Edgerly v. . Bush

81 N.Y. 199 | NY | 1880

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] This is an action for the conversion of chattels. It is clear that if the plaintiff had the title to them, or the right to take immediate possession of them, the defendant exerted such dominion over them as was in law a conversion of them. It is also clear that the plaintiff had the title to the property by the laws of this State, and the right to the immediate possession of it.

The defendant must make his defense, if he may at all, upon a title got by Bromley from De Lisle, to which he has succeeded. De Lisle was a resident of Canada, and a trader dealing in articles like the property in contest, and had actual possession of this property there as the proprietor of it. Bromley bought it of him in good faith, gave value for it, and had not actual notice of the plaintiff's right to it. The plaintiff has never reimbursed to Bromley or to the defendant the price paid for it by Bromley, nor has he offered so to do.

We think that these facts make a title in Bromley that the law of Lower Canada would uphold in that jurisdiction. We deem it unnecessary to go into the detail of the interpretation. The question remaining is, which law is to prevail in determining this contest — that of Lower Canada, or that of this State?

We take note that the plaintiff, and Baker from whom the plaintiff got title, were residents of this State when the transfer was made between them; that it was a transfer of property which was then here, whence it was taken without the consent of the plaintiff; that the transfer was made by mutual consent, and was executed and valid here; that the consideration for the transfer existed and passed here; that the plaintiff and defendant were and are residents of this State; and that the forum in which they stand is here. Thus the law of the domicile, and the law of the then situs of the property, and the law of the forum in which the remedy is sought, all concur to sustain the right of the plaintiff. The law of the domicile of the owner of personal property, as a general rule, determines the validity of every transfer made of it by him. By that law, as it exists in this case, the plaintiff became the owner of this property before it was taken beyond its operation. By that law, too, an owner of property may not be divested of it without his consent, or by due process of law; plainly not by a dealing with it by others without his knowledge, assent, or procurement. Still, another State may make provision by statute in respect to personal property actually within its jurisdiction. Though a transfer of personal property, valid by the law of the domicile, is valid everywhere as a general principle, there is to be excepted that territory in which it is situated and where a different law has been set up, when it is necessary for the purpose of justice that the actual situs of the thing be examined. (Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139.) Yet the statutes of that land have no extra-territorial force propriovigore, though often permitted by comity to operate in another State for the promotion of justice, where neither the State nor its citizens will suffer any inconvenience from the application of them. The exercise of comity in admitting or restraining the application of the laws of another country must rest in sound judicial discretion, dictated by the circumstances of the case. (Per PARKER, Ch. J., Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 6.) It is plain that on no principle applicable to this case could the sale of the plaintiff's property by another having no authority from him, to his wrong indeed, be upheld, save that it was authorized by the statute of Lower Canada. So that the question is one entirely of the comity to be shown by the courts of this State to the enactments of another country. Those statutes not only enact the rule of market-overt as it prevails in general in England, but carry it further, and make, as in the city of London, every sale by a trader dealing in like articles as good as a sale at market-overt.

That rule does not obtain in this State. It has not been our policy to establish it. Our policy has been, and is, to protect the right of ownership, and to leave the buyer to take care that he gets a good title. It would be to the contravention of that policy, and to the inconvenience of our citizens, if we should give effect to these statutes of Lower Canada, to the divesting of titles to movables lawfully acquired and held by our general and statute law, without the assent or intervention, and against the will of the owner by our law. Notions of property are slight, when a bona fide purchase of stolen goods gives a good title against the original owner. (Per KENT, Ch. J., Wheelwright v.Depeyster, 1 Johns. 470.) We are not required to show comity to that extent; especially as it is to our citizens alone that we are administering justice.

There are judgments to the end that the law of the situs of the movable property will determine who is entitled to it, and the matter of comity is not taken into account. A notable one is Cammell v. Sewell, in the Exchequer Chamber (5 H. N. 728). But there the property had not been in England until after the sale in Norway, and had never been in the possession of the English owners. We doubt whether, in a case like this, where, after a title to property has been acquired by the law of the domicile of the vendor, and of the situs of the thing, and of the forum in which the parties stand, in a contest between citizens of the State of that forum, it has ever been adjudged that such title has been divested by the surreptitious removal of the thing into another State, and a sale of it there under different laws. There are decisions that it has not, however. (See Taylor v. Boardman, 25 Vt. 581; Martin v. Hill, 12 Barb. 631; French v. Hall, 9 N.H. 137; Langworthy v.Little, 12 Cush. 109.) It is sought to distinguish these cases from that in hand; but they went upon a principle that is not inapplicable here. In them, as here, a right to movable property had been acquired in one State in a mode efficient thereto by its laws. The property had been taken into another State where that mode was not sufficient by its law to create a right. But the right acquired by that mode was upheld. In all the cases the property was taken away from under the laws which gave the right, and placed under the operation of laws that denied the right. We perceive no difference in those cases from this that we have, save that in those a creditor was seeking to recover his debt out of the property, in invitum the right thus acquired. Here there is a sale of the property between third parties despite the right. In those it was sought to take away the right by a public judicial sale. In this it is urged that the right has been destroyed by a private sale. By the laws of those other States the creditors would have succeeded. So here the third parties would succeed by the law of Lower Canada. But in those cases the law of the State where the right was acquired was recognized, and force given to it in another State and under different law. Why should it not be in this case?

Such cases as Cranch v. McLachlin (4 Johns. 34), and TheHelena (4 Rob. Ad. 3), do not conflict. In them there were in the foreign country legal proceedings in rem, or analogous thereto, so that the question was of respect for the judicial proceedings of another country. The case of Greenwood v. Curtis (6 Mass. 358) recognized the principles upon which our judgment proceeds, but held that the facts did not call for the application of them.

The order of the General Term should be reversed, and judgment on report of the referee be affirmed.

All concur, except RAPALLO, J., not voting.

Order reversed and judgment affirmed.