Edwards v. StateEdwards v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Simmons
It аppears, from the record in this case, that Edwards was accused in the city court of Atlanta of the offence of a misdemeanor, in “buying and receiving from T. B. Hunnaway and Guy King two woolеn shirts of the value of four dollars, the property of J. P. Northrop, knowing the same to have been stolen and feloniously taken. The accusation further alleges that Hunnaway had fled thе State and was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and that “ Guy King had been given, on his trial on a chаrge of larceny from the house for a sum under fifty dollars, a verdict of not guilty, on the ground of his being undеr age, to-wit, ten years of age, and not subject to conviction.” Upon the trial of the сase the defendant was convicted.. He made a motion for new trial, upon the several grounds stated in the motion, which was overruled by the court; and he excepted, and assigns аs error the judgment of the court in overruling his said motion. The plaintiff in error insisted here mainly upon the 5th ground of the motion, which is as follows:
“ 5th. Because the court erred in the following charge to the jury: ‘ On the other hand, if you believe from the evidence that T. B. Hunnaway and Guy King together privatеly stole two shirts from the store of Northrop, and of some value, and in manner and form as chаrged in the accusation, and that Guy King was taken and was prosecutedj and was acquitted оn the ground of non-age, that ia, *129on the ground that he was under ten years of age, so as not to be generally amenable for his acts, this state of facts would excuse the State from exhibiting in evidence a record of the conviction of Guy King as a principal thief, ox one of the principal thieves, thereby relieving the State of the necessity of making one оf the required proofs in order to convict of the offence charged in this accusаtion.’ ”
It is true that it was proved on the trial thаt he was acquitted because he was under the age of ten years. If he was under ten yeаrs of age, he was properly acquitted, because the law is “ that an infant under that age shall not be considered or found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor.” Code, §4295. He was acquitted, therefore, because he was not guilty of the larceny. If he was not guilty, Edwards was not guilty as an accessory after the fact, and that was the accusation made against him. Beforе a conviction can be had, under this section, it must be shown that the principal, whether takеn or not, whether known or unknown, is guilty. We think, therefore, that the court erred in his charge to the jury, as complained of in the 5th ground of the motion.
We do not intend to rule that a person can rеceive stolen goods from an infant incapable of committing a crime, and not be guilty of a crime himself. On the contrary, we hold that “ he who acts through an irresponsible agent is liablе as principal and that a person so acting is not liable as accessory, but as рrincipal. Wharton’s Grim. Law, §§206, 212. It is true that these principles are gen*130erally applied to рersons who counsel, procure or incite infants, idiots and lunatics to commit crimes. But we see no reason why the analogy would not hold good‘as to persons who take or sharе the fruits of the crime after it has been committed by an infant, idiot or lunatic. If Edwards received these goods from an infant, who had taken them from Northrop’s store without his consent, why would not Edwards bе guilty of simple larceny, just as he would be if he had found them on the streets and concealеd them and appropriated them to his own use ?
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court below.
Judgment reversed.