117 Iowa 365 | Iowa | 1902
While authority to levy such assessments is traceable, to the taxing power, they are nevertheless assessed on the-theory that the property against which they are levied is-benefited thereby to the extent of the levy, and the municipality acts as an agent, merely, in collecting the tax-The district improved is never co-extensive with the county or city, and it is not true that in paying the assessment the county must raise money to pay over to itself, and that, no one would be benefited but the officers employed in the-collection of the tax.' There is no reason why the county,, the city, or the school district shóuld not pay for the benefits received by it the same as any other property owner-Of course, their property may not be sold, but there is no. reason why the amount of the tax should not be paid out of the treasuries of these institutions; and, if the governing bodies fail to make payment, mandamus will lie to compel them to do so. Counties and cities are bodies corporate, may sue and be sued, may acquire and hold property, and make all contracts for the control, management, and improvement of the same. Code 1873, section 279. County boards of supervisors may make such orders concerning corporate property as they may deem expedient, may build and keep in repair the necessary buildings for the use of the county, and have the care and management, of the property belonging to the county; and, as said in the Sioux City Case, we think this includes not only the buildings and grounds themselves, but safe and convenient ways-of reaching the same. A county sho-»1'1, in our judgment,
Much more might be said in support of these propositions, but this opinion has already outgrown limits, and we conclude by saying that the distinction between this and the Sioux City Case and the Polk Co. Sav. Bank Case is already made apparent. In the Savings Banh Gase the state was made a defendant. It could not be sued by the bank, and its voluntary appearance gave the court no jurisdiction over it. Its property could not be sold, nor could ■a judgment against it be enforced in any manner. Añ appropriation by the legislature would be required to meet any judgment that might be rendered, and this could not be enforced. These, among other things, clearly distinguish it from the Sioux City Case; and, while the conclusion in the Savings Bank Case was correct, some of the reasons given in support thereof do not appear to us to be sound. Moreover, if that case holds to the rule as claimed by appellee, it is in direct conflict with the Sioux City Case, and that decision should have been overruled. The opinion clearly negatives the thought that it was to be overruled, and, as this construction will harmonize both decisions, we are the more ready, as it is our duty, to adopt it. While it is true the city exercises but a delegated power in making these assessments, and in so doing is acting as one of the instrumentalities of government, it is nevertheless true that in levying and collecting the same it acts merely as an agent of the parties, and derives no direct benefit therefrom distinct from that of the property owners. The assessment is made solely on the ground of benefits conferred, and no debt on the part of the city is created by a contract whereby it undertakes to do the paving at the expense of the property owners. True, the right to levy these assessments is referable to the power of taxation, but statutes
Reduced to its last analysis, the question is one of power in the city to levy the assessment against the county-property. The statute giving the power is broad enough, to cover lots or lands owned by municipal or quasi municipal corporations, and, if there be any exemption, it is to be implied, unless we hold with those courts which say that county or state property is not to be included unless-expressly mentioned, or by necessary implication inferred-We are not disposed to apply this last-mentioned rule in construing our statutes. Such property is expressly exempted from general taxation, but no such exemption is made from special assessments. Even without a statute,, property devoted to governmental use would not, in the-absence of express authority, be taxed, and the fact that-it is expressly exempted in one case and not in the other is strong evidence that the legislature did not intend to exempt it from special assessments. There are certain implied exemptions because of the nature of the proceedings. Property held by the United States or by the state itself cannot be made liable for two reasons: First, because it cannot be sold on execution, nor may any lien be created against it; and, second, because neither the state nor the United States can be sued, nor may judgments be enforced against either. But one of these reasons applies to county property. While its property cannot be sold on execution, it may sue and judgments may be enforced against it, the same as against an individual, and these judgments, when rendered, may be enforced by mandamus.
The judgment of the district court dismissing the petition as to the county is reversed, and the cause remanded for proceedings in harmony with this opinion. — Reversed.