Edwards v. Dismukes, Case No. 809

Case No. 809 | Tex. | Nov 25, 1879

Lead Opinion

Gould, Associate Judge.

1. Appellants’ second and fifth assignments of error assume that there was no evidence of notice to them that the husband of appellee was, under her instructions to him, without authority to deliver to them the deed which he and she had executed, and which she had separately acknowledged and entrusted to him. If, however, we look beyond the bill of exceptions to the charge of the court, we find instructions to the jury, that the delivery of the deed by the husband would pass the title to appellants, notwithstanding it was made in violation of his instructions, if the appellants had no notice of such instructions. Looking to the evidence and considering the terms of the alleged compromise, even as stated by appellants, we are of opinion that there was evidence tending to charge appellants with notice that the delivery of the deed was premature and unauthorized, and that it cannot be said that there was no evidence of notice of the instructions.

Although the bill of exceptions might well have explained that the court admitted evidence of the instructions, because there was evidence of notice, that fact amply appears from the record, and must be considered a sufficient justification of the ruling complained of.

If Edwards and wife received the deed, although privily acknowledged by Mrs. Dismukes, having notice that its delivery was unauthorized, it does not seems to be denied by appellants that the fact, if established by competent evidence, would entitle Mrs. Dismukes to relief. They object, however, that Mrs. Dismukes was not competent to testify as to what instructions she gave her husband, or as to a fraud practiced on her by her husband. We remark that the husband was not a party to the suit at the trial; that the communication from the wife to the husband does not appear to have been of a confidential nature; and that we know of no rule of law which forbids the wife, in support of her rights against a third party, from testifying as to fraudulent acts of her husband.

2. The charge asked and refused on the subject of notice had been substantially given, and the refusal to repeat it was not error.

3. Dismukes, the husband, having refused to join in the suit, was not a necessary party, and the dismissal of the suit as to him did not operate a discontinuance. McIntyre v. Chappell, 2 Tex., 378" court="Tex." date_filed="1847-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/mcintire-v-chappell-4887003?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="4887003">2 Tex., 378.

The judgment is affirmed.

[Opinion delivered November 25, 1879.]

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Rehearing

OPINION ON REHEARING.

Referring to the opinion originally delivered in this case, it is not proposed to add to it otherwise than by a very brief explanation.

The material issue of fact on the trial was whether the deed was delivered by authority of Mrs. Dismukes; and, if not, whether the circumstances authorized the defendants to receive the deed, believing that the husband was empowered to deliver it, or whether they had notice that its delivery was unauthorized.

The testimony of Mrs. Dismukes, that she instructed . her husband to deliver the deed to her attorneys was admissible as amounting to a denial that she assented to its delivery to the defendants, with a fact added explaining to whom and for what purpose it was to be delivered. If, under the circumstances, Edwards and wife had notice that the delivery of the deed to them was unauthorized, that was equivalent to notice of the purport of Mrs. Dismukes’ instructions to her husband. We are still of the opinion that there was evidence sufficient to support a verdict charging defendants with notice of the husband’s want of authority to deliver the deed, and sufficient to justify the action of the court in admitting her to testify as to her instructions. This disposes of the ground of error most strongly urged by counsel.

We remark that the record shows that Mrs. Dismukes regarded the suit against her as one to be compromised, and executed the deed in the expectation that it would be used in such a compromise. Whilst this fact might give rise to a surmise or suspicion that the suit against her was based on a just claim, it is certainly not bf itself sufficient to establish that fact, nor is there any evidence in the record enabling us to see that the claim was just. We have disposed of the case on the legal questions presented; and, whilst the possibility that the result may be a hardship may have had its influence in leading us to grant a rehearing and have the case argued a second time, we have arrived at the conclusion that there is no valid reason why the judgment should be reversed. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

[Opinion delivered October 19, 1880.]