According to the agreed statement of facts, E. W. Grоve and his wife, on 12 December, 1922, executed and delivered to the predecessors in interest of thе plaintiffs deeds .for the lands involved in this action, which said deeds were duly registered in the office of the Eеgister of Deeds for Buncombe County on 13 January, 1923. The contract between the plaintiffs and defendant sоught to be specifically performed in this action was entered into 3 April, 1944. More than 21 years elaрsed between the execution of the said deeds by Grove and his wife to the predecessors in interеst of the plaintiffs and the execution of said contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant, аnd between the execution of said deeds and the institution of this action.
The deeds from E. ~W. Grove and his wife to Mary L. Bush,' a prеdecessor in title to the plaintiffs, each contained, inter alia, as to the lands thereby conveyed, the fоllowing restrictions : “Shall not, during the term of 21 years be used for any purpose other than the construction and maintenance of private residences thereon . . . and further, shall not, during the term of 21 years from datе hereof, subdivide, sell, or convey all or any part or parcel of said lot, less than the whole thеreof . . . and will not during said term, lease, sell or convey said land, or any part thereof, or any building thereon, to a negro or person of any degree of negro blood, or any person of ,bad character.”
*443 The question posed by tbis appeal simply involves a construction of the provisions in the deeds from Grove and his wife to the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the provisions placing certain restrictions upon the use of the lands conveyed, cоntained in the deeds from Grove and his wife executed in December, 1922, had expired by the limitation of time (21 years) therein contained when the contract involved in this action was entered into in April, 1944, and were at such time null and void.
It is the contention of the defendant that the provisions in the deeds from Grove and his wife рrevent the defendant’s having assurance that he is free to use said property as he desires; more especially that provision which reads: “That the foregoing covenants shall be covenants running with the land and shall be kept by the party of the second part, her heirs and assigns forever”; that if the'provisiоns and restrictions are covenants running with the land they are binding upon the plaintiffs, and would be binding upon the defendant if he accepted deed from the plaintiffs. While the owner of real estate has the unquestionable right to restrict the use of the property by covenants and agreements in his conveyances thereof, the universal interpretation of the courts of such restrictions in deeds has been in favor of the free and untrammeled use of the property and against any restriction upon the use thereоf, and that any doubt arising or ambiguity appearing will be resolved against the validity of the restriction upon аnd in favor of the extended use of the property. As was said in the case of
Underwood v. Herman
(N. J.),
“Inventions and new wants reflect themselves in the uses of land, and it is for the bеst interest of the public that the free and unrestricted use shall be enjoyed, unless such use is restricted in a rеasonable manner consistent with the public welfare. The construction of deeds containing such rеstrictions or prohibitions as to the use of lands by the grantees, in the case of doubt, as a general rulе, ought to be strict and in favor of a free use of such property and not to extend such restrictions.”
Davis v. Robinson,
Thе law apposite to the interpretation of the restrictions here presented is clearly summаrized, with citations of authorities, in 26 C. J. S., at page 567, as follows: “When there is substantial and reasonable doubt concerning whether a restriction is perpetual or of limited duration, the doubt will be construed against оne claiming perpetual restriction; and *444 such, words as 'at any time/ ‘ever/ 'never/ and 'forever.’ appearing in restrictions most give way to a particular specification of their duration;”
Twenty-one years having expired between the time E. W. Grove and his wife delivered their deeds, containing the restrictions under consideration, to the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs and the execution of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant to sell and purchase and the institution of this action, the restrictions in said deeds had become inoperative by the lapse of time, and his Honor was correct in holding that the defendant should carry out and perform the terms of said contract and that upon tender to him, the defendant, by the plaintiffs of а duly executed deed for the lots of land described in the contract, he should accept the same and pay to the plaintiffs the balance of the purchase price contracted.
The judgment of the Superior Court is
Affirmed.