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Edward Gilliam v. Betty Mitchell, Warden
179 F.3d 990
6th Cir.
1999
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*2 GILMAN, Circuit Judges. NORRIS, J.,

ALAN E. delivered the court, MERRITT, opinion of the in which J., GILMAN, joined. 995-96), J. (pp. separate concurring delivered a opinion. OPINION NORRIS, ALAN E. Circuit Judge. prisoner Ohio appeals Gilliam petition from the denial of his for a writ of corpus, pursuant habeas filed to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In petitioner was convicted following a bench trial part for his robbery armed of a drive-through store in Elyria, located Ohio. appeal

On he contends that the trial court violated right his Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses him admitting non-testifying the statement of a Assuming co-defendant. that we find a Confrontation Clause violation and engage analysis, harmless error he then asks us aрply Chap- the standard articulated in California, man v. U.S. (1967) (error 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 must be doubt) beyond a reasonable rath- recently er than the standard more out set Abrahamson, in Brecht v.

(error injurious must have substantial and verdict). ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍in determining influence I. matter, preliminary

As a petitioner prior initiated this action to the effectivе date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Penalty Death Act of Pub.L. No. (codified 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 at 28 2254). § Consequently, the statute U.S.C. governing petitions habeas that was ef briefed), E. (argued Jill Stone David AEDPA prior passage fect Bodiker, Office, H. Public Defender’s Commission, Columbus, Murphy, to this Lindh v. case. Public Defender OH, 320, 326-27, for' Petitioner-Appellаnt. in front of the wit- parked The car was version of Under in her front made statute, of fact house and she findings ness’ court are entitled appellate from away

state trial or ten feet yard approximately 28 U.S.C. “presumption correctness.” vehicle was The four-door the vehicle. amended); 2254(d) sеe (subsequently § got into the in color. One gray *3 Mata, v. Sumner got man in behind The other front seat. (1981). 66 L.Ed.2d in, driver, getting trouble the but had hear elected to something.” Supreme leg The Ohio or he had a stiff “like and summarized appeal this case on direct the men Moore ask The witness heard as follows: the facts or, eithеr, “How you get?” did “What defendant-appel- August On you get?” much did Gilliam, a lant, made statement Elyria police, questioned When Mike Medders police. Detective ap- he had driven Moore admitted that testified Department Elyria Police Rite Nau to and pellant Treadwell August on that Gilliam admitted that he Moоre admitted “check it out.” Elyria Beverage to Rite he rode Nau they “gonna were this meant assumed Bruce Tread- and with William Moore confession, tajoed In his place.” rob the inside and ordered Appellant went well. that he had seen a admitted Moore also on employee of wine from bottle robbery, which he Joseph as before shotgun later duty, who was identified appellant that the brought, Pleban but Pleban. told Treadwell had believed handed Appellant came to $2.01. by appellant. total thought was owned $2.00, was appellant while Pleban and and Tread- appellant Moorе stated penny, for a in his digging pockets Moore waited well went inside while and shotgun with a appeared Treadwell car. and Treadwell Gilliam money. demanded with mon- together, the car returned to man who had or- Pleban testified they Moore that ey bag, in a and told surprised appear wine did not dered the got money. Both men gotten had some with the shot- appeared when Treadwell car; into the front appellant got into the that he followed explained Pleban gun. Tread- then them to seat. Moore drove orders, went to the cool- Treadwell’s carried well’s house. Treadwell Pleban money bag. As get er to home. appellant insidé and went shotgun said, cooler, Treadwell walked to the court, was tried before Appellant I’ll a hole try funny, put anything “Don’t and Treadwell. from Moore separately took the mon- back.” your Treadwell money register and the to the witness ey from the cash Thе state called Moore Pleban the cooler. bag, stand, and closed his Fifth Amend- but he exercised win- through glass Pleban watched testify. privilege ment refused He could the side the cooler. dows on offered Moore’s Consequently, he could see appellant, see but longer no ap- evidenсe over taped confession into money pants. into his stuffing Treadwell also intro- objection. The state pellant’s left, he Pleban noticed that Treadwell As statement into appellant’s taped duced shotgun. longer could no see tapes and Based on these evidence. that he and рolice Appellant stated evidence, convicted the trial court and met Moore Treadwell left together robbery with aggravated appellant of witness, A Vicki Glo- back at the car. crime of prior both a firearm and ver, had seen two black testified that she specification. violence running from the laughing males 17, 18-19, Gilliam, 70 St.3d State men ran to of Rite The direction Nau. Petitioner 635 N.E.2d Rite down from car four houses parked factual recita- (whom take issue with this does not Nau, a third in which car Moore) upon the effect of rather waiting. tion but focuses she identified as be vised taped Moore’s confession to of his before the statement permitting introduced at trial. was made. Id. denying petitioner, relief to the Ohio Petitioner initiated this action on August exclusively with the Court dealt 1, 1995, raising the same Sixth Amend- “whether the admis- issue now before us: ment issue considered the Ohio Su- taped of a co-defendant’s sion preme The initially Court. matter was after the co-defendant becomes unavailable magistrate referred to a judge report appellant’s

violated Sixth Amendment and recommendation. magistrate right to ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍confront adverse witnesses.” Id. judge with took issue the Ohio 635 N.E.2d at 1245. The Court Court, concluding that the statement at concluded that it did not: any firmly issue did not fall within *4 The a Confrontation Clause is consti- hearsay exception and also did not have safeguard tutional that ensures a defen- particularized guarantees of trustwor- dant will not be convicted based on the required by thiness the Confrontation unseen, unknown, charges of and un- However, report Clause. recom- and. Illinois, challengeable witnesses. Lee v. mendation went on to conclude that 530, 540, 2056, 476 106 90 U.S. S.Ct. admission of the statement constituted (1986). Thus, the Confron- harmless error. tation Clause bars the admission of some The district court agreed that the writ evidence that would otherwise be admis- should rejected magis- be denied but hearsay exception. sible under a Idaho judge’s reasoning. trate The court indicat- 805, 814, Wright, 497 U.S. ed that it was “inclined to find that Rule (1990). 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 When a 804(B)(3) firmly a hearsay excep- is rooted hearsay present declarant is not However, tion.” it based its denial of the trial, cross-examination at the Confron- writ upon ground by the second articulated requires tation a that showing Clause he the Ohio Court: state- is unavailable and that the statement particularized guaran- ment “had sufficient adequate reliability.” bears “indicia of tees of trustworthiness that admission [its] Roberts, 56, 66, Ohio v. 100 against Petitioner did nоt violate Petition- (1980). S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d 597 The er’s under the Confrontation reliability standard can be satisfied with- found, pur- Clause.” The court also out more in a ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍case where the evidence poses argument, of the error —if firmly hearsay falls within a rooted ex- harmless. ception. Id. at 100 S.Ct. 2531. Oth- —was erwise, satisfy to the Confrontation In an оrder dated December supported Clause evidence must be granted probable this court a certificate of by a showing “particularized guaran- of cause. tees of trustworthiness.” Id. (citations 19-20, at at Id. 635 N.E.2d II.

reformatted). The Court went on to hold Challenge A. Clause Confrontation the statement at fell within issuе a proper place begin analysis firmly hearsay a exception as state- Roberts, of this issue is Ohio v. ment interest. Id. at (citing N.E.2d at 1246 R. Evid. propri Roberts involved “the constitutional 804(B)(3)). The held that Court also ety of the in evidence of the introduction challenged statement did not violate the preliminary heаring testimony of a witness Confrontation Clause because it came with produced not the defendant’s subse of particularized guarantees trustworthi- quent criminal trial.” Id. at Among ness. Id. it things, other looked to After the fact that declarant did not S.Ct. 2531. some discussion attempt to shift blame and that he had been ad- Confrontation Clause and its interaction 1997), control the rules, will outcome summa- Neuman the Court hearsay distinguishable. it De terms: case is analysis these this unless proper rized the a dis petitioner’s attempts draw spite hearsay declarant is when cases, we conclude tinction between 'trial, the Con- for cross-еxamination sufficiently similar Neu- they are normally requires frontation Clause to control. Even that he is unavailable. showing if then, only is admissible his statement given Moore The statement reliability.” adequate it “indicia bears authorities, in the which was summarized more inferred without Reliability can be opin- Supreme Court’s passage of the Ohio where the evidence falls in case earlier, sufficiently inculpatory ion cited hearsay exception. firmly rooted requirements. satisfy the Williamson cases, be ex- the evidence must Williamson, 600-01, 114 512 U.S. at cluded, showing par- absent a at least (Fed.R.Evid.804(b)(3) ad- allows of trustworthi- guarantees ticulаrized statements). self-inculpatory mission of ness. during a his activities Moore discussed Id. at S.Ct. 2531. them almost defini- robbery, rendering In addition to the self-inculpatory. tion above, the Ohio As mentioned constituting a declaration *5 that the statement of statements concluded Court (and thereby falling against because interest non-testifying proper witness hearsay 'to the firmly hearsay firmly exception ex- “within a rooted rooted it fell rule), guar- support belief particularized factors also our ception” and showed indicia bore “sufficient antees of trustworthiness. statement petitioner’s that reliability” of to ensure roоted respect “firmly to the With not vio- Clause were Confrontation hearsay exception” question, petitioner his lated: had received Miranda Court has points out that that his warnings; allegation there is no that to decide issue. explicitly declined and, coerced; he did not statement was States, 594, v. United 512 U.S. Williamson exchange in favor- make-his statement (1994) 605, 476 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 114 Accordingly, we able treatment. conclude (“we hearsay whether the need not decide right to petitioner’s that Sixth Amendment for declarations interest exception witnesses was violat- confront adverse Clause ‘firmly rooted’ Confrontation by of Moore’s ed the admission statement. court ruled purposes”).1 Since the district case, however, this court has held in this B. Error Harmless hearsay exception that for statements alternative, any In the we hold that firmly interest against penal constitutes in error the admission statement of exception purpоses Confron argues Petitioner that issue is harmless. v. analysis. See Neuman tation Clause be apply court should the “harmless this (6th 315, Rivers, Cir. 125 F.3d 319-320 doubt” standard of re yond reasonable 1997).2 that one this court panel Given of by Chapman v. view enunciated of may published decision not overrule Califor 18, 24, 824, nia, 17 87 S.Ct. see, 386 U.S. e.g., v. panеl, another United States (6th (1967), 510, of “sub- L.Ed.2d instead Washington, 127 F.3d 517 Cir. 705 case, recently in instant Neuman involved 2. As 1. We note that the 804(b)(3). may argument in a case well counterpart oral that to Fed. R. Evid heard Lilly Virginia, question. Neuman, v. this resolve we observed: we find "[I]f In - U.S. -, 443, 142 L.Ed.2d 398 rulings court’s satisfied the federal the state Because, certiorari). (1998) (grant as еx rule, certainly pass they constitutional almost holding today infra, on plained we base our Neuman, ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍n. 1. 125 F.3d 319 muster.” ground any ad error in the alternative mitting harm Moore's statement constituted error, we elected not to await less have opinion Lilly. an in issuance of

995 injurious effect” standard of that he left in stantial and Moore’s car. Given these Abrahamson, 619, 638, facts, any v. 507 U.S. error was Brecht harmless. 1710, 113 S.Ct. III. petitioner, the former stan

According appropriate dard is when the federal dis reasons, For the foregoing the denial of the first court to review for trict court is petition is affirmed. Lockhart, error. See v. Orndorff GILMAN, (8th Cir.1993). Judge, Circuit 1426, concurring. 998 F.2d 1430 majority rejected Omdorff, of circuits have I agree majority’s conclusion See, Smith, e.g., Sherman v. 89 however. analysis the harmless error set forth (4th Cir.1996) F.3d 1141 CBrecht Abramson, 619, 638, in Brecht v. all applies pro standard federal habeas ceedings); Davis v. Executive Director to the case. Under that Corrеctions,

Dep’t 100 F.3d 772 n. standard, error committed trial (10th Cir.1996) (same); Horsley v. Ala in admitting court Moore’s bama, (11th 1492 n. 11 Cir. entirety I was harmless. therefore concur 1995) (“Brecht all rule reaches to almost the result reached the majority. cases”); Tyson Trigg, habeas federal however, separately, I write express Cir.1995) (7th (federаl F.3d 446-47 my belief that the trial court erred when it corpus apply habeas courts should admitted Moore’s entire statement if Kotteakos standard even state courts police, admitting only por- instead of those analysis). have not conducted a Chapman tions of the statement that were self-incul- аppears While this circuit not to have States, patory. Williamson v. United issue, weighed explicitly on the we re- *6 cently applied Brecht error anal- harmless (1994), the Supreme Court ysis to a challenge Confrontation Clause defined the term “statement” Rule the fact that it despite appear doеs not 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence court engaged harmless single to mean “a declaration or remark” Schotten, analysis. error Norris rather than “a report or narrative.” See (6th Cir.1998). We now id. The cautioned against explicitly adopt position taken wholesale admission confessions that are majority of our sister circuits and hold partially self-inculpatory: the harmless error standard announced person making The fact that a Brecht even if a federal habeas broadly self-inculpatory confession does court is the first to review not make more credible the confеssion’s error. non-self-inculpatory parts. One ways most effective to lie is to mix false- standard, Under the Brecht even if truth, especially hood with truth that argument we assume for the sake of particularly ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍persuasive seems because of use of Moore’s statement er constituted self-inculpatory nаture. ror, hold that not have a we error did 599-600, 114 injurious “harmful or effect” on the funda Id. at S.Ct. 2431. The Court 804(b)(3) mental fairness of trial. held that not allow the gov As the Rule does out, ernment other evidence corrob points non-self-inculpatory admission of state gener orates the conclusions drawn from Moore’s ments mаde the context of a narrative, ally inculpatory statement. A witness who lived close to because “the the store testified that she saw two males fact that a statement is collateral to a self- vehicle; says nothing at all laughing running inculpatory to Moore’s asked, you reliability.” Moore then “Hоw much did about the collateral statement’s 600-01, get?” Petitioner admitted that he drove to 2431. Trial See id. the store with Treadwell and Moore and courts must thus determine the admissibil- a narra remark within separate

ity of each

tive. See id case, attempted

In the robbery from blame for primary

shift He Treadwell. stat-

himself to Gilliam from him and plans their they kept

ed that robbery until

that he did not learn the extent that happened. it To

after had attempts assign blame

such statement fully it was neither robbery, under nor reliable

against Moore’s interest Illinois,

Lee v. (“[A] code- 90 L.Ed.2d unre- presumptively

fendant’s confession is detailing the de- passages

liable as culpability or because

fendant’s conduct product passages may well be

those or spread desire to shift

the codefendant’s favor, himself,

blame, or di- curry avenge another.”). opinion attention to Our

vert per- construed to

should therefore not be a narrative

mit wholesale admission of it contains discrete state-

simply because pe- the declarant’s

ments that are

nal interest. KEY, Plaintiff-Appellee,

David G. Advocacy

Michigan Protection *7 Intervenor-Appellee, Service, Incorporated,

v

. GRAYSON, Warden, Trusty

Henry Divi (SMT); Gary

sion, Prison Ga Jackson

bry, Michigan Chairperson, Parole McGinnis, Director,

Board; Kenneth Corrections, Department

Michigan

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 98-1471. Appeals,

United States Court

Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 1999. 9, 1999.

Decided June Rehearing

Rehearing Suggestion July

En Banc Denied

Case Details

Case Name: Edward Gilliam v. Betty Mitchell, Warden
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 9, 1999
Citation: 179 F.3d 990
Docket Number: 97-3426
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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