91 S.E. 584 | N.C. | 1917
Plaintiff Riley W. Edwards brought an action in the Superior Court of Beaufort County against H. H. Proctor and L. Y. Holliday to recover damages for a breach of a contract by which they employed him to cut timber on their land, and they brought an action in Pitt County against him to recover a balance due on said contract to them by Edwards. The two cases were consolidated, and by agreement tried together in Beaufort County, and the following verdict rendered under the instructions of the court:
1. Did the plaintiffs and defendants enter into a contract for the cutting and manufacture of lumber, as alleged in the complaint in Edwards v. Proctor et al.? Answer: "Yes."
2. Did Proctor and Holliday wrongfully breach said contract, as alleged by Edwards? Answer: "No."
3. If so, what damage is Edwards entitled to recover? Answer: "None."
4. Did Edwards wrongfully breach said contract with Proctor and Holliday, as alleged? No answer.
5. If so, what damages are Proctor and Holliday entitled to recover on account of said breach? No answer.
6. In what amount, if any, is Edwards indebted to Proctor and Holliday for money advanced over and above the value of the lumber delivered and other offsets? Answer: "$278.50."
Plaintiff Edwards alleged that Proctor and Holliday had (43) committed a breach of contract, by ordering him to stop operations at the mill, which entitled him to sue at once for his damages. The evidence of plaintiff was that Holliday told him "to saw the logs he had already cut and not to say any more," to which Edwards replied that he would not stop, or could not stop, until Mr. Proctor told him to do so, and that he would have to come down, and then both tell him to stop the cutting of timber. Holliday said he would send Proctor, and Proctor did go to the mill and told Edwards "that he wanted him to shut down," to which Edwards replied "that he was not going to shut down until Proctor had paid him for the timber," and Proctor said, "Well, go on and cut the timber." When he walked off he remarked: "Shut down for a few days, and I will come back and let you know." He did not come back and tell Edwards that to do. Proctor and Holliday did not state why they wanted Edwards to stop the mill, but did say that they had given an option on the land.
William Smith, plaintiff's witness, testified that Holliday had told him that he had just gone to Riley Edwards to see if he would shut *86 down the mill and stop cutting the timber, and that he thought Edwards would do so. He also stated that Riley Edwards had said to him that Holliday wanted him to stop, but that he had told Holliday he would not do it until Proctor said so. Edwards stopped the mill, except a few days, when he sawed for some other parties.
The court held that the evidence did not show such a breach by Proctor and Holliday as entitled plaintiff to sue, and instructed the jury accordingly, directing the answers to the issues, the amount of recovery, $278.50, being agreed upon by the parties. Plaintiff Edwards appealed.
When parties enter into a contract for the performance of some act in the future, they impliedly promise that, in the meantime, neither will do anything to the harm or prejudice of the other inconsistent with the contractual relation they have assumed. The promisee, it also has been said (and this seems to be the better reason), has an inchoate right to the performance of the bargain, which becomes complete when the time for such performance has arrived, and, meanwhile, he has a right to have the contract kept open as a subsisting and effective one, as its unimpaired and unimpeached efficacy may be essential to his interests. Clark on Contracts (1904), p. 445, 447; Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Exch., 111. It has, therefore, been held (the Massachusetts court dissenting from this (44) view in Daniels v. Newton,
The plaintiff might have enjoyed the full benefit of his contract if he had not stopped cutting the timber when he did. He had been overpaid for what he had done, and he risked nothing in suspending a few days. The jury found, without any serious contest between the parties as to the amount, that defendant owed a balance of $278.50. The case shows that he had been advanced the sum of $974.50, and from this was deducted "$600 for the contract price of cutting 100,000 feet of timber; $25 for building a house on premises; $51 for cutting out a right of way, and $20 for piling timber, leaving balance of $278.50," the amount allowed by the jury under the instructions of the court. It seems, *90 therefore, that plaintiff was engaged in a losing business, but if there was a prospect of its being profitable, he should not have thrown up the contract, but gone on with it to the end and reaped the profit. So far as we can see from the facts as they now appear, he would not have been interrupted in his work.
We think the case was correctly submitted to the jury.
No error.
Cited: Trust Co. v. Ins. Co.,