Edith Bostwick v. Nancy BerryhillEdith Bostwick v. Nancy Berryhill
MEMORANDUM **
Plaintiff Raymond Alvandi appeals from the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian“) on Alvandi‘s claims that Experian violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA“),
We review de novo the district court‘s grant of summary judgment. Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004).
Liability under Alvandi‘s FCRA claims requires a prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Alvandi raises multiple theories as to why his Experian credit reports were inaccurate. To the extent Alvandi argues that his Experian credit reports were inaccurate because they reported a debt that he was not legally obligated to pay or a debt that contained charges not permitted by law, these challenges are insufficient to establish that the reports were inaccurate within the meaning of the FCRA. Id. at 892 (holding that FCRA claims against credit reporting agencies “are not the proper vehicle for collaterally attacking the legal validity of consumer debts“). To the extent Alvandi raises new theories as to why his Experian credit reports were inaccurate in response to Experian‘s summary judgment motion, and these theories were not pled in Alvandi‘s complaint, the Court concludes that these belated theories lack merit and are insufficient to defeat Experian‘s motion for summary judgment. See Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Simply put, summary judgment is not a procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings.“).
AFFIRMED.
Lawrence David Rohlfing, Attorney, Law Offices of Lawrence Rohlfing, Santa Fe Springs, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Thomas C. Stahl, Chief Counsel, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, Jeffrey Chen, Attorney, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, NGUYEN, Circuit Judge, and AMON,** District Judge.
MEMORANDUM ***
Edith Bostwick appeals the district court‘s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security‘s determination that she did not qualify for disability insurance benefits. At steps four and five of the sequential evaluation process, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ“) found that Bostwick could not perform her past work as a sales representative, but could perform other work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy and was therefore not disabled. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
1. The ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence before concluding that Bostwick had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. The ALJ gave specific reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Dr. Bronner‘s opinion because it is inconsistent with the opinions of the examining doctor, testifying medical expert, and two state medical consultants, as well as inconsistent with the record. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)
Substantial evidence also supported the ALJ‘s decision to credit the testimony of Dr. Jensen that Bostwick could perform light work, even with her limitations. Dr. Jensen‘s testimony comported with the objective medical evidence and with the opinions of the examining doctor and state medical consultants. Although Bostwick argues that the ALJ needed to address Dr. Jensen‘s off-the-record comment, an ALJ need not discuss every single piece of evidence. See Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “the ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence,” and the “ALJ is not required to discuss evidence that is neither significant nor probative“) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
2. The ALJ identified the specific testimony that he did not find credible: Bostwick‘s account of her limitations to the extent that her testimony was inconsistent with the ALJ‘s residual functional capacity assessment. Her testimony was inconsistent with the lack of evidence that she needed a hand-held assistive device to walk, see Social Security Ruling 96-9p, the extent of her daily activities, see Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2010), and the testimony and opinions of the medical experts, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002).
3. Remand is unnecessary to consider the new letter that Bostwick submitted to
AFFIRMED.