Ryan Russell Edwards was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of his 13-month-old child.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial evidence showed as follows. Edwards and Toni Brown had a child, Mikkah, who was born in December 2010. Mikkah lived with Brown and her two other children, A. B. and B. B. In January 2012, Brown, who was working two jobs while also attending college, called Edwards to watch her children after her babysitter quit unexpectedly. Edwards agreed and stayed at Brown’s home for a few days to watch the children while Brown was at work.
On January 26, Brown saw Mikkah before she left for work around 10:20 p.m., and he appeared healthy and was behaving normally. During the night, A. B., who was then 12 years old, went downstairs to get a drink of water and saw Edwards holding onto something tied around 13-month-old Mikkah’s neck and swinging the child like a “rag doll.” A. B. said that Edwards swung Mikkah around for 30 to 45 seconds. When Edwards finally noticed A. B., he sat Mikkah on the floor. A. B. was concerned and wanted to call his mother but couldn’t because Edwards had the only phone in the house.
When Brown returned from work the following morning (January 27), she checked on her kids. Mikkah was in bed with Edwards and appeared to be asleep. When Brown kissed Mikkah, she noticed an abrasion on his forehead. Brown asked Edwards about the injury, and he responded that Mikkah might have fallen off a toilet. Edwards took the child out of the room, telling Brown to rest and reassuring her that Mikkah was fine and just tired from staying up late. Brown noticed that Mikkah’s head was “wobbly” when Edwards picked him up.
At some point, A. B. told Brown that he saw Edwards swinging Mikkah around by his neck the night before. Brown tried to wake Mikkah, but he was unresponsive and his
After being airlifted to the children’s hospital, Mikkah was placed on life support. Doctors told Brown that Mikkah had severe brain damage, part of his brain stem was gone, and he would never breathe or eat on his own or speak again. Mikkah was taken off life support after a few days and died as a result of his injuries.
A medical examiner testified that Mikkah’s cause of death was blunt force head trauma evidenced by retinal hemorrhages, a swollen brain, subdural hemorrhages, and two skull fractures caused by at least two forceful impacts to the child’s head. A physician with experience in child abuse issues who evaluated Mikkah at the children’s hospital testified that the retinal hemorrhages were consistent with rapid acceleration and deceleration of the head, such as by significant and forceful head trauma. The doctors also described the child’s other injuries, including a tear to the child’s frenulum likely caused by a very forceful impact to the mouth; abrasions and bruising on the neck, back, and chest; and additional hemorrhages in the thoracic and lumbar regions of the child’s spinal cord.
1. Although Edwards does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, it is our customary practice in murder cases nevertheless to review the record and determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient. Having done so, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Pursuant to Georgia v. McCollum,
In McCollum, the Supreme Court of the United States held that defendants are prohibited from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes. See Allen v. State,
The opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to give a race-neutral reason for the strike; the trial court then decides whether the opponent of the strike has proven discriminatory intent.
Id. (citation omitted). Although the burden of production shifts to the defendant if the State makes a prima facie case, the ultimate burden of persuasion as to discriminatory intent rests with — and never shifts from — the State. See Purkett v. Elem,
We find no merit to Edwards’s argument that the court improperly merged steps two and three of the McCollum inquiry After the trial court found that the State made a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the court asked Edwards to explain his reasons for the strikes. Following Edwards’s race-neutral reasons, the trial court asked the State for additional argument, implicitly indicating it was moving to step three. The State did not challenge Edwards’s reasons for striking Juror 68 but argued that his reasons for striking the other jurors were pretextual. The trial court gave Edwards one final opportunity
The cases cited by Edwards where a trial court improperly merged steps two and three are readily distinguishable. In those cases, the trial court rejected the defendant’s reasons at the second step and terminated further inquiry. See, e.g., Jackson v. State,
Edwards also suggests that we presume error because the trial judge in this case was previously reversed in a different, case for failing to apply McCollum properly But we do not presume error simply because a judge erred in a previous case. Quite the opposite, in fact; absent evidence of error, we presume trial courts follow the law. See Hall v. State,
3. Edwards argues that the trial court prohibited him from preserving his ineffectiveness claim against trial counsel, and thus requests a remand to perfect the record. We disagree.
In his amended motion for new trial, Edwards asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and present favorable evidence. In furtherance of this claim, Edwards subpoenaed school and Division of Family and Children Services records relating to Mikkah, A. B., and B. B., and asked the court to conduct an in-camera inspection of those confidential records to determine whether there was evidence to support his ineffectiveness claim. At the outset of the motion for new trial hearing, apparently under the impression that the requested confidential records had not been produced, Edwards asked for a continuance on the ineffectiveness claim. The court told Edwards that it received and reviewed the records, and that it had not provided any material to him because there was nothing in the
We agree with the trial court that Edwards waived his right to a hearing on his ineffectiveness claim by affirmatively saying he had nothing else to present after the court rejected his other argument. Waiving a right to a hearing on an ineffectiveness claim, however, is not the same as waiving the claim itself. See Wilson v. State,
Edwards does not point to any specific favorable evidence trial counsel failed to present. This is fatal to his claim. The trial court’s ruling after an in-camera inspection that the records did not contain any exculpatory material establishes that as a matter of fact absent a showing to the contrary. See Dempsey v. State,
4. The trial court purported to merge the three felony murder counts (Counts 2, 3, and 4) into the malice murder count, and merged two of the predicate felony counts that were separately charged (Counts 6 and 7) into the malice murder count as well. Edwards argues that the trial court erred by merging the felony murder counts into the malice murder count because those counts were vacated by operation of law, and asserts that the court should have also merged the last predicate felony count (Count 5) into the malice murder sentence.
We agree that the felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law and therefore vacate that portion of the trial court’s sentencing order. See McClendon v. State,
(a) Count 5 charged Edwards with aggravated assault for swinging Mikkah around by an object tied around the child’s neck and causing serious injury. We reject Edwards’s argument that Count 5 merged with the malice murder conviction.
“[Wjhere a victim suffers a series of injuries inflicted by a single assailant in rapid succession, each injury does not constitute a separate assault.” Reddings v. State,
Here, the evidence does not require merger. The medical examiner stated that the external injuries on Mikkah’s neck, which were correlated to having been swung around the neck, did not have any associated internal injuries and thus did not contribute
(b) Even though Edwards does not raise the issue, our review of the evidence shows that Count 9 — aggravated battery — should have merged with malice murder. See Nazario v. State,
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded for resentencing.
Notes
For crimes occurring in January 2012, Edwards was indicted for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony murder (Counts 2, 3, and 4), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 5 and 7), three counts of aggravated battery (Counts 6, 8, and 9) and five counts of cruelty to children (Counts 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14). Following a trial in May 2013, a jury found Edwards guilty of all counts except Count 13. The trial court sentenced Edwards to life in prison without parole for Count 1 and six consecutive 20-year sentences for Counts 5 (aggravated assault), 9 (aggravated battery), 10,11, 12, and 14 (cruelty to children). The trial court also purported to merge the felony murder counts into the malice murder count for sentencing purposes, and merged Counts 6, 7, and 8 into the malice murder count. Edwards filed a timely motion for new trial, which he subsequently amended. After the trial court entered its order denying the motion for new trial, Edwards filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court for the term beginning in April 2017 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
After granting the State’s motion in part, the trial court reinstated Jurors 45, 57, 59, 70, and 73 and redid the striking process. Edwards again exercised a peremptory strike on Juror 59, and the State did not challenge his reason for striking her. Edwards accepted Jurors 45 and 57. There was no further discussion about Jurors 70 and 73 because enough jurors had been chosen to serve on the jury.