34 Pa. Commw. 622 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1978
Opinion by
Petitioner, a former patient at Polk State School and Hospital (Polk), has been presented with a notice of assessment in the amount of $894.00 by the respondent Department of Public Welfare (Department). This alleged liability arises from the cost of earing for the petitioner at Polk from July 1974, through September 1975. The petitioner has pursued the appropriate administrative remedies for contesting this
Petitioner, who is 50 years old and mentally retarded, was involuntarily committed to Polk on December 12, 1939 where she remained a resident until her release on a leave status to a group home on September 10, 1975. After her first year at the institution, petitioner was assigned housekeeping and institutional jobs at Polk for the benefit of the institution. She was not compensated for this work until January 1975 when she began to receive wages of approximately $1.05 an hour. Petitioner continued to receive this rate of pay for her work until her discharge receiving a total compensation of $531.54 for 514 hours during the nine month period. In 1964 petitioner was awarded Social Security disability benefits with the revenue agent at Polk named as the representative payee of these funds. From 1964 to July 1974 the agent assessed these benefits for her care and treatment at Polk. From July 1974 through September 1975 the revenue agent credited petitioner’s account with $2,060.64 in Social Security payments and assessed petitioner $1,514.68 for care and maintenance at the institution. These Social Security checks and the bill from the State for her care and maintenance were presented to the petitioner on November 14, 1975. By this time petitioner had moved from the group home to her own apartment where she was able to maintain an independent living status with income from a part-time job and her Social Security benefits. In furnishing the apartment petitioner expended a portion of the earlier Social Security payment leaving a balance of $1,614.68 in an escrow account maintained by her attorney.
Because this case involves the consideration and application of two federal court decisions, and Department regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, we will outline their history and substance at this time for the sake of convenience and clarity. In Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1973), certain named plaintiffs instituted a class action seeking damages and injunctive relief to end involuntary labor in state mental health facilities in that such forced work violated the thirteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The' court granted a motion to dismiss the claim against the Commonwealth on the basis of no jurisdiction to grant the relief and against the individual defendants as to damages, but held that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient, if proven, to support an injunction against the individual defendants. On May 6, 1974, five months later, a consent decree was entered whereby the Department agreed to prepare a plan to end assigned but unpaid work in state schools and hospitals by December 7, 1974 and a final plan submitted to the court by March 1, 1975. The consent decree also specified compensation to patient workers after
Before reaching the merits of petitioner’s claims, we must first consider two threshold defenses of the Department raised against her appeal, first the doctrine of res judicata predicated upon the binding effect of the consent decree in Downs, swpra, and second, that of sovereign immunity.
We need not decide the question of whether res judicata precludes the claiming of credit for unpaid work performed before the consent decree in Downs. There is serious doubt as to whether the consent decree in Downs could bind petitioner in a claim against the Commonwealth, since the court in Downs had already decided it would not have jurisdiction over the claim against the Commonwealth. Obviously, this jurisdiction could not have been subsequently obtained by a consent decree. However, to so hold might declare the consent decree in Downs as not binding on the Commonwealth. Since the hearing officer seems to have accepted all of petitioner’s evidence on this point and found against her, she having the burden, the matter of res judicata on this point is moot. As to the time subsequent to the date of the Downs decree, clearly res judicata is not applicable.
With regard to sovereign immunity, we hold that this defense must fail under the rules laid down in Commonwealth v. Berks County, 364 Pa. 447, 72 A.2d 129 (1950). In that case our Supreme Court ruled that where the state voluntarily submits to a court’s jurisdiction by the institution of a suit, it makes available to the adverse party as a defense such claims as have arisen out of the same transaction which gave rise to the state’s suit. This defense is in the nature of a recoupment, and is limited to such amounts as the state has claimed against the defendant. In the case at bar, the Commonwealth has not
While petitioner has raised several issues on appeal,
To reiterate, hopefully for clarity, we are remanding this case for the hearing officer to receive “documented proof”
Accordingly, we will enter the following
Order
And Now, April 11, 1978, the order of the Department of Public Welfare in this matter dated Novem
29 U.S.C. §201 et seq., as amended. Tlie consent decree in Downs followed an earlier federal decision, Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973) which held patient workers in non-federal hospitals for the mentally ill and mentally retarded were “employees” within the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act and ordered the Secretary of Labor to prepare regulations to enforce the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of that act. The regulations that pertain to this case provide that time studies are to be made to determine the level of efficiency of handicapped workers and their comparable rate of compensation. See 29 C.F.R. §529.4.
Although we need not decide petitioner’s other claims regarding the right to setoff for unpaid work on a quasi-contract theory or the contention that the hearing officer erred in finding no substantial hardship in the assessment, these arguments appear to hare no merit. , .
See Record p. 73.