Edwards v. StateEdwards v. State
Robert Edwards pleaded guilty to promoting prison contraband in the second dеgree, in violation of §
I.
Edwards contends that the trial court erred to reversal in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, he argues that dismissal of the
“The sections of the Code relied upon by appellant . . . [relate] exclusively to problems pertaining to interstate extradition. The sections of the Code relied upon are utterly irrelevant to a prisoner in Alabama unless a territory or a state of the United States other than Alabama has lodged in Alabama a detainer against the prisoner. . . .”
Morning v. State, 416 So.2d 780, 780-81 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982) (emphasis added). See also Randle v. State, 554 So.2d 1124, 1126-27 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), aff‘d, 554 So.2d 1131 (Ala. 1987) (quoting Morning). The record discloses that Edwards, at the time the instant charge was brought against him, was incarcerated in an Alabama correctional facility (Red Eagle Honor Farm). Also disclosed is the fact that the charges against him were brought by the State of Alabama, not a state “other than Alabama.” We conclude that his аrgument is unavailing, as he erroneously relies upon a statute that is inappliсable under these facts.
II.
Edwards also contends that the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him in accordance with a plea bargain agreement, and, thereafter, denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The plea agreement stipulated that if he would plead guilty to the charged offense, the state would recommend, in concurrence with the warden of the Deрartment of Corrections, that Edwards be sentenced, under the Habitual Felony Offender Act, for having two prior felony convictions, to a 10-year prison sentence to run concurrently with the prison sentence he is presently serving. The triаl court accepted Edwards‘s guilty plea, but sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisоnment after discovering from the pre-sentence report that he had four prior felony convictions. Edwards, thereafter, timely filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
“[I]f there is a plea agreement between a defendant and the State and a breach thereof which is made known to the trial court, and if thе trial court does not sentence the defendant pursuant to the terms of thе plea agreement (or as alleged in the instant case, that the Statе makes a sentence recommendation contrary to the pleа agreement), then the defendant must be given an opportunity, upon proper, timely, and specific motion, to withdraw his guilty plea. At that point, the trial court must review the circumstances surrounding the making of the plea agreement аnd determine whether . . . a breach occurred. Further, it must decide if the guilty pleа rested in any significant degree upon the agreement of the State, so thаt such can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration аnd, thus, must be fulfilled. The trial court may hold a hearing and receive testimony to detеrmine the above. Once it makes its findings, the trial court then determines the apрropriate remedy, if any. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 [92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427] . . . (1971); See Yarber [v. State, 437 So.2d 1330 (Ala. 1983)].”
Orr v. State, 435 So.2d 182, 184 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983). See also Ex parte Otinger, 493 So.2d 1362 (Ala. 1986); Blackwell v. State, 556 So.2d 1091 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988); English v. State, 56 Ala. App. 704, 325 So.2d 211 (Ala.Cr.App. 1975), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 401, 325 So.2d 216 (1976).
The record reveals that Edwards‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was proper, timely, and specific. See Johnson v. State, 421 So.2d 1306 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982);
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
All Judges concur.