroactively on federal collat-
eral review.
The Ramos Court fully understood all of this. Although Ramos stopped short of expressly deciding this retroactivity question (because it was not squarely presented), Ramos discussed retroactivity and plainly foreshadowed today’s decision. The lead opinion in —which was joined in relevant part by two of today’s dissenters, J USTICE B REYER and J USTICE S OTOMAYOR —explained that overruling or re- pudiating Apodaca was not likely to significantly affect Louisiana’s and Oregon’s reliance interests in preserving fi- nal convictions because Ramos was not likely to apply ret- roactively on federal collateral review. In particular, the lead opinion said that the States’ “worries” about Ramos applying retroactively and overturning hundreds of final convictions outstripped “the facts” because “ ’s test is
Opinion of the Court
a demanding one, so much so that this Court has yet to an-
nounce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting
it.”
Ramos
,
In short, the Court’s holding today—namely, that Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review— carefully adheres to Ramos and tracks the Court’s many longstanding precedents оn retroactivity.
Second , the dissent suggests that the Court knows that Ramos should apply retroactively under the watershed ex- ception, but wants to avoid applying Ramos retroactively, and for that reason has decided to just eliminate the water- shed exception altogether. That suggestion is unfounded. Ramos was a momentous decision, and those of us who joined it continue to agree with it. But as we have ex- plained, Ramos itself analyzed the Court’s retroactivity precedents and foretold today’s decision on retroactivity. We are simply following through on what Ramos (as well as the Court’s many other precedents) already said about ret- roactivity to now squarely hold that Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. If we thought otherwise and believed that Ramos qualified under the Court’s precedents as a rule that applies retroactively, we would certainly say so. But applying our retroactivity prec- edents, we have concluded that does not apply ret- roactively—just as the Court has previously held that other historic cases like Mapp , Miranda , Duncan , Batson , and Crawford did not apply retroactively. After reaching that
Opinion of the Court
conclusion, we then took account of the overall jurispruden- tial landscape of the last several decades in Teague cases and acknowledged what has become unmistakably clear: The purported watershed exception is moribund.
Third
, on that last point, the dissent responds that
Teague
nominally identified a retroactivity exception for
watershed procedural rules and that we should do so as
well. But the problem, as we see it, is that
Teague
simulta-
neously said that it was “unlikely” that new procedural
rules would qualify as watershed.
As noted above, no stare decisis values would be served by continuing to indulge the fiction that ’s purported watershed exception endures. No one can reasonably rely on a supposed exception that has never operated in prac- tice. And perpetuating what has become an illusory excep- tion misleads litigants and judges, and needlessly expends the scarce resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts. At this point, given that landmark cases like Mapp , Miranda , Duncan , Batson , Crawford , and now have not applied retroactively, we are simply acknowledging re- ality and stating the obvious: The purported watershed ex- ception retains no vitality.
Fourth , the dissent asserts that the Court is not living up to the promise of Ramos for criminal defendants. To begin with, the dissent cannot reasonably charge the Court with failing to live up to Ramos given that Ramos itself explicitly
Opinion of the Court
forecast today’s decision on retroactivity. Moreover, with respect, J USTICE K AGAN dissented in Ramos . To be sure, the dissent’s position on the jury-unanimity rule in Ramos was perfectly legitimate, as is the dissent’s position on ret- roactivity in today’s case. And it is of course fair for a dis- sent to vigorously critique the Court’s analysis. But it is another thing altogether to dissent in Ramos and then to turn around and impugn today’s majority for supposedly shortchanging criminal defendants. To properly assess the implications for criminal defendants, one should assess the implications of Ramos and today’s ruling together . And criminal defendants as a group are better off under Ramos and today’s decision, taken together, than they would have been if J USTICE K AGAN ’s dissenting view had prevailed in Ramos . If the dissent’s view had prevailed in Ramos , no defendant would ever be entitled to the jury-unanimity right—not on collateral review, not on direct review, and not in the future. By contrast, under the Court’s holdings in Ramos and this case, criminal defendants whose cases are still on direсt review or whose cases arise in the future will have the benefit of the jury-unanimity right announced in . The rhetoric in today’s dissent is misdirected. Different Members of the Court have reached different con- clusions in Ramos and in this case, but each Member of the Court has acted in good faith in deciding the difficult ques- tions before us.
* * *
To summarize the Court’s retroactivity principles: New substantive rules alter “the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” Summerlin , 542 U. S., at 353. Those new substantive rules apply to cases pending in trial courts and on direct review, and they also apply retro- actively on federal collateral review. New procedural rules alter “only the manner of determining the defendant’s cul- pability.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Those new procedural
Opinion of the Court
rules apply to cases pending in trial courts and on direct review. But new procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
Ramos announced a new rule of criminal procedure. It does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
T HOMAS , J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 19–5807 _________________ THEDRICK EDWARDS, PETITIONER v. DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2021]
J USTICE T HOMAS , with whom J USTICE G ORSUCH joins, concurring.
I join the majority in full because it correctly charts its
way through precedent to hold expressly what we have long
implied: “New procedural rules do not apply retroactively
on federal collateral review.”
Ante,
at 15. I write separately
to highlight that we could also have resolved this case by
applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA directs
federal courts to deny “any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court” unless the state court’s decision
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). In 2011, peti-
tioner urged a Louisiana court to hold that the Federal Con-
stitution requires jury unanimity, and the court rejected
that claim on the merits. That conclusion was consistent
with
Apodaca
v.
Oregon
,
T HOMAS , J., concurring
I
A
Congress first prescribed federal habeas jurisdiction in
the Judiciary Act of 1789. That statute did not clearly de-
fine the scope of relief, but “the black-letter principle of the
common law [was] that the writ was simply not available at
all to one convicted of crime by a court of competent juris-
diction.”
[1]
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Ha-
beas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 465–
466 (1963) (Bator); see
Felker
v.
Turpin
,
Congress expanded the writ in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. This Act extended the writ to prisoners in state custody but again provided only “bare guidelines” about the scope of the writ. [2] Wright v. West , 505 U. S. 277, 285 (1992) (plurality opinion). At first, this Court continued to apply the common-law rule that allowed a state petitioner to challenge only “the jurisdiction of the court that had rendered the judgment under which he was in custody.” Ibid. But the Court later “expand[ed] the cat-
[1] Section 14 of the Judiciary Act provided that “courts of the United States . . . shall have power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus ” and that “justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.— Provided , That writs of habeas corpus shall in no cases extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.” 1 Stat. 81–82.
[2] The relevant language of the Act stated that courts, “in addition to the authority already conferred by [the Judiciary Act of 1789], shall havе power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.” 14 Stat. 385.
T HOMAS , J., concurring
egory of claims deemed to be jurisdictional for habeas pur- poses.” Ibid. In 1874, for example, this Court found juris- dictional defects whenever state courts imposed sentences under unconstitutional statutes or imposed sentences not authorized by a statute. Ibid. (collecting cases). And a few decades later, the Court expanded relief to situations where, in the eyes of the federal court, “no state court had provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate” a prisoner’s federal claims. Ibid. But absent a “jurisdictional” defect, a state court judgment was entitled to “ ‘ absolute respect’ ” as long as the prisoner “ ‘had been given an adequate oppor- tunity to obtain full and fair consideration of his federal claim in the state courts.’ ” Ibid. That rule left no room to grant relief simply because a state court made an error of law.
In 1953, this Court abruptly changed course and decided
that federal courts could grant a writ of habeas corpus
simply because they disagreed with a state court’s judg-
ment. See
Brown
v.
Allen
,
Admitting that “the Constitution neither prohibits nor re- quires retrospective effect,” Linkletter v. Walker , 381 U. S. 618, 629 (1965), the Court took an atextual and ad hoc ap- proach, presumably based on its interpretation of the 1867 Act. The Court declared that some federal decisions apply *27 4
T HOMAS , J., concurring
retroactively to final state convictions, thus allowing fed- eral courts to grant habeas relief depending on the “merits and demerits in each case.” Ibid. To guide the analysis, Linkletter announced several factors for federal courts to consider: “the prior history of the rule in question, its pur- pose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Ibid.
This rule did “not le[ad] to consistent results,” so two dec-
ades later the Court tried a new interpretation of the 1867
Act. See
Teague
v.
Lane
,
B
Teague
, however, was not the final word on how federal
courts should review the decisions of state courts. In 1996,
Congress enacted AEDPA, the most significant change to
the habeas corpus statute since 1867. AEDPA filled in the
“bare guidelines” of the 1867 Act by creating a comprehen-
sive system for addressing federal habeas claims brought
by state prisoners. See
Wright
,
Directly relevant here are two provisions that ensure that
[3]
Two years before
Teague
, this Court overruled cases that had allowed
courts to apply the balancing test in
Linkletter Walker
,
T HOMAS , J., concurring
state courts hаve the primary role in adjudicating these
claims. First, a prisoner must exhaust his claims in state
court before he can seek relief in federal court. If “any avail-
able [state-law] procedure” remains open, a federal “writ of
habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted.” §§2254(b)–(c). Sec-
ond, once a state court has had the opportunity to decide
that claim, AEDPA demands that federal courts respect
that judgment. The law precludes relief “with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim” either (1)
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding.” §2254(d).
It is not enough for a federal court to disagree with the state
court—much less disagree on a point of law that this Court
had not yet settled when the state court issued its judg-
ment. Rather, the state court’s decision must conflict with
clearly established law and be obviously wrong “beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington
v.
Richter
,
II A Here, the system worked as designed. Edwards pre- sented his unanimous jury claim to a Louisiana court. And the state court reasonably relied on Apodaca in rejecting that claim. AEDPA is clear about what happens next—re- lief “shall not be granted.” §2254(d).
Our analysis could have begun and ended there—with §2254(d)(1)’s plain text. Congress, through AEDPA, has made clear that federal courts cannot provide relief in this case. See Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U. S. 190, 221
T HOMAS , J., concurring
(2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte Bollman , 4 Cranch 75, 94 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[T]he power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law”).
B
The Court, instead, relies on Teague . I join the Court’s opinion because it correctly applies preсedent and leads to the same judgment, but I would be remiss if I did not point out two other problems with Teague .
First, it has
never
been clear what gave this Court au-
thority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners based on
“new” constitutional rules of criminal procedure.
Teague
did not explain why the 1867 Act gave federal courts this
power. Moreover, primarily focused on moving the
law in the opposite direction of
Linkletter
’s permissive ap-
proach to collaterally reviewing final state convictions. See
Danforth
,
Second, the Court’s reliance on Teague today and in the past should not be construed to signal that AEDPA is an afterthought in analyzing a claim like petitioner’s or that Teague could justify relief where AEDPA forecloses it. AEDPA does contemplate that some new constitutional rules might be retroactive in narrow circumstances. See §§2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (evidentiary hearings), 2244(b)(2)(A) (sec- ond-or-successive bar), 2244(d)(1)(C) (statute of limita- tions). But it does not contemplate retroactive rules upset- ting a state court’s adjudication of an issue that reasonably applied the law at the time. Section 2254(d)—the absolute *30 7
T HOMAS , J., concurring
bar on claims that state courts reasonably denied—has no
exception for retroactive rights. Congress’ decision to cre-
ate retroactivity exceptions to the statute of limitations and
to the bar on second-or-successive petitions but not for
§2254(d) is strong evidence that
Teague
could never have
led to relief here.
Russello
v.
United States
,
* * *
A state court rejected petitioner’s claim that he was enti- tled to a unanimous jury verdict. That adjudication was not unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law. AEDPA’s explicit directive thus independently resolves this case: “a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted.” §2254(d).
[4] As J USTICE G ORSUCH correctly points out, federal courts have “equi- table discretion to decide whether to issue the writ or to provide a rem- edy,” which includes the powers to create doctrines such as harmless er- ror. Post , at 8 (concurring opinion). And federal courts can rely on those doctrines as well as statutory bars to deny relief. That is why, as J USTICE G ORSUCH explains, an equitable retroactivity bar with no watershed ex- ception can independently justify denying relief. Post, at 9, n. 5.
[5] The Constitution does not require that habeas relief be available for
new “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. See,
e.g
.,
Brown
v.
Allen
,
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 19–5807 _________________ THEDRICK EDWARDS, PETITIONER v. DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2021]
J USTICE G ORSUCH , with whom J USTICE T HOMAS joins, concurring.
Sometimes this Court leaves a door ajar and holds out the possibility that someone, someday might walk through it— though no one ever has or, in truth, ever will. In Teague v. Lane , 489 U. S. 288 (1989), the Court suggested that one day it might apply a new “watershed” rule of criminal pro- cedure retroactively to undo a final state court conviction. But that day never came to pass. Instead, over the follow- ing three decades this Court denied “watershed” status to one rule after another. Rules guaranteeing individuals the right to confront their accusers. Rules ensuring that only a jury may decide a defendant’s fate in a death penalty case. Rules preventing racially motivated jury selection. All failed to win retroactive application. Today, the Court can- didly admits what has been long apparent: Teague held out a “false hope” and the time has come to close its door. Ante , at 15. We take this step not because this Court’s criminal procedure rulings are somehow unimportant. Any decision seeking to enforce liberties enshrined in the Constitution has a claim to “watershed” importance. Instead, we aban- don ’s test because it poses a question this Court has no business asking.
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
I
Though we often refer to
the
writ of habeas corpus, the
common law knew several. See
Ex parte Bollman
,
Among them all, however, only one came to be known as “The Great Writ.” The writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien- dum was a mechanism for asking “ why the liberty of [a] subject[ ] is restrained.” Id. , at 131 (emphasis added). Leading up to the English Civil War, monarchs sometimes jailed their subjects summarily and indefinitely, with little explanation and even less process. E.g. , Darnel’s Case , 3 How. St. Tr. 1–59 (K. B. 1627). In response, common law courts developed the ad subjiciendum writ to force the Crown to provide reasons for its actions and, if necessary, to ensure adequate process—like a criminal trial—to justify any further detention. See Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1, ch. 1, ¶¶ 5, 8 (1628). In other words, “habeas corpus [w]as the instrument by which due process could be insisted upon.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U. S. 507, 555 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Great though it was, the writ’s power was never limitless. A prisoner confined under a final judgment of conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction stood on different footing than one confined by the King without trial. A court might issue the writ asking, “What is the reason for confinement?”
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
But if the return came back: “Because he’s serving a custo- dial sentence after being convicted of a crime,” the inquiry was usually at an end. See Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus , Wilm. 77, 88, 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 36 (K. B. 1758); cf. Anonymus , Cart. 221, 124 Eng. Rep. 928 (C. P. 1671); Ha- beas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, ¶¶ 2, 20. Custody pursuant to a final judgment was proof that a defendant had received the process due to him. See, e.g. , Bushell’s Case , Vaugh. 135, 142–143, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009–1010 (C. P. 1670).
In 1789, Congress authorized federal courts to issue the habeas writ. 1 Cong. ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82; Ex parte Bollman , 8 U. S. (4 Cranch), at 93–94. When called upon to interpret that statute, this Court defined the scope of ha- beas review by looking “to the common law.” Id. , at 93–94. Unsurprisingly, it proceeded to restate the longstanding rule associated with criminal judgments: Ad subjiciendum provided no recourse for a prisoner confined pursuant to a final judgment of conviction. Ex parte Watkins , 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193, 209 (1830). As Chief Justice Marshall rhetori- cally asked, “is not that judgment in itself sufficient cause?” Id. , at 202 (emphasis added).
If the answer was nearly always yes, one important ex- ception existed both here and in England. A habeas court could grant relief if the court of conviction lacked jurisdic- tion over the defendant or his offense. Id. , at 202–203. Still, the exception was “confined” to that “limited class of cases.” Ex parte Parks , 93 U. S. (3 Otto) 18, 21 (1876). One judge could not grant relief just because he might have decided the merits of the case differently than another had. As this Court put it, a perceived “error in the judgment or proceed- ings, under and by virtue of which the party is imprisoned, constitute[d] no ground for” relief. Ex parte Siebold , 100 U. S. (10 Otto) 371, 375 (1880). Any other approach, the Court explained, risked converting the habeas writ into “a mere writ of error,” little more than a chance to redo a trial
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
or its appeal. Ibid.
Originally, Congress allowed federal courts to issue ha-
beas writs only to federal custodians. Reconstruction
changed that. After the Civil War, Congress granted fed-
eral courts the power to issue habeas writs to state author-
ities as well. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 39 Cong. ch. 28, § 1,
14 Stat. 385, 385.
[1]
Even then, however, this Court contin-
ued to interpret the habeas statute consistent with histori-
cal praсtice. If a prisoner was in custody pursuant to a final
state court judgment, a federal court was powerless to re-
visit those proceedings unless the state court had acted
without jurisdiction.
E.g., In re Graham
,
Under the view that prevailed in this country for most of our history, and in England for even longer, ’s ques- tion about the “retroactive” application of “watershed” rules of criminal procedure to undo final criminal judgments would have made no sense. Because a final judgment of conviction, pursuant to a full-fledged criminal trial, was the process due to a criminal serving a custodial sentence, the habeas writ had served its purpose. A final judgment evi- denced a lawful basis for confinement and was “binding on all the world.” Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.), at 207.
[1] That Act conferred on federal courts the “power to grant writs of ha- beas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of” federal law. Ibid. (emphasis added). Two earlier statutes extended federal habeas jurisdiction to state custodians, but only for a much narrower class of cases. In 1833, Congress authorized federal courts to issue habeas process to state custodians detaining fed- eral officers for acts taken to implement federal law. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, 22 Cong. ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634–635. This provision lives on in 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(2). And in 1842, Congress permitted federal courts to issue habeas process to state custodians detaining foreign officials whose acts implicated the law of nations. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, 27 Cong. ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, 539. It, too, lives on in 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(4).
G ORSUCH , J., concurring II Only in the middle of the twentieth century did things really begin to change. In 1915, this Court suggested that a state court’s extreme departure from “established modes” of criminal trial practice, such as proceeding under the specter of mob violence, might be akin to the loss of “juris- diction,” at least if no corrective mechanism like an appeal existеd. Frank v. Mangum , 237 U. S. 309, 326, 335–336 (1915). But if that represented an innovation, it was a mod- est one.
The same cannot be said for
Brown
v.
Allen
, 344 U. S.
443, 464, 478 (1953). There, this Court effectively recast
habeas as another way for federal courts to redress practi-
cally any error of federal law they might find in state court
proceedings. Never mind that state courts are obligated to
follow federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Never
mind that those courts may have already passed on a de-
fendant’s argument about his federal rights. See
id.
, at 487;
id.
, at 497–501 (Frankfurter, J.). Never mind, too, that the
defendant may have lost on appeal within the state court
system, and even petitioned this Court for direct review.
See
id.
, at 456–457;
id.
, at 489–497 (Frankfurter, J.). Eve-
ryone accepts that, in our criminal justice system today, a
judgment becomes final only after the completion of a trial
and the appellate process, including the opportunity to seek
certiorari from this Court on questions of federal law. See
Clay
v.
United States
,
[2] When a sovereign furnishes an opportunity to appeal (as state and federal governments now do), it necessarily invites an appellate court to revisit an initial merits determination. See J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 148–153 (5th ed. 2019) (describing development of the appeal at common law); G. Jacob, A New Law-Dictionary (1729) (de- fining “appeal”). Under an appellate system, then, “[n]one of the[ ] [pre- ceding decisions] are final” in an ultimate sense until any appeals are concluded. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 411 (1768).
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
after all that,
Brown
held, a federal district court could
still
vacate a final state court judgment based on any perceived
error of federal law it might detect—and do so though the
entire state judicial system and this Court had seen nothing
amiss.
The result? As Justice Jackson warned, habeas became little more than an ordinary appeal with an extraordinary Latin name. The Court “so departed from [the finality] principle that the profession now believes that the issues [federal courts] actually consider [in] habeas corpus are substantially the same as would be considered on appeal.” Id. , at 540 (Jackson, J., concurring in result). “The fatal sentence that in real life writes finis to many causes”— Judgment affirmed. or Certiorari denied. —became “in legal theory . . . a complete blank.” Id. , at 543. Justice Jackson feared that this result not only “trivializ[ed] . . . the writ,” but promised practical problems too. Id. , at 536. A large new “haystack” of frivolous habeas petitions was sure to fol- low, making it that much harder for courts to identify the meritorious “needle.” Id. , at 537. The only solution Justice Jackson could see was to hold fast to the traditional rule: A final judgment, after completion of trial and the exhaustion of any direct appellate review, was res judicata , and the sole exception was a lack of jurisdiction. Id. , at 543–544.
Brown
not only upended centuries of settled precedent
and invited practical problems; it produced anomalies as
well. The very same term it decided
Brown
, this Court
re-
jected Brown
’s fix-any-error approach for final judgments
issued by military courts.
Burns
v.
Wilson
,
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
having their final judgments reopened. So federal courts
wound up with more power to reopen the judgments of a
different sovereign’s courts than the administrative pro-
ceedings of the federal government itself. See
Rushing
v.
Wilkinson
,
With time, these implications became clear and, as Jus-
tice Jackson predicted,
Brown
’s innovation proved unsus-
tainable. The haystack just grew too large. During the
1960s, this Court incorporated the exclusionary rule
against the States.
Mapp
v.
Ohio
,
For years, this Court struggled to devise rules for sorting
the hay from the needles. Its approach varied wildly and
inconsistently over time. In a few cases, the Court held a
new rule of criminal procedure should not apply retroac-
tively to settled convictions.
Tehan United States ex. rel.
Shott
, 382 U. S. 406, 409, n. 3, 419 (1966);
Linkletter
v.
Walker
,
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
results “an extraordinary collection of rules.” Desist v. United States , 394 U. S. 244, 256–257 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He even wondered whether they could “properly be considered the legitimate products of a court of law.” Id. , at 259.
III
It was only in this world that ’s question about the
retroactive application of new “watershed” rules of criminal
procedure could even begin to make sense. In an effort to
bring some coherence to the area, the Court refocused its
attention on the terms of the federal habeas statute. The
statute provides that “writs of habeas corpus
may
be
granted”—not that they
must
be granted. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2241(a) (emphasis added); see also
id.
§ 2243. The law
thus invests federal courts with equitable discretion to de-
cide whether to issue the writ or to provide a remedy.
Withrow
v.
Williams
,
Exercising this remedial discretion, the Court began to
develop doctrines aimed at returning the Great Writ closer
to its historic office. It decided that some claims are not
cognizable on federal habeas review if state courts provide
a mechanism for review.
Stone
v.
Powell
, 428 U. S. 465,
494–495 (1976). It established procedural default rules to
prevent habeas petitioners from evading independent and
adequate state law grounds for sustaining their convictions.
Wainwright Sykes
,
[3] That is how this Court reads nearly identical text in the Declaratory
Judgment Act (DJA). Because the DJA says federal courts “ ‘
may
declare
the rights and other legal relations of any interested party,’ ” district
courts “possess discretion” to award declaratory relief.
Wilton Seven
Falls Co.
,
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
it applied abuse-of-the-writ rules to prevent an endless cy-
cle of petition and re-petition by prisoners with nothing but
time on their hands.
McCleskey Zant
,
Chief among these new-but-old developments was
Teague
. Drawing on the historic role of habeas, the Court
held that newly recognized rules of criminal procedure
should not normally apply to cases “which have become fi-
nal.”
[4] Although the lead opinion in
Teague
garnered only a plurality, a ma-
jority of the Court adopted the plurality’s rule later that same year in
Penry Lynaugh
,
[5] Apparently believing our judge-made doctrines did not go far enough,
Congress added further “new restrictions” of its own in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
Felker
v.
Turpin
, 518
U. S. 651, 664 (1996). But AEDPA creates only additional conditions to
relief; it did not do away with the discretion afforded courts in the habeas
statute, or the various rules this Court has formulated in the exercise of
that discretion. As this Court has (unanimously) explained, “AEDPA did
not codify
Teague
” and the one “neither abrogates [n]or qualifies the
other.”
Greene
v.
Fisher
,
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
IV
While
Teague
did much to return the writ to its original
station, it didn’t quite complete the journey. After insisting
that final judgments cannot be reopened as a “general rule,”
Teague
left some wiggle room. It added that some new rules
of criminal procedure might yet apply retroactively if they
had “watershed” significance.
But all these words have yielded nothing. In more than
three decades since
Teague
, not a single new rule of crimi-
nal procedure has satisfied its “watershed” test.
Ante
, at
10–15. Nor is it as if we have lacked promising candidates.
an
additional
reason why the Fifth Circuit correctly denied a certificate
of appealability here.
Ante,
at 5 (concurring opinion); see
Miller-El
v.
Cockrell
,
[6]
Teague
also discussed an exception to the finality rule for certain
“substantive rules.” Because the parties agree that involved only
a new rule of criminal procedure, little need be said about
Teague
’s “sub-
stantive rule” exception. But it is worth noting that substantive rules,
which place certain conduct “ ‘beyond the power of the criminal law-mak-
ing authority to prescribe,’ ”
id.
, at 307, bear at least some resemblance
to this Court’s early cases finding a lack of jurisdiction over a defendant
or an offense. See
Ex parte Siebold
, 100 U. S. (10 Otto), at 376;
Ex parte
Parks
, 93 U. S. (3 Otto), at 20–21. Perhaps this aspect of can be
understood as accurately invoking the jurisdictional exception to the fi-
nality rule; perhaps not. See
Brown
,
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
This Court has refused “watershed” status to new rules that
seek to еnsure death penalty decisions are made by jurors
rather than judges. See
Schriro
v.
Summerlin
, 542 U. S.
348 (2004) (denying watershed status to
Ring
v.
Arizona
,
The Court’s decision today retraces this familiar path. It denies “watershed” status to Ramos v. Louisiana , 590 U. S. ___ (2020), a decision that (like Crawford ) returned us to the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment—and one that (like Ring and Batson ) concerns a vital aspect of the jury trial right. The Court explains why this result neces- sarily follows from our post- Teague precedents: If so many other highly consequential rulings have failed to clear Teague ’s bar, it’s hard to see how Ramos might. One could even say that any other result would defy this Court’s re- cent precedents. Ante , at 14.
At the same time, though, one might also say these prec- edents illustrate how mystifying the whole Teague project has been from its inception. If Teague only prohibits the retroactive application of new rules of criminal procedure, after all, it’s not exactly obvious why that prohibition ap- plies to cases like Crawford or . Both decisions sought to realign this Court’s decisions with the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment; in that sense, the rights they recognized were anything but new. And to the extent asks whether a new rule is “fundamental” or “bed- rock,” it’s hard to see how rights originally memorialized in
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
the Constitution could fail to qualify. Certainly, this Court
is in no position to second-guess the judgment of those who
wrote and ratified the Constitution. Surely, too, many of
the other rules of criminal procedure this Court has found
less than “fundamental” since
Teague
seem anything but
that to those whose lives they affect. Nor is it only ’s
results that mystify. The test itself has been fraught with
contradictions from the start. It asks litigants to be on the
lookout for new procedural protections “ ‘implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.’ ”
Beard Banks
,
For me, it’s here where the history canvassed above mat- ters. This Court’s (in)activity since Teague only begins to make sense when viewed against the backdrop of the tradi- tional rule that old judgments are impervious to new chal- lenges. Yes, this Court’s decisions should apply to all cases pending in trial courts and on direct appeal. But they should not apply retroactively in habeas. The reason has nothing to do with whether Members of this Court happen to think the rules they announce are “new” in some sense or insufficiently “fundamental” in another. It’s simpler than that: The writ of habeas corpus does not authorize federal courts to reopen a judgment issued by a court of competent of jurisdiction once it has become final. Supra , at 2–4.
It’s here, too, where today’s decision makes its real con- tribution. If Teague pointed us back in the direction of the traditional rule, each of the cases that has followed in its wake has edged us, step-by-step, closer still. Today’s deci- sion advances the progress by making express what has long been barely implicit: The “watershed” exception for new rules of criminal procedure is no exception at all. Ante , at 15. Not only does this development do much to honor the traditional understanding of habeas review and the great *43 13
G ORSUCH , J., concurring
weight of this Court’s precedents throughout its history. It also allows us to retire a test that was unknown in law until 1989 and whose contours remain unknowable decades later. It frees this Court from the dreary task of needing to concoct reasons to denigrate the importance of obviously important rules like those discussed in , Ring , Bat- son , and Crawford , which affect the lives and liberty of countless individuals. It does away with the strange busi- ness of having to repackage old rules as new ones. And it eliminates the need for litigants and lower courts to endure years of protracted litigation—tangling with a contradic- tory test and seemingly inexplicable precedents—all sure to achieve nothing. The Court’s candor tоday is admirable— and correct.
With these observations, I am pleased to join the Court’s
opinion. My vote in similar cases to come will, I hope, “be
guided as nearly as [possible] by the principles set forth
herein.”
Brown
,
[7] The dissent criticizes today’s decision as a departure from modern ha- beas precedent. Post , at 2; post , at 3, n. 2; post , at 12–13. But the dis- sent’s history is selective. The dissent champions decisions from the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s. But it disregards how those decisions departed from a century of this Court’s precedents and the common law before that. Supra , at 5–8. At the same time, the dissent’s account overlooks this Court’s precedents refusing to afford retroactive application in every case since the 1980s. Post , at 10–11; post , at 12, n. 7. The dissent may prefer decisions within a particular 30-year window. But it is too much to say this preference is required to “[r]espect[ ] stare decisis .” Post , at 1, n. 1.
K AGAN , J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________ No. 19–5807 _________________ THEDRICK EDWARDS, PETITIONER v. DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 2021]
J USTICE K AGAN , with whom J USTICE B REYER and J USTICE S OTOMAYOR join, dissenting.
“A verdict, taken from eleven, [i]s no verdict at all,” this Court proclaimed just last Term. Ramos v. Louisiana , 590 U. S. ___, ___ − ___ (2020) (slip op., at 4–5) (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Citing centuries of history, the Court in Ramos termed the Sixth Amendment right to a unani- mous jury “vital,” “essential,” “indispensable,” and “funda- mental” to the American legal system. Id. , at ___, ___, ___ (slip op., at 4, 6, 7). The Court therefore saw fit to disregard stare decisis and overturn a 50-year-old precedent enabling States to convict criminal defendants based on non-unani- mous verdicts. [1] And in taking that weighty step, the Court also vindicated core principles of racial justice. For in the Court’s view, the state laws countenancing non-unanimous verdicts originated in white supremacism and continued in our own time to have racially discriminatory effects. See id. , at ___ − ___ (slip op., at 2–3); id. , at ___ (S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 4); id. , at ___ − ___
[1] I dissented in
Ramos
precisely because of its abandonment of
stare
decisis
. See
K AGAN , J., dissenting
(K AVANAUGH , J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 12–15). Put all that together, and it is easy to see why the opinions in Ramos read as historic. Rarely does this Court make such a fundamental change in the rules thought necessary to ensure fair criminal process. If you were scanning a the- saurus for a single word to describe the decision, you would stop when you came to “watershed.”
Yet the Court insists that ’s holding does not count as a “watershed” procedural rule under Teague v. Lane , 489 U. S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion). The result of to- day’s ruling is easily stated . Ramos will not apply retroac- tively, meaning that a prisoner whose appeals ran out be- fore the decision can receive no aid from the change in law it made. So Thedrick Edwards, unlike Evangelisto Ramos, will serve the rest of his life in prison based on a 10-to-2 jury verdict. Only the reasoning of today’s holding resists explanation. The majority cannot (and indeed does not) deny, given all Ramos said, that the jury unanimity re- quirement fits to a tee Teague ’s description of a watershed procedural rule. Nor can the majority explain its result by relying on precedent. Although flaunting decisions since Teague that held rules non-retroactive, the majority comes up with none comparable to this case. Search high and low the settled law of retroactivity, and the majority still has no reason to deny Ramos watershed status.
So everything rests on the majority’s last move—the over- turning of Teague ’s watershed exception. If there can never be any watershed rules—as the majority here asserts out of the blue—then, yes, jury unanimity cannot be one. The re- sult follows trippingly from the premise. But adopting the premise requires departing from judicial practice and prin- ciple. In overruling a critical aspect of , the majority follows none of the usual rules of stare decisis . It discards precedent without a party requesting that action. And it does so with barely a reason given, much less the “special justification” our law demands. Halliburton Co. Erica P. *46 3
K AGAN , J., dissenting
John Fund, Inc.
,
I
Start with what
Teague
and its progeny repeatedly said
about what makes a new rule of criminal procedure “water-
shed” (so that, before today, the rule applied retroactively). A watershed rule, we held, is “implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.”
Teague
,
[2] Prior to , the Court gave retroactive effect to a somewhat wider range of new procedural rules. See ante , at 13, n. 5; Danforth Minne- sota , 552 U. S. 264, 271–273 (2008). To find the no-retroactivity-ever rule that the majority announces today, a time traveler would have to go back to around 1950—when the Bill of Rights’ protections for criminal defendants did not even apply to the States. See ibid .
4
K AGAN , J., dissenting
rules” needed to fairly adjudicate a defendant’s guilt.
Beard
,
The first clue that the unanimity rule falls within
’s small core is that the Court thought its adoption
justified overturning precedent.
Ramos
didn’t just an-
nounce a new rule. It reversed a prior, well-settled one. As
the majority recounts, “
Ramos
repudiated this Court’s 1972
decision in
Apodaca
v.
Oregon
, 406 U. S. 404, which had
allowed non-unanimous juries in state criminal trials.”
Ante
, at 1. Such a toppling of precedent needs a special
justification—more than a run-of-the-mill claim of error. To
meet that demand, the
Ramos
majority described
Apodaca
as flouting the essential “meaning of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s jury trial right,” as revealed in both historical prac-
tice and judicial decisions.
[3] The majority misunderstands my point about the interaction between
K AGAN , J., dissenting
And putting talk of
stare decisis
aside, there remains
much more in
Ramos
to echo
Teague
. If, as today’s majority
says,
Teague
is full of “adjectives,”
ante
, at 10, so too is
Ra-
mos
—and mostly the same ones. Jury unanimity, the
Court pronounced, is an “essential element[ ]” of the jury
trial right, and thus is “fundamental to the American
scheme of justice.”
K AGAN , J., dissenting
the Founding: To obtain a conviction, “unanimity in the ver- dict of the jury is indispensable.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 6).
If a rule so understood isn’t a watershed one, then noth-
ing is. (And that is, of course, what the majority eventually
says.) Once more, from the quotations just above: “funda-
mental,” “essential,” “vital,” “indispensable.” No wonder to-
day’s majority declares a new-found aversion to “adjec-
tives”—or, as a concurring opinion says, “all these words.”
Ante
, at 10;
ante
, at 10 (G ORSUCH , J., concurring). The una-
nimity rule, as
Ramos
described it, is as “bedrock” as bed-
rock comes. ,
Twice before, this Court retroactively applied rules that
are similarly integral to jury verdicts. First, in
Ivan V.
v.
City of New York
,
K AGAN , J., dissenting
Winship
retroactive, highlighting the reasonable-doubt
standard’s “indispensable” role in “reducing the risk” of
wrongful convictions. 407 U. S., at 204–205. Second, in
Brown
v.
Louisiana
,
[4] The majority argues that
Ivan V.
and
Brown
applied these new rules
only to cases on direct appeal. See
ante
, at 13, n. 5. But that isn’t right.
Although
Ivan V.
itself involved a direct appeal, the Court has made clear
that the “complete retroactive effect”
Ivan V.
gave
Winship
included
cases in habeas. See,
e.g.
,
United States Johnson
,
K AGAN , J., dissenting
And something still more supports retroactivity here, for
the opinions in
Ramos
(unlike in
Winship
or
Burch
) relied
on a strong claim about racial injustice. The Court detailed
the origins of Louisiana’s and Oregon’s non-unanimity
rules, locating them (respectively) in a convention to “estab-
lish the supremacy of the white race” and “the rise of the
Ku Klux Klan.”
II
The majority argues in reply that the jury unanimity rule defendant’s guilt. *52 9
K AGAN , J., dissenting
is not so fundamental because . . . . Well, no, scratch that. Actually, the majority doesn’t contest anything I’ve said about the foundations and functions of the unanimity re- quirement. Nor could the majority reasonably do so. For everything I’ve said about the unanimity rule comes straight out of Ramos ’s majority and concurring opinions. Just check the citations: I’ve added barely a word to what those opinions (often with soaring rhetoric) proclaim. Start with history. The ancient foundations of the unanimous jury rule? Check. The inclusion of that rule in the Sixth Amendment’s original meaning? Check. Now go to func- tion. The fundamental (or bedrock or central) role of the unanimous jury in the American system of criminal justice? Check. The way unanimity figures in ensuring fairness in criminal trials and protecting against wrongful guilty ver- dicts? Check. The link between those purposes and safe- guarding the jury system from (past and present) racial prejudice? Check. In sum: As to every feature of the una- nimity rule conceivably relevant to watershed status, Ra- mos has already given the answer—check, check, check— and today’s majority can say nothing to the contrary.
[5] The majority does try to say that the plurality opinion in Ramos none- theless “plainly foreshadowed today’s decision” by noting that ’s watershed test was “demanding by design,” in recognition of the States’ reliance interests. Ante , at 16–17 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ante , at 17–19 (repeating the assertion twice more). But the Ramos plurality’s description of the watershed test was nothing more than objective fact: Yes, the watershed test was purposefully demanding. As to whether the watershed test was so demanding as to exclude the jury unanimity rule, here is what the plurality had to say: “Whether the right to jury unanimity applies to cases on collateral review is a question for a future case where the parties will have a chance to brief the issue and we will benefit from their adversarial presentation.” , 590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24). Not a lot of “plain[ ] foreshadow[ing]” there. Only a fair bit of wisdom about how to resolve legal issues—which, as I’ll later discuss, the majority could usefully have considered before overrul- ing the watershed exception. See infra , at 13.
K AGAN , J., dissenting
Instead, the majority relies on decisions holding non-ret- roactive various other—even though dissimilar—proce- dural rules. In making that argument from past practice, the majority adopts two discrete tactics. Call the first “throw everything against the wall.” Call the second “slice and dice.” Neither can avail to render the jury unanimity rule anything less than what Ramos thought it—as the ma- jority concedes, “momentous.” Ante , at 14.
As its first move, the majority lists as many decisions
holding rules non-retroactive as it can muster. See
ante
, at
11–12 (reviewing a “long line of cases”). The premise here
is that sheer volume matters: The majority presents the
catalog as if every rule is as important as every other and
as if comparing any to the unanimity requirement is beside
the point. But that idea founders on this Court’s constant
refrain that watershed rules are only a small subset of pro-
cedural rules. See,
e.g.
,
Graham
v.
Collins
,
K AGAN , J., dissenting
Enter the majority’s second stratagem, which tries to con-
quer by dividing. Here, the majority picks out “three as-
pects of
Ramos
” pointing toward watershed status, and
names one prior decision to match each of the three.
Ante
,
at 12. So in addressing the unanimity rule’s “significance,”
the majority notes that the Court once held the jury-trial
right non-retroactive.
Ante
, at 12–13 (citing
DeStefano
v.
Woods
,
What the majority doesn’t find—or even pretend to—is any decision corresponding to Ramos on all of those dimen- sions. Take just a pair of examples. The Court has never suggested that requiring a bench trial has race-based pur- poses or effects. See DeStefano , 392 U. S., at 633–635.
[6] Even on the metric of significance alone, the Court has not previously
ranked the jury-unanimity and jury-trial rights as today’s majority does.
As earlier noted, the Court in
Brown
found a unanimity rule retroactive
despite its earlier holding that the jury-trial right was not. See
supra
, at
6–7. The Court explained that the accuracy and fairness concerns raised
by divided juries—where, by definition, at least one person retains rea-
sonable doubt—exceed those arising from judicial verdicts. See
Brown
,
K AGAN , J., dissenting
Similarly, the Court thought its new rule on hearsay evi-
dence of less than towering import: Calling the rule “limited
in scope,” we doubted that it would have any effect on the
“accuracy of factfinding.”
Whorton
,
So the majority is left to overrule Teague ’s holding on wa- tershed rules. [7] On the last page or so of its merits discus- sion (before it turns to pre-butting this dissent), the major- ity eliminates the watershed exception, declaring it “long past time” to do so. Ante , at 15. Teague had said there would not be “many” (retroactive) watershed rules. 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). The majority now says there will be none at all. If that is so, of course, jury una- nimity cannot be watershed. Finally, the majority offers an
[7] In describing the majority as overruling
Teague
, I do not mean it over-
rules only . That decision doesn’t stand alone in stating the wa-
tershed exception as governing law. As I count, the Court has recited the
exception 17 more times before today. See
Montgomery
v.
Louisiana
, 577
U. S. 190, 198 (2016);
Welch
v.
United States
,
K AGAN , J., dissenting
intelligible reason for declining to apply Ramos retroac- tively.
But in taking that road, the majority breaks a core judi-
cial rule: respect for precedent.
Stare decisis
is a foundation
stone of the rule of law, “promot[ing] the evenhanded, pre-
dictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fos-
ter[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”
Payne
v.
Tennessee
,
To begin with, no one here asked us to overrule .
This Court usually confines itself to the issues raised and
briefed by the parties. See,
e.g
.,
United States Sineneng-
Smith
,
Equally striking, the majority gives only the sketchiest of
K AGAN , J., dissenting
reasons for reversing
Teague
’s watershed exception. In de-
ciding whether to depart from precedent, the Court usually
considers—and usually at length—a familiar set of factors
capable of providing the needed special justification. See,
e.g.
,
Knick
v.
Township of Scott
, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019)
(slip op., at 20) (listing such considerations). The majority
can’t be bothered with that customary, and disciplining,
practice; it barely goes through the motions. Seldom has
this Court so casually, so off-handedly, tossed aside prece-
dent. In its page of analysis, the majority offers just one
ground for its decision—that since
Teague
, the Court has
not identified a new rule as watershed, and so “the pur-
ported exception has become an empty promise.”
Ante
, at
15. But even viewed in the abstract, that argument does
not fly. That the Court has not found a watershed rule since
Teague
does not mean it could or would not in the future.
Teague
itself understood that point: It saw value in the wa-
tershed exception even while recognizing that watershed
rules would be few and far between.
In choosing otherwise, the majority imposes a steep price for overruling Apodaca in Ramos . Taking with one hand what it gave with the other, the Court curtails ’s ef- fects by expunging ’s provision for watershed rules. And so too the Court limits the consequences of any simi- larly fundamental change in criminal procedure that may emerge in the future. For the first time in many decades *58 15
K AGAN , J., dissenting
(since long before Teague , see supra , at 3, n. 2), those con- victed under rules found not to produce fair and reliable verdicts will be left without recourse in federal courts.
I would not discard ’s watershed exception and so keep those unfairly convicted people from getting new tri- als. Instead, I would accept the consequences of last Term’s holding in Ramos . A decision like that comes with a prom- ise, or at any rate should. If the right to a unanimous jury is so fundamental—if a verdict rendered by a divided jury is “no verdict at all”—then Thedrick Edwards should not spend his life behind bars over two jurors’ opposition. I re- spectfully dissent.
[8] The majority’s final claim is that it is properly immune from this crit- icism—that I cannot “turn around and impugn” its ruling—because “criminal defendants as a group are better off under Ramos and today’s decision, taken together, than they would have been if [my] dissenting view had prevailed in .” Ante , at 19. The suggestion is surprising. It treats judging as scorekeeping—and more, as scorekeeping about how much our decisions, or the aggregate of them, benefit a particular kind of party. I see the matter differently. Judges should take cases one at a time, and do their best in each to apply the relevant legal rules. And when judges err, others should point out where they went astray. No one gets to bank capital for future cases; no one’s past decisions insulate them from criticism. The focus always is, or should be, getting the case before us right.