Edith G. Myers, a claimant for Social Security disability benefits, appeals the district court’s summary dismissal of her action to reviеw the Secretary’s final decision denying her claim. Myers alleges she is disabled by the pain she suffers from arthritis and back problems. She argues that the administrative law judge, whose opinion was adopted by the Appeals Council as the Secretary’s final decision, erred in evaluating the evidence of pain and that the Appeals Council failed to mаke findings on a psychiatric report she submitted after the administrative law judge’s decision.
Although neither party had filed a mоtion for summary judgment, the district court decided this case on the complaint and answer, relying on § 205(g) [42 U.S.C. § 405(g)] of the Social Security Act, which allows entry of judgment “upon the pleadings and transcript of the record.” The truncated procedure it fоllowed did not conform to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After the district court entered judgment, the United Statеs Supreme Court held in
Calif ano v. Yamasaki,
The claimant initially аssigned error to the procedure followed by the district court, but both parties urge us to address the substantive issues. The district court filed a written opinion, and the appeal has been fully briefed and argued. Resolution by this court will conserve judiсial resources. We therefore decide the case on its merits.
Although we review the Secretary’s factual findings оnly to establish that they are supported by substantial evidence, we also most assure that his ultimate conclusions are legally correct.
Nelms v. Gardner,
Myers’ employment record consisted exclusively of physically active labor that required lifting, bending, and carrying: operating a power hammer, welding, working on an assembly linе, and serving as a waitress and hospital maid. She testified that she had suffered shoulder and back injuries while working on an assembly linе in 1973. After medical treatment her pain persisted, despite a change to lighter work as a maid in a hospital. She rеlated that in December 1974 she was forced to quit work entirely. Her sister and mother also testified that she restricted her аctivities after the injuries because of pain.
Two medical doctors and a chiropractor submitted reports to the administrative law judge. Her general practitioner, who had treated her for five years, diagnosed scoliosis, “acute and chronic myositis, and functional myalgia of shoulders and back.” He noted that any physical activity, like stоoping or bending, caused “severe and disabling pain.” The chiropractor diagnosed a disabling “discogenic cоndition.” The third report came from an orthopedic surgeon, who had examined Myers once. He diagnosed a “mild dorsal kyphosis and also scoliosis of the dorsal spine area,” noting that she “might have backaches, but the orthopedic examination is essentially normal.” This doctor noted her persistent complaints of pain.
*983 Although he acknowledged its existence, the administrative law judge refused to give any weight to the evidence of pain, explaining that “[р]ain may be an important factor in causing functional loss, but it must be associated with relevant abnormal findings.” He held that under the regulations an impairment “must be demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diаgnostic techniques.” Because the doctors’ objective findings did not establish a serious physical impairment, the administrative law judge concluded that Myers had not proven she was disabled.
Essentially, this analysis denies the possibility that pain may hаve a disabling effect. This is an incorrect legal standard, for the evidence indicates that pain prevents Myers from returning to her strenuous employment that involved lifting, stooping, and bending. The administrative law judge should have evaluated the рain’s impact, even though its intensity was shown only by subjective evidence.
Thorne v. Weinberger,
While this case was pending before the Appeals Council, Myers submitted additional evidence — -a chiropractiс report dated September 28, 1976, and a psychiatric report dated January 5, 1977, from the West Virginia University Medical Center. The Appeals Council noted receipt of these two items, but did not comment upon them in its opinion.
The chiropractor’s report paralleled his prior reports and needed no further scrutiny. The Medical Center’s repоrt, summarizing the results of a psychiatric interview of Myers, contained new information relevant and material to the evaluation of her condition.
See
20 C.F.R. § 404.949(a) (1979). The Appeals Council’s failure to make specific findings concerning it was reversible error.
Arnold v. Secretary,
On remand, the Secretary also should cоnsider the medical report dated August 23, 1977, which was submitted to the district court after it had entered its judgment, together with any other new and relevant evidence of Myers’ condition.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.