88 U.S. 532 | SCOTUS | 1874
EDWARDS
v.
ELLIOTT ET AL.
Supreme Court of United States.
Mr. D. McMahon, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. A.Q. Keasbey, contra.
*549 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Nothing appears in the record to warrant the conclusion that any question re-examinable here was presented in the court of original jurisdiction, whether the proposition is tested by the declaration, the pleas filed by the defendant, the special verdict, or by the judgment, as all alike tend to show that the questions presented, examined, and decided were questions of local law. Every suggestion of that kind, therefore, may be dismissed without further remark, as they are utterly destitute of support.
Opposed to that statement is the suggestion in argument, that the presiding justice overruled the demurrer to the declaration, but it is a sufficient answer to that suggestion to say that this court cannot go out of the record to re-examine any question under a writ of error to a State court.
Suppose that is so, still it is contended that the defect is supplied by what occurred in the Court of Errors and Appeals. Tested alone by the errors assigned in that court, it is quite clear that the jurisdiction of this court could not be sustained, as the errors assigned in that court do not show, with sufficient definiteness, that any question cognizable here under a writ of error to a State court was presented to the State Court of Errors for decision. Complaint, it is true, is made that the subordinate court improperly decided that the lien law of the State is valid and constitutional, but it is not alleged that the law is repugnant to any particular provision of the Constitution of the United States, nor that the court of original jurisdiction rendered any decision upon that subject.[]
*550 Something more must be set forth in such a pleading, to raise a Federal question, than the mere allegation that the law is invalid and unconstitutional, as such an assignment is satisfied if held to refer to the constitution of the State, in which event the question raised is not one cognizable here under a writ of error to a State court.[*]
If the case stopped there it would be clear that the writ of error must be dismissed for the want of jurisdiction, but it does not stop there, as plainly appears by the judgment of affirmance rendered in the Court of Errors, which shows that the State court of last resort determined, among other things, the following propositions: (1.) That the lien law of the State is not in any respect repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, as contended by the original defendants. (2.) That the contract for building the vessel in question is not a maritime contract, and that the remedy given by the lien law of the State does not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States. (3.) That the said lien law does not violate the right of trial by jury nor conflict with the constitution of the State.
Like every other pleading, an assignment of error is subject to a reasonable construction. Reasonably constructed it cannot be held that the first proposition of the judgment of affirmance involves a comparison of the State lien law with every separate provision of the Federal Constitution, and if not with every one, it is impossible to determine with which one, as there is nothing in the judgment or any other part of the record pointing to any particular part of the Constitution, except what is contained in the second proposition of the judgment, which, in view of the whole record, must be regarded as a more complete specification of what is meant by the first proposition.
Viewed in the light of these suggestions it must be understood from the two propositions that the State Court of Errors decided that the contract in this case for the building *551 of the schooner was not a maritime contract, and that the law of the State giving the remedy which was pursued by the plaintiffs does not conflict with the Federal Constitution or with Federal laws. Such an allegation in the judgment of the State court is sufficient to give this court jurisdiction under the writ of error to re-examine that question. Well-founded doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained, unless it be assumed, as contended by the plaintiffs, that the copy of the judgment embodied in the transcript is not correct.
Due entry of the writ of error to the State court was made here the sixth of December, 1872, and on the first of April, 1874, the Court of Errors decided that the judgment of affirmance, entered there in the case under date of the twentieth of August, 1872, did not correctly express the judgment of the court; and after hearing argument the court ordered that it be wholly annulled, and that it be stricken from the minutes, and that the judgment exhibited in the supplemental record be entered nunc pro tunc in lieu thereof.
Alterations of a very material character are made in the substituted judgment, as compared with the judgment originally entered, and which remained unchallenged at the time the writ of error was sued out and when the supersedeas bond was filed. Such alterations, it is insisted by the defendants, could not properly be made at that stage of the litigation, as the writ of error from this court to the Court of Errors brought up the judgment first mentioned as a part of the transcript annexed to the return made, to the writ of error, by the Court of Errors, to which it was addressed.
Exceptions may arise to that proposition, as broadly stated, but it is not necessary in this case to examine the question in so general an aspect, as whatever may be the power of the Court of Errors to change or amend such a judgment for the purposes of any proceeding under it in the exercise of their own appellate functions, we are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the judgment brought here as part of the return *552 to the writ of error from this court must, under the circumstances, remain as the judgment which this court is called upon to re-examine and review.[*]
Enough has already been remarked to show that the judgment of affirmance first rendered raises the question whether the contract under which the vessel was built is a maritime contract, and whether the law of the State which gives the remedy pursued by the plaintiffs is in conflict with the Federal Constitution. Beyond all doubt that question was presented to the State Court of Errors, and was decided by that court adversely to the defence set up by the defendants in the court of appellate jurisdiction.[]
Materials were furnished by the plaintiffs to the persons who contracted to build the schooner, during the progress of the work. Payment for the materials being refused, they instituted the described proceedings to enforce the lien given them by the State law, in such a case, against the vessel for which the materials had been contracted.
When the proceedings were commenced the schooner was only partially constructed and was resting on her original stocks, having never been launched into the water. She was without a name and had never been registered or enrolled, nor had she ever been licensed or surveyed, and she was without a master or crew, and the record shows she had never had a commander.
Concede all that and still the defendants contend that the plaintiffs, as the furnishers of the materials, had a maritime lien for their respective claims which may be enforced in the admiralty, and that the State law giving the remedy which the plaintiffs pursued is in conflict with that clause of the Federal Constitution which provides that the judicial *553 power of the United States shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. They admit, in effect, that to maintain that proposition it is necessary to show that a contract to furnish materials for the construction of a ship is a maritime contract, and they accordingly submit the affirmative of that proposition and insist that all such contracts are maritime, if it appears that the vessel to be constructed is designed for use upon navigable waters.
Maritime contracts are such as relate to commerce and navigation, and unless a contract to build a ship is to be regarded as a maritime contract, it will hardly be contended that a contract to furnish the materials to be used in accomplishing that object can fall within that category, as the latter is more strictly a contract made on land, and to be performed on land, than the former, and is certainly one stage further removed from any immediate and direct relation to commerce and navigation.
Building materials for such a purpose come very largely from the forest and mines, but if it be admitted that a contract to build a ship is a maritime contract it is difficult to affirm that a contract to furnish the materials for the same is not of the same character, although its breach and even its performance may involve judicial inquiries into the business transactions of men, as well in the forests and mines as in the manufactories and workshops of the whole civilized world. Wherever the question, therefore, involved in the present assignment of error, has been considered, the decision has uniformly turned upon the solution of the inquiry whether a contract for building a ship is or is not a maritime contract. Unless the contract to build a ship is a maritime contract, no one, it is presumed, would contend that the furnishers of the materials for such a purpose can successfully support such a claim; and if it be admitted that the builders of a ship may enforce the payment of the contract price in the admiralty, it would be difficult to maintain that the furnishers of the materials for the purpose are not entitled to pursue their remedy to enforce payment in the same jurisdiction.
*554 Shipbuilding is an occupation requiring experience and skill, and, as ordinarily conducted, is an employment on land, as much as any other mechanical employment, and men engage in the business for a livelihood just as they do in other mechanical pursuits and for the same purpose. Shipwrights, unlike the seamen, have their homes on the land, and not on the seas, and they are seldom shipowners, and not more frequently interested in commerce and navigation than other mechanics. Ships are bought and sold in the market just as ship timber, engines, anchors, or chronometers are bought and sold, even before they are fully constructed and before they are equipped for navigation, and no reason is perceived why a contract to build a ship, any more than a contract for the materials of which a ship is composed, or for the instruments or appurtenances to manage or propel the ship, should be regarded as maritime.
Attempt is made in vain to point out any distinction in principle between a contract to build a ship and a contract for the materials, as the latter are included in the former, and both fall within the same category under the rules of the civil law. Every one who had built, repaired, or fitted out a ship, whether at home or abroad, or lent money to be employed in those services, had by the civil law a privilege or right of payment, in preference to other creditors, upon the ship itself, without any instrument of hypothecation, or any express contract or agreement subjecting the ship to any such claim, and that privilege still exists in all those countries which have adopted the civil law as the basis of their jurisprudence.
Authorities to support that proposition are unnecessary, as the proposition is conceded by both parties in this controversy, but that rule was never adopted in England, and the reverse of it is the settled rule in our jurisprudence in respect to the question under consideration. Conclusive support to that proposition is found in the case of The Jefferson,[*] in which the opinion of the court is given by Mr. Justice *555 Catron. By the statement of the case it appears that it was a libel filed by the assignees of the builders against a new steam ferryboat for a balance due to the builders on account of work done and materials furnished in constructing the hull of the ferry-boat. They claimed a lien for the unpaid balance of the price, and the decree was in their favor in the Circuit Court, but the claimants appealed to this court. When the cause came up for argument the first point made for the claimants was that a contract to build a ship is not one within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts, even though it be intended to employ the vessel in ocean navigation. Sufficient appears in the report of the case to show that the libellants took direct issue upon that proposition, and the court say, in disposing of it, that the only matter in controversy is whether the District Courts have jurisdiction in admiralty to enforce liens for labor and materials furnished in constructing vessels to be employed in the navigation of waters to which the admiralty jurisdiction extends.
Neither shipbuilders nor furnishers of materials for shipbuilding had any lien at that date under the State law, but the court unanimously decided that the admiralty jurisdiction was limited to contracts, claims, and services which were purely maritime, and to such as had respect to rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation. Applying that rule to the case then under consideration the court say: "So far from the contract being purely maritime and touching rights and duties appertaining to navigation, it is a contract made on land to be performed on land."
Convinced or not, every candid inquirer must admit that this court did decide in that case that neither a contract to build a ship or to furnish materials for the purpose is a maritime contract. Nor does that decision stand alone, as the same question since that time has more than once come before the court and been decided in the same way. Such was the view of the court in the case of Roach v. Chapman,[*] in *556 which the opinion of the court was given by Mr. Justice Grier.
Proceedings in that case had been instituted in the District Court against a steamer to enforce a lien for a part of the price of the engine and boiler, which had been furnished to the builders in another State, where the steamer was built. Process was served and the claimants appeared and filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, which was sustained by the Circuit Court, and the libellants appealed to this court. Able counsel appeared for appellants, but this court decided that a contract for building a ship or for supplying engines, timber, or other materials for her construction is clearly not a maritime contract, and the court remarked that any former dicta or decisions which seem to favor a contrary doctrine were overruled.[*]
During the same session of the court the same question was again presented, and was again decided in the same way.[]
Express reference is there made to the case of The Jefferson, and the remark of the court is that the court there decided that a contract to build a ship is not a maritime contract; that in this country such contracts are purely local and are governed by State laws, and should be enforced by the State tribunals. Decisions to the same effect have been made in the Circuit Courts, of which the following are examples: Cunningham v. Hall,[] The Orpheus.[§]
State legislatures have no authority to create a maritime lien, nor can they confer any jurisdiction upon a State court to enforce such a lien by a suit or proceeding in rem, as practiced in the admiralty courts.[]
Other support to that proposition than the act of Congress is not needed, as the provision is to the effect that the District Courts shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, except *557 where the common law is competent to give to suitors a common-law remedy. Common-law remedies are not applicable to enforce a maritime lien by a proceeding in rem, and consequently the original jurisdiction to enforce such a lien by that mode of proceeding is exclusive in the District Courts.[*]
Taken together and properly construed those provisions warrant the conclusion that such a party wishing to enforce such a lien may proceed in rem in the admiralty, or he may bring a suit in personam in the same jurisdiction, or he may elect not to go into admiralty at all and may resort to his common-law remedy in the State courts, or in the Circuit Court of the United States, if he can make proper parties to give that court jurisdiction of the case. But a maritime lien does not arise in a contract to build a ship or in a contract to furnish materials for that purpose; and in respect to such contracts it is competent for the States, under the decisions of this court, to create such liens as their legislatures may deem just and expedient, not amounting to a regulation of commerce, and to enact reasonable rules and regulations prescribing the mode of their enforcement, if not inconsistent with the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty courts.[]
Objection is also taken to the validity of the State law upon the ground that it is in conflict with the provision of the Federal Constitution which secures to every party, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury.
Two answers may be made to that objection, either of which is decisive: (1.) That it does not apply to trials in the State courts.[] (2.) That no such error was assigned in *558 the Court of Errors, and that the question was not presented to, nor was it decided by, the Court of Errors.
Jurisdiction is not shown unless it appears that some one of the specified questions did arise in the State court and that the question was decided adversely to the party assigning error in this court.[*]
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
NOTES
[] Messenger v. Mason, 10 Id. 509; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Id. 16; Furman v. Nicholl, 8 Id. 44; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 Howard, 516.
[*] Farney v. Towle, 1 Black, 351; Hoyt v. Shelden, Ib. 521; Railroad Co v. Rock, 4 Wallace, 180.
[*] Generes v. Bonnemer, 7 Wallace, 564; Avendano v. Gay, 8 Id. 376; Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Id. 431; Hozey v. Buchanan, 16 Peters, 215; Albers v. Whitney, 1 Story, 310; Brush v. Robbins, 3 McLean, 486; Medford v. Dorsey, 2 Washington's Circuit Court, 433; Kanouse v. Martin, 15 Howard, 210; Cheang-Kee v. United States, 3 Wallace, 326; Noonan v. Bradley, 12 Id. 129.
[] Elliott et al. v. Edwards et al., 6 Vroom, 266; Edwards v. Elliott, 5 Id. 96.
[*] 20 Howard, 393.
[*] 22 Howard, 129.
[*] The Jefferson, 20 Howard, 400.
[] Morewood v. Enequist, 23 Id. 494.
[] 1 Clifford, 45.
[§] 2 Id. 35.
[] The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 644; The Moses Taylor, 4 Id. 411; Hine v Trevor, Ib. 555.
[*] Brookman v. Hamill, 43 New York, 554; The Josephine, 39 Id. 19.
[] The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 645; Sheppard v. Steele, 43 New York, 55; Ferran v. Hosford, 54 Barbour, 208.
[] Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters, 247; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wallace, 326; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Peters, 551; Fox v. Ohio, 5 Howard, 434; Smith v. Maryland, 18 Id. 76; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 2d ed. 19.
[*] Crowell v. Randell, 10 Peters, 392; Suydam v. Williamson, 20 Howard, 440.