*1 closing transactions entrusted with two clients real estate insurance, money pay pay. which he failed to These ac- taxes and (d). violated Standards 63 and 65 of State Bar Rule 4-102 He tions two-year suspension. seeks special accepted Geraghty’s petition master recommends years suspension for three and that he not be readmitted until the Lawyer Impairment emotionally
Committee of determines that ishe practice fit to resume the of law. The Review Panel of the State Disci- plinary accepted special Board master’s recommendation.
Having adopt reviewed the the recommendation of the panel Geraghty suspended review and order that John F. practice years. suspension law this state for three This com- 11, 1991, retroactively April mences on the effective date of Ger- prior two-year suspension, aghty’s concurrently and runs with that readmission, suspension. gain To he must obtain a favorable determi- Lawyer Impairment, specified nation from the Committee of as panel’s review recommendation. Bell, J., Hunt, Benham, P. Fletcher and Sears-
Collins, JJ., concur. 22,
Decided October 1992. Bar, Jenny William Smith General Counsel State K. Mit- telman, Bar, Assistant General Counsel State for State Bar of Geor- gia.
S92A0647. v. THE EDWARDS STATE.
Bell, Presiding Justice. appellant, Edwards, Earl Lee was found of the malice Tommy appeals, murder of Wene.1 contending Edwards that the state intent; requisite failed to concerning prior that evidence admitted; testimony threats should not have been was admitted sequestration; violation of the rule of trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm. 7,May May 21, The crime occurred on 1991. He Edwards indicted on 1991. prison 20, sentenced to life in for the murder conviction on June 1991. Edwards filed a mo 11, July reporter transcript September
tion for new trial on 1991. The court certified the on 1991. Edwards amended his motion for new trial on November 1991. The trial court February appeal denied the motion for new trial on 1992. filed his on Edwards notice February 1992. The case was docketed this Court on March 1992. The arguments April submitted for decision without oral on his former wife’s house mowing his former wife’s lawn. Edwards knew and saw Wene had been dating. his former wife had been that Wene and years testified that he and his former for almost four divorced his wife was to have no men on the agreement wife had an oral *2 7 property daughter living his at the residence. while living observing with his former wife. After Edwards’ pulled neighbor’s into a property, activities on the Wene’s driveway. neighbor testified that Edwards said Wene was not kill Wene. Edwards then supposed to be there and threatened However, a away. a short time later he drove the lawn sec- Later, time, yelling from his car. Edwards returned to his former ond lawn, stopped He drove onto the wife’s house for a third time. vehicle, Ed- and called to Wene. As Wene walked toward striking in the single handgun, wards fired a shot from a Wene chest. Although Edwards testified that Wene came at with an stick, knife, gun, his hand that could have been a witnesses said police object, that Wene did not have such an found no such ob- scene. ject at the error, the evi-
1. In his first enumeration of Edwards contends disagree. support is insufficient his murder conviction. We dence verdict, most favorable to the we Viewing light have found Edwards conclude that a rational trier of fact could v. a reasonable doubt. Jackson Virginia, 443 U. S. beyond murder 560) (1979). (99 LE2d 307 SC 61 error,
2. In Edwards contends the trial his second enumeration he permitting the state to introduce evidence of threats court erred Wene; wife had dated before had made to to a man Edwards’ former Wene; daughter. Edwards boyfriend she dated and to a of Edwards’ placed his charac- improperly that evidence of these threats contends ter the threats were too remote into no error. homicide to be admissible. We find First, from the homicide the threats were not too remote time was di- to be relevant. Each of the threats occurred after Edwards homi- year-and-a-half from his former wife and within a vorced 625) State, (3) (b) (400 Emory v. 815 SE2d cide. See 260 Ga. (1991). Moreover, Wene admissible to the threats were “ ‘motive, intent, demonstrate or bent of mind toward Edwards’ ” (2) (296 State, Hales v. 250 Ga. 113 (quoting victim.’ Id. at 815 577) (1982)). the man Finally, find that the threats toward SE2d we and the former before she dated Wene that Edwards’ wife dated boyfriend admissible be- daughter’s Edwards’ were threats toward relevant pattern a of conduct that was cause establish v. case. See Ward intent, motive, the instant 472
State, (2) (417 (1992).2 262 Ga. SE2d Contrary enumeration, to Edwards’ third we conclude the trial in permitting prosecution court not err testify witness to even though the had witness remained the courtroom in violation of the State, sequestration. (4) (376 rule of Johnson v. 258 Ga. 857-858 356) (1989); State, (3) (340 SE2d Moore v. 255 Ga. 521-522 SE2d 888) (1986).
4. After his conviction Edwards’ trial counsel replaced by current counsel. his motion for new trial Edwards claimed that his trial counsel had been ineffective. evidentiary After an hearing, trial court denied Edwards’ motion for new trial. On contends the trial court failing erred to find his trial counsel ren- dered ineffective assistance. after reviewing the conclude the trial court State, did not err. See Miller v. 261 Ga. (410 (5) 101) (1991); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 674) (1984). SC 80 LE2d Judgment J., Bell, Hunt, Benham and affirmed. Sears-Collins, JJ., concur; Fletcher, J., concurs specially as to Divi- sion 2. *3 Justice, concurring specially as to Division 2.
Fletcher, case, present the the state sought to introduce evidence of four separate incidents wherein the accused had threatened to kill a man with whom his ex-wife or I agree involved. with the majority that evidence of these four independent acts was admissible in present the I case but separately write to examine such evidence closely. more by words used in the state the notice of its present intent to independent
the act evidence involved here stated that being purpose offered “for the of identifying defendant, the showing a motive, common plan, scheme, mind, bent of oper- modus of conduct.” words, Those basic [course] numerous varia- ands tions, are being used magic like some litany justify the introduction 2 The concurrence of Justice Fletcher is correct insofar as it warns the use of a “magic litany justify independent the introduction” of act and also insofar as it explains why independent question the prove intent, acts were admissible to but we disa gree with the independent concurrence’s conclusion that the acts were not also admissible to prove identity. acknowledge While we that Edwards’ admission that he the victim shot relevancy identity, reduce the of the admissibility acts as to we see no reason that the of the identity acts as to must admissibility be considered in purposes. isolation from their for other (as Once it opinion is concluded do both the concurring opinion) of this Court and the that independent the prove intent, acts were admissible to then there is no reason to disallow the help issues, use of those acts to identity. utility establish other such as of the latter use may small, prejudice upon but defendant, such use inflicts possible no additional the as all prejudice they from intent, introduction of the prove acts will accrue once are allowed to regardless prove of whether identity. are also allowed to independent evidence in case act after case that comes before this nothing magic court. there is about those words and their requisite analysis type use is no substitute for the this of evi- undergo may dence must before it be introduced: evidence of the in- dependent acts must purpose be offered for some other than to show person Additionally, the accused is a of bad character. it must be demonstrated that the independent relevance of the act evidence out- weighs inherently prejudicial its nature.
Here, victim, because Edwards admitted the the issue of identity perpetrator Thus, of the in dispute. of the crime was not challenged relevance of the evidence perpe- as to the of the by trator was far outweighed prejudice created the minds of the jurors by the introduction of the evidence and did justify not its ad- mission.
However, Edwards’ defense upon was based his claim that he had victim, fired at the victim self-defense when the with an unidenti- hand, fied in his state, rushed at Edwards. The on the other hand, sought that Edwards had not acted in self-defense but out jealousy for the victim’s involvement with Edwards’ ex-wife. upon Edwards’ defense turned the intent behind firing his act of at and, result, the victim as a the earlier instances of threats made Edwards were relevant to show that Edwards’ intent was not to de- fend himself from the victim but to kill the victim because of the victim’s involvement with Edwards’ ex-wife.
Because the prejudice independent inherent act evidence could be said to be outweighed intent, its relevance I to Edwards’ specially concur with Division 2 majority opinion.
Decided October III,
William W. Keith appellant. for Bowers, Jack O. Partain Attorney, District Michael J. Attor- General, ney Boleyn, Susan Attorney General, V. Senior Assistant Benjamin C. A. Woolf, Attorney, appellee. for Staff
S92A0838. MONTES v. THE STATE. Justice.
Benham, Appellant was convicted of malice murder and three counts of aggravated arising assault from a surviv a bar.1 The two early January 7, morning Appellant The crimes were committed in the hours of