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Edward R. Coss, Jr. v. Lachine County District Attorney the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
204 F.3d 453
3rd Cir.
2000
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 HARTE, Appellant Robert J. CORPORA

BETHLEHEM STEEL Board of the

TION; Pension General Corporation

Bethlehem Steel

Subsidiary Companies; Michael P. Secretary, Employee Benefits

Dopera, Committee.

Administration 98-2052.

No. Appeals, States Court

United

Third Circuit.

March BECKER, Judge,

Before: Chief NOONAN,*

McKEE, Judges. Circuit PANEL PETITION FOR

SUR

REHEARING rehearing ap- filed petition for

The having been submitted

pellees in the decision

judges participated who court, panel rehearing is vacat- panel opinion The

is GRANTED. file a memorandum

ed. shall the con- responding to

withing two weeks Re- Petition for set forth

tentions

hearing. COSS, Jr., Appellant R.

Edward DISTRICT

LACKAWANNA COUNTY Attorney

ATTORNEY; General Pennsylva Commonwealth

nia

No. 98-7416. Appeals, Court of

United States

Third Circuit. 1, 1999

Argued March

Re-Argued Nov. Feb.

Decided * Noonan, designation. Cir- United States John Honorable Circuit, sitting Judge for the Ninth cuit *3 Siegel (argued), I. Fed-

Daniel Assistant Defender, District eral Public Middle PA, Attorney Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Appellant. for Malley P. Assistant (argued), William O’ Scranton, PA, Attorney Attorney, District Appellees. for General, Fisher, Attorney D. Michael Jr., Deputy Ryan, H. Executive William General, Director, Law Attorney Criminal Graci, Division, Exec- Robert A. Assistant General, Attorney Law and Deputy utive Division, T. Ronald Wil- Appeals, Criminal General, liamson, Deputy Attorney Senior Section, Legal Crim- and Services Appeals Division, Attorneys Amicus Law inal Curiae, Attorney Pennsyl- General vania.

Argued March STAPLETON, RENDELL Before: ALDISERT, Judges Circuit 8, 1999 Nov. Re-Argued BECKER, Judge, Before: Chief MANSMANN, SLOVITER, NYGAARD, SCIRICA, GREENBERG, RENDELL, McKEE, ALITO, ROTH, STAPLETON, BARRY, ALDISERT and Judges. Circuit OF THE COURT OPINION ALDISERT, Judge. Circuit denial appeals Edward Coss for writ of Kulick, Appellant’s girlfriend, Sherry to U.S.C. 2254. He is pursuant filed Car- challenging roommate, Frieto, the merits of the state ol Anris Lisa Lisa’s presently he is incar- brother, conviction for which George Frieto. Most Instead, he contends that cerated. be- guests party at the consumed alcohol.1 It for which cause a former conviction he is roommate, seems that Ann’s Carol Lisa longer any parole no incarcerated or under Frieto, got pulling into hair contest with aby was tainted constitutional restraint Kulick, revelers, Sherry thereafter infirmity, and that conviction was improp- drinking, all of whom had been apparently erly when he was sentenced for considered picked grand donnybrook sides and a offense, his his second current term of Ann, hostess, all until Carol incarceration his constitutional violates everyone threw out of her house. rights. *4 outdoors, great Undeterred We must first decide whether the con- donnybrookers continued their carousing viction of offense was his first considered outside until the landlord and the neigh- sentencing judge the matter for police. bors called the cops When the incarcerated, presently thereby which he is greeting, arrived with their usual “Break it vesting subject jurisdiction matter in the up,” apparently there slight problem was a present District Court for his If petition. adjustment, attitude and cops say jurisdiction we find such we must then Appellant that couple punches threw a examine his first conviction to determine them, at one of landing himself in the local he whether was denied his Sixth Amend- lockup. Totally with dissatisfied the ac- right competent ment If counsel. we commodations, Appellant proceeded to agree with this contention then we must complaint by voice his destroying a radia- remedy decide what is available to him. tor, sink, light toilet and a fixture on this, ceiling his cell. For he was I. convicted of simple assault and institution- melancholy The chronicle of events al vandalism and sentenced to six months simple battery started with a assault and year to a on Appellant each offense. did place that took on June his time and was society released to on community City small of Dickson in Lacka- parole. County, wanna Pennsylvania, when the lo- police cal high were called to a Appellant school met with assigned his attor- graduation party ney, McGowan, at the home of Ann Carol Rose Ann on two occasions Frank, the sister of the then seventeen- before his trial. The District Court made year-old Appellant, finding Edward Coss. At the of fact that Appellant gave District hearing, testimony Court pre- was McGowan the names and addresses sev- Appellant sented that party attended the eral potential during witnesses their first brothers, along with his Jimmy Bobby, and meeting.2 gave Appellant Counsel no no- Although Appellant’s at story his trial dif- that he and McGowan also discussed the here, fered from the we facts recount possible names of meeting. witnesses at this clearly District Court credited this version of testify McGowan did not what occurred at events. meetings. testify these She did at the eviden- tiary hearing Appellant give did not her Appellant evidentiary hearing testified at the the names of witnesses he wanted her to meeting, that in the he first and McGowan subpoena, but then admitted that she did story, discussed "the hap- whole entire how it specifically Appellant’s remember case and pened, who was [and] involved.” His second testifying was general instead based on her meeting and final with McGowan to his practice public as a defender. motion, trial occurred after a severance re- questing charges that the in connection with Appellant The court also noted that even if simple assault be severed from filed those provide did not the names to McGowan at damage juvenile for the to the detention cen- time, cursory police this review of the re- ter, September alleges was filed 1986. He George at individual named was him that an contacted date but of the trial tice story, trial Jimmy corroborated one hour before the scene. approximately point Appellant party no stating at which that there was Carol begin, was to courthouse, stopping Ann’s, directly only at Carol Ann’s they drove were Jimmy at brother pick up camera, only to that he had give her house school. drinking Appellant and that did not been police not hit a officer. October began trial on

Appellant’s trial, the At the days. two and lasted ultimately presented to the charges Appellant, Officers who arrested officers crim- vandalism and jury were institutional Wrobel, that when and testified Adamitis assault, mischief, ar- simple resisting inal scene, individuals be- at the they arrived disorderly jury conduct. The rest and Ap- they grabbed scattering gan institutional vandal- Appellant convicted They ear. to his running he was pellant as ism, simple assault.4 criminal mischief screaming vul- Appellant testified January Appellant was sentenced They alcohol. tes- garities smelled year six months to one receiving that, being grabbed, tified after charge and six months simple and was Officer Wrobel began pushing vandalism year on the institutional to one testified that as They also then arrested. charges. The and criminal mischief *5 Appel- to attempted grab Adamitis Officer consecutively to ran assault sentence Bobby, Appellant punched brother lant’s vandalism and criminal mis- institutional punch face. This Officer Adamitis Ap- previously, As stated chief sentence. simple assault Appellant’s for basis for already served his sentence pellant has Wrobel testi- Finally, Officer conviction. convictions. these also George named that an individual fied 30, 1989, eight or August seven On Bobby. arrest attempts to hindered their from Appellant’s discharge months after testify Appel- on only witnesses to a certain parole supervision, Pennsylvania Jimmy.3 Appellant and lant’s behalf were “by group was beaten Peter Petrovich the incident on June Their accounts of men, Ap- including appellant.”5 five or six from the completely different 1986 were arrested and subsequently pellant was years later at the testimony adduced some as- aggravated one count of convicted on (1) hearing. They denied District Court battery and one count of sault and at Carol Ann’s party that there was to group in the effort part for his assault (2) Appellant night and that house that person. displeasure on Petrovich’s register (3) that They testified drinking. had been to a term of six was sentenced Appellant Jimmy Ap- and night question, on ag- years imprisonment twelve to driveway, in their sister’s pellant were Presently, he conviction. gravated assault Bobby, and had along with their brother charges a sentence based serving than fifteen minutes been there no more conviction, unrelated to his from this began arrived and police when two officers Although he has served (4) 1986 convictions. Bobby Appellant, that to and charge, simple assault the term for the anyone punch not curse or Appellant did that his claim is moot (5) Appellant urges did not know who he to en- charge was used because the assault referring to when he stated officer was and criminal 4. The institutional vandalism ports the names and would have identified Appellant’s destruction mischief result of some of these witnesses. addresses are not related to the detention cell and police outside Appellant’s interaction with the suggest Jimmy testi- 3.McGowan did not initiative, Instead, of Carol Ann’s house. fy. Appellant, on his own brought Jimmy and asked him to to the trial Coss, 695 A.2d did not testify. admitted that she 5. See Commonwealth McGowan 1997). (Pa.Super.Ct. Jimmy. prepare subpoena, interview or party hance his from the 1990 convic- there was a and Edward was present, police that someone had called the tion for which he is still incarcerated. thing police

and that the first that the did arrival upon approach Edward and II. place police him in one of the back of September Appellant On filed They police cars. testified that then pro petition se for writ Bobby, point George chased after at which an pursuant filed jumped on the back of one of the officers original on Novem- amended try attempt to hinder his to arrest 29, 1995, and a ber Second Petition Thus, Bobby. according to these wit- Corpus Writ of Habeas November testimony, nesses’ in the Appellant was petition Appellant claimed car police police the entire time the at- that he was denied his Sixth Amendment tempted Bobby. According to arrest right to effective assistance of counsel dur- Court, the District “McGowan’s recollec- ing proceedings leading up to his 1986 evidentiary tion of the case hear- [at on, among things, convictions based other ing] sketchy.”7 was somewhat con- She subpoena any counsel’s failure to during hearing ceded that she did not requested.6 witnesses he investigate surrounding the events Coss’ arrest, electing dispatch not to her investi- April evidentiary On an hear- gator to interview of the witnesses at ing was held to Appellant’s address inef- issue, by stating and defended her actions fective assistance of counsel claims. At that “Coss must have told her not to sub- hearing, each of the witnesses (June 10, poena Op. them.” Dist. Ct. Appellant stated he had identified to coun- 1998). sel, Ann, namely, Bobby, Sherry, Carol George, testified that McGowan did Following hearing, the District *6 not contact them regarding Edward’s trial Appellant’s Court denied ineffective assis- and that he did not police strike offi- tance of counsel claims. The court held that, Bobby, Sherry, cer. and George although testified failure McGowan’s to sub- Cottone, Appellant alleged Judge according also that his counsel was once Mr. Coss told empaneling jurors transcript, thinking ineffective for two adverse to the that he was about interests, this, Appellant’s failing appeal, they telling have the an but were him just distinctly, institutional vandalism and criminal mischief then I recalled. I do recall —I charges failing post-trial exactly, they they., advising dismissed and to file him —the me, way, okay? motions. The District Court dismissed these and he would not listen to and, other bases of ineffective counsel see When we wanted to file the Post-trial Motions V, that, Appellant appeal Section does not on he did not want them.... That is infra their dismissal. Now, may direct recollection. the other stuff general. be evidentiary hearing a review of From transcript, agree with we the District Court’s Q. McGowan, asking you Ms. what I’m memory characterization of McGowan’s of is, you, specifically, about do hav- remember evidentiary hearing, this case. At ing this conversation with Eddie Coss about McGowan testified: your testimony these witnesses or is that this Q. McGowan, you normally yourself? is how conduct your testimony, Ms. to- No, No, no, no, A. no. it wouldn't be. I day, par- base d on actual recollection of this case, case, peo- would have asked him what these about you testify- ticular the Coss or are these, ple, know, ing, upon what about what your general practice, based about these? You as a Defender, they doing you what were there how are employed Public when were or they the Public Defender’s Office? related to this? questioning part, yes, A. It would—it The continued with McGowan an- would be in and i part, portions swering questions regarding n no. Because certain that I’ve her failure to to, responded subpoena I have direct recollection. IAs the witnesses in the form of what said, I have direct recollection —once I looked she "would have” done or what Coss "must said, sentencing report, at the distinguished stating I had direct recollec- have” as from what tion, mean, exactly, transpired. what had she "did” or what Coss "said.” transaction, being these as one one inci objec- “fell below an these witnesses poena reasonableness,” dent, conviction, Appel- than one rather two. tive standard Therefore, prejudiced viewing that he was I will be the defendant prove lant failed to because the verdict McGowan’s failure with a record score of two rather different, given April not have been than three.” Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 5. On inconsistency the accounts of stated that in judge determining hand, and the and his on the one the sentence “we’ve taken into brother consider Ap- the other. police your presentence investigation, witnesses and the on ation ” District pellant appeals report your prior this decision ... record.... [and] Court, appeal that the District arguing on Pl.’s Ex. at 6. application preju- Court erred its are satisfied that We prong dice of the ineffective assistance judge for the 1990 conviction took into counsel test stated Strickland Appellant’s simple consideration

Washington, U.S. stemming conviction from the events of L.Ed.2d 674 25,1986. June

III. TV. inquiry Our first is whether the sentenc- into ing court at the 1990 conviction took We must now decide whether the consideration the 1986 conviction. The subject juris District matter Court Lackawanna presentence report of the petition. over this diction habeas Section Ap- indicated that Adult Probation Office jurisdiction confers United States January pellant had been convicted petitions District Courts to entertain Vandalism, 1987 of Institutional Criminal persons relief was sen- Simple Mischief and Assault and “in custody” who are in violation of the Simple charge tenced Assault “[o]n or laws or treaties of the Constitution costs, 1 years plus 6 months to consecutive Supreme Court has United States. to the Institutional Vandalism sentence.” interpreted mandating 2254 as that the Pl.’s Ex. 5 at 5. On March custody” pursuant be “in petitioner question counsel raised the Appellant’s or he seeks to attack conviction Appellant’s whether 1986 convictions filed. See Ca the time his misdemeanor, should count as one rather *7 LaVallee, 234, v. 391 U.S. 88 S.Ct. rafas Mecca, 2 A Mr. than two. Pl.’s Ex. at 5. 1556, A habeas 20 L.Ed.2d 554 office, ostensibly probation from the com- custody” “in petitioner does not remain mented: sentence im under a conviction “after the defendant com- To state when the fully expired, merely it has be posed for City in simple mitted a assault Dickson possibility prior cause of the petitioned, charged, time was conviction will be used to enhance the detention, juvenile in the fol- placed imposed any subsequent for sentences Scranton, Pennsylvania, in lowing day of which he is convicted.” Mal crimes institution- charged decided or was with Cook, eng v. 109 S.Ct. vandalism, destroying al the cell he (1989) 1923, (per 104 L.Ed.2d cu 540 in, say and the act as that is one same riam). does, however, satis petitioner A assault, by simple a which was followed custody” requirement “in for fed fy hours, day if no criminal activi- not a jurisdiction he asserts a eral habeas when say guide- under the ty, to that is one currently a he is challenge to error, Judge. an lines is by enhanced serving that has been Id. at 9. conviction. Id. at allegedly prior invalid Moreover, 493, 109 United hearing

At a continuation of the the next Tucker, 443, 404 view States v. U.S. day judge ruled that he “will 460 (1972), federally guaranteed in protecting 592 the Court courts

589, L.Ed.2d 30 in a prisoner rights.” could attack Evans v. Court Common held that allegedly Pleas, Pa., an proceeding habeas 959 County, federal Delaware F.2d conviction, (3d Cir.1992) if even he has 1227, unconstitutional (citing 1230 O’Halloran entirety resulting (3d Cir.1987)). the sentence 506, served Ryan, 835 F.2d conviction, if that conviction had “[ijnexcusable from the course, or inordinate de- Of present sentence. See also an effect on lay by processing the state in claims for (3d 72, Vaughn, 83 F.3d Cir. Young v. may remedy state effec- relief render the 1996) may that “a at (holding prisoner tively unavailable” and exhaustion- will be aby current sentence habeas tack his Fulcomer, Wojtczak excused. 800 F.2d constitutionality of an challenge to the (3d Cir.1986). 353, 354 if that conviction was expired conviction sentence”). to enhance his current

used § filing peti Prior to his tion, Appellant petition challenging had a Although Appellant already has pending his 1986 conviction under Penn the al resulting served the sentence from sylvania’s Hearing Post Act Conviction legedly unconstitutional 1986 convictions (PCHA), § seq. 42 Pa. et Cons.Stat. currently serving a sentence for an and is (amended 1988), approximately for seven that occurred in unrelated conviction years any activity. without Under these he contends the sentence his circumstances, the District Court excused adversely by 1990 conviction was affected requirement the exhaustion and we find (cid:127)the 1986 assault conviction. We Appellant no fault with that has decision. sentencing judge have concluded that the not, however, presented Pennsylva did, fact, Appellant’s refer to 1986 con nia state courts his claim that the invalid assaulting police viction officer in conviction was to enhance him for his 1990 used his conviction. attacking subsequent conviction in prior is thus con convic attempt in an to have his current being challenged underlying viction tion sentence, Nonetheless, which relied on his convic petition. we con tion, reevaluated. The District Court clude that this is not a situation which appropriately Appel therefore construed the District Court was faced with a mixed challenging lant’s the 1990 con petition necessitating dismissal under conviction, expired viction rather than his Lundy. Rose v. As was made clear Young, properly see 83 F.3d at Pennsylvania Supreme Court Com jurisdiction concluded that it had over his Ahlborn, monwealth v. 548 Pa. juris petition. appellate We have (1997), A.2d 718 collateral relief is not §§ pursuant diction to 28 U.S.C. available under either the Post Conviction Hearing Act or under the common law remedies of state habeas or coram *8 V. petitioner currently nobis for a who is not excuse, a valid a serving imprisonment Absent habeas a sentence of for petitioner present all challenge, must federal claims the conviction he wishes to even 2254(b); § 28 if petitioner state courts. U.S.C. contends that collateral conse 509, Lundy, Rose v. 455 102 quences U.S. S.Ct. stem that conviction. Ac 1198, 71 cordingly, clearly L.Ed.2d 379 “The exhaus insofar as state law fore requirement tion that state of Appellant’s ensures courts closes state court review claim, opportunity consequence” have the first to federal “collateral the Dis review challenges constitutional properly to state convic trict Court excused exhaustion preserves tions and of the the role state and entertained the claim on its merit.8 remedy 8. We view Commonwealth v. Ahlborn not as ment that there is no available state bar,” erecting “procedural present but as a state- for the claim that the sentence was

461 See, Scheidemantel, pre-AEDPA e.g., requirements govern. Gibson v. 805 Appel- (3d Cir.1986) 135, (citing Duck obligated F.2d 138 lant was to obtain certificate of Serrano, 1, 3, 102 worth v. S.Ct. probable cause in to appeal order from the curiam)). (1981) 18, (per L.Ed.2d 1 70 judgment District Court’s dismissing his corpus petition. VI. pre-AEDPA certificate of fil Appellant submitted Because probable require cause did not specifica ings to the District Court both before and placed tion of issues and the entire case after the enactment of the Antiterrorism before the court of appeals. Ramsey See Penalty and Effective Death Act of 1996 Bowersox, (8th 749, v. 149 F.3d 759 Cir. (“AEDPA”), necessary we think it to brief 1998); States, Herrera v. United 96 F.3d ly governing the law discuss action. (7th 1010, Cir.1996); 1012 see also United brought that the We conclude amendments ex Hickey Jeffes, States rel. v. 571 F.2d AEDPA apply about do not to this case (3d Cir.1978). 762, contrast, By 765-766 Appellant’s original petition and amend post-AEDPA appealabili certificate of ment were both filed to AEDPA’s ty requires specification as to which issues v. Murphy, effective date. See Lindh satisfy the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. 138 L.Ed.2d U.S. 2253(c)(2),i.e., those issues for which the (1997); Vaughn, 172 McCandless v. F.3d applicant showing has made a substantial (3d Cir.1999); United States v. Skan right. of the denial of a constitutional In dier, (3d Cir.1997). Though 125 F.3d 178 case, granting Ap the instant than rather file a Appellant did “Second Petition” pellant probable a certificate of cause to 1996, i.e., November after the enact appeal, granted Appel the District Court AEDPA, petition ment of did not add lant certificate of limited to appealability claims, waived, merely new but as was his claim that counsel rendered constitu permitted the District Court’s order of tionally by failing ineffective assistance presented October those claims subpoena witnesses original petition his that were determined charge. pre-AEDPA Under law we deter by the District Court to be unexhausted. inappropriate mined that it for a District Rose, See U.S. at S.Ct. 1198 prescribe Court the issues or issue (petitioner may petition amend his to de may which support be considered in of or claims); lete unexhausted McMahon in opposition judgment Ap to a and that Fulcomer, (3d Cir.1987) 821 F.2d pellant which is free to choose claims to (same). fairness, view Appellant’s we appeal. Hickey, assert on 571 F.2d at 766. “Second Petition” filed after AEDPA as Appellant, through attorney, Because tantamount to a further amendment or limited his request ap certificate on clarification his initial petition, filed at peal to the one issue he believed to be of Court, the direction of the District which merit,” is, “arguable the ineffective merely expressed Appellant’s intention to issue, ness of counsel claim at we see no proceed with his claims. exhausted There beyond reason to review extend our fore, we all consider the claims raised as Moreover, given merits of that claim. our having been asserted in a filed disposition appeal, we believe that prior to AEDPA’s enactment date. See expanded an review would make little dif Duffus, also United States 174 F.3d ference. (3d Cir.1999) (discussing, 336-337 inter *9 alia, provision the “relation back” of Rule VII. 15(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clarifying Appel and its to amend We now the merits of application reach petitions). Accordingly, ments to habeas lant’s Sixth Amendment claim that he was incorrectly by enhanced an invalid viction. con- by rogue police officers. As- taged assistance of counsel. Be- two

denied effective legal suming Appellant involves the that would have his contention still tes- cause way ineffective assistance of tified and have testified in the component of an would did, claim, plenary review. we exercise that he the District Court reasoned counsel Fulcomer, (3d Parrish v. 150 F.3d that the failure to call these witnesses was Cir.1998). Appellant. not to It reasoned prejudicial offered, testimony, only that if would their based on an ineffective To obtain relief jury suggested Appellant that claim, a petitioner counsel assistance of lying on the witness stand and that per- only not that his counsel’s must show Appellant during was drunk and excitable unreasonable, objectively formance was the incident. Because this case turned on prejudiced it his case. but also that credibility Appel- determination between Washington, Strickland v. U.S. officers, lant District and the Court 2052, L.Ed.2d 674 Appellant reasoned that could not have determined that his The District Court by prejudiced been counsel’s failure to call subpoena failure to the witnesses counsel’s witnesses who would have contradict- unreasonable, objectively but issue was facts, Appellant’s ed version de- Appellant denied relief because had failed jury.10 stroying credibility with the prejudice.9 to demonstrate The District Court thus concluded that the prove prejudice To under the outcome of trial would no have been of the Strickland test, prong second a different, is, Appellant that still .would defendant must “establish reasonable guilty assaulting have been of found probability sufficient to undermine —one officer, absent failure to counsel’s summon our confidence the outcome—that the other witnesses. jury’s verdict would have been different if not for counsel’s errors.” United v. We States disagree with the District Court. (3d Cir.1989). Gray, F.2d it Although unlikely that a court can certainty The District Court reached its conclusion determine with the result of the failure, Appellant proceedings that had failed demonstrate absent counsel’s we witnesses prejudice because the who testi must examine the “breadth of the evi- evidentiary hearing painted fied at the a dence” and determine whether the case completely picture way different of the incident would have out the that it if come did United leading Appellant’s from present. arrest that told witnesses had been (3d brother, Kauffman, at States v. by Jimmy, Appellant and his 109 F.3d Cir.1997). evidentiary hearing testimony trial. The Having examined the evidence case, night including evidentiary made clear of the inci hear- Appellant drinking ing transcript, dent had been at a we that a conclude reason- party to be up probability broken able exists that had counsel witnesses, police. a far cry subpoenaed This version events is calm, Appellant’s testimony trial guilty assaulting have been found quiet visit him and his brother sabo- the officer.

9. We are not asked to review the issue of 10. The District Court also considered that Bobby's testimony Carol Ann and would have justifi- reasonableness counsel’s actions as suspect they siblings, been since are Coss’ strategic Appellant’s able or decisions. attor- Sherry’s testimony would have been sus- ney claimed no tactical merit to her failures pect girlfriend, since she was Coss’ and that except say that she must have done what George testimony, seemingly Frieto's while Appellant nesses; subpoenaing wanted in not wit- Appellant in that he beneficial to testified that does the nor Commonwealth contest officer, it was he who attacked the is also not finding that the District Court’s her conduct testimony inconsistent with the officer’s objective “fell below standards of reasonable- George, an individual named in addition to ness.” Bobby’s Appellant, tried to hinder arrest. *10 failure to con- failure call As a result of counsel’s witnesses should be assessed investigation duct an into the events in the context the testimony pre- other arrest, only Ap- surrounding Appellant’s sented the witnesses.” Dist. Ct. defense younger Jimmy and his brother pellant (June 1998) atOp. (emphasis add- in There can testified his defense. be ed). The District phrased Court as the Appellant Jimmy little doubt that question: critical would the result of the try decided to to conceal the fact that if, trial have been different instead of they drinking evening had been that be- only Appellant Jimmy testifying, the they underage. were both Re- cause other four witnesses had also testified in to lie gardless Appellant’s motivation defense? In framing ques- Coss’ so provok- about context of the incident tion, the court Ap- assumed not that arrest, however, ing both he and pellant would still have testified on his own Jimmy Appellant that did testified not behalf, but also that he would have told the police assault a officer. At the eviden- same tale that he did at trial. tiary hearing investigate Appel- held to Strickland teaches that a court consider claims, lant’s ineffective counsel Carol “the totality of the evidence before Ann, Bobby, Sherry and all George tes- judge jury” in determining prejudice. or that was a at party tified there Carol 466 U.S. at 2052. “Some house, people par- Ann’s at the pervasive errors will have had a effect on alcohol, ty consuming fight were that a to be drawn inferences from the evi- out, police and that came to broke dence, altering evidentiary pic- the entire up. important, they break it Most all ture, isolated, and some will have had an consistently Appellant testified did 695-696, trivial Id. at effect.” punch police Bobby, not a officer. Sher- 2052. ry George consistently testified it George jumped police was who Here, had pervasive counsel’s error officer’s back when the officer assaulted effect, altering evidentiary pic- the entire Bobby. Finally, they testified consis- testimony ture at The trial. of the wit- that, tently at the time the officers ar- presented not not be nesses should consid- Bobby, according rested which to the of- merely hypothetical supplement ered as that Appellant ficers time trial, actually to the evidence offered at officer, punched Appellant was sit- presumed with the remainder of the trial ting police car with the door actually Considering to unfold as it did. Thus, although shut.11 the witnesses’ evidence, totality of the we believe of what happened night rendition that, subpoenaed the wit- counsel question large part conflicts in with and heard from them their version nesses trial, Appellant’s version at his all ac- that, (including although of the events evening of the are counts consistent police it allegations, were correct their significant respect Appellant their most — Appellant, who George, not assaulted alleged. did not commit officer), presented she would events, evening’s at trial all versions of the We believe that the District Court em- clearly fictional rendition. including Coss’ ployed analyz- too narrow an approach reasonably probable When we assume the ing Appellant’s prejudice. claim of When ineffectiveness, outcome without counsel’s prejudice prong it reached the test, that envi- Strickland the District Court stated we must also assume scenario “ ‘[prejudice’ acting effectively.12 to a defendant from the sions counsel’s important pointed Appellant, Il note that at out if counsel had all witnesses As evidentiary hearing sequestered, put were both and the witnesses issue bolstering credibility presented thus of these wit- on the stand and an inconsistent defense, convincingly theory that in itself could consti- nesses’ consistent versions of the Bland v. Cali- critical events. tute ineffective assistance. See *11 previous to the assault and any have realized and reference should District Court battery conviction. the course that the different considered have taken had coun- probably trial would in grant relief that we habe- The normal man- objectively reasonable in an sel acted peti- is to order that the habeas interviewing these by subpoenaing ner freed, subject right tioner be to the of a defense witnesses, presenting then timely manner the society to correct testimony. Had their with consistent through error a new state constitutional witnesses, we these counsel interviewed proceeding. It cannot be controverted probabil- there is a reasonable believe that Appellant petition that his habeas filed would not have testified ity Appellant that or during period the he was incarcerated all, have testified con- that he would or parole from the first conviction and we witnesses, the thus with other sistently deprived decided that he had been of his contradictory testimony that avoiding the counsel, to we right Sixth Amendment the District Court. troubled Pennsylvania op- the would have accorded releasing correcting tion of him or emphasized, preju has As the Court means, infirmity by of a new trial or other concepts of relia inquiry dice also involves See, proceeding. e.g., Henderson bility Lockhart v. Fret and fairness. See (3d Frank, Cir.1998); Barry 155 F.3d 159 well, (3d Cir.1988). Brower, 864 F.2d 294 that coun We believe L.Ed.2d 180 subpoena these witnesses - sel’s failure to however, Here, we cannot “free” They would have testified prejudicial. was already, in Appellant because he has innocence to the Appellant’s as to vernacular, the crime and “done done charge. strongly suggests This very time.” We are faced with the thus the outcome of the trial would not give society, question: nice Should we In light quan have been the same. here, Pennsylvania, of Commonwealth avail tity exculpatory evidence right to cure the Sixth Amendment yet presented jury, not to the we able give constitutional defect or should we counsel’s conduct made the result Appellant believe a free ride and have his second fundamentally simply of the trial unfair and unre sentence declared invalid because Henderson, has Appellant liable. thus met burden he is recidivist? we ex power limit prove plained under to that he was “federal habeas Strickland ed, first, to a prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to sub determination whether improper there has been an detention the witnesses at issue. poena judgment; virtue of the state court We, therefore, conclude that the District second, detention, if an illegal we find such denying for a Court erred ordering the immediate release of the corpus. writ of habeas prisoner, conditioned oppor on the state’s tunity to correct constitutional errors VIII. pro we conclude occurred the initial ceedings.” 155 F.3d at 168. Finally, we what re must address appropriate. suggested Appellant previ- lief It has been contends that where a that, infirm already ously inasmuch as has conviction has been used to subsequent in a pro served his sentence under the tainted enhance case, ceeding, only remedy relief is to di criminal available to available require rect Commonwealth to re-sentence a federal court is to the state to re- Appellant for the 1990 conviction without sentence under the second conviction and Corrections, attempt present theory Dep't 20 F.3d her a consistent

fornia course, (9th Cir.1994). defense, Of counsel can- because she did not interview these rely proper say on Bland to that it was witnesses to ascertain inconsistencies. testimony her to not offer the witnesses’ deny opportunity it the always correct con- of is respondent. The teach- infirmity previous ings stitutional case. of Tucker reflect exception one *12 He relies on a general series of cases which we rule of permitting the state to- now examine. correct the constitutional in infirmity a subsequent sentence enhancement case— n Appellant’s primary reliance is where the federal court the authority lacks Tucker, teachings of United States v. 404 to afford the state opportunity to cor- 443, 589, 92 30 U.S. L.Ed.2d 592 rect the infirmity constitutional because no (1972). We do not deem this to be an state officer a party is to the litigation. analogue appropriate to this case or We now turn to other exceptions reflected other federal habeas case brought under in the cases. By § caption 2254. content United States v. Tucker was not a habeas This court has held that where a return § brought case under 2254 based on a to the state for additional proceedings state conviction. There the defendant virtually “would be impossible” under the a, seeking post conviction circumstances, relief from the federal court in a feder- pursuant § § al conviction to 28 U.S.C. 2255. 2254 may case simply order re-sentenc- This is a distinction with a ing fundamental subsequent conviction without difference. possibly The Court could not affording the state an opportunity to cure condition relief on affording any previous state the constitutionally infirm convic- retry opportunity to the defendant Commonwealth, because tion. See Clark v. 892 (3d Cir.1989). no state parties officials were to the law- F.2d 1142 Clark awas de- wardens, suit. No state custodians or privation process of due case lodged state officers were respondents or against prior defen- a conviction that served to § in petition. dants as the case of a enhance the sentence subsequent for a of- action, In bringing his Tucker was attack- fense. gravamen petitioner’s ing imposed federal sentence complaint 1974, was that in when Clark District Court for the Northern years District of was 17 age, he was denied a juvenile California that had been enhanced on the hearing court to determine wheth- basis of invalid state court convictions er he juvenile should been tried as a from Florida and Louisiana. Because the or as an adult. We determined that this petitioners Court had no state officers as violation, denial constituted process a due respondents it, or before the Court lacked reversed the granted district court and power or authority give option relief, and, to a without elaboration at this state court in retry Florida or Louisiana to in point opinion, ordered that “the prevent defendant. To the “erosion of matter must be remanded for re-sentenc- the Gideon principle” right ing on the 1979 conviction without consid- effective assistance counsel is funda- eration of the offenses.” F.2d at mental, the Nevertheless, Court had no alternative other opinion, our earlier than to order the defendant be recognizing re- that at the time we heard this sentenced the federal conviction appeal petitioner with- years was 31 old, out reference to the invalid state court there sup- statement of reasons contrast, convictions.13 In every porting our determination of proper petition brought § under an officer relief. Although set forth in our discus- political of the state or a portion subdivision there- sion of Pennsylvania Post- specifically The Court's discussion sentencing judge tar- have been if the different geted to a 2255 case: respon- had known that at least two of the question real previous [T]he here is not whether the dent's convictions been un- pro- results of the Florida Louisiana constitutionally obtained. ceedings might have been different if the (emphasis 404 U.S. at 92 S.Ct. 589 add- counsel, respondent had had but whether ed). the sentence in the might case federal him to live Act, compelling and ordeal and we commented Hearing Conviction anxiety and inse- continuing state delay, years since that “both possibili- violation, curity, enhancing as well as prej- and the process alleged due may though even innocent he be ty present.... ... Given udice are guilty. found judge and the destruction death of the trial notes, to now stenographic of the relevant States, (quoting Id. Green United issue a collateral against defend 187-188, 2 L.Ed.2d U.S. virtually impossi- proceeding would be (1957)). Pennsylvania To return to the ble.... jeopardy prob- example An of a double *13 F.2d at thus be futile.” 892 courts would petitioner if a were suc- lem would arise Moreover, us and 1148-1149. before Virginia, in a like cessful case Jackson gave the the district court Commonwealth 2781, 307, 99 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. it fur- pursue no that wished to indication (1979). Jackson, claimed petitioner In the in- constitutionally in the proceedings ther he had corpus proceeding a habeas only relief prosecution. The firm 1974 constitutionally inade- been convicted re-sentencing was to order possible evidence. The Court held the quate en- subsequent conviction without granted “upon if petition would be Thus, reflects a second hancement. Clark no adduced at the trial record evidence permitting rule exception general rational trier of fact could have found option of addition- the state to exercise beyond a reasonable doubt.” proof guilt of proceedings. al 324, at Id. 99 S.Ct. Had addition, a defendant could not be case, granted been in that the state could by the where the trial never retried state retry petitioner not because it would a serious should have been held because of right against jeopardy. double violate denial of a constitutional violation such as States, also Burks v. United 437 U.S. See Wingo, Barker v. right speedy (1978) to a trial. 2141, 1, 11, 98 57 L.Ed.2d 1 S.Ct. 2182, 514, 522, 92 33 (“The 407 U.S. Jeopardy Double Clause forbids (1972). that: L.Ed.2d 101 Barker teaches affording purpose second trial for the prosecution opportunity also leads to another [speedy right [T]he trial] which it failed to muster unsatisfactorily remedy supply severe evidence proceeding. This is central to of the indictment when the the first dismissal objective prohibition against of the right deprived. has been This is indeed trials.”). it consequence a serious because means successive may guilty of a that a defendant who be Another situation where a defendant free, go serious crime will without hav- granted retried when a writ is cannot be remedy more ing been tried. Such petitioner denied the due because state exclusionary than an rule or a serious destroy- process by suppressing or of law trial, only it is the reversal for but new exculpatory longer evidence that no ing possible remedy. Mary- Brady can reconstructed. be See added). The Court also (emphasis Id. land, 1194, 10 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. only remedy (1963). teaches that dismissal is prosecution If the L.Ed.2d princi- jeopardy for violation of the double exculpatory not withhold evi- were to ple. Maryland, In Benton v. Brady, also de- dence violation but 795-796, 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 89 S.Ct. it, could receive a stroy a defendant never (1969), remarked: the Court pro- could never fair trial. The defendant totality in his or all its resources and duce the of the evidence

[T]he State with her of the constitutional power not allowed to make defense because should be instance, only con- In this repeated attempts to convict an individu- violations. offense, unconditional thereby remedy sub- stitutional would be alleged al for an embarrassment, expense granting of the writ. jecting him to parallel no the case at respondent’s There is between least prior [some] unconstitutionally convictions had been and those cases where courts have ob- bar Tucker, tained.” United States v. that states should not be enti- U.S. determined 30 L.Ed.2d 592 retry petitioner. tled to record, On have no doubt íj: ‡ ‡ & # sentencing judge im- Therefore, entry we will condition the of posed exactly the same sentence had he by extending the writ to the Common- known Coss’ 1986 conviction option conducting wealth the a new trial. assault was constitutionally infirm. There- produces If this new trial a verdict differ- fore, I respectfully from that por- dissent verdict, ent from the must state majority’s tion of the opinion holding that account for any re-sentence Coss is entitled to habeas relief. Because due guilty enhancement to this verdict.14 due, I conclude that no relief is I express option The Commonwealth also has the of no view on the propriety of the majority’s affording merely pro- a new trial and remedy. ceeding re-sentencing into on the 1990 con- This is at least third time that Coss *14 viction. has asked court to review the sentence above, the For reasons stated we will arising from his 1990 conviction for simple judgment reverse the of the District Court aggravated time, assault. The first the petition that denied for a writ of habe- Pennsylvania Superior Court “vacated corpus and remand with instructions the sentence because it was not clear that that it issue a writ of condi- presentence report was accurate” and on the foregoing options tioned available to remanded resentencing. the case for See the Commonwealth. Coss, 831, Commonwealth v. 695 A.2d 833 (mem) (Pa.Super.1997) (citing Common-

NYGAARD, Judge, dissenting. Circuit Coss, wealth v. 449 Pa.Super. 674 A.2d (1995)). 313 agree I with much majority’s Indeed, opinion. agree I that Coss was At his resentencing hearing, Coss chal- denied effective assistance counsel dur- lenged gravity assigned both the to his ing assault, simple his 1986 trial for conviction, aggravated assault and its en- subsequent that his conviction on that hancement based on his criminal record. charge constitutionally is infirm as a re- sentencing agreed See id. The court part I company majority sult. with the his three misdemeanor convictions question over the and, whether chal- all arose from the same action accord- lenged “might sentence have been ingly, prior differ- reduced his record score from ent if the sentencing judge had known that adjust- See id. The effect of the retry opinion 14. Even if the Commonwealth elects to no on whether such a retrial would Coss, regard- he will have to be Pennsylvania re-sentenced be consistent with law. More- over, less of the outcome. Even if a valid convic- if there a conviction on retrial of the forthcoming charge, offense, tion is on the earlier Jeopardy earlier the Double Clause nothing changes the fact that his current sen- requires already that the time he has served tence was enhanced an unconstitutional original on 1990 sentence be credited violation. A vacated conviction is not the against the new sentence. North Carolina same conviction as one occurs after vaca- Pearce, 711, 718-719, 395 U.S. 89 S.Ct. Thus, conviction, tur. in the event of a valid trial, (1969) ("If, upon 23 L.Ed.2d 656 a new he would still have to be re-sentenced on the acquitted, way defendant there is no subsequent light proceed- offense in of new years spent prison he can be returned to ings earlier offense. reconvicted, years him. But if he is can these by subtracting and must be them We hold that a retrial on the earlier returned — imposed.”), whatever offense would not violate the Federal sentence is over- Consti- Smith, comity requires grounds by tution and that ruled on other us to afford Alabama opportunity Commonwealth the to cure 104 L.Ed.2d original express We constitutional defect. Instead, deny relief because the 1986 convictions sion. to eliminate ment was entirely. conviction is such prior simple record score his 1986 from Coss’ 2of was based that record that there post-adjustment component score minor adjudication court, of delin- solely sentencing on Coss’ 1985 that the question is no making Despite concerns, id. at 835. imposed See would have quency. given its however, resen- adjustment, the court event. exactly the same sentence six-to-twelve-year tenced Coss to same appeal, nature of Coss’ it is Given the That originally imposed. it had sentence that the focus of certainly understandable remained within the standard challenged attention has been the state range provided assault. But I take a conviction for record ad- guidelines even after the extensive broader view and include justment, and the court found no reason managed criminal record that Coss has departure. See id. at 833- for downward arrest, It with a compile. starts old, recklessly years when Coss was 11 sen- resentencing Coss to the same endangering person. another See Presen- sen- originally imposed, tence it had Investigation repro- Report tence a number of dif- tencing court considered Thereafter, at 258. Supp.App. duced In explaining ferent factors. the sentence five adjudicated delinquent Coss record, court Coss for the informed (when he was separate occasions that: old) (1) for, years respectively: and 16 taken passing you sentence on I’ve (2) receiving property; stolen theft and presentence inves- into consideration arrest; disorderly resisting conduct and *15 tigation report, and I’ve deleted there- (3) (4). assault; yet simple simple another through all the remarks the matter (5) assault; burglary. and See id. my brought [defense to attention I adult, and will not consider those counsel] As an Coss has been convicted on matters. simple charges assault aggravated and currently imprisoned. In for which he is

I’ve taken into consideration the state- incidents, separate pleaded guilty he has to counsel] ments and seri- [defense being disorderly charged conduct after and nature of the crime involved ousness offense, here, hindering as with being and of with that as well protection the well apprehension, pleaded in 1989. He also people community, who live in our record, guilty possession of a controlled sub- your prior possibili- criminal rehabilitation, being charged ty your the testi- stance in 1992 after with and offense, endanger- and with reckless mony that I’ve heard. I was the trial in I ment judge, and take into consideration the testimony from the trial. addition, Coss’ record at the time of 4-5, Sentencing Transcript of at 03/27/1996 sentencing included:1

reproduced Supp.App. in at 243-44. (1) making a 1986 arrest for terroristic deny the relief he Coss threats; merely prior seeks because his criminal (2) aggravated for only many record was one of factors on a 1988 arrest assault; sentencing simple which the court its deci- and based Straw, law, (citing Pennsylvania 238 Pa.Su Under court Commonwealth 535, (1976); may prior per. 361 A.2d 427 Common consider arrests in an offender’s 77, record, convictions, Tisdale, Pa.Super. 233 334 A.2d that did not result in "so wealth v. Shoemaker, (1975); long court the defendant 722 Commonwealth as the realizes that (1973), Pa.Super. 226 A.2d 342 had not been convicted on those 313 aff'd (1975)); charges,” give 462 111 see also and them "undue Pa. 341 A.2d does not Allen, Pa.Super. weight.” Craft, 304 Commonwealth v. See Commonwealth v. 494, (1982) Pa.Super. A.2d 912 n. 4 450 A.2d (3) delivery arrest a con- record. I am Because certain that (heroin);

trolled substance sentencing court would not have sentenced differently Coss had it known that one (4) assault, aggravated arrest for conviction infirm, was constitutionally I re- assault, simple recklessly endanger- spectfully dissent from majority’s con- ing another and person disorderly contrary. clusion to the conduct; (5) aggravated another arrest for Judge joins Roth in this dissenting opin- assault; and ion. (6) yet another 1989 arrest for simple assault as well for making terror- RENDELL, Judge, Circuit concurring threats;

istic in part and dissenting part: (7) a 1990 arrest for simple assault and I concur with reasoning and result of theft; retail majority opinion in all respects except (8) a 1990 arrest for retail theft and its discussion of the relief to be afforded to

criminal conspiracy; Eddie Coss as set forth at Part VIII. I See id. at 5-7. believe that Part VIII of the majority opinion proceeds from an prem- erroneous

The 1996 sentencing court was intimate- ise “general about a rule” to be followed in ly Coss, familiar with the charges with challenging cases a sentence en- convicted, which he been and with his hancement, then, ante at as a criminal record. It opportunity had the result, asks the wrong question about what hear the against evidence Coss at trial. It appropriate relief particular had the opportunity to hear from at Coss (1) case.1 I that: “general conclude sentencing. Sentencing Transcript See favoring rule” retrial does not exist 4-5, reproduced Supp. 04/28/1993 subsequent cases; sentence enhancement .App. at 199-200. importantly, Most it had (2) for prudence comity, reasons of relatively rare opportunity reconsid- better alternative this case is to condi- er its original decision when the tion our writ Commonwealth Yet, appeal. vacated on the court *16 resentencing court’s Coss on his 1990 con- impose chose to the same sentence it had (3) viction; and such a writ would not initially imposed, finding “no reason” for a provide an untoward “windfall” to peti- reduction. Sentencing Transcript See tioner. 26, reproduced in Supp.App. 03/27/1996

at 244. majority’s remedy The discussion of be-

In finding no reason to gins unobjectionable reduce Coss’ with proposition sentence, the court found it “indicative that normal relief that grant “[t]he we in actions” that he [Coss’] would “con- habeas is to order that the habeas freed, tinue to break the petitioner subject law.” Id. Given the right be extensive and often violent society nature of Coss’ timely to correct in a manner the record, criminal I find it impossible to through constitutional error a new state sentencing conclude that the court’s con- proceeding.” Ante at 464. I take no issue for being people statement, cerns “the well who with this nor do I disagree with community” live in our that, and the “possibility majority’s § assertion in cases, [Coss’] rehabilitation” would have been there is a “general permit- rule of allayed by the ting omission of his 1986 convic- the state to correct the constitutional tion for assault from his criminal infirmity,” and that this rule extends to question, give 1. This "nice” see ante at is: we should a free ride and here, give society, “Should we the Common- second sentence declared invalid Pennsylvania, right wealth of to cure the simply because he is a recidivist?” Sixth Amendment constitutional defect or “permit that we should the state agree enhancement cases as subsequent sentence infirmity,” the constitutional be- Ante at 464. correct other habeas cases. well as goal accomplished that to be lieve However, majority an then makes conditioning our writ on the state’s leap logic that I cannot unarticulated resentencing in Coss a manner consistent transforming general its rule accept, knowledge that his convic- with the permitted be to correct its the state should as- tion was obtained without the effective “general rule” error into constitutional writ, of counsel. Such a which sistance permitted retrial that the state should be instruct the state to release Coss method for this correction whenever as the him in a unless it resentences fashion simply This latter rule does not possible. accords with our determination that true, observes, majority It is as the exist. sentencing as a use of the 1986 conviction in ordinary in an habeas case—one improper and rendered his enhancer gives confinement that rise to which the unconstitutional, par- is an exact sentence directly from petition stems ordinary in an allel to the conditional writ alleged that is to be deficient— conviction case, habeas which instructs the state normally a conditional granted the writ it petitioner repeats release the unless retry allowing writ the state to the defen- way in a that accords offending process because, garden-variety dant. This is reviewing determination with court’s cases, infirmity” the “constitutional habeas aspect process that some of that was con- of lies the conviction being complained stitutionally infirm. contrast, in challenged. a situa- being majority such enhanced sen- asserts that cases involving improperly tion an tence, exceptions are to a it is the latter sentence itself that is Tucket2 and Clark3 jurisdiction general per rule that the state should be for our and that is basis possible, mitted retrial whenever even infirmity” complained the “constitutional Cook, enhancement scenario. Maleng of. See (1989) However, (per majority has not been able 104 L.Ed.2d 540 curiam) in which (stating petitioner point that a in to one enhancement case custody” “in a habeas court has ordered retrial on the an case is not enhancement sentence, charge, suggested initial or even retrial as expired the earlier but rather subsequent potential form of relief. Nowhere custody” is “in sentence); support the ease law is there for the Young Vaughn, enhanced (3d Cir.1996) (stating proposition that Tucker was conceived as 75-76 F.3d of retrial jurisdiction exception general in a case an to a rule Maleng-Vpgo, we have n enhancement applicable the habeas is con- only because *17 Tucker, Although it is true that challenging subsequent as en- cases.4 strued case, the use underly- than the unlike the instant addresses hanced sentence rather conviction, invalid en out “the of earlier state convictions as ing pointing and that sentence, there is hancements of a purpose [petitioner’s] petition pre- federal in in evidence either Tucker itself or sumably to terminate the sentence he is no that Tuck subsequent citing cases Tucker presently serving”). Accordingly, while Tucker, (the granted re-appeal relief in 92 ditioned on United States v. 404 U.S. Barry re-appeal 30 L.Ed.2d 592 was because the violation appellate proceed- question occurred in the (3d Pennsylvania, 3. Clark v. 892 F.2d 1142 ing), simply present same do not situation Cir.1989). case; Barry and are as the instant Henderson only and in- not sentence enhancement cases majority 4. Cases cited such as "garden-variety” habeas scenario. volve the Frank, (3d 162 Henderson v. 155 F.3d Similarly, jeopardy non- the double and other Cir.1998), a writ conditioned which ordered Brower, retrial, cases cited the ma- sentence enhancement Barry 864 F.2d and (3d Cir.1988), us. jority question do not resolve the before ordered a writ con- which under- jurisprudence § 2255 Nor has our Court s arising from limited to cases er is Rather, Tucker excerpt stood Tucker as such.5 majority quotes an The petitions. theory background assump- to reflect a appears for the support as from Tticker limited, resentencing providing at tion that the sen- see ante is so that Tucker — However, tencing opportunity court with the to cor- majority has omitted n. 13. infirm that ex rect the sentence was attacked immediately preceding the lines appropriate in the habeas clearly point opposite cerpt, which —is remedy challenges in habeas to sentence full content of the relevant direction. enhancements. is instructive: passage speculate about whether We need not cases, including Many appellate federal respondent’s the outcome of own, support concept the basic some of our necessarily prosecutions and 1946 resentencing is the default form of if he had had the have been different challenges to invalid sen- relief lawyer. speculation help of a Such The law of our tence enhancements. fruitless, quite but beside only not quite point. clear on this actually Court is question here is not For the real point. Clark, Pennsylva- In we held where of the Florida whether the results wrongly considered sentencing judge nia might have been proceedings Louisiana previous Pennsylvania two convictions ob- respondent if had had different juvenile tained while Clark was a but with- counsel, the sentence in the but whether juvenile procedures, out appropriate might have been dif- 1953 federal case § peti- relief on Clark’s appropriate sentencing judge if ferent challenging tion the enhanced respon- that at least two of the known later, wrongfully resentencing on the un- convictions had been previous dent’s Clark, F.2d at charge. enhanced See constitutionally obtained. resentencing In 1143-44. its references replete Tucker, 447-48, proper remedy, Clark is 589. as the words, “mandates” inquiry language is not with about In other the relevant “musts,”6 resentencing as refers to prior convictions them- inquiry an into the under Tucker.” selves; permitted relief Supreme “[t]he characteriza- Court’s efforts to majority’s Id. at 1149 n. 10. The being “quite speculation tion of such away on the basis that the explain Clark point” suggests that the convic- beside the since the years passed our that had appropriate targets sixteen tions are not states, impracti- Rather, “real trial made retrial Clark as Tucker relief. unavailing; arguments these result of the sen- cable are question” is whether the case, equally applicable to Coss’s suspect. I cannot would be tencing proceeding is reopening of require retrial would majority’s statement that Tuck- which accept the took § case whose events 2255 a import er’s is somehow limited nearly years ago. fourteen Other present place simply Tucker does petitions. apparently as- general Appeals rule. Courts of exception an itself as conviction.”); resenlencing subsequent clearly 5. Third Circuit case law states beyond ("Because applicable Tucker itself is context. case, id. at 1150 the 1974 convictions Clark, §a 2254 enhancement upon by the 1980 were relied to the fact we made several references court, provided to the relief Clark is entitled *18 governing precedent. the See that Tucker was resentenced.”). That by and must be Tucker Clark, ("Thus, at 1144 under the 892 F.2d is, resentencing afforded as we not Tucker, the mat- United States v. mandate of ter must be remanded for case, explicitly § but also relief in a 2254 resentencing of the § well as controls 2254 as stated that Tucker instruction that 1979 conviction with § 2255 cases. convictions, obtained in violation of 1974 right process, to due Clark’s constitutional See, excerpts example, from for the three 6. imposition in the of the not be considered omitted); sentence.”) (citation quoted at n. in note 5 above. id. 1149 Clark ("The only permitted under Tucker is 10 relief 472 an enhanced sentence serving individual the relief in sen resentencing as

sumed cases, indeed the habeas to reduce the may invoke federal tence enhancement spe has Appeals lengthened Circuit Court to the extent it was Seventh sentence holding conviction”). Tucker’s to extend cifically read prior unconstitutional See, e.g., v. Duck § cases. Crank 2254 least, very I think it clear At the Cir.1990) (7th worth, F.2d any of a dispels case law notion appellate (“Tucker of con holds that ‘misinformation pre- retrial on the “general favoring rule” is, reliance magnitude’ stitutional —that in an enhancement case. vious conviction re conviction—authorizes prior an invalid resentencing it clear that equally I think sentence.”) (citation current lief from the case, remedy in appropriate is the this Perrill, omitted);7 902 F.2d Feldman v. judicial implicating both several reasons Cir.1990) (9th if 1445, 1449-50 (stating that First, I comity. am not prudence is indeed challenged prior conviction can afford the convinced that we even flawed, remedy appropriate shall be suggested by majority. Having relief Parole for a remand to the Commission original parole el his entire sentence on recomputation petitioner’s served conviction, offense without con not “in igibility clearly on the later Coss conviction);8 challenged Maleng, sideration of see custody” charge, on that Farley, 25 F.3d see also Smith v. and therefore U.S. S.Ct. Cir.1994) (7th that a (stating n. 10 remedy would not have recourse to challenging wrongly enhanced petitioner at this through petition retrial a habeas seeking to set aside sentence would not be It to me that we have the point. is unclear constitutionally as original his conviction relief, the power provide that same ben- invalid, merely challenging be but would -peti- efits of which are unavailable constitutionality of his conviction as “the petition challenging in a tioner sentence”). present used to enhance sentence, to the re- subsequent enhanced fact, has described the In Justice Souter I petition. in that same spondent law” in this area appellate “uniform case federal case that addresses this found no wrongly that the enhanced suggesting question,9 and believe we should conviction, sentence, is the not the unnecessarily this issue reach out decide petition. Custis target of the habeas See the well-estab- when we can instead choose States, 485, 512, 114 United option simply conditioning our lished (1994) (Souter, 1732, 128L.Ed.2d 517 resentencing writ on the Commonwealth’s J., (joined by Blackmun and dissenting) the 1990 conviction. Coss on JJ.) Stevens, out that the Custis (pointing addition, comity I believe that uni “does not disturb majority’s holding argue in majority raised holding case that an concerns appellate form law Crank, case, proce- leading § treatise on federal habeas is a 9.A like the instant prior, alleged- open very Maleng case in which both left dure notes ly subsequent conviction and the sen- Randy flawed question. S. Liebman & See 1 James on that conviction as an tence that relied Hertz, Corpus Federal Habeas Practice (both state offenses enhancement were initial and 1998) 8.2c, (3d at 333 n. 20 ed. Procedure were subsequent Crank convictions question open ("Maleng [the] ... left ... convictions). Indiana state whether, voiding process of a current in the the basis of an uncon- sentence enhanced on Feldman, Tucker, Although addresses like stitutionally imposed prior conviction as to previous a flawed state conviction use of terminated, custody prior con- has which nothing subsequent proceeding, in a federal voided, may depriving be thus it viction 'itself reaching suggests back to the in Feldman consequences in addition to collateral other original appropriate would be conviction being currently effect on the sentence its Ninth enhancement case. The 493-94, served.”) (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at Appeals that Feldman Circuit Court of noted 1923). Maleng,” a "indistinguishable Feldman, § 2254 902 F.2d at 1448. case.

473 See, resentencing. Crank, It relief limited to initial state conviction.11 e.g., favor of (“We to difficult determine what ramifications is 1091 F.2d at did not decide in by majority mandated the will the relief Lowery the whether federal court could I the 1986 state conviction. am have on invalidate the pur- conviction for all give to exactly not certain what it means only poses purpose or for the partic- of the “opportunity” a defen- retry state an to served, ular being impor- sentence then an context; in this the ma- dant cannot fit if tant distinction the rendering state the proposed proper jority’s relief into original judgment an retains in its interest parlance. vacating procedural Are we the Smith, validity.”); n. F.3d at underlying 1986 conviction? we over- Are (finding “merely ... challenging] that the It turning it? seems that order to allow constitutionality of [the conviction earlier] Coss, retry to essential- the state we must present as used to enhance his sentence” conviction, ly declare the 1986 which is not comity implicates less directly than would subject of the current invalid petition, the “set[ting] aside conviction as the[earlier] me a purposes. for all This seems to far invalid”). Furthermore, constitutionally more extensive intrusion on the state’s noted, previously full Coss has the served process than the of criminal alternative on him imposed by sentence the Common- declaring that that can- merely conviction conviction, wealth the 1986 reducing at be used enhance the sentence any possible might interest that the state Thus, issue in Coss’s habeas petition. have in him.12 retrying principle that federal habeas courts should majority’s comity contention that is grant “require[s] the relief that generally by fostered its choice of relief further is intervention crimi- the least into the state by the weakened fact that the Common- Frank, nal process,” Henderson Pennsylvania already wealth of has (3d Cir.1998), suggests F.3d validity to address of opportunity conditioning resentencing the writ on is conviction, the 1986 and do so. declined to option Several appropriate here.10 majority opinion As Part of the V discuss- by Circuit cases decided the Seventh es, at Appeals presented see ante Coss explicitly Court of found that by with an attack his 1986 comity implicated concerns are less re- Commonwealth on by than reopening petition pursuant conviction in Penn- assertion, Contrary majority’s charge regardless tencing the 1990 of the on guidance pursue Henderson’s federal habeas decision Commonwealth’s whether to "first, power seemingly charge, regardless is limited to a deter- the 1986 retrial on of whether there an im- of such a occur. mination has been outcome retrial should it Thus, by proper detention state 467 n. 14. virtue of the court See ante at the limited intru- second, process judgment; presented by if we find such an sion on state detention, illegal ordering resentencing regardless the immediate will occur which prisoner, on the to fashion—the release conditioned relief we choose relief ordered opportunity majority state's to correct constitutional as well as the that I relief propose. that we conclude occurred in initial errors Henderson, proceedings,” 155 F.3d argues conditioning in favor of the writ on Perrill, 12.See Feldman 902 F.2d resentencing charge on the 1990 rather than 1990) that, (9th (stating peti Cir. because the possibility of retrial the 1986 challenges en tioner who a later sentence charge. complained The "detention” longer custody is no on the hancement suffers) (indeed, Coss detention he conviction, rendering the state initial flawed resulting the detention 1990 sen- pun conviction that initial "has extracted its tence, proceedings thus the relevant peti ishment and has no further interest in opportunity should have the to cor- state tioner”). go We need not as far as Feldman’s sentencing proceedings, not the rect are the state’s interest in the initial statement that 1986 conviction. However, is eliminated. fact conviction served his full that Coss has clearly greatly majority opinion, in the the ma- 1986 conviction reduces the As noted jority’s require choice of relief would resen- Commonwealth’s interest that conviction. *20 a resentencing provide would Hearing stating Act Post Conviction sylvania’s recidivists, § (PCHA), seq. 9541 et seems to believe 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. windfall to (now Post Relief known as the Conviction defendant would lie that a criminal Act). § filing his Prior to Coss’s prison sen serving while an invalid wait court, the state PCHA in federal petition tence, initial refusing to contest this sen approxi- pending had been petition potential of a future bene tence because activity. any mately years without seven challenge him of a later to this fit to in the context of an enhance sentence highlights Pennsylvania’s inaction also a crime proceeding hypothetical ment on inaccuracy of the “nice” of the aspect one yet committed.13 Such that he has majority, see ante at posed the question an here, image impris an of what motivates society, the give we 464: “Should credulity, right oned convict strains and has Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth explic having constitution- additional flaw of been to cure the Sixth Amendment In give itly rejected by Supreme or should we Court. al defect Fordice, have his sentence free ride and second Garlotte simply because he is a (1995), declared invalid L.Ed.2d any “right” I to recidivist?” submit Supreme prisoner Court held that defect inherent cure the Sixth Amendment “in serving consecutive state sentences is already in the 1986 conviction has been on custody” purposes for habeas all op- its to the Commonwealth via afforded sentences, even those that consecutive against to defend this conviction portunity to run first and that had were scheduled petition; PCHA the Commonwealth Coss’s already expired at time of therefore further consideration of this has forfeited rejected petition. The Court the ar years of inaction. To “right” its seven gument holding would encour mind, gives my majority’s relief delay to their age prisoners raising a “free ride” courts of the Commonwealth prisoner naturally prefers claims: “A re apparent for no reason. Further, to later. lease sooner release petitioner generally because the habeas assumptions underlying the second proof, delay apt the burden of bears part majority’s question referring, — disadvantage more than petitioner to a “free ride” for possibility Id. the State.” at 115 S.Ct. 1948. reject I equally Coss—are inaccurate. The Court’s observations Garlotte are person that a who has al- implication equally applicable to Coss’s case.14 ready prison served a a con- majority’s specter find that the therefore viction that was secured violation “free ride” without substance rights gotten a of a his Sixth Amendment has majority in here.15 opinion, “free ride.” The noting It that in order to take offense of which he was convicted in 1990. is also worth benefit, opinion advantage speculative Court of this future District would to run the “exhaus- our defendant gauntlet post-conviction pro- concerning tion” of state 15.One observation is in order last and, course, ceedings, prevail the risk of a "free ride” in this or other test, heavy challenge. merits of the Strickland burden enhancement unconstitutional indeed. we writ on Were to condition our the Com- resentencing monwealth's Coss on the 1990 conviction, pre- judge 14. It is obvious that Coss himself has made no sumably strategic delay challenge be able to take into account such decision to fact, underlying the 1986 convic- the District at issue in 1986 conviction. facts tion, though sufficiently proven, even our Court’s to the fact that Coss's PCHA if reference taking petition challenging the tainted the 1986 conviction was order would bar it ability pending years” itself into account. This for "about seven before Coss conviction possible a defendant’s filed in 1994 consider the facts of the instant challenged possibility act reduces the that the makes it Coss the 1986 bad clear that get can a "free ride.” conviction well before the commission of defendant *21 sum, support Emmerling; I can find no for the Paul E. Philip Erb; H.

majority’s express choice of relief. no Erb; Roy Freed; Gerald J. Marvin E. opinion question whether it would Fultz; Galvin; Ralph Clarence A. possible some other case be for us to Gaul, Jr.; Frank Geissinger; H. Rather, order such relief. I would decline Gilbert; Harvey Gilbert, James T. W. question, to reach that difficult and would Jr.; Gilliland; Robert W. M. Gene Ha instead the District reverse Court’s denial genberger; Larry Harshbarger; L. Coss’s remand to Harshbarger; James L. Carl L. Hart the District with it Court instructions that sock; Heister; Joseph Edwin E. E. order writ of habeas to issue Heller; Herst; David S. T. Lewis He upon being conditioned Coss’s resentenced trick; Hile; William L. Donald Hor on the 1990 conviction without consider- ner; Hostetler; B. John Melvin H. ation of the previous 1986 assault convic- Hughes; Boyd Hunter; Mrs. Ronald comport tion. Such relief would with the Johnson; jurisdiction Johnson; N. principles traditional of habeas John I. Frank by giving incorrectly the tribunal that sub- Keller; B. Kelly; R. John Donald E. jected “custody”— Coss to his current Knepp; Knepp; Dennis D. Mrs. Fred namely, the 1990 court—the Krebs; Leeper; Gary Charles W. M. opportunity to correct its error resen- Leeper; Eugene Lingle; F. Harriet Coss, tencing ridding his sentence of the Marthouse; Martin; Larry Mrs. Clare taint unconstitutional of his convic- McCoy; McKee; C. Lois M. Richard tion. McMunn; D. Metzger; John E. Ches ley Middleton; Mitchell; S. Fred

Judge joins opinion. McKEE in this Moore; L.

Richard Harold C. Mum mah; Nale; Clarence B. F. Joe Nor man; Norris; Joseph L. M. James Ol nick; Pacini; Mrs. Phil Mrs. John Pacini; Parker, Jr.; Melvin E. Her Pecht; George Pitzer; bert W. Rich Quilter; Jay Ream; ard J. A. Don E. Richard; Rhinehelder; Fred D. Righter; Ross; Charles Ferdinando ADAMS; Andrews; David L. Aaron F. Rothrock; Calvin E. Robert R. Ru Archibald; Lynn Aurand; Paul A. E. ntagh; Dorothy Baker; Searer; Banshiere; John E. E. Charles Mrs. Edward Bashore; Basom; John O. Albert L. Shannon; Wayne Sheaffer; E. Ronald Vaughn Baumgardner; K. Ronald L. Shoemaker; Simonetti; J. Paul Don Beckwith; Bell, Jr.; William K. Smith; Smith; ald W. Ross L. Donald Bender; Joseph Berrier; Charles E. G. Snyder; Snyder; H. L. James Glen C. Bickel; Edward Clarence W. R. Bore Solt; Steele; William M. John W. man, Jr.; Harry Bradley, Jr.; John H. Stuck; Suloff; David L. Robert Clark; Joseph Close; R. A. John Swartzell; Thompson; Edward M. Clouser; Condo; Ray Charles W. H. Treaster; Tubbs; Irvin S.L. S. Wilbur Confer; Connare; Thomas J. Donald Ulsh; Vanada; C. Ronald I. H. Gilbert Cook; Crawford; G. Ronald W. Glen Varner; Gary Wagner; Harry L. M. Crissman; Crisswell; F. Gerald W. Wagner; Wagner; Richard S. William Cruikshank; Charles R. L. William Wagner; Wagner; L. M. Gene James Cummings; Davidheiser; Frank J. Wilhelm; Henry Wilson; E. F. Lee M. Davis; Downing; A. William David S. Dumm; Eaton; Wilson; Wolfgang; Gerald Richard H. G. Harold E. Robert

Case Details

Case Name: Edward R. Coss, Jr. v. Lachine County District Attorney the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Feb 29, 2000
Citation: 204 F.3d 453
Docket Number: 98-7416
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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