185 P. 423 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1919
The complaint stated a cause of action in forcible detainer. The trial court in its decision of the case found that on or about December 17, 1912, the defendant unlawfully and forcibly entered upon the described premises. The complaint alleged an unlawful entry during the absence of the plaintiff, but did not allege a forcible entry. The *406 complaint also alleged, and the court found it to be a fact, that on said seventeenth day of December the plaintiff made demand in writing upon the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the possession of said premises, and that the defendant refused for a period of five days thereafter to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff; the court did not find that the entry was made during the absence of the plaintiff, but that fact was not denied.
Forcible entry is defined as follows (Code Civ. Proc., sec.
"1. By . . . any kind of violence or circumstance of terror enters upon or into any real property; or,
"2. Who, after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats, or menacing conduct, the party in possession."
[1] There is no evidence to show that defendant's entry upon the premises on the seventeenth day of December, 1912, was accompanied by any kind of violence or circumstance of terror, or that the defendant turned out by force, threats, or menacing conduct the party in possession. It follows that there was no forcible entry.
At the trial evidence was produced showing that the defendant had also entered upon the land on the twenty-third day of November, 1912, and remained there for a few hours. The evidence does not show where the plaintiff was at the time of such entry, but it does show that a short time thereafter, and on the same day, the plaintiff appeared on the premises accompanied by a constable, by whom the defendant was arrested. Defendant's occupancy at that time continued for only a few hours, and he did not enter again until the seventeenth day of December following. We have carefully examined the evidence showing the circumstances of said entry of November 23, 1912, and we are satisfied that it is not sufficient to support the claim of forcible entry at that time.
If this action can be maintained at all it must be as an action of forcible detainer under subdivision 2 of section
During the pendency of this action and prior to the trial thereof defendant Bodkin, as plaintiff in an action of ejectment against Edwards, obtained a judgment against Edwards for possession of the property described in the complaint in this action. At the time of trial of this action that judgment had become final, and the same was introduced in evidence herein by the defendant Bodkin. It was therein determined that at all times after June 1, 1912, Bodkin was the owner and entitled to possession of the land described, which was the same land described in the complaint in this action. Presumably by reason of that judgment, the court in this present action refused to award judgment for possession in favor of plaintiff Edwards, but granted judgment for damages, as for a period of forcible detainer, down to the time of entry of the judgment in the ejectment case. If the court was right in refusing to award possession to the plaintiff, it is doubtful whether damages could be separately granted. [3] In Brawley v. Risdon IronWorks,
The judgment is reversed.
Shaw, J., and James, J., concurred.