121 Wash. 380 | Wash. | 1922
The plaintiff, Edwards, seeks recovery of damages from the defendants, Lambert and
The first, and apparently the principal contention here made in behalf of appellants, the Lamberts, is that the trial court erred in its refusal to take the case from the jury and decide, as a matter of law, that the evidence was insufficient to support any recovery by respondent Edwards; this question having been presented to the trial court by appropriate and timely motions.
At about three o’clock during the afternoon of the day in question, Edwards, then about sixteen years of age, with two other boys, alighted from an automobile which was proceeding north on the paved Pacific highway at about a quarter of a mile south of the Duwamish river bridge, in King county. Their purpose seems to have been to go to the home of an uncle of one of them, situated a short distance north and east of the place where they alighted. However that may be, while they all were standing still together very near, and Edwards possibly on, the easterly edge of the pavement, and while one of the boys was pointing out to the others the home of his uncle to the north and east, all seemingly facing more north than east, and unconscious of the approach of any automobile or other vehicle from the south, Edwards was struck and severely injured by the fast-moving automobile of the Lamberts, driven by Mr. Lambert, from the south. Edwards was seemingly
One of the instructions given by the trial court to the jury reads as follows:
“Under the laws of the state of Washington the drivers of automobiles are required to drive them in a safe and prudent manner, and to sound a gong, bell or alarm in approaching crossings and at a sign of imminent danger, and a maximum speed at which they are permitted to run is 30 miles per hour, and while the violation of a law is negligence per se, yet, before the owner or driver of a vehicle becomes liable on account of negligence it would have to be shown that the negligence of the driver was the proximate cause of any injuries that might occur.”
It is not contended that this is an incorrect statement of the law of this state; but it is argued that it was prejudicial to the rights of appellants to call the attention of the jury to the requirements of the law as to sounding an alarm on approaching crossings or at a sign of imminent danger, or to the legal speed limit; in that there was no evidence that the accident occurred near a crossing — but evidence showing to the contrary — and no credible evidence that there was any sign of imminent danger, nor any credible evidence of excessive speed. We think it plain that the instruction was in no event erroneous in calling the attention of the jury to the law requiring the sounding of a signal at a sign of imminent danger, since the jury might well believe from the evidence that, under all the circumstances shown, Edwards was in imminent danger of being struck by the oncoming automobile. It seems
As to the instruction calling the attention of the jury to the law relative to the sounding of a signal of approach to crossings, we are inclined to think that it was technically erroneous, in view of the fact that the evidence does conclusively show that there was no crossing within a quarter of a mile or more in either direction calling for the sounding of a signal on that account alone. However, we fail to see how such error could have been prejudicial, in view of the fact that the jurors as sensible persons must have known that there was no question of sounding a horn in connection with any approach to a crossing. That, it seems to us, was a mere abstract statement of the law touching a matter which the jurors could and did plainly see had nothing to do with any question they were called upon to decide.
The court further instructed the jury that
“ . . . any person driving or operating any motor vehicle shall drive or operate the same in no other than a careful and prudent manner nor at any greater speed than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic and use of the way by others, or so as to endanger the life and limb of any person;
This it is insisted was prejudicial to the rights of appellants because, as it is argued, there was no evidence tending to show that Mr. Lambert was driving his automobile other than in a careful and prudent manner. We cannot agree that this instruction was
A witness for Edwards, referring to the boys in her testimony, volunteered this remark:
“I haven’t spoken to any of them since the boy was in the hospital, I think two weeks, when the insurance agent called me up and tried to get me to come down to the office and talk to him. ’ ’
This volunteer statement of the witness was objected to by counsel for the Lamberts, who moved the court that it be stricken; and the court, in the presence of the jury, made its order accordingly in such manner as to plainly inform the jurors that it was not to be considered by them. The claim is made in behalf of the Lamberts that this volunteer remark of the witness was incurably prejudicial to their rights, in that it suggested that whatever judgment might be recovered against them in the case would be paid by some insurance company. We think it not impossible that an ordinary person might get such an impression from the remark; of the witness, but we think it is not so clearly capable of that construction as to call for a holding that it was reversible error, in view of the court’s order striking it out immediately following its making.
Some other claims of error are suggested and briefly argued, but we think they are without merit and that the case does not call for further discussion.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mitchell, Bridges, Tolman, and Fullerton, JJ., concur.