79 Neb. 347 | Neb. | 1907
John Dopke was seized of a life estate in a quarter section farm in Franklin county, which the defendant occupied as his tenant under a lease expiring March 1, 1905. In August, 1904, Dopke made an oral agreement to let the land to the defendant for a term of one year, to begin March 1, 1905; and, following this agreement, the defendant sowed a portion of the land to wheat, and prepared some additional ground for spring planting. In December, 1904, Dopke died. In March, 1905, the plaintiff, who was seized of the fee in the land in question, brought proceedings under the forcible entry and detainer statute to recover the possession thereof. The defendant claimed that by virtue of the oral agreement made in August, 1904, and by the fact of his solving the wheat, he was at the time of the commencement of this action entitled to the possession of the premises. The plaintiff requested the court to direct a verdict in his favor, which request was denied and the case submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict for the defendant; and from the judgment rendered upon such verdict the plaintiff appeals.
I. It is cleai’ that the lessee of a tenant for life is charged with notice of the extent of his landlord’s title, and that on the termination of the life estate, his estate also ends. Guthmann v. Vallery, 51 Neb. 824.
• 2. It is equally clear that, if the sublessee of a life tenant plants a crop before the death of his landlord, he is
It does not appear from the evidence whether there was a house, barn or other buildings upon the premises, nor how much land Avas sown to Avheat; but it is sufficiently disclosed that there was other land than that sown to Avheat, which the defendant purposed to plant to spring crops. The action of forcible entry and detainer being under our statute a purely possessory one, in Avhich no other question than the right of possession could be determined, it must necessarily folloAV that, if in this case the plaintiff had the right of possession, she Avas entitled to recover. The only reason urged by the defendant in his brief against the plaintiff’s right to possession is the planting of the crop during the life of John Dopke; and this, he argues, operated to extend the lease. We have
The trial judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion to direct a verdict, and we therefore recommend that the judgment of the district court be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing-opinion, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed.