116 Ga. 201 | Ga. | 1902
Edwards brought a petition for injunction against the Milledgeville Water Company, in which he sought to enjoin the defendant from disconnecting its water-main from the private pipe running therefrom to bis residence, and from in any way interfering with his use of the water at his residence, under the terms of
1. It is contended by counsel for the defendant in error that, the object of the plaintiff’s petition, “though not prayed for in express terms, is to obtain specific performance of an alleged contract”; and that “a court of equity can decree specific performance
In Horsky v. Helena Consolidated Water Co., 13 Mont. 229, 33 Pac. 689, the plaintiffs, who were the owners of a large brewery, sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from shutting off water from the plaintiffs ’ private pipe, which connected with the defendant’s system of piping. The court held: “ An injunction will lie to enjoin a water company from breaking its contract to supply water to a brewery, when turning off the water would stop the brewing, destroy a large quantity of malt, and injure the brewers’ trade.” Pemberton, J., in the opinion said: “We think the facts stated in the complaint, which are confessed by the demurrer, entitle the appellants to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the court, and to the negative and preventive relief of injunction.” In Callery v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 35 La. Ann. 798, the court held : “ Where a contract is made with the city waterworks company to procure water from the pipes and fire-plugs of the company for a stipulated price, for the purpose of watering and sprinkling the streets, the party complying with his contract may prohibit the company and its officers and employees from any interference with his business under the contract, and from any act to hinder or disturb him in using or procuring the required quantity from the water-pipes, for the aforesaid purpose.” Todd, J., said: “The plaintiff had the legal right to use the water from the pipes and fire-plugs in his business, in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes contemplated by the contract, and we can see no reason why he could not prevent the threatened invasion of his rights under such contract, and the stoppage of his water supply, by an injunction. It was not. in our view to compel the company to do an act, but to refrain from interference with or doing something to the prejudice of the plaiutiff, and in contravention of a legal engagement.” In Brown v. Frankfort, 9 S. W. 384, a case decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, it was held: “Where a city agrees, in consideration of the right of way granted, to allow the owner of land
The plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law. A court of law could neither prevent the defendant from depriving him of the use of the water, nor restore to him such use after he had been once deprived of it; and the damages which he would sustain in the future, during the long period covered by the contract, by being deprived of the use of a plentiful supply of pure water flowing through pipes upon his premises, and easily and conveniently accessible at all times for the varied necessities and even the luxuries'of a household, would be very difficult to ascertain, and could not, with any certainty, be estimated. Even if the plaintiff could, by erecting and máintaining a private system of waterworks, supply his resi
2. For the purpose of obtaining the injunction prayed for, the petition stated the terms, scope, and extent of the contract with sufficient fullness and certainty. The plaintiff showed the present existence of the contract, and that, under it, he would be entitled to the use of the water for many years to come. ' Consequently his mere failure to give the precise date when the contract was entered into, and the exact date when it would expire, afforded no ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Judgment reversed.