Edward A. Crapo, in his capacity as Alachua County Property Appraiser v. Academy for Five Element Acupuncture, Inc., a Florida Non-Profit CorporationEdward A. Crapo, in his capacity as Alachua County Property Appraiser v. Academy for Five Element Acupuncture, Inc., a Florida Non-Profit Corporation
PER CURIAM.
Alachua County Property Appraiser Edward A. Crapo appeals a circuit court decision awarding the Academy for Five Element Acupuncture, Inc. an educational property tax exemption under section 196.198, Florida Statutes. On the merits, Property Appraiser Crapo argues that the Academy does not qualify for the exemption because it is not an “educational institution” as defined in section 196.012(5)—and we agree. Procedurally, the Academy raises a tipsy-coachman argument1 urging us to affirm the circuit court’s ruling because an earlier Value Adjustment Board decision favoring the Academy was preclusive under the administrative
I. Facts
The Academy operates a not-for-profit private post-secondary school in downtown Gainesville that teaches and trains students in acupuncture, health sciences, and herbal studies. For years, while located in Broward County, the Academy received an educational tax exemption on its property. But when it moved to Gainesville in 2008 and applied for the same exemption, Property Appraiser Crapo denied it. He asserted that the Academy was not an “educational institution” under the tax code and did not qualify for the property tax exemption. The Academy petitioned the Alachua County VAB to resolve the dispute, and a special magistrate heard the case. The special magistrate concluded, with substantial hesitation, that the Academy qualified as an educational institution under
The Academy received the educational exemption on its Alachua County property from 2008 through 2013. In 2014, Property Appraiser Crapo again raised the education exemption issue. He issued a notice to the Academy disapproving its exemption for failing to meet the definition of an educational institution. The Academy responded by again petitioning the VAB. The VAB upheld the tax exemption, the same result as in 2008. This time, however, Property Appraiser Crapo filed suit in circuit court for de-novo determination of the issue. See
In addition to deciding the tax exemption issue, the circuit court considered the Academy’s alternative administrative-finality argument. The Academy argued that Property Appraiser Crapo was prohibited from litigating the tax exemption issue because the underlying facts had not changed, and he lost the same issue before the VAB in 2008. But the circuit court rejected the Academy’s decisional-finality argument under the theory that each tax year stands on its own.
Property Appraiser Crapo then appealed the property tax exemption issue to this Court, and the Academy cross-appealed on the administrative-finality issue. A three-judge panel affirmed the trial court’s final judgment for the Academy based on administrative finality, holding that Property Appraiser Crapo could not revisit or challenge the Academy’s tax exemption any more after the VAB’s 2008 decision. The panel opinion did not reach the merits of Property Appraiser Crapo’s argument against the Academy’s tax exemption. Property Appraiser Crapo then filed a motion for rehearing en banc, which we granted. See
II. Merits: The Exemption
Real property in Florida is annually assessed and subject to an ad valorem tax unless an exemption applies. Art. VII, § 4, Fla. Const.;
“Educational institution” means a federal, state, parochial, church, or private school, college, or university conducting regular classes and courses of study required for eligibility to certification by, accreditation to, or membership in the State Department of Education of Florida, Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, or the Florida Council of Independent Schools . . . .
The parties disagree about whether the Academy falls within the
In this case, no one disputes that the Academy is a state-licensed private post-secondary school that grants certificates and degrees in acupuncture, Chinese herbal studies, and health science. But Property Appraiser Crapo argues that the Academy is not entitled to the exemption because it is not credentialed by, and does not offer classes or courses as required for credentialing by, one of the three entities identified in
We cannot read
Colleges under the jurisdiction of the Commission for Independent Education shall apply to the commission. Colleges that are not under the jurisdiction of the commission shall apply to the Department of Education.
In addition to having different school-approval regimes, we recognize that Florida law grants authority to the Commission independent from the Department,
In light of these statutes, we agree with Property Appraiser Crapo that the Commission’s licensure is not the same as the Department’s certification within the meaning of the tax-exemption statute. On the record presented, we cannot conclude that the Academy’s programs satisfy the Department’s certification requirements under
III. Procedure: Administrative Finality
The Academy’s alternative argument is that Property Appraiser Crapo was barred from revisiting the tax exemption issue after he lost the same issue before the VAB in 2008, and did not raise the issue in a circuit court proceeding. This argument requires us to pull together a complex constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and factual framework to decide an important issue that is deceptively simple to state: Does administrative finality attach to VAB decisions that are not subsequently litigated in circuit court?2
Given the unique context of ad valorem taxation and exemptions, we must agree with Property Appraiser Crapo that administrative finality does not attach to VAB decisions. To achieve preclusive finality of a tax ruling requires either going
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
This analysis requires an understanding of the laws and rules establishing and governing the office of property appraiser and its authority over tax exemptions, VABs and their authority and processes, circuit court jurisdiction and standards for review of tax questions, and the oft-repeated maxim in tax law that “each year stands on its own.” We address these topics in turn.
(1) Property Appraisers and Exemptions
Each Florida county has a property appraiser, who is an elected and independent constitutional officer charged with determining whether real property situated within the county is subject to ad valorem taxation; and if so, valuing the property and assessing tax on it. Art. VIII, § 1(d), Fla. Const.4 Each property appraiser also has authority to determine whether property is entitled to a tax exemption.
A property appraiser denying an initial or renewal application must notify the applicant, who then can choose any or all from among three options to challenge the denial: request an informal conference with the property appraiser under
Property appraisers also have the statutory right to file suit in circuit court after a VAB rules against them.
(2) VABs
Each Florida county has its own VAB, the members of which are two members of the county’s governing body, one member of the school board, and two citizen members—one homestead property owner and one commercial business owner.
The VAB has specific authority to hear disputes involving exemptions.
While it is tempting to try to analogize VAB decisions to a variety of other non-judicial processes, it is important to respect the differences between them.6 The
Florida Statutes.
A VAB is also not a local governing body like a city or county commission. It does not promulgate ordinances, determine and regulate local land use, or otherwise govern a locale. See Broward Cty. v. G.B.V. Int’l, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2001) (illustrating county commission function of regulating land use subject to limited and deferential court review); Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995) (recognizing right of judicial review of local administrative action of evicting tenant from public property, under increasingly narrow standards at each step of review); City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982) (noting right to review but explaining narrow scope of review of civil service board decision on employee termination). A VAB merely serves to informally resolve tax disputes or attempt to do so, and because of the de novo standard that applies in circuit court and the circuit court’s original, exclusive jurisdiction, VAB decisions have no weight whatsoever in circuit court litigation. See
(3) Circuit Court Jurisdiction
Two important concepts apply to circuit court adjudication of tax disputes: exclusivity and de novo review. The Florida Constitution gives circuit courts “exclusive original jurisdiction . . . in all cases involving legality of any tax assessment or toll” unless the Legislature changes that by general law. Art. V, § 20(c)(3), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). Far from having been changed by general law, this requirement remains codified at
Regardless of the prior history of a dispute, review in circuit court is de novo: “The circuit court proceeding shall be de novo, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the action.”
Thus, although proceedings in circuit court after earlier informal attempts at dispute resolution are sometimes called “appeals,” a VAB decision is not “appealable” in the formal sense of an appeal as a review proceeding. Crossings, 991 So. 2d at 801 n.6 (“While this process is referred to as an ‘appeal’ of the board’s decision, actions brought in the circuit court pursuant to
value and is owed no deference; the property appraiser’s decision is reviewed de novo.
(4) “Each year stands on its own.”
The general maxim of “each year stands on its own” is foundational to the understanding of tax law, and has been extended to the context of tax exemptions and not merely valuations. Page v. City of Fernandina Beach, 714 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“The taxable status of property is determined on January 1 of each year. See
This year-standing-alone concept reflects the nature of taxation and the annual taxation process established in the Florida Statutes. Property owners seeking tax exemptions must apply annually, and failure to file “shall constitute a waiver of the exemption privilege for that year.”
The corollary to the maxim that “each tax year stands on its own” is that no taxpayer has a vested right to a tax exemption. Sowell, 192 So. 3d at 30-31 (relying in part on the statutory procedures for tax exemptions as evidencing the absence of a vested right to an exemption); see also City of Largo v. AHF-Bay Fund, LLC, 215 So. 3d 10, 14-15 (Fla. 2017) (noting nonprofit exemption statute requires taxpayer to take affirmative steps to request exemption on an annual basis; the exemption is not automatic and can be waived); Spencer Estates of Fla., LLC v. Havill, 125 So. 3d 795, 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (affirming circuit court’s refusal to entertain taxpayer’s attempt to punish property appraiser for failing to grant exemption in 2009 and 2010, where pending case determining taxpayer’s entitlement to exemption involved only tax year 2008; “[e]ach [tax] year stands on its own”); Davis v. Macedonia Housing Auth., 641 So. 2d 131, 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (expressly rejecting trial court’s ruling that taxpayer was to be granted charitable tax exemption for future years “absent a material change in applicable law or a material change in Plaintiff’s status or operation,” because exemption can be waived and entitlement to exemption must be affirmatively demonstrated annually).
B. Analysis
This unique and detailed legal framework brings us to agree with Property Appraiser Crapo: administrative finality does not attach to a VAB decision that is not subsequently adjudicated in circuit court. Chief among the legal principles driving this result are the status of Florida’s property appraisers as elected, independent constitutional officers; the exclusive original jurisdiction of circuit court in tax assessment matters under the constitution and
The dissent seems to argue that the Legislature’s creation and regulation of VABs, and the role given them, at least does not preclude the possibility that VAB decisions have administrative finality effect. See Fla. Export Tobacco Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 510 So. 2d 936, 955 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 519 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1987). In Export Tobacco, this Court held that the statutory authorization of tax refund remedies before the Comptroller or in
The dissent also argues that it is unfair not to give administrative-finality effect to VAB decisions because it forces taxpayers to defend their requests for exemptions year after year even if they think their property and its ownership and use have not changed from previous years when exemptions were granted. This argument is misplaced for several reasons. First, as a threshold factor, this argument overlooks that the statutory and regulatory framework mandates a year-at-a-time process. Even if an exemption is granted, and re-application waived in favor of an automatic renewal, it is only subject to the appraiser’s statutory right to require a new or updated application. No one goes into this with an absolute “right” to avoid interacting with the property appraiser for more than a year.
Second, the nature of the dispute here was, and is, a threshold legal question—the proper interpretation of the educational exemption statute. Even if a tax-exemption statute does not change, there remains the possibility of differing interpretations of it over time as a body of law develops on it. This is especially true for a narrowly-applicable tax-exemption statute such as the one at issue here. One would not expect hordes of lawsuits generating reams of precedent on every arcane tax exemption, and indeed judicial precedent can be entirely lacking. A property appraiser’s initial interpretation of an exemption statute may lie alone and untested until some precedent is created on the issue, or until a change of professional judgment—or a change of property appraiser—occurs. In either event, the property appraiser has not only the right but the duty to advance and apply the interpretation deemed legally correct at the time. A new office-holder should not be bound by erroneous positions taken by a predecessor and not adopted by an Article-V court. Our disposition of the Academy’s licensing issue is a perfect example: it turns out Property Appraiser Crapo’s professional judgment to deny this exemption was correct.
Third, the Academy’s argument is one-sided, claiming a right to revisit VAB decisions upon a change in taxpayer facts but not upon a change in circumstances on the property appraiser side. But a change on the taxpayer side of the equation cannot be the only route into circuit court. We can envision several circumstances under which a property appraiser may choose to litigate an issue that was not
Finally, even putting aside the practical point that it is highly unlikely any elected property appraiser would “force” the same taxpayer to dispute an exemption ruling year after year, the statutes even-handedly provide taxpayers as well as property appraisers the means to obtain finality: file suit in circuit court. Taxpayers are free to try for a favorable ruling informally and then go to court if necessary, but also can go directly to circuit court. In either approach, taxpayers have available and within their control a clear path for obtaining finality.
In the unique context of ad valorem taxation, which by constitution, statute, and rule operates on a year-at-a-time cycle and mandates de-novo review in a circuit court having original and exclusive jurisdiction, we reject the Academy’s administrative-finality argument, and reverse the circuit court’s judgment.
REVERSED.
RAY, C.J., and WOLF, LEWIS, ROBERTS, ROWE, BILBREY, KELSEY, WINOKUR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
OSTERHAUS, J., concurs in part in an opinion in which B.L. THOMAS, J., joins.
MAKAR, J., dissents in an opinion in which WETHERELL and JAY, JJ., join.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under
OSTERHAUS, J., concurring in part.
I concur in the Court’s per curiam opinion, except for the part about administrative finality. I don’t see the need to decide in broad strokes whether Value Adjustment Board decisions merit decisional finality because, regardless of the answer to this issue, the Academy’s tipsy-coachman argument loses. See Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship v. Nantucket Enters., 211 So. 3d 42, 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (avoiding adjudication of a first impression issue where the underlying evidence failed to support the argument). Administrative finality doesn’t apply where the facts have materially changed. Here, even if administrative finality applies to VAB exemption decisions, the 2008 decision did not fit the new facts and changed conditions relied upon by the Academy to prove its case for the 2014 and 2015 tax-year exemptions. For this reason, the circuit court and VAB did not err by declining to apply decisional finality.
The Florida Supreme Court has warned courts and administrative agencies to apply
This case involved new facts, new circumstances, and additional submissions, as well as an uber-equivocal exemption decision in 2008. Even the VAB itself refused to follow its own 2008 decision in this case. And it’s not hard to see why. “Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1309 (2015) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979)). In the 2008 case, the VAB relied completely upon the Special Magistrate’s recommendation, which barely reached a conclusion on the Academy’s exemption after reviewing the law and evidence. The Special Magistrate granted the exemption because it considered the statute “ambiguous and very difficult to comprehend”:
2. The undersigned has read this statute again and again to try to understand its meaning. The statute appears to be unclear. There is no case law or other information which the undersigned could find which clarifies the statute or provides any assistance with its interpretation.
. . . .
6. The Commission for Independent Education issued the Petitioner an annual license. . . .
7. This certification appears to allow the Petitioner to come within the meaning of “educational institution” as set forth in the statute. This would allow it to obtain an educational tax exemption.
8. This issue needs to be addressed by the Legislature to provide clarity. Reviewing this issue by reading all the statutes which are involved would seem to suggest that the Petitioner should be qualified as an educational institution and receive the appropriate tax exemption. . . . Taking all the above into consideration the undersigned is going to recommend that the petition be granted because the statute is ambiguous and very difficult to comprehend.
(Emphasis added.) This result is exactly the opposite of how tax exemption issues are supposed to be decided. See Nat’l Ctr. for Construction Educ. & Research Ltd., Corp. v. Crapo, 248 So. 3d 1256, 1257-58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Sowell, 192 So. 3d at 30) (requiring tax exemptions to be strictly construed, with ambiguities resolved against the claimed exemption). The 2008 VAB, in turn, checked a box on the 2008 “Final Decision” form indicating that it “considered and adopts all the special magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law (attached).”
With such a vacillating 2008 order, it is not surprising that in 2014, the VAB put no stock in its own prior order. It declined the Academy’s invitation to decide the 2014 and 2015 tax-year issues based on the 2008 decision, giving “no weight to the recommended decision of the VAB special magistrate from 2008, nor to the fact that the exemption was granted in that instance.” It chose instead to make the exemption decision for tax years 2014 and 2015 based on the current evidence. And
In addition to the decisional deficiencies in the 2008 order, the case record in this case for tax years 2014 and 2015 contained new and different evidence. To begin with, the 2014-15 evidence included a new parcel that was not part of the 2008 case. According to the Academy’s summary judgment evidence, it purchased an adjacent property in late 2014, that it claimed to be mostly used for educational purposes (part was leased to a third party for purposes not identified in the record). The Academy sought for an educational exemption to be applied to this property too, according
to the ratio of its educational use for the first time in this litigation. The question of whether this property qualified for the educational exemption was not part of the 2008 case. And administrative finality does not apply where there are new facts and changed conditions. Thomson, 511 So. 2d at 991. Each case must stand on its own.
The Academy also offered new exhibits and affidavits attesting to its ongoing educational work on the properties. Whereas the Special Magistrate’s 2008 decision hinged on the Academy possessing a “certification appear[ing] to allow the Petitioner to come within the meaning of ‘educational institution,’” the Academy put “voluminous” evidence into the 2014-2015 record of this case, as the Special Magistrate recognized. An affidavit from the Academy’s Executive Director gave up-to-date information regarding educational programs offered on-site, numbers of students, descriptions of faculty and property, etc., with supporting exhibits. The Executive Director’s affidavit also addressed state approval for the Academy’s new bachelor’s degree program: “On January 8, 2014, the Florida Department of Education Commission for Independent Education approved the Academy’s request for a bachelor’s degree program in Health Science.“ And it submitted other post-2008 exhibits, including: an application and documentation submitted to the Commission in 2014; its Renewal of Accreditation from ACAOM (2011); an approval letter from the United States Department of Education (2015); and a state Department of Revenue Consumer’s Certificate of Exemption (2013). This evidence was key to bolstering the Academy’s case for the 2014 and 2015 exemptions because of the statutory importance of showing that it conducted “regular classes and courses.”
For his part, Property Appraiser Crapo disputed the efficacy of this evidence in the circuit court:
It is the Defendant’s burden to establish that they conduct regular classes and courses of study “required for eligibility to certification by . . . the State Department of Education of Florida . . .”. (DOE)
§ 196.012(5), Fla. Stat. . Davis v. Macedonia Hous. Auth., 641 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The Defendant has never tendered any
evidence or rule of the DOE establishing the required regular classes or courses. . . .
And contrary to the dissent’s view, I don’t see a stipulation from the Property Appraiser in the record below or read the briefs to say that everything material remained static from 2008 to 2014. Nor did the circuit court make such a finding. The record shows that the parties contested
For these reasons, because of the equivocal 2008 decision and the existence of new facts, changed conditions, and post-2008 evidentiary submissions, and especially in view of the Florida Supreme Court’s admonition to exercise “great caution” in applying decisional finality in administrative cases, I see no error in the decisions of the
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MAKAR, J., dissenting.
Florida’s sixty-seven value adjustment boards, which issue formal written rulings in hundreds of property tax disputes annually after notice, evidentiary hearings, and many other due process protections, are quasi-judicial tribunals to which principles of finality and preclusion apply. For this reason, a property appraiser who fails to challenge a tax exemption previously
boards’ quasi-judicial jurisdiction over property tax matters and that its jurisdiction is concurrent with the circuit court, meaning that its rulings are entitled to finality and preclusive effect. If that were not the case, and circuit courts continued post-1972 to be the only constitutionally permissible fora to adjudicate property tax
Moreover, the vesting of circuit courts with “
3.
Next, Crapo relies on the general tenet that each tax year’s assessment “must stand or fall on its own validity” without reference to prior years, a principle that exists primarily due to the
fluidity of rapidly changing circumstances that affect the factual and legal bases for the value of property underlying an
But nothing changed factually or legally as to the Academy’s exemption, rendering this general tenet inapplicable. The doctrine of res judicata is applied with caution, particularly in zoning and permitting cases, because facts and circumstances are often not stagnant and subject to change. Thomson, 511 So. 2d at 991. But that caution does not apply in this case: Crapo admits that nothing at all has changed. Expanding the already broad authority of property appraisers to allow repetitive and vexatious administrative challenges to previously granted tax exemptions serves no cognizable purpose where the factual and legal underpinnings of an exemption remain unchanged. Doing so amounts to an impermissible second attempt to deny a previously granted exemption. Holiday Inn, 678 So. 2d at 529-30.
Plus, it cannot be that every tax year stands or falls on its own validity in all cases because, as Crapo concedes, res judicata applies to all adverse circuit court rulings including those not appealed. By his admission, if Crapo fails to appeal an adverse circuit court ruling granting a tax exemption, he is precluded from challenging the same exemption in future tax years absent changed circumstances. By extension, because the general tenet (i.e., “every tax year stands or falls on its own”) is inapplicable
where a circuit court has ruled on the matter and no appeal is taken, it is likewise inapplicable where a value adjustment board has ruled on the matter and no appeal is taken. B & B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1305. In short, the general tenet does not trump core principles of finality and preclusion.
Likewise, the preclusive effect of an adverse ruling by a circuit court does not depend on why a property appraiser chose to not pursue an appeal. A property appraiser’s choice to not appeal an adverse ruling may be due to litigation costs, budgeting issues, economic conditions, policy choices, or other strategic reasons, none of which affect the adverse ruling’s preclusive effect: the unappealed circuit court ruling controls and principles of res judicata apply. Again, by extension, the preclusive effect of an adverse ruling by a value adjustment board does not depend on the reasons a property appraiser may have harbored in choosing not to appeal; the unappealed ruling controls and principles of res judicate apply.
4.
Crapo also points to an agricultural exemption statute, which addresses the unique problems associated with assessing agricultural lands. He notes that subsection 3(e) of that statute establishes a form of issue preclusion as to classification decisions by value adjustment boards:
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) [which requires an annual classification of agricultural/non-agricultural lands], land that has received an agricultural classification from the value adjustment board or a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to this section is entitled to receive such classification in any subsequent year until such agricultural use of the land is abandoned or discontinued, the land is diverted to a nonagricultural use, or the land is reclassified as nonagricultural pursuant to subsection (4).
Overlooked is that nothing in subsection 3(e) suggests a legislative intent to displace the well-established principle that res judicata applies to quasi-judicial bodies. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 501 U.S. at 108 (common law principles of preclusion apply absent legislative intent to the contrary). The default presumption, that finality and preclusion apply to quasi-judicial judgments, can be overcome only upon an express or implied legislative intent to the contrary. Id. at 110 (concluding that intent of federal age discrimination statute was to not give preclusive effect to judicially unreviewed state administrative findings in federal courts).
Rather than displacing or undermining preclusion principles, subsection 3(e) complements the common law preclusive effect of quasi-judicial decisions by making it more difficult to overcome a prior classification decision, requiring proof that an agricultural use was abandoned, discontinued, diverted, or reclassified due to changed circumstances. Subsection 3(e) does not jettison ordinary preclusion principles, it strengthens them as to agricultural exemptions, which are fraught with subjectivity. As explained in Tilton v. Gardner, subsection 3(e) constrains a property appraiser “to presume that land is still being used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes and must limit the inquiry to what may have changed.” 52 So. 3d 771, 777-78 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (emphasis added).
If nothing has materially changed, then the property appraiser is powerless to deny an agricultural classification despite a belief that the current agricultural use is not bona fide. On the other hand, if the land use has materially changed, then the property appraiser is free to consider the “bona fide” factors of
Id. at 778 (emphasis added). By raising the evidentiary bar to overcome the presumption of correctness of a prior agricultural classification decision, subsection 3(e) supplements common law preclusion principles as they apply to quasi-judicial decisions; the legislature can supplement jurisdictional principles without displacing all others. Stated differently, the legislative purpose of giving heightened preclusive effect to prior agricultural classification decisions cannot logically eliminate the finality and preclusive effect of all other property tax decisions.
Moreover, Crapo ignores that subsection 3(e) includes within its ambit both value adjustment boards and circuit court decisions, i.e., “courts of competent jurisdiction.” Crapo claims that subsection 3(e) is a limited legislative grant of preclusive effect for rulings on agricultural exemptions by value adjustment boards, whose other decisions lack precedential effect. By Crapo’s logic, preclusive effect would be lacking as to judicial decisions of circuit courts in property tax matters, not just quasi-judicial ones. Why else would “courts of competent jurisdiction” be included? The reason is that subsection 3(e) supplements existing principles of res judicata by strengthening those applicable to agricultural exemptions; its language and purpose reinforce, rather than diminish, the Academy’s position.
5.
Finally, the policy argument is made that taxes are different and that property
changed that would alter a value adjustment board’s (or circuit court’s) ruling. Crapo contends that he can annually deny an exemption for no reason, merely hoping for a different outcome on identical facts/law, which embodies the definition of arbitrary action. Agrico Chem. Co. v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 365 So. 2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (“An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or despotic.”). Not to mention the expense of vexation litigation and the depletion of judicial (and quasi-judicial) resources of such a deny-exemption-every-year-though-nothing’s-changed-hoping-for-different-outcome policy. Having failed to pursue available appellate relief in 2008, Crapo is precluded from undertaking duplicative and vexatious actions against the Academy absent changed circumstances, which he admits don’t exist.
Conclusion
Just as “a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered” on an identical issue previously raised, a prevailing litigant deserves finality after a victory fairly achieved where nothing’s changed. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 501 U.S. at 107. Res judicata principles require that the circuit court accord the Alachua County Value Adjustment Board’s 2008 decision with preclusive effect, entitling the Academy to the educational exemption it has held for almost twenty-five years. Because the res judicata issue decides only this specific case, it is unnecessary and unwise to go further by overturning the education exemption, which will surely cause confusion and distress among the hundreds of educational institutions statewide who have justifiably relied on it. Far better to point out the exemption’s shortcomings, leave it at that, and allow for a legislative fix, if deemed warranted.
* * *
Postscript
Judicial baby-splitting is a well-worn strategy for finding common ground in a contentious appellate case. But keep in mind that Solomon didn’t actually cut the baby in two; his threat to do so exposed the true mother (i.e., the one who was willing to let the
child live though with the wrong mother). While Judge Osterhaus’s attempt to split the baby is commendable, it exposes two truths.
First, his analysis necessarily recognizes that principles of finality and preclusion apply to value adjustment boards. Deciding that the “changed circumstances” exception to res judicata applies in this case means that finality and preclusion principles apply to value adjustment boards generally. To conclude otherwise would be like saying no judicial taking occurred without acknowledging a judicial takings theory. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 718 (2010) (“But embracing a
Second, his analysis actually requires splitting the baby because it raises and adjudicates in the first instance on appeal a factually intense legal issue no party has raised during the entire course of this litigation: whether the “changed circumstances” exception applies. The reason it was never raised is that the parties agreed that nothing relevant had changed between the 2008 ruling and the 2014 ruling. Crapo repeatedly admitted that nothing factually or legally has changed: his counsel told the three-judge panel and the en banc court that nothing factually or legally had changed25, and that property appraisers can perpetually challenge value adjustment board rulings even if the facts and law are unchanged.26 We heard this case en banc on the stipulated premise of no changed circumstances.
Judge: Just to make clear, your position is that the property appraiser in whatever jurisdiction can come back year after year after year and challenge [the
exemption] again and again and again even though nothing’s changed.
Counsel: Hypothetically my answer to the question is yes. I don’t know of any rule or law over the years that says no.
As such, raising and adjudicating a fact-intense issue sua sponte on appeal that Crapo disavows, that was not addressed or factually developed below, and that has not been brought to the parties’ attention comes across as appellate prestidigitation. Giving vitality to an unpreserved, undeveloped, and unbriefed issue is particularly unwise because the Academy has had no opportunity to address and rebut the issue; and, more importantly, the trial court never developed the facts that it might deem relevant for a “changed circumstances” exception (because Crapo did not claim them). Affirming on an unraised, unbriefed, unargued, factually undeveloped, and immaterial issue is not, in truth, a fitting way to decide a case of exceptional importance.
APPENDIX
12D-9.001. Taxpayer Rights in Value Adjustment Board Proceedings.
(1) Taxpayers are granted specific rights by Florida law concerning value adjustment board procedures.
(2) These rights include:
(a) The right to be notified of the assessment of each taxable item of property in accordance with the notice provisions set out in Florida Statutes for notices of proposed property taxes;
(b) The right to request an informal conference with the property appraiser regarding the correctness of the assessment or to petition for administrative or judicial review of property assessments. An informal conference with the property appraiser is not a prerequisite to filing a petition for administrative review or an action for judicial review;
(c) The right to file a petition on a form provided by the county that is substantially the same as the form prescribed by the department or to file a petition on the form provided by the department for this purpose;
(d) The right to state on the petition the approximate time anticipated by the
(e) The right to authorize another person to file a board petition on the taxpayer‘s property assessment;
(f) The right, regardless of whether the petitioner initiates the evidence exchange, to receive from the property appraiser a copy of the current property record card containing information relevant to the computation of the current assessment, with confidential information redacted. This includes the right to receive such property record card when the property appraiser receives the petition from the board clerk, at which time the property appraiser will either send the property record card to the petitioner or notify the petitioner how to obtain it online;
(g) The right to be sent prior notice of the date for the hearing of the taxpayer‘s petition by the value adjustment board and the right to the hearing within a reasonable time of the scheduled hearing;
(h) The right to reschedule a hearing a single time for good cause, as described in this chapter;
(i) The right to be notified of the date of certification of the county’s tax rolls;
(j) The right to represent himself or herself or to be represented by another person who is authorized by the taxpayer to represent the taxpayer before the board;
(k) The right, in counties that use special magistrates, to a hearing conducted by a qualified special magistrate appointed and scheduled for hearings in a manner in which the board, board attorney, and board clerk do not consider any assessment reductions recommended by any special magistrate in the current year or in any previous year;
(l) The right to have evidence presented and considered at a public hearing or at a time when the petitioner has been given reasonable notice;
(m) The right to have witnesses sworn and to cross-examine the witnesses;
(n) The right to be issued a timely written decision within 20 calendar days of the last day the board is in session pursuant to Section 194.034, F.S., by the value adjustment board containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and reasons for upholding
or overturning the determination of the property appraiser or tax collector;
(o) The right to advertised notice of all board actions, including appropriate narrative and column descriptions, in brief and nontechnical language;
(p) The right to bring an action in circuit court to appeal a value adjustment board valuation decision or decision to disapprove a classification, exemption, portability assessment difference transfer, or to deny a tax deferral or to impose a tax penalty;
(q) The right to have federal tax information, ad valorem tax returns, social security numbers, all financial records produced by the taxpayer and other confidential taxpayer information, kept confidential; and,
(r) The right to limiting the property appraiser’s access to a taxpayer‘s records to only those instances in which it is determined that such records are necessary to determine either the classification or the value of taxable non-homestead property.
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John C. Dent, Jr., and Jennifer A. McClain of Dent & McClain, Chartered, Sarasota, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Paul A. Donnelly and Jung Yoon of Donnelly + Gross, Gainesville, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Matthew H. Mears, General Counsel, and James L. Richmond, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae The Department of Education, Commission for Independent Education.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Timothy E. Dennis, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae State of Florida, Department of Revenue.
Benjamin K. Phipps of Phipps & Howell, Tallahassee; Michael D. Minton of Dean Mead Minton & Zwemer, Fort Pierce; Gerald J. Donnini of Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A., Fort Lauderdale; and Mitchell I. Horowitz of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Tampa, for Amicus Curiae The Tax Section of the Florida Bar.
Loren E. Levy and Stuart W. Smith of The Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae The Property Appraisers’ Association of Florida, Inc.