177 Iowa 389 | Iowa | 1916
Plaintiff was indicted by the grand jury of Huerfano County, Colorado, for the crime of murder. The indictment was in short form, as follows:
‘ ‘ That the defendant did then and there feloniously, wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and of (his) malice aforethought hill and murder one Pliny P. Lester, contrary to the form of the statute,” etc.
The indictment was in exact conformity with the statutes of Colorado. See Colorado Statutes of 1908, p. 577, Section 1956, reading as follows:
‘‘Sec. 349. All exceptions which go merely to the form of an indictment shall be made before trial, and no motion in arrest of judgment or writ of error shall be sustained for any matter not affecting the real merits of the offense charged in such indictment; no indictment shall be quashed for want of the words, ‘with force and arms,’ or of the occupation or place of residence of the accused, nor by the reason of the disqualification of any grand juror or grand jurors; and in any indictment for murder or manslaughter it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which or tho means by which the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient in every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder the deceased; and it shall be sufficient in every indictment for manslaughter to charge that the defendant did feloniously kill and slay the deceased. [G. S. § 926; L. ’79, p. 50, § 1, amending G. L. § 786, R. S. p. 236, § 180.] ”
It is also claimed that such a statute is in contravention of the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution and of the Constitutions of both states, and is unreasonable and arbitrary and should be so pronounced by this court. This statute has reference to procedure only, and to the form' of an indictment for murder. It is within the power of each state to regulate its own procedure, and a statute for this purpose must clearly offend against some constitutional provision before it will be declared void by the courts. Counsel have not pointed out any constitutional provision, either state or national, which . covers the point; but they do insist upon some generalities which they seem to think cover the case. ¥e find nothing upon which to base the argument. On the contrary, the Colorado court has sustained the statute against such an attack. Jordan v. People (Colo.), 36 Pac. 218, 220. See, also, Ryan v. People (Colo.), 114 Pac. 306; Andrews v. People (Colo.), 79 Pac. 1031; Cremar v. People (Colo.), 70 Pac. 415. The reasoning of the Colorado court is sound, and although not conclusive upon us, it is so persuasive that nothing need be added. It is there said:
“The statute, taking its origin in England, has been
We reach the conclusion that the trial court properly ' denied the writ, and the order must be and it is affirmed, and petitioner is ordered delivered to the defendant Miller as agent for the state of Colorado.