Edwards v. StateEdwards v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Gilbert
Lead Opinion
Thе witness who was permitted to testify over objections’ duly mаde, was only five years of age; and while the court had a preliminary examination made to determine the competency of the child to testify, it does not appear from the answers to the questions proрounded that the child was sufficiently matured or intelligent to undеrstand the nature of an oath and the consequenсes of perjury. The examination and the answers to thе questions are substantially as follows: “My name is Mattie Virginia Edwards. I know what it is to tell the truth. . . I am five years old. . . If I don’t tell the truth ‘bad man gets you.’ I held up my right hand out here when *205others did. Meant truth. Meаnt right. It meant I said I was going to tell the truth ‘tell what they ask me.’ I am not going to tell a story. I am going to tell the truth. . . I live in the Gee Pаtch. I know who owns the Gee Patch. I don’t know what an oath means. It means No sir. . . I don’t know what month this is. I have been to sсhool. . . I don’t know when I went to school. I haven’t been tо school this year. Last year. . . I can say my abe’s ‘a, b, с, d, e, f, g, k, 1, n . . ’ I can count [counts from one to twelve, stoрs] can’t count any further. I don’t know the days of the week. All I know if I don’t tell the truth the bad man will get you.” Under the proof this child was not shown to possess sufficient intelligence to understаnd the nature of an oath, or the penalty for its violation, and we are of the opinion that the court erred in permitting the witness to testify. On another trial as she advances in years and moral training she may possibly better understand the obligation of an oath and the penalty fоr its violation, and may become a competent witness. Johnson v. State, 76 Ga. 76; Miller v. State, 109 Ga. 512 (35 S. E. 152). Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. Measured by the common knowledge of mankind, there is muck that may be said for thе ruling by the majority. However, when considered in conneсtion with the facts, the ruling in substance means, as we construe it, that a child five years of age is not a competent witness. Our dissent from the ruling is based on our unwillingness to have this cоurt set an arbitrary rule to the effect that a child under fivе is an incompetent witness in any case, thus taking away that discretion which heretofore has been reposed in the trial court. We concede that it is quite unlikely that a child of the tender age of five years will possеss the qualification of a competent witness, but the triаl judge saw the witness, heard her testimony, and observed her dеmeanor, and should be able to know, much better than this сourt can know, the facts as to her competency. The general rule heretofore stated by this court is as follows: “It is left to the sound discretion of the trial cоurt to determine whether or not a child of tender years is a competent witness; and where the court exаmines a child as to its knowledge of the nature and sanctity of an oath and decides that it is competent to testify, this *206court will not interfere, where it does not appear that such discretion has been flagrantly abused.” Beebee v. State, 124 Ga. 775 (53 S. E. 99); Reece v. State, 155 Ga. 350 (116 S. E. 631), et cit.