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Edwards v. United States
766 A.2d 981
D.C.
2001
Check Treatment

*2 9, 1996, was sen- Edwards On October Before SCHWELB and prison term an aggregate tenced to serve WASHINGTON, Judges, Associate Novem- forty-five years. of fifteen to On PRYOR, Judge. Senior 12, 1997, after year ber more than one PER CURIAM: filed a imposed, sentence was vacate On June motion to Timothy appeals G. from an order a written issued denying hearing order without a with- which he denied motion vacate his guilty plea. motion to hearing. appeal This followed. out convictions, that we set aside con- asks tending that the time of his government’s proffer. B. The resulting from a suffered mental defect prose- damage, colloquy, not under- During from brain that he did Rule morning proffered early the nature and of his that in the stand cutor complaining a brain that the injury, due to hours of October witness, prostitute flawed initials are plea proceeding fundamentally whose K.W.,2 area of plying he did not the benefit of her trade because offer, government's they entered their 1. The offer to Edwards its This was “wired” to offer to James. pleas during proceeding. the same that the offer each defendant means acceptance by conditioned on the both defen- case, light we think it of the nature of the disposi- government’s proffered dants of the identify complainant name. best not to accepted tion. In this both defendants Streets, 13th and L police N.W. when she was and a woman known to approached by appellant prostitute who passenger seat. The driving a black Ford Mustang. Ac- opened Mustang officers the trunk of the cording prosecutor, of- lying and discovered Mr. James it. The pay fered to in exchange K.W. for a police $50 recovered from the trunk a silver *3 car, sexual act. K.W. entered the and which, K.W., handgun according to resem- Edwards drove her to an alley the rear weapon bled the brandished a nearby department store. Edwards previous night. on the identified K.W. “pulled then a handgun, put silver it in the Edwards and James as the men who had it, victim’s face and clicked ask[ed] raped K.W., According and robbed her. her money.” K.W. handed Edwards $450 Edwards was the driver of the car and in cash. James was the individual who had been hiding in the trunk. prosecutor

The represented further “popped” Edwards then the trunk release C. The colloquy. Rule 11 Mustang,

of the and that Edwards’ co- defendant, James, Gregory S. emerged The trial judge accepted pleas from the trunk. Edwards and James or- Edwards and James a following lengthy dered K.W. into the back seat of the vehi- hearing.4 During the colloquy, Edwards cle, blanket, covered her with a and drove stated, alia, inter that he understood the alley to an Capitol Upon Hill. reaching charges pleading to which he was guilty, as destination, their the two men forced well as to the maximum and mandatory K.W., will, against her to have oral and offenses; minimum penalties for these vaginal sex with each of them. Edwards pleading guilty to these offenses of watch, and James also stole K.W .’s rings, will; his own free that he understood that purse and coat. The men then told K.W. up trial, he was giving right to a well as bushes,3 to hide in nearby some they as the rights that he would have at a trial drove off. right appeal and the a finding guilt;

Following the robbery rape, K.W. attorney; he was satisfied with his Streets, returned to the area of L 13th and and that questions there were no that he N.W. proceeded She then hospital to a wished to judge. prosecutor ask the The Alexandria, located in Virginia where she then described the evidence reported that raped she had been B, supra, as set forth Part I but the requested medical attention. did K.W. not proceedings ran difficulty into some when police contact the until following night, asked Edwards whether he under the somewhat fortuitous circum- agreed prosecutor’s proffer: with the stances set forth below. Edwards, THE Okay. COURT: Mr. is prosecutor proffered in the happened? that what early morning hours of October DEFENDANT I EDWARDS: didn’t twenty-four some hours after her initial car, handgun your have no in the Honor. James, encounter with Edwards and K.W. didn’t, I I handgun didn’t hold no to her Streets, inwas the area of 13th L head. It wasn’t even like that. again N.W. when she saw driving THE you COURT: Did force her to Mustang. the black At point, K.W. you? have sex with reported sighting police, and the No, officers soon located the vehicle a near- DEFENDANT EDWARDS: I by alley. Edwards was the driver’s seat her. emphatic transcript plea proceedings James made this order even more 4. The by showing handgun K.W. a second and re- twenty-eight pages long. this, marking: get "See back in the bushes.” Well, spite affirmative Mr. of Edwards’ one-word

THE COURT: “this act” question answer to the whether I’ve indicated— stated, prosecutor occurred as DEFENDANT Excuse EDWARDS: immediately apparent became that Ed- no, get wrong, me. I mean don’t me she really prose- agree with the had sex me. cutor’s account: attempted explain then weap- you possess THE Did COURT: could not Mr. that he on? if he degree to first sexual abuse No, EDWARDS: DEFENDANT innocent: weapon. didn’t hold you, THE I indicated to Mr. COURT: weapon you THE Did COURT: up something Edwards —let me clear it, she where, could where where she see *4 I you you plead guilty. before Now it? aware of plead care you guilty don’t whether or Yes. EDWARDS: DEFENDANT not, But, up to but in to you. it’s order as we have prosecutor proffered, had guilty, a has to forced plead person seen, handgun in put a Edwards that him person to or to have have sex it, face, mon- and demanded K.W.’s clicked threatened her. weapon some- ey, not was a that there you if guilty would You not be view.5 where within KW.’s not be guilty her for sex. You would whether, asked Edwards was not While abuse, I and degree first sexual couldn’t version prosecutor’s by agreeing that the be you guilty. punish- find That would accurate, previ- his retracting he was person. an I couldn’t let ing innocent account, give did exculpatory ous crime you plead guilty you to a that to withdraw opportunity final Edwards a commit. didn’t that, if he him and warned guilty plea his no in way anybody There’s this room he wished forward with go to you can know whether committed it back to permitted “tak[e] would not be except you if don’t crime responded “yes sir.” later.” Edwards —and have to guilty, jury will decide accepted Edwards’ then you only or not. But the degree whether did first and Edwards found I if way you guilty you could find sexual abuse and PFCV. you guilty. that

stated were don’t D. withdraw Edwards’ motion to know what happened. explained you THE I’ve COURT: As attorney, On a new November it at the of this what means beginning by parents, retained for Mr. Edwards you you guilty, be I asked whether to with- filed a on Edward’s behalf motion you prepared were to admit were motion plea. The draw client’s you yes. guilty and told me on an evalu- part in substantial based you Now are able to admit that this Levin, Ph. by ation of Edwards Bronson prosecutor] act occurred as de- [the D., psychologist. In his evalua- clinical words, it happen scribed? other that he was report, tion Dr. Levin related way? in by November told Yes, Your DEFENDANT EDWARDS: dam- substantial brain Edwards suffered Honor. beating an age alleged as a result of They THE did? COURT: car police high-speed which followed a in injuries resulted chase.6 Edwards’ DEFENDANT EDWARDS: Yes. note, however, description of 6. Dr. related that Edwards did not Levin Edwards' 5. We its conse- this and commented event plead guilty robbery. quences: in changes cognitive reported “marked both his Dr. Levin further that Ed- emotional functioning” significantly deny aspects wards had continued to some memory. affected his concentration and he had offense which entered Levin, According to Dr. guilty, and that he had reiterated names, remembering including “trouble only his claim of at the innocence not very dog.” familiar names like that of his hearing, sentencing but also at Dr. Levin administered a number of tests pre-sentence statement to the writer of the IQ which revealed that Edwards’ was 76 (PSI).8 Levin, report According to Dr. (in population),7 the bottom 5% of the post-concussive Edwards was “still phase injury of his when he was involved [h]is scores two areas were in deciding plead guilty whether or not to bottom 2% and similar to a retarded charges.” reported to these expression level. impair- Verbal showed that, injury, Dr. Levin since the “he loses ability ment in blocked express ideas meaning track of the if conversations (“I it, apparently knew know but (‘It they complicated. become don’t com- out.”). put I can’t Spelling ability is before’).” prehend to me like only equal grade to a third student. On psychologist further told the that at the a test is sensitive to the effects of hearings, he was unable to sustain brain-injury (Trial-Making), he showed *5 his process attention to the because “[a]t disruption both mild ability to follow a first, just I good.... gave sounded Then pattern impairment and moderate in up thought hopefully somebody will ability to shift sequences, showing diffi- explain Finally, this to me later on.” after culty in concentrating circumstances noting that attorney plea, at the that following involve more than one Dyson, Esquire, apparently Thomas idea at a time.... These results are helpful been less than in specific explaining rele- impairment to brain and are not client,9 depression procedures due to vant being and issues to his incarcerat- ed. Dr. Levin concluded as follows: driving girlfriend’s was gun [Edwards] his car I didn’t click a at her We head. approached by plainclothed when he was police got upset her. She and wanted more mon- says identify who he did ey.... money not them- proper- We didn’t take the or frightened selves. He ty gun became that he was from her. The was in the the trunk carjacking night about to become a victim so he of the offense the whole time. off, sped losing control of the car at the first support plea, 9.In the motion to vacate the By report, police turn. his the then "beat attorney by Gladys filed an affidavit They me into the woods. hit me so with Edwards, mother, Mae the defendant’s which many flashlights. They split my open. head sharply Dyson, was critical of Mr. the attor- everywhere. Kicked me thought I was ney initially she and her husband had re- gonna die.” He believes he lost conscious- represent According stretcher, tained to Edwards. to briefly ness handcuffs, and was taken on a in Edwards, Dyson Mrs. Mr. did not return calls hospital to the where he remem- nothing promptly explain did little or being pain throughout body. bers options par- his client’s to Edwards or to his Hospital records indicate that the nose and fact, knew, Dyson fractured, ents. In as far as she never eye socket bones were his vision plea bargain discussed a with until impaired, scalp and there was a hema- day parents op- the of trial. Edwards' were Surgery performed toma. to re-set an posed entering plea, son Ed- their eye properly into its socket. He has had always wards had maintained his innocence. trouble with his vision ever since. Dyson Mrs. Edwards had asked Mr. to advise that, view, 7. Because some of Edwards’ scores were parents’ her son average” "close to and because Edwards read accept plea bargain. should not She level, grade believe, however, at the sixth Dr. Levin believed Dyson not that had con- IQ probably that Edwards' in the low 80s message According veyed this to his client. prior injury. Dyson Mr. to Mrs. had told parents wards and his "that the most that our report: jail years.” 8. Edwards told the author of the five PSI son would do in would be (1984), attempt 83 L.Ed.2d 76 and that Despite [c]ourt’s ascer- be process tain that understood should therefore vacated for that its Mr. Edwards was through colloquy, reason as well. comprehending

not incompetence This was due judge’s E. The trial decision. post-concussive impairment cogni- judge the trial denied On June processing tive combined inade- in a written order. The Edwards’ motion handling quate impatient coun- judge on Edwards’ admission “in relied sel. (1) open court and on the record that Finally, be noted that Mr. it should despite giving up that he knowing disability, while significant, penal- certain legal prevent him from entering does faced, ties he he still wished to present new if the one is with- (2) guilty; he understood what he course, drawn, provided, present that (3) doing; any he did not wish to ask dysfunction counsel is cognizant questions.” emphasized accordingly. and communicates dispute por- hesitate Edwards did not Dr. Relying heavily on Levin’s evalua proffer tions of the when he tion, attorney argued in his Edwards’ new disagreed prosecutor’s account. permitted be motion his client should pointed also out that at plea. Emphasizing to withdraw his colloquy, Rule 11 he had conclusion of the continuing protest Edwards was his in finality “underscored nocence, Ed counsel asserted “Mr. informing he could still [Edwards] pled despite inno his claimed plea, at that time.” Edwards withdraw his spite cence [because] [c]ourt’s point at that that he “wished had indicated attempt Ed careful to ascertain Mr. *6 to take it go try to and would not forward happening, what was understood the judge back stated later.” by pleading guilty not did understand representation open defendant’s right he would forfeit his to assert plea proceeding that he the understood motion, According innocence.” Ed plead to “earned guilty and that he wished wards “did not understand this basic con In the verity.” a strong presumption brain-injury cept because of his induced view, unable judge’s been [previous] with his limitations combined presumption. overcome that attorney’s take the ex failure to time to Dr. Levin’s evaluation of Turning Mr. plain carefully matters Edwards.” wards, opinion the was of the attorney Finally, Edwards’ new claimed report “not under- psychologist’s the did plea was “motivated that his chent’s presumption arising mine from strong the fell advice received from counsel which un- plea hearing the itself competence [Edwards] range of the demand short cases,” of the and the charges the nature attorneys derstood ed of in criminal McClur States, 1848, plea.” of his v. 472 A.2d 1360 kin United 838, (D.C.), denied, report gener- as cert. the “far too 469 U.S. 105 S.Ct. characterized note, however, plea, plea the Al time Edwards entered his Mr. We collo- the judge correctly quy Dyson facing prospect advised Edwards that of criminal years be the maximum could fifteen sentence charges stealing from the estate of life. Mrs. and her husband had Dyson later to disbar- client. Mr. consented that, their Dyson advised Mr. since son's head ment, (D.C.1997) Dyson, re 695 A.2d 112 In injury, "he has had a difficult time with his curiam), (per plea and entered understanding memory and of even Sept. Washington See criminal fraud. Post, concept.” most Mrs. Edwards basic 29, 1999, page B-4. "believe, know, everything that I my occurring what was son understood pled guilty.” when he

987 (D.C.1995) al,” States, 288, and he believed that Dr. Levin had ed 656 A.2d 293 (citations omitted). to take into account the Rule 11 failed Finally, judge rejected colloquy. process “It is fundamental to due permit-

contention that Edwards should be that a defendant who waives constitutional plea grounds ted to withdraw his on the do entering must original attorney that his was constitution- voluntarily, knowingly, intelligent so ally ineffective: States, ly.” Pierce v. United 705 A.2d argues Defendant ... that his counsel (D.C.1997) 1086, Eldridge v. (quoting 1089 in giving was ineffective advice to (D.C. States, 690, A.2d guilty, arguing that did not [counsel] 1992)). reviewing guilty plea whether a enough take time to assure that the voluntary, this court examines the entire But, if intelligent. analyzes totality of the record defendant did understand the conse- surrounding circumstances [cjourt quences of his as the has Morgan, Henderson v. 426 U.S. did, determined he then there was no (1976). 2253, 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 108 prejudice to the defendant even if a to a “Surrounding circumstances relevant thirty-minute discussion could be consid- reviewing inquiry concerning court’s volun range compe- ered outside the wide include complexity tariness of the competent tence accorded counsel. charges, characteristics of the 668, v. Washington, Strickland 466 U.S. defendant, familiarity the defendant’s 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 justice system the criminal and the factual (1984). Defendant conflates ineffective- ac proffered support basis the court’s ness and knowing intelligent waiver. ceptance plea,” McClurkin United But there is no constitutional ineffective (D.C.1984) (ci States, did, if assistance counsel defendant omitted). tations [cjourt found at the and reaf- now, firms knowingly intelligently In this Edwards offers two interre- waive his trial rights. grounds support argument lated of his denying that the trial court erred in

II. argues motion. He that his was not knowingly entered and thus was involun- LEGAL ANALYSIS *7 (1) tary plea because at the time of the he Edwards suffering injury filed his motion to with was from a brain that guilty plea draw his year plea more than a after made it difficult for him to follow the imposed. the sentence ap proceedings appre- was Under the understand and and/or rule, plicable consequences pleading guilty; “the court after sentence ciate the of (2) may set aside the of judgment plea proceeding conviction and the was fundamen- permit and tally the defendant to withdraw the flawed because the trial court was plea,” only capacity but this relief is authorized unaware of his diminished mental it required adequately when in order to “correct and thus failed to ascertain injustice.” Super. manifest Ct.Crim. R. whether there was a factual basis for the 82(e). States, plea. McCarthy Edwards’ motion is thus “un v. United 394 tested See a high der standard.” Southall v. United U.S. 89 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 418 (D.C.1998). States, (1969). arguments In Interwoven into these a that trial coun- suggestion order to withdraw the movant must is Edwards’ his only plea constitutionally that ineffective because demonstrate the was sel was manifestly unjust, spend enough helping time but must also show that he failed plea fundamentally either the factual ba- proceeding “the Edwards understand the complete plea consequences flawed such that a for the or the of there was sis miscarriage justice.” plea. of Williams Unit colloquy

For wards. review of that re- essentially the reasons relied Our upon by judge, questioned the trial we find veals that once Edwards the arguments unpersuasive. judge’s accuracy prof- The trial the factual of fer, careful, by of the Dr. engaged denial motion informed the trial court in a it although Levin’s evaluation was based probing, patient, colloquy and extensive (1) on primarily his own observations in an effort with Edwards to determine and conversations with factors whether there was a factual for ac- basis (2) to which we great accord deference. cepting plea; whether Ed- consequences understood At the important outset it is to note trial did not pleading guilty. The court reported while Dr. that Levin his evalu rush in factual basis inquiry its about the ation that sustained brain pains great for the plea and the took damage functioning that him at a level left clearly understood ensure that Edwards retardation, borderline mental Dr. Levin entering a giving up by what he was incompe opined never that Edwards plea. fact, to enter tent a Dr. Levin evaluation, which was Given Dr. his Levin’s by indicating concluded evaluation recollec- assistance, part based in on Edwards’ proper patient large with there plea mind no tion of entering would be to Edwards his state barrier ear- hearing year over one granted place another if the trial court that took lier, it consistent motion to withdraw this one. have been more would if when argues injury trial erred in brain failing purported a hearing agreed to hold to determine he whether he by whether asked the court competent a had in- to enter once the government’s proffer, dicated, indirectly, issue was to the court’s directly raised attention or either agree prop the record. While we with the he was or that not understand osition that the issue of proffer “where a defen because the factual by confused competence dant’s mental been In- [has] for him to follow. complicated was too record, raised on court must stead, Edwards, the ex- listening to after specialized hearing a conduct determine gov- proffer tensive factual made competence a defendant who seeks ernment, portion of only that questioned Hunter v. guilty.” that he had proffer alleged factual States, 548 A.2d 806 (D.C.1988). findWe to rob weapon used personally held and conclusion, that Dr. ultimate Levin’s believe, K.W. assault We sexually competent to enter if Edwards, in dis- judge, did the trial the nature and factual puting specific portion explained appropriate way, were in an dif that he was proffer, actually demonstrated Hunter,10 ferentiates this case in the actively mentally engaged nature of the process understood the As the trial noted in or *8 charges facing. he was motion, denying der Edwards’ Dr. Levin’s evaluation, In of the facts indicating questioning accuracy generally while problems proffer, types injuries of Edwards’ contained in the him, to the exception on the 11 wards took essentially caused did not focus Rule force government’s allegation court had that he used colloquy the trial with Ed- court distinguishable guilty the trial Hunter is was error because 10. also because bearing on the pre- improperly ignored to evidence case involved a motion withdraw a appellant's competence plea. In reviewed of enter a sentence which is for abuse clearly this considered discretion under the more liberal "fair and the trial rejected opposed higher report it because the just standard” to the Dr. Levin’s but unpersuasive issue injustice apply we court it to be on the “manifest standard” here. found addition, competence at time of the In we held that the trial of Edwards' in Hunter plea. court’s a motion to withdraw a denial of rape court, stating either or rob K.W. that he understanding Edwards’ con- sex, the victim for that he did not proffer to allegation cern with the be the have a handgun the car with him on the head, gun he had held the to K.W.’s offense, night of the and that he never held inquired further so that he could deter- gun to the head of the victim. At that any mine there factual whether basis point, judge patiently the trial and careful- for Edwards’ to PFCV. It was at this ly explained to Edwards the nature of the acknowledged time that Edwards charges pleading to which he was guilty, there gun the front seat the car particular focusing on the fact that the during where K.W. could see it the inci- use of necessary force was in order for point, dent. At that the trial judge was Edwards to be convicted the crimes he satisfied that there was a factual basis for addition, faced. the trial it judge made claim, plea. Edwards does not nor clear that he could not and would not he, proffer, could that the factual as modi- accept guilty plea prof- Edwards, by fied sup- was insufficient to charges fered of PFCV or sexual assault if port plea of guilty to PFCV and sexual conduct that evening voluntary. KW.’s Therefore, assault.11 claim A fair reading of Dr. Levin’s evaluation proceeding was flawed because suggests that even with his men- the trial properly court failed to determine deficiencies, tal capable of focusing on whether there was a factual basis for the and understanding trial judge’s expla- supported by is not the record. nation that force was a necessary element of the crimes to which plead- Edwards was support We also failed to find in the ing guilty. record for by the assertion brain injury, because he was unable

Nonetheless, before proceeding further appreciate consequences entering with the colloquy Rule 11 the trial judge pleas charges. these two On suggested that speak with his twenty-three no less that occasions trial counsel so that he could address with court, colloquy with the Edwards was any him further concerns Edwards had asked whether he understood what he was plea. about the very After a brief discus- doing rights giving up. and what he was table, sion at Edwards, himself, counsel occasion, On each Edwards answered affir- indicated that ready proceed he was matively. may While Edwards have ques- again questioned accuracy tioned the factual proffer about whether agreed he by made government, he at no time government’s proffer regarding the judge’s facts of the claimed be confused the trial case. agreed While he at first explanation giving that the of what he was government’s previous proffer was accurate, upon up by entering guilty. further Given questioning by the trial judge prior about his in the involvement with a involvement criminal weapon, disputed only justice system, he relatively the fact that as well as the had held a gun prior to the victim’s lenient treatment he head. Im- received for his convictions, portantly, longer he no contended that was not unreasonable for the force was not used nor did he continue to trial to view his claim that he was contend that voluntarily. K.W. acted confused about of his pleaded constructively possessed to unarmed first doubt that Edwards degree necessary night sexual abuse so it was not a firearm on the of the offense. Ed- *9 holding gun for him to admit to a to the head wards’ admission that he knew there was a car, view, plea the plain of victim in order for the to be firearm in the in and within reach, factually supported. respect With to the was sufficient evidence from which charge, possessory PFCV beyond because it is a of- a reasonable fact finder could find a fense, government only required constructively the was reasonable doubt that Edwards proffer facts possessed weapon during rape from which a reasonable fact a the and rob- beyond bery finder could conclude a reasonable of K.W. 990 11 inquiry, applying reasonably the Rule a ob-

plea strong as insufficient to rebut here, jective of presumption verity given colloquy the state- litmus test we the ments he made to the find that Edwards has failed to show that Williams, plea proceeding. 656 A.2d plea proceeding fundamentally was (internal omitted). at 294 citations holding plea flawed or that to his Edwards unjust. manifestly would be our Given in- Finally, accurately trial court judge’s personal deference to the trial rec- potential formed Edwards of sentence and, proceedings ollection of the after a ultimately an gave he faced record, thorough are review of we plea opportunity to withdraw his at the not judge the trial convinced proceedings. judge close of the The trial in denying abuse its discretion plea, was convinced that at the time of the motion. was competent to enter the on the judge’s based conversa- Affirmed. him, tions with as his as well observations nothing of and we see in this SCHWELB, Judge, Associate record that lead us to a would different dissenting: conclusion. one, I easy not Although the issue is an find that Because we the trial my colleagues’ am agree unable to denying did not judge err not entitled conclusion that Edwards was plea, motion to withdraw his we also to a motion withdraw hearing on his conclude the trial court did not err respectfully dissent. Accordingly, denying, hearing, without a motion, part, based his Edwards has claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. attorney on his that his allegation required a hearing Such here nature of ineffective. The constitutionally where, law, aas matter of could content, not a motion its is determined prejudice prong not meet the of Strickland caption. its Wallace v. Warehouse Cf. Washington, v. 466 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 730, 801, Employees A.2d No. 482 Union 2052, (1984), 80 if a L.Ed.2d 674 even (D.C.1984). is there 804 Edwards’ motion thirty day minute discussion on of trial § fore 23-110 cognizable under D.C.Code disposition of case discuss the (1996), 32(e), and an as well as under Rule a through is considered outside “un hearing required evidentiary thus range competence compe wide accorded conclusively less the files and records show tent defense counsel. As the trial can no facts the movant establish “[tjhere observed, correctly is no constitu warranting relief.” Southall v. United if a tional ineffective assistance counsel (cit States, (D.C.1998) 716 A.2d 188 knowingly intelligently defendant 110(c)). alia, ing, § inter D.C.Code 23— his trial rights.” waives my recognize, As is fun judge, although colleagues “[i]t

In this the trial admittedly process damental to a defendant unaware of Edwards’ mental due condition at time of the nonethe- who waives constitutional in enter in a engaged ing plea voluntarily, less must do colloquy so careful, considered, intelligently.” Maj. op. appropriately knowingly, States, here, To 705 thorough. prevail (quoting Edwards must Pierce (D.C.1997)) manifestly A.2d El unjust (quoting show that would be States, dridge pro- stand and that v. United (D.C.1992)). If have ceeding fundamentally competency flawed such issues record, complete trial court miscarriage that it resulted in a been raised on “the justice. say specialized hearing hind- must to de might While we conduct competence sight that the trial could asked termine the defendant plead guilty....” who Hunter v. probing questions during even more seeks

991 (D.C. States, 806, categories 548 A.2d 810 among two where he scored 1988) States, (quoting 2%, v. Willis United 468 lowest Edwards functioned at the re- 1320, (D.C.1983)); accord, A.2d 1323 Indeed, tarded level. Edwards could not Pierce, supra, 705 A.2d at 1089. More facts, simple familiar even remember such over, words, dog. name of his In other if

where it is alleged that an individual is credited, Dr. assessment then Levin’s is retarded, mentally the trial court must practical purposes for all mental consider that factor determining when comparable capacity was to that of a child.3 whether an individual “has mental reported Dr. Levin further that Edwards’ capacity to necessary achieve the under- plea attorney “impatiently instructed Mr. Hunter, standing” guilty plea. of a thinking Edwards to leave the to him.” Masthers, supra, (citing 548 A.2d at 810 During much of the colloquy, supra,1 where the defendant was men- disputed the truth of some of the retarded). tally Additionally, we have government’s principal allegations. He stressed this is an area where ex- denied that he had threatened the com- pert testimony should be considered and plainant with a handgun, and he claimed a trial should relying refrain from performed that her sexual acts were volun- observations of the individu- tarily and that she had been for them. Hunter, al. supra, 548 A.2d at 810-11 fact, In disagree Edwards continued to (expert informed judge appellant the thrust of the ver- appeared to be suffering organic allegation sion—the pulled gun damage); brain Mitchell v. United cf. on K.W.—even after he had answered in States, 1099, (D.C.1992) 609 A.2d 1104 judge’s question affirmative the wheth- (advising to have assistance er he was “able admit that this act expert guidance and not rely on one’s prosecutor] [the occurred as described.” perceptions own appellant where is al- Moreover, repeated his denials of ill, legedly mentally citing Hunter and guilt to the writer of the PSI. Masthers). Pierce, supra, 705 A.2d at 1091-92. Athough Dr. Levin’s evaluation did not upon transcript focus of the Rule 11 present reported Dr. Levin colloquy, I find the inescapable conclusion his evaluation that Edwards had sus- handicapped that if Edwards was as tained substantial brain as Dr. damage which left be, him Levin found him to functioning at a level of then his affirmative borderline response mental to a virtual abstraction —whether IQ retardation. Edwards had an 76,2 and, only Levin, prosecutor’s account was according to Dr. accurate —did impaired intelligent this condition not constitute an ability to “fol- low more than acknowledgment one idea at a time.” In that he forced K.W. to fact, level, intelligence placed him in have sex with him. On a concrete population, bottom 5% of the Edwards denied the use of force and of á Masthers, 389, 396-402, an, 5, U.S.App.D.C. 1. United States v. 176 395 n. 113 S.Ct. 509 U.S. 242, (1976). 2680, 539 F.2d 721 (1993). court stated in 321 125 L.Ed.2d colloquy Masthers that "the 11 standard Rule may prove inadequate an measure of the va IQ recognize adequate 2. is not an sub lidity plea proffered by of a a defendant of thorough individualized in stitute for an questionable competence.” mental 176 "IQ quiry competency. into alone ... is not 249-50, U.S.App.D.C. at 539 F.2d at 728-29. a definitive measure of retardation.” Masth competency Masthers also held that the stan ers, supra, U.S.App.D.C. 539 F.2d 176 a pleading guilty exacting dard for is more than t 245 n. 16. competency the standard for to stand trial. U.S.App.D.C. n. 539 F.2d at Levin, 30; According "[sjpell- accord, States, to Dr. 726 n. Williams United (D.C.1991). ability only equal ing a third aspect [that of] This grade of Masthers was overruled in v. Mor- student.” Godinez *11 Hunter, directly. voluntary. su knowing he asked weapon whenever 810-11; they supra, guilt, if admissions Pierce pra, His admissions were, presupposed reasoning A.2d at 1091-92. level of which, and care- analogy patient without a sum, in light of Dr. Levin’s assess- counsel, ful be be- explanation by would allegations, ment and Edwards’ related I yond depict- capacity of the individual possible do not believe it was deter- ed in Dr. Levin’s evaluation. hearing mine without a whether Edwards’ experienced judge trial made com- voluntary, decision to enter his mendable efforts to that Edwards’ ensure Accordingly, I intelligent. voluntary. must agree we appealed vacate the would order judge’s provi- into account also take court for a the case to the trial remand warning dent at the conclu- theAt hear- hearing on Edwards’ motion. sion the Rule 11 that if Ed- colloquy, remand, would be ing prosecutor on persisted pleading guilty, Levin, gov- to cross-examine Dr. able permitted would not be to withdraw opportunity would ernment proceeding after the was over. testimony if it contrary expert present scene, trial was on the and his van- so, dispositive do deter- elected to and the tage purposes point, assessing Ed- injustice has mination —whether manifest understanding proceedings, wards’ made on a then be established —could been superior to ours. Finally, comprehensive meaningful rec- more responses inquiries to some of the court’s ord. as

come across more rational and focused expect

than might one from an individual supposed as Dr. handicapped Levin be, and this even may

wards to have been apparent judge, who was

more

able to observe the defendant

proceedings. the time entered But at that Edwards C.L.M., Appellant. In re apprised not been No. 98-FS-349. impaired damage Edwards’ brain or his cognitive functioning.4 Mentally retarded Appeals. District of Columbia Court impaired cognitive and others with people, Argued 2000. Feb. abilities, predisposed are often to answer 15, 2001. questions way designed in a Decided Feb. understanding, lack of so that conceal their and communi- language [their]

“even when normal, appear abilities

cation to be

questioner give should extra attention

determining whether the answers are reli- W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckas-

able.” James Mentally

son Retarded Criminal Defen-

dants, 414, 428 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev.

(1985). reasons, For these we have held judge may rely exclusively

that the observation of the defendant finding

as a basis for that his alleged regard. to withdraw this his motion plea attorney fault in plea that his was at

Case Details

Case Name: Edwards v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Feb 15, 2001
Citation: 766 A.2d 981
Docket Number: 98-CO-1079
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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