218 Pa. Super. 157 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1971
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
This is one of nine appeals by various school districts from the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which reviewed the adjudications by the State Board of Education of a plan of school district reorganization for Allegheny County formulated by the Allegheny County Board of School Directors pursuant to the Pennsylvania School Reorganization Act of July 8,1968, P. L. , 24 P.S. §2400.1 (Act 150). All of these cases were argued before this Court on November 12, 1970, arid all appeals were affirmed by our per curiam orders of December 30, 1970.
That part of the plan submitted by the Allegheny County Board of School Directors to the State Board of Education which is involved in this case provided for Unit 38, comprised of the School Districts of the Boroughs of Swissvale and Braddock Hills, which since 1965 have operated as a jointure under the name of “Swissvale and Area Joint Schools”; and Unit 40, comprised of the School District of the Borough of Edge-wood, which has been an independent school district of long standing. Braddock Hills School District (Braddock Hills), appealed to the State Board, praying that Unit 40 be included within Unit 38. The State Board permitted Edgewood to intervene; a hearing was held at which both Edgewood and Braddock Hills offered testimony; and the State Board, after making findings of fact, affirmed the plan of the Allegheny County Board of School Directors. On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas by Braddock Hills, a hearing was held before the Honorable J. Frank McKenna, Jr., who heard additional testimony and ordered Unit 40 abolished and Edgewood to be included in Unit 38. This appeal by Edgewood followed.
There are legal and procedural issues involved in this case that were not fully developed in the other school appeals argued before us on November 12, 1970, primarily for the reason that this is the only case in which, having decided that the State Board of Education had erred in its adjudication of adopting the plan formulated by the Allegheny County Board of School Directors, the lower court exercised its own discretion, a power given it under the Pennsylvania School Reor
It is apparent in this case that the lower court interpreted Act 150 as giving the State Board far less a range of discretion in school reorganization than the State Board has been exercising in these cases. In that aspect this case requires our review. Additionally, Act 150 provides for a unique procedure for review of the State Board’s discretion. The act provides for preparation of a plan of organization of certain school districts in each County by the County Board of School Directors and its submission to the State Board of Education. Section 8 of Act 150 provides: “The State Board of Education shall review all plans and approve such plans as it deems wise in the best interests of the educational system of the Commonwealth. No plan of organization of administrative units shall be approved in which any proposed school district contains a pupil population of less than four thousand (4,000), unless when factors of topography, pupil population, community characteristics, transportation of pupils, use of existing school buildings, existing, administrative units, potential population changes and the capability of providing a comprehensive program of education are considered by the State Board of Education as requiring the approval of a plan of organization of administra
“The court, after hearing such additional testimony as the parties may wish to present and a consideration of the entire record, shall enter an order either affirming the plan as approved by the State Board of Education or an order making such amendments to the plan as the court, in its discretion, shall find necessary or advisable. The order of the court shall be a final order.”
Based upon the evidence in the record at the hearing before it, the State Board made findings of fact concerning both Unit 38 and Unit 40, significantly, as follows:
“2. Eor 1966-1967 the ADM [average daily pupil membership] for Unit 38 was 2,286 and the ADM for Unit 40 was 928. (County Plan)
“4. Both Units 38 and 40 offer full programs of instruction, kindergarten through grade twelve (County Plan).
“5. Approximately 85% of the Edgewood graduating class go on to college or degree granting institutions, whereas only 50% of the Swissvale graduates attend degree granting institutions. (N.T. 51 and 83)
“6. Edgewood offers a comprehensive program of quality education, K-12, providing for all its students individualized guidance and scheduling (N.T. 81-86, 140; Edgewood Exhibit 1).
*162 “9. The secondary program presently offered in Unit 38 is accredited by the Middle States Association. (N.T. 194).”
According to its findings, the State Board admitted that, neither Unit 38 nor Unit 40 approached the 4,000 figure for pupil attendance; however, it justified, the approval of both units on the basis that both units were capable of offering a comprehensive program of education. The lower court overruled the State Board on these findings for two reasons. First, the lower court found that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the findings that the units offered or were capable of offering a comprehensive program of quality education. Secondly, the lower court held that, even if the units did offer a comprehensive program of quality education, such a finding cannot justify the State Board’s approval of a unit containing less than 4,000 students. In so ruling the lower court stated, “Further, it has never, in any other case, been suggested that just because a district is presently offering a comprehensive plan, it should not be merged with other districts.
I disagree with the lower court on both of the. latter points. First, I believe that the record discloses ample evidence before the State Board on which can be sustained their findings that both units are capable
The complete or comprehensive education has been a subject of much controversy through the ages and remains undefined even today. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania has not defined it but has left it in the hands of the State Board, of Education. Under the mandate of Act 150, the State Board made an unsatisfactory attempt at definition by adopting on July 11, 1968, “Standards for Approval of Administrative Units,” pertinent excerpts from which follow.
“4. An administrative unit shall make available an educational program and educational opportunities to meet the varying needs, aptitudes, abilities, and interests of individual residing in the administrative unit.
“7.h. Capability of Providing a Comprehensive Program of Education. For purposes of reorganization planning, Capability of providing a comprehensive program of education’ shall mean: The ability to educate and train each child within his capacity to the extent demanded by the immediate requirements of his growth and his relationship to the strengthening of this Commonwealth and nation, and, shall include, but not be limited to, wealth per pupil, qualifications of professional staff, enrollment and diversification of curricula.” There is no contention by the parties that the elementary schools in these two units are not offering now or are incapable of offering all the educational subjects required by the State Board. Braddock Hills’ primary contention is that a combination of the two units will allow an offering of a greater variety of elective courses to all the high school students as well as more services to all students. Indeed, Dr. James S. Snoke, Assistant Superintendent of Allegheny County Schools, testifying in behalf of Braddock Hills, ap
Braddock Hills does not seriously contend in this case that Unit 38 does not offer a variety and quality of curricula and services equal to or exceeding those of Edgewood. And the record supports the finding of the State Board that both units are financially able to support their present system.
Secondly, I believe that it is irrelevant in this case that'the purpose of the General Assembly in enacting Act 150 may or'may not have been to achieve a unit with a pupil size of 4,000; and whether there is validity'in thé presumption that the larger the pupil size, the more capable is the district to offer quality education; is álso irrelevant. In spite of those alleged goals and principles, Act 150 permits the State Board to allow or to form units with less than 4,000 pupils where it' finds the capability of providing a comprehensive program of education; Act 150 reposes that amount of discretion in the State Board: It is my interpretation that the State Board, in exercising that discretion, has the right to ignore the fact that any one smaller unit may be:capable:of providing á comprehensive program of education and force it to merge with other units; but, on the other hand, it may also exercise its discretion to allow 'any one unit só capable to remain alone, as it did in this case.
The final issue in' this appeal is whether Act 150 empowers the lower court to' ignore the findings of the State Board and make its own findings, when it cannot be shown that the Board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or otherwise misapplied the law. I believe that the lower court was powerless to do so in this case. I do not interpret Act 150 to give the lower court the absolute right to consider the case de novo similar to the power this Court exercises in divorce appeals. Act 150 clearly provides that the State Board is first required to. adjudicate the matter; and more importantly, an appeal can be taken from its adjudication to the court of common pleas if the State Board’s action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other
Since the State Board’s findings were based on substantial evidence, the State Board properly applied the law thereto and properly exercised its discretion, and no further material evidence was offered upon which the lower court could exercise its independent discretion, I agree with Edgewood’s contention that the lower court was without legal justification to substitute its discretion for the State Board’s, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
Bellevue School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 702, 272 A. 2d 225 (1970); Braddock School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 702, 272 A. 2d 267 (1970); Coraopolis Borough School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 743, 272 A. 2d 231 (1970); East Pittsburgh School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 741, 272 A. 2d 215 (1970); Moon Schools Union School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 743, 272 A. 2d 206 (1970); Munhall School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 744, 272 A. 2d 253 (1970); Neville Township School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 743, 272 A. 2d 233 (1970); North Braddock School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 745, 272 A. 2d 220 (1970); West Homestead School District Appeal, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 749, 272 A. 2d 262 (1970).
I believe, on the contrary, that this issue was raised either directly or indirectly by a majority of the School Districts in their appeals to the lower court. Also see the record in the case of East Pittsburgh School District Appeal, supra, in which the issue was. directly raised on appeal to both the lower court and this Court.
Lead Opinion
Opinion
Order affirmed.