6 Neb. 265 | Neb. | 1877
The doctrine of a vendor’s lien appears, to have had its origin in the civil law, from which it was borrowed and became a part of the equity jurisprudence of England. Mackreth v. Symons, 15 Vesey, 327. By the
The principle upon which the lien is sustained is, that where a person has obtained the estate of another he ought not in conscience, as between them, be allowed to hold it without paying the full consideration therefor. Mackreth v. Symons, 15 Vesey, 340. Story’s Eq. Juris., 1219. The doctrine that the vendor, upon an absolute conveyance of land, where no security has been taken, has a lien upon the land sold for the unpaid purchase money is well established in England. And the decisions of her courts on that question have been followed in the supreme court of the United States, and in the courts of •' last resort of many of the states of the Union. The question is now presented to this court for the first time. It is our duty therefore to examine the grounds on which it rests, and the reasons assigned for its support, and see how far they are applicable to this state, under our laws.
Blackstone, after describing the principal kinds of deeds by which real estate might be conveyed in Eng. land, says: “ These are the principal species of deeds or matters m pais by which estates may be conveyed or at least affected. Among which the conveyances to uses
Section sixteen, chapter 61, Geni. Statutes, 875, provides that: “ All deeds, mortgages, and other instruments of writing, which are required to be recorded,
Section fifty, Genl. Stat. 881, provides that: “Every conveyance of real estate shall pass all the interest of the grcmtor therein, unless a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used.”
The obvious intention of the registry acts is to give notice to all persons who - may have occasion to ascertain whether there has been any prior incumbrance or conveyance of any real estate. And the notice given by the record is as effectual in law as-personal notice to the party to be affected by it. The policy of our law is to discourage secret liens, and to require all instruments affecting the title of real estate to be entered of record. The law thus places the means within the reach of every one desiring to purchase real estate of ascertaining the condition of its title.
What is a vendor’s lien? We are told that it is an equitable mortgage for the amount of purchase money of real estate remaining unpaid. But an equitable mortgage grows out of an agreement that a lien shall be created, while a vendor’s lien in a case like the one at bar arises, if at all, without a contract, and against the express terms of the deed. Neither is it in the nature of a trust. There is no agreement of any kind that the land shall he held as security for the payment of the purchase money. This is a case where credit was deliberately given, trusting to the solvency of the debtor, and notes, payable in the future, were received by the
In Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason, 192, Story, J., says: “ The lien of a vendor for the purchase money is the mere creature of a court of equity, which it moulds and fashions according to its own purposes. It is, in short, a right which has no existence until it is established by the decree of a court in the particular case, and is then made subservient to all the other equities between the parties.”
Blackstone says: “ Hard is the common law still subsisting, that land derived or descending to the heir shall not be liable for simple contract debts of the ancestor or devisor, although the money was laid out in pv/rchasing the wry landB Blackstone Com., Book III, 430.
This provision of the common law doubtless had great influence in leading the court of Chancery of England to adopt the doctrine of vendor’s lien from the civil law to prevent a failure of justice. But this doctrine can have no application in this state, where debts are a charge upon the lands of decedents, and where the estate descends or is devised subject'to such'debts.
¥e are clearly of opinion that the, doctrine of a vendor’s lien in a case like the one at bar is repugnant to our statutes in relation to real estate, and is therefore no part of our law. It follows from these views that the judgment of the district court must be reversed and the cause dismissed.
J ÜDGMENT ACCORDINGLY.